Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!oddjob!mimsy!eneevax!umd5!brl-adm!cmcl2!nrl-cmf!ames!amdahl!pyramid!prls!philabs!micomvax!vedge!ken
From: ken@vedge.UUCP (Ken)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self Awareness
Message-ID: <314@vedge.UUCP>
Date: 10 May 88 13:51:52 GMT
References: <770@onion.cs.reading.ac.uk> <1177@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu>
Reply-To: ken@vedge.UUCP (Ken Stevens)
Distribution: comp
Organization: Visual Edge Software, St. Laurent, PQ
Lines: 22
Posted: Tue May 10 09:51:52 1988

In article <1177@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu
(Cliff Joslyn) writes:

>Why not instead (define) freedom as simply the *lack* of *complete* external
>control?

Although this definition intuitively concurs with our every-day notion of
freedom (e.g. free to leave my country), I would question whether it is
meaningful to our discussion of free will.  I am concerned with the term
"external".  In our every-day lives we have a concept of that which comes from
us (e.g. our speech) and that which comes from sources exterior to ourselves
(e.g. a postcard from a friend).  But in the realm of the infinitesimal, the
realm of uncertainty, "mystery"; the place where quantum phenomenon live...
how do we distinguish the "external" from the "internal"?  If the laws which
govern the motion of the partical/waves which compose my brain are external to
me, then are also their individual motions?  If we believe that the physical
brain is wholly responsible for all the goings on in the mind, then are we left
with any "internal" at all?  In short, I question the value of your definition
for its understanding of freedom in terms of "external" control.

float ken();
/* fourth year student of Pure Math/Philosophy at U of Waterloo (Ontario) */