Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!seismo!sundc!pitstop!sun!decwrl!purdue!i.cc.purdue.edu!j.cc.purdue.edu!pur-ee!uiucdcs!uiucdcsm!channic From: channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: More Free Will Message-ID: <3200017@uiucdcsm> Date: 11 May 88 17:24:00 GMT Lines: 133 Nf-ID: #N:uiucdcsm:3200017:000:7117 Nf-From: uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu!channic May 11 12:24:00 1988 bettingr@sunybcs.uucp replies to an earlier posting of mine: >> }I see plenty of room -- my own subjective experience. I make mental >> }decisions which are not random and are not completely determined (although >> }certainly influenced) by past determinism. >> How do you know that? Do you think that your mind is powerful enough to >> comprehend the immense combination of effects of determinism and chance? >> No one's is. "How do I know?" is as old a question as western philosophy if not all philosophy. The reason the question is that old is because subjective personal experience is undeniable. I know I have free will because that is my experience. No, my mind is not powerful enough to fathom the unfathomable. And I agree that no one's is, save God's. But if no one's mind can comprehend the effects of determinism and randomness on free will, what is the use of postulating them as a model for free will? As a basis for machine simulation? Okay, it's a start, but if a human mind cannot develop a formalism for structuring free will from an incomprehensible combination of determinism and chance, I can't reasonably expect a machine to magically create and use its own free will. > }[...] But this BEGS THE QUESTION of intelligent machines in the worst way. > }Show me the deterministic > }laws that create mind, Dr. Minsky, then I will believe there is no free will. > > No one denies that we humans experience free will. But that experience says > nothing about its nature; at least, nothing ruling out determinism and chance. From where does this tendency to IGNORE subjective experience when discussing SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA originate? My own (and your own) experience of free will tells me (and you) a great deal about its nature. In fact, this experience is the most reliable source of information regarding free will. And the experience is neither deterministic or random. No matter what decision I make, whether choosing a political candidate, a career, or a flavor of ice cream, I experience neither that my choice is determined, nor random, NOR some nebulous combination of the two. From an objective standpoint, a choice can be described as somewhere between these opposites, but a choice can also be described as "some combination" of good and bad, altruistic and selfish, physical and meta-physical, socially acceptable and unacceptable, imaginative and practical, and perhaps most importantly, responsible and irresponsible. Such measures provide no less insight into free will than the deterministic/random continuum, in fact I would say that they provide far more insight. > }Do you believe your career was merely the result of some bizarre genetic > }combination or pure chance? > The answer can be "yes" here, if the conjunction is changed to "and". If so, no one can be held responsible or need to feel responsible for his/her actions. I cannot accept that. > }The attack is over. The following is a plea to all AI researchers. Please > }do not try to persuade anyone, especially impressionable students, that s\he > }does not have free will. Everyone has the ability to choose to bring peace > }to his or her own life and to the rest of society, and has the ability to > }MAKE A DIFFERENCE in the world. Free will should not be compromised for the > }mere prospect of creating an intelligent machine. > > Believe it or not, Minsky makes a similar plea in his discussion of free will > in _The Society of Mind_. He says that we may not be able to figure out where > free will comes from, but it is so deeply ingrained in us that we cannot deny > it or ignore it. Since it can't be denied, let's go one step further. Free will has created civilization as we know it. People, using their individual free wills, chose to make the world the way it is. Minsky chose to write his book, I chose to disagree, someone chose to design computers, plumbing, buildings, automobiles, symphonies and everything that makes life enjoyable. Our reality is our choice, the product of our free will operating on our value system. Another poster in this discussion noted that our values are not as universal as number because values cause factions, rivalries and wars. I claim that the fault is not in the nature of values but in the values themselves. We need to, and can, choose values which facilitate peace among individuals, cultures and nations, just as we have chosen a number system which accurately and effectively transcends international boundaries. I believe all people, especially leading scientific minds, have the wisdom to use their undeniable free will to making choices in values which will promote world harmony. Unfortunately, as many postings in this discussion indicate, the attempted mechanization or formalization of intelligence and free will -- the reductionist approach -- tends not only to reduce their complexity but also tends to reduce their significance of their role in improving life on this planet. Free will explained as an additive blend of determinism and chance directly attacks the concept of individual responsibility. Can any machine, based on this theory of free will, possibly benefit society enough to counteract the detrimental effect of a philosophy which implies that we aren't accountable for our choices? I do not imply that AI researches are not responsible to society. I do wonder why so many seem to accept a theory of free will which includes no notion of responsibilty whatsoever. Minsky seems to be suggesting that if we throw a little randomness into our deterministic automata, what we'll get is just as good as free will, and therefore, more intelligent. Does anyone else see danger here? As AI researchers we are in a BUSINESS, the business of making intelligent machines. To maximize profits in this business, we must demonstrate that our machines really are more intelligent. To this end there are two approaches, one is to make machines that do something new and useful, the other is to define intelligence in such a way that a machine can do it. Minsky's theory on free will is guilty of the latter. It reduces free will to ignore responsibility. I implore AI researchers not to fall prey to this second approach. Real, living, human intelligence is our best hope for the survival of the world. Don't trivialize it for a new improved toy! Simplify it, yes, but not without a clear demarcation of the shortcomings of the simplification in relation to the real thing. I feel that I'm on a soap box and I apologize. I do not wish to single out AI researchers as the cause of the world's problems. In fact, the great response to this topic indicates many more people are thinking about these issues than the literature of the field suggests. I only wish to add the observation that free will, values, and beliefs are the reason we're all in this game, so while we're playing we shouldn't pretend these things don't exist or are any less complicated and miraculous than they really are. Tom Channic University of Illinois channic@uiucdcs.cs.uiuc.edu {decvax|ihnp4}!pur-ee!uiucdcs!channic