• Tag Archives money
  • Yes, a Currency Devaluation Is Very Much Like a Tax


    Britax is a global corporation with a manufacturing hub in Fort Mill, South Carolina where it employs 300. It is there that the company creates car seats for children. Unknown is how long it will continue to.

    While it’s surely risky to draw immediate correlation, James Politi of the Financial Times recently reported that Britax is thinking about relocating. The impetus for relocation is the tariffs the Trump administration has levied on foreign goods.

    It seems the car seat business is a low margin affair, and beginning in 2018, Britax suddenly faced a 10 percent tariff on the textiles it imports to cover its seats. The tax moved up to 25 percent after a breakdown of trade talks this past May, and then this month a new, 15 percent tariff on metallic inputs such as harnesses and buckles was imposed. The taxes levied on imported inputs Britax relies on to complete its car seats has put it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis car-seat makers located outside the U.S. According to Politi, foreign producers of the seats enjoy a tariff exemption care of the “U.S. trade representative for some, but not all, safety products.”

    It’s all a reminder of the basic truth that tariffs are a tax, plain and simple. Not only do they harm the businesses they’re naively assumed to protect by shielding them from market realities, they’re paid for by other businesses reliant on imported inputs; meaning all businesses.T

    Figure that something as prosaic as the pencil is a consequence of global cooperation, so imagine by extension just how much a car seat is the end result of production taking place around the world. In this case, the Trump administration falsely “protects” textile and metal companies located in the U.S., and the bill for the protection is sent to companies like Britax. The tax paid by the latter has shrunk its already slim margins even more.

    Interesting about tariffs is that they bring about agreement among people with differing ideologies. President Trump’s NEC head Larry Kudlow strongly believes that tariffs are a tax, as does Democratic presidential hopeful, and frequent Trump critic, Pete Buttigieg. Tariffs raise the cost of doing business, which means they’re a tax on earnings. It’s all very simple.

    Which is why the quietude about President Trump’s dollar stance is so strange. As some know, Trump would like a weaker dollar. He incorrectly believes a debased greenback would make U.S. industry more competitive. Except that it wouldn’t, and one reason that a falling dollar wouldn’t enhance the health of U.S. corporations is because currency devaluation is 100 percent a tax.

    Tariffs raise the cost of importing simply because a 10, 15 or 25 percent tariff is a tax above and beyond the price of the imported good in question. When Trump imposes tariffs that are paid for by importers, the U.S. Treasury ultimately collects the proceeds of same.

    With devaluation, much the same is at work. In this case, devaluation of the dollar logically raises the cost of importing foreign goods. It also raises domestic prices, but that’s another piece of commentary for another day. For now, it should be said that money is an agreement about value. If the agreement is shrunk such that it means something different, or is exchangeable for less, it’s only logical that the cost of importing foreign inputs is going to rise unless foreign producers are willing to accept haircuts for what they send our way.

    And what about the U.S. Treasury. While it doesn’t collect the “proceeds” of dollar devaluation in the way that it does the false fruits of tariffs, the result is the same. A dollar is yet again an agreement about value. If the exchangeable value of the dollar is shrunk, so shrinks what Treasury owes.

    Devaluation is most certainly a tax, and it has a very similar impact on corporations as a tariff. Not only does it raise the cost of purchasing the inputs necessary to produce market goods, it at the same time shrinks company earnings. If the dollar is devalued, so must shrink the value of the dollars a corporation takes in.

    For those who think a dollar is a dollar is a dollar, think again. No one earns dollars, as much as they earn what dollars can be exchanged for. There’s a big difference. If the value of the dollar decreases, so must we decrease the value of a dollar earned by a business.

    The previous paragraph helps explain why periods of dollar devaluation (think the 1970s, think the 2000s) correlate with greatly subdued stock-market returns. If the market value of a company is a speculation by investors about all the dollars a company will earn in the future, it’s only logical that a devaluation of the currency unit that investors use to attach a value to corporations is going to negatively impact share prices.

    Taking the previous point further, companies logically grow via investment; be it in people, processes, and nearly always both. Investors, as readers of this column well know, are buying future dollar returns when they put money to work. Devaluation logically shrinks the exchangeable value of those returns. Again, it’s a tax.

    Which leads to the final question of this piece: why do honest members of left and right readily acknowledge the tax that is the tariff, all the while ignoring the tax that is devaluation? In each instance policymakers are shrinking the value of individual and corporate work, all the while shrinking what individuals and corporations can get in return for their work.

    Yet Trump’s tariffs bring forth all manner of reasonable (and sometimes unreasonable) hand wringing, while his calls for a shrunken dollar happen mostly without comment. This despite them being the same. Yes, a tariff is a tax. And so is devaluation. Why don’t policy types and candidates for public office speak up about the other devaluation?

    This article is republished with permission from Forbes. 


    John Tamny

    John Tamny is Director of the Center for Economic Freedom at FreedomWorks, a senior economic adviser to Toreador Research & Trading, and editor of RealClearMarkets.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.


  • Good Money, Bad Money—And How Bitcoin Fits In


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    Let us start with talking about bad money, by which I mean the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, the Chinese renminbi, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and basically all official currencies.

    They all represent fiat money. The term fiat is derived from the Latin word fiat and means “so be it.” Fiat money is “coercive money,” or “money forced upon the people.”

    There are three major characteristics of fiat money:

    1. The state (or its agent, the central bank) has a monopoly on money production.
    2. Fiat money is produced through bank credit expansion; it is literally created out of thin air.
    3. Fiat money is intrinsically valueless. It is just brightly colored paper and intangible bits and bytes that can be produced at any time and in any amount deemed politically expedient.

    Just in passing, I would like to let you know that fiat money has not come into this world naturally. States have worked long and hard to replace commodity money in the form of gold and silver with their own fiat money.

    The final blow to commodity money came on August 15, 1971: US President Richard Nixon announced that the US dollar would no longer be convertible into gold. This very decision (which I like to call the greatest monetary expropriation in modern history) effectively put the world on a fiat money regime.

    Against this backdrop, it may not come as a surprise that fiat money suffers from economic and ethical deficiencies.

    First, fiat money is inflationary. Its buying power dwindles over time, and history has shown that this entropy is almost as irreversible as gravity.

    Second, fiat money enriches a chosen few at the expense of many others. The first receivers to get a hold of the new money benefit to the detriment of latecomers.

    Third, fiat money fosters speculative bubbles and capital misallocations that culminate in crises. This is why economies boom and bust.

    Fourth, fiat money lures states, banks, consumers, and firms into the pitfall trap of excessive debt. Sooner or later, borrowers find themselves in a deep hole with no way out.

    Fifth, fiat money feeds big government. And as the state expands and sprouts like weeds in an untended garden, this outgrowth strangles—even destroys—individual freedom and liberty.

    I have spoken enough about bad money. Let us talk about good money.

    What is good money? To answer this question, we just have to think about how a free market in money works.

    Here, people are free to decide which kind of money they would like to use, and they also have the freedom to cater to the needs of fellow people seeking good money.

    The outcome of a free market in money will be good money simply because people will demand, out of self-interest, good money—not bad money. This is actually what sound monetary theory would tell us. Money has emerged from a commodity and spontaneously from the free the market: no state or no central bank was needed in the process.

    To qualify as good money, the “thing” or good in question must have specific properties. It must be scarce, homogeneous, divisible, durable, transportable, mintable, etc. Gold and silver meet these requirements par excellence, and this is why they were chosen as the universally accepted means of payment whenever people were free to choose.

    How does Bitcoin fit in?

    I would argue that from a monetary theory point of view, Bitcoin qualifies as a good money candidate. It has emerged from the free market through the voluntary actions of all participants involved, respecting individual freedom and private property rights.

    I would also argue that Bitcoin complies with the regression theorem and thus provides the crypto unit with a necessary requirement to potentially become money. The key question, therefore, is whether Bitcoin will stand a chance in challenging and outcompeting official fiat currencies or gold money. Let us think about this in further detail.

    One exciting feature of Bitcoin is that its quantity is limited to 21 million units. This hard cap means that at some point, the quantity of Bitcoin will not grow any further. If the quantity of money is constant and the economy expands, prices for goods and services will fall.

    Would that be a problem for money users or the economy? No, it would not. Firms can still be successful if prices decline. Their profits result from the spread between revenues and costs. If goods prices fall (in nominal terms), firms just have to make sure that revenues keep exceeding costs.

    Consumers would be pleased to see the prices of goods fall. Their money becomes more valuable. They can reduce their cash balances and increase spending.

    But wait: would consumers not refrain from buying goods if and when prices can be expected to fall over time? Imagine a car costs $50,000 today and only $40,000 in a year. If I need the car right now (because my old one has broken down), I would have to buy a new one right away, I would not and could not wait.

    The general answer is this: People make their decision to buy now or later based on discounted marginal utility. The marginal utility of buying the car for $50,000 ranks lower on people’s value scale than paying only $40,000. But the car available for $40,000 is not for sale now but in a year. When it comes to decision-making, people will, therefore, discount the marginal utility of purchasing the good for $40,000 in a year using their individual time preference rate.

    They will then compare the result with the marginal utility of buying the good now for $50,000. If the discounted marginal utility of buying the car for $40,000 in a year is lower than the marginal utility of buying at $50,000 now, people buy now. If it is higher, they will postpone their purchase.

    The important point is: There is no reason to fear that the economy will come to a standstill if and when the prices of goods decline over time. Money that has a limited quantity, such as Bitcoin, would work just fine!

    Let me stress something fundamentally important here: The quantity of money in an economy does not have to grow to make increases in production and employment possible. The sole function of money is exchange, and so a rise in its quantity does not make an economy richer; it does not bring about any social benefit.

    All an increase in the quantity of money does is lower the purchasing power of one money unit compared to a situation in which the quantity of money has not been increased.

    We just heard that in a Bitcoin money regime, we would have to expect price deflation. What would that do to the credit market? As the prices of goods fall, holding money becomes more profitable.

    If, for instance, prices fall by three percent per year, the purchasing power of money increases by three percent. In this case, I would not exchange my money for a T-Bill that yields only, say, two percent per year.

    To make me part with my money, a borrower would have to offer me a return on the investment that is higher than the increase in the purchasing power of money. Borrowers would be careful taking up debt because they know that in times of stress, they will not be bailed out by an inflationary monetary policy.

    Therefore, it is likely that in an economy where there is a constant quantity of money, the credit market will remain relatively small—especially compared to the debt pyramid that comes with today’s fiat money regime.

    At the same time, firms retaining earnings and issuing equity for funding would be much more commonplace. People would invest their life savings in company stock rather than debt (be it issued by banks, governments, or corporations).

    What about the market interest rate in a world in which price deflation occurs? We know that in a free market, the nominal interest rate cannot drop below zero. This is easy to understand: if I lend $100 to you for one year at, say, minus 5 percent per annum, you would have to return $95 in one year.

    Of course, any lender (who is not out of his mind) would politely reject this kind of deal. They would be better off just holding on to cash and would not lend at a negative interest rate. I cannot go into detail here but will simply say that in a free money market, the market clearing interest rate is determined by people’s time preference. Time preference is always and everywhere positive, and so is its manifestation, the originary interest rate. In other words: the interest rate would not and cannot fall to zero, let alone into negative territory.

    So far, I have argued that the limited quantity of Bitcoin does not stand in the way of the crypto unit becoming money. However, some aspects appear to be disadvantageous for Bitcoin’s aspirations to become money.

    From the current state of technical capabilities, distributed ledger technology is unlikely to be put to widespread use in retail and large value payments. Currently, there are around 360.000 Bitcoin transactions per day, and given its current configuration, the Bitcoin network is presumably running at full capacity. This is not enough. For instance, in Germany alone there is an average of around 75 million transactions per business day!

    What is more, Bitcoin transaction costs vary widely. For instance, in July 2016, it cost around $.08 for a transaction mined on the block (data recorded in files) in the next 10 minutes. In December 2017, it cost more than $37. Currently, the price is around $4. High and volatile transaction costs might discourage the use of Bitcoin from the viewpoint of many people and institutions.

    Another aspect is finality. Financial transactions require a point in time from which they can be taken as valid. However, not all DLT (distributed ledger transaction) consensus mechanisms offer this. The “proof of work” protocol, for instance, merely provides a probabilistic finality (due to the creation of forks).

    What about safety? Progress has been made in Bitcoin safekeeping (think of, for instance, cold storage wallets). However, vulnerabilities remain, as scams and thefts at even the largest and most sophisticated crypto exchanges prove.

    A central issue in this context is where to store your private cryptographic keys. They need to be stored offline (so they cannot be hacked), and the place of storage must the secured (to prevent theft) and immune to electromagnetic fields (otherwise the stored codes could be destroyed).

    For professional investors, this is a challenge. They might need a bunker storage solution, but this could turn out to be quite inconvenient. How does one get access to private keys quickly and at low costs?

    Bitcoin was developed for peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange without any intermediation. But would people really want a monetary and financial system without any middleman? For some payments, you may not need intermediation (e.g. to buy a book).

    For others, you may wish to involve an intermediary. Imagine you mistakenly send 100 Bitcoins instead of just one. How would you get it back? Who is going to help you out in a P2P world without any intermediation? The answer is nobody, and nobody would help you if your wallet got hacked.

    What about more sophisticated financial transactions like borrowing and lending? It is hard to imagine that this can be done in an anonymous and trustless regime as envisaged by the Bitcoin protocol. Interestingly enough, many Bitcoin owners seem to keep their coins on crypto exchanges, which control the private keys of the Bitcoins. Obviously, people trust some intermediaries in the Bitcoin space, actively demanding the services supplied by these “middlemen.”

    This observation points us toward a rather important but unfortunately often neglected issue: To support economic progress and a sophisticated monetary sphere, a currency must be compatible with some form of financial intermediation. Otherwise, it will be difficult to compete effectively wit