• Tag Archives economics
  • Our Quasi-Soviet Fiscal Policy

    Our Quasi-Soviet Fiscal Policy

    “It’s like deja vu all over again.”

    Do Yogi Berra‘s words of wisdom apply to the “new” trillion dollar “public infrastructure” program? The last program, still unpaid, focused on “shovel-ready” projects but somehow missed most potholes. Meanwhile, private companies are prepared to spend $100’s of billions on a new fiber optic internet super highway.

    Is the current proposed public spending program more likely to pay off for taxpayers than the last one?

    Historical Precedent


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    When the hammer and sickle flag was lowered for the last time in Moscow on December 25, 1991, the international finance agencies created in Bretton Woods in 1944, led by British economist John Maynard Keynes and the Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury Harry Dexter White, found a new mission.

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a “bank” according to Keynes, provided the financial infrastructure for international trade. The World Bank (WB), or a “fund” according to Keynes, was promoted by, known communist and accused Russian spy, Undersecretary White to help reconstruct European infrastructure, but primarily Russia’s infrastructure, in the wake of WW II destruction.

    The IMF lost its raison d’être in 1971 after President Nixon eliminated dollar convertibility into gold, ending the Bretton Woods function. Russia turned down World Bank membership, so the Bank turned to lending for infrastructure projects in the “underdeveloped” nations, which by 1991 faced overwhelming political obstacles.

    Assisting in the conversion of formerly centrally planned economies into capitalist market economies became the finance agencies’ new post-Soviet mission. However, few people had much of an idea of how to accomplish this. It had never been done before, and the IMF and WB were particularly ill-equipped as their charter limited them to lending only to governments. They were essentially statist organizations with little experience with (or sympathy for) competitive private markets (which helps explain why they remain chronically underdeveloped).

    Russia’s capital stock was in poor condition, but not for lack of funding. The saving rate was about six times that of western democracies (albeit by force), but the return to state-allocated investments was decidedly negative, as continues to be the case in China (where the resulting credit bubble may soon burst).

    Zero Productivity, Raises for Everyone

    In early 1992, I found myself on a WB mission. The intention was to help create housing markets in Russia, where the housing stock was poorly located and maintained, that quickly morphed into a government plan to build housing for returning Afghan war veterans (who were armed and potentially dangerous, hence an important political constituency).

    The first problem we faced was in obtaining building materials. In particular, there was a serious shortage of sheet rock for interior walls. My interview with the “President” of one of the few production organizations, a recently “self-privatized” state enterprise, went something like this:

    Me: So, how is it going?

    President: Spectacular, I gave all the employees a 100 percent raise.

    Me: But there are no workers.

    President: That is because that stupid West German machine still isn’t working.

    Me: Why not? They are usually of the highest quality.

    President: It needed oil!

    Me: So?

    President: Who can afford oil when labor costs so much?

    When I returned six months later, I got the same story; wages up another 100 percent but still no oil–and no sheet rock.

    Failing Infrastructure

    Crazy, right, but it can’t happen here? Well, if the purpose of government spending is to “create high paying jobs” then the sheetrock firm was a smashing political success.

    State and local governments in the U.S. already do that all too well. “It is routine now for firefighters to be up over $200,000, $300,000,” said Mark Bucher, chief executive officer of the California Policy Center, a public policy think tank. That doesn’t count pension costs, which exceed wage costs for many municipalities in spite of the fact that, several years ago, unfunded pension liabilities were estimated at $3.0 trillion (and I would double that).

    The growing public sector wage bill doesn’t produce or maintain public infrastructure. For decades the American Society of Civil Engineers has been warning that deferred maintenance creates ever greater problems. By 2013 the national grade was D+, and is expected to decline with this year’s quadrennial report. The situation isn’t much different at the federal level, where Labor costs are artificially lowered by sub-contracting.

    Nobody likes a flunking infrastructure grade. But the problem isn’t insufficient total state and local taxation: total annual tax revenue is about $3.4 trillion. Nor is it a problem of financing, i.e. the inability to issue general obligation or revenue bonds: there is about $3 trillion in outstanding debt, about two-thirds of which is revenue bonds. Fixing the infrastructure shouldn’t be about “creating American jobs:” Soviet state enterprises could do that.

    We have a principal-agent problem like that of the Soviet factory manager. State and local employees have undue control of their governments. Taxpayers simply don’t have enough control over their political agents to prevent the diversion of public funds.

    Fiscal federalism, a system resembling the Soviet distribution of funds from the center to the oblasts (and on to state-owned enterprises), is intended to further reduce or eliminate public accountability and control.

    If at First You Don’t Succeed

    Past initiatives for “public improvements,” which go back to the Nation’s founding, have flooded the swamp. Democrats since the Clinton Administration have advocated for a national infrastructure bank, another government-sponsored enterprise, that is more like the WB in its practice of lending and accountability (or lack thereof). Now political advocates demand direct control that favors their labor and Wall Street constituents.

    President Trump plans to provide accountability for new infrastructure projects with public-private partnerships and opaque tax subsidies. That is not unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s model of public risk for private profits that subsidized the subprime lending bubble. To ensure that infrastructure investments are “good deals” for the public, the government should avoid bailing out states that are filling the swamp, stick to purely federal infrastructure improvements and calculate the ROI to taxpayers as a business, or better still, finance it themselves.


    Kevin Villani

    Kevin Villani, chief economist at Freddie Mac from 1982 to 1985, is a principal of University Financial Associates. He has held senior government positions, has been affiliated with nine universities, and served as CFO and director of several companies. He recently published Occupy Pennsylvania Avenue on the political origins of the sub-prime lending bubble and aftermath.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.


  • There is No Such Thing as Trickle-Down Economics

    There is No Such Thing as Trickle-Down Economics

    Critics of liberalism and the market economy have made a long-standing habit of inventing terms we would never use to describe ourselves. The most common of these is “neo-liberal” or “neo-liberalism,” which appears to mean whatever the critics wish it to mean to describe ideas they don’t like. To the extent the terms have clear definitions, they certainly don’t align with the actual views of defenders of markets and liberal society.

    Trickle Down

    Economists have never used that term to describe their views. Another related term is “trickle-down economics.” People who argue for tax cuts, less government spending, and more freedom for people to produce and trade what they think is valuable are often accused of supporting something called “trickle-down economics.” It’s hard to pin down exactly what that term means, but it seems to be something like the following: “those free market folks believe that if you give tax cuts or subsidies to rich people, the wealth they acquire will (somehow) ‘trickle down’ to the poor.”

    The problem with this term is that, as far as I know, no economist has ever used that term to describe their own views. Critics of the market should take up the challenge of finding an economist who argues something like “giving things to group A is a good idea because they will then trickle down to group B.” I submit they will fail in finding one because such a person does not exist. Plus, as Thomas Sowell has pointed out, the whole argument is silly: why not just give whatever the things are to group B directly and eliminate the middleman?

    There’s no economic argument that claims that policies that themselves only benefit the wealthy directly will somehow “trickle down” to the poor. Transferring wealth to the rich, or even tax cuts that only apply to them, are not policies that are going to benefit the poor, or certainly not in any notable way. Defenders of markets are certainly not going to support direct transfers or subsidies to the rich in any case. That’s precisely the sort of crony capitalism that true liberals reject.

    General Prosperity

    Government doesn’t “give” us tax refunds; it simply refrains from taking more of what we created.What the critics will find, if they choose to look, is many economists who argue that allowing everyone to pursue all the opportunities they can in the marketplace, with the minimal level of taxation and regulation, will create generalized prosperity. The value of cutting taxes is not just cutting them for higher income groups, but for everyone. Letting everyone keep more of the value they create through exchange means that everyone has more incentive to create such value in the first place, whether it’s through the ownership of capital or finding new uses for one’s labor.

    In addition, those of us who support such policies don’t want to “give” anything to anyone, whether rich or poor. When people talk about tax cuts as “giving” something to someone, they implicitly start from the premise that everything belongs to government and we are only able to keep some for ourselves by its indulgence of us.

    Aside from the fact that rights are not what government gives to us but what we already have that it should, in theory, protect, the only reason government has any revenue in the first place is because it was taken through taxation from those in the private sector who created it. Government doesn’t “give” us tax refunds; it simply refrains from taking more of what we created through mutually beneficial exchange in the first place.

    Grain of Truth

    The key is not transferring funds to the currently rich, but ensuring the most competitive economic environment possibleHowever, there is one small grain of truth in the “trickle down” idea. One of the key reasons that modern Westerners, including poor ones, live so much better today than at any point in the past is because our ability to combine our labor with more and better capital has driven up our wages and driven down the cost of goods and services. The accumulation of capital by some does contribute to the enrichment of others as that capital makes workers’ labor more productive and thus more valuable.

    That historical truth is not a justification for directly subsidizing the current owners of capital. Contrary to what thinkers like Thomas Piketty appear to believe, merely possessing capital does not ensure a flow of income. It is not ownership of capital per se that benefits others, but the ability to deploy capital in ways that create value for consumers. That is why reducing the tax and regulatory burden on everyone is so important: anyone can come with new ways to create value and potentially enrich themselves and others in the process.

    The key is not transferring funds to the currently rich, but ensuring the most competitive economic environment possible so that those with the better ideas can put them into practice. The current owners of capital should not be able to lock in their position by using the political process to enrich themselves by legislation that specifically benefits themselves.

    As Hayek observed in his defense of competition:

    [I]t is by no means regularly the established entrepreneur, the man in charge of the existing plant, who will discover what is the best method [for efficient production]. The force which in a competitive society brings about the reduction of price to the lowest cost at which the quantity salable at that cost can be produced is the opportunity for anybody who knows a cheaper method to come in at his own risk, and to attract customers by underbidding the other producers.

    Today’s owners of capital do not have all of the answers, and the way to ensure the best result for everyone, especially the least well off, is to give everyone the freedom to enter and exit the market and to have the maximum incentive to do so by enabling them to keep the fruits of their successful value creation.

    Wealth Creation First

    The way to help the poor is to maximize our freedom to create and keep value through the unhampered market economy. No serious economist believes the lives of the poor are improved by wealth being transferred to the rich and then “trickling down” to the poor. What economics does tell us is that wealth has to be created first and foremost. You can’t transfer something that does not exist. Wealth creation is most likely to happen when people are able to innovate without permission and put their ideas to the market test.

    This process of market-tested permissionless innovation will indeed make some people rich, and it will make some rich people poor. What it also does is to drive the creation of value across entire societies, raising the standard of living for all of their inhabitants.

    The momentary snapshots of rich and poor are not the categories that matter for sound economic policy. Wealth does not “trickle down” from rich to poor. It is created by all of us when we develop new ideas, skills, and products as either workers or owners of capital.

    The way to help the poor is to maximize our freedom to create and keep value through the unhampered market economy. The answer is not giving hand-outs to those who, momentarily, occupy the group we call “the rich.” And history tells us that the improving standard of living for everyone that results from more economic freedom will be more of a flood than a trickle.

    Steven Horwitz


    Steven Horwitz

    Steven Horwitz is the Charles A. Dana Professor of Economics at St. Lawrence University and the author of Hayek’s Modern Family: Classical Liberalism and the Evolution of Social Institutions. He is spending the 2016-17 academic year as a Visiting Scholar at the John H. Schnatter Institute for Entrepreneurship and Free Enterprise at Ball State University.

    He is a member of the FEE Faculty Network.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.


  • What the UN Gets Wrong about Free Markets

    What the UN Gets Wrong about Free Markets

    Hillel Neuer has succeeded in getting the UN Human Rights office to delete a tweet that asked whether “market fundamentalism”–namely, “the belief in the infallibility of free market economic policies”–is “an urgent threat.” I suppose it means a threat to human rights.

    Read the story in full here. Neuer issued a magnificent press statement:

    Tellingly, the same UN human rights office has failed to issue a single tweet about this past month’s dire human rights crisis in Venezuela, where millions face mass hunger in part due to attacks on the free market in the failed economic policies of the late president Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro, which included arbitrary seizure of businesses and private property.

    Because the free market is a process of discovery, as it moves from experiment to experiment, certainly some of these experiments may and should fail.

    I’d like just to observe how the erased tweet in itself is quite telling. The author calls market fundamentalism “the belief in the infallibility of free market economic policies.” The reference to “free market economic policies” puzzles me. The market is a process, “a vast and on-going laboratory of experiments” (see this splendid piece by Don Boudreaux). The policies that somehow favor the free market are those that pave the way to people’s ingenuity, so that these experiments can actually take place. This means that they keep in check the discretion of political powers, limit and clarify norms, decrease legal barriers to entry in a certain market, and open up international trade. It is difficult to describe them as “free market economic policies,” because they imply the minimisation of economic policies, that is: of actions that the government takes in the economic field per se.

    Certainly no one believes that “free market economic policies” are infallible per se, as actually free-marketers are well aware of the limitations of decision makers, and of the fact that sometimes “privatisations” and “liberalisations” can go wrong. How to foster transition has been a widely debated issue, and we have success stories as well as failures.

    Neither does anyone believe that “the free market” is infallible. That’s kind of too obvious to stress, but because the free market is a process of discovery, as it moves from experiment to experiment, certainly some of these experiments may and should fail. “Markets fail, that’s why we need markets” is a good way of putting it. (I’m quoting Arnold Kling. See this article by Arnold and Nick Schulz).

    I know myself that a tweet is 140 characters, and one may argue that whoever wrote that UN tweet went for synthesis. But I fear that the tweet itself is quite revealing of an understanding, or lack thereof, which comes before and informs profoundly the political bias that brought the author to write such a tweet. Coming from people who should be concerned with a matter as sensitive and important as human rights, the author highly deserves the shaming treatment Hillel Neuer served him.

    A version of this article was first published by EconLog.

    Alberto Mingardi


    Alberto Mingardi

    Alberto Mingardi is Director General of Istituto Bruno Leoni, Italy’s free-market think tank.

     

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.