Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!oddjob!mimsy!eneevax!umd5!brl-adm!cmcl2!nrl-cmf!ames!amdahl!pyramid!prls!philabs!micomvax!vedge!ken From: ken@vedge.UUCP (Ken) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Free Will & Self Awareness Message-ID: <314@vedge.UUCP> Date: 10 May 88 13:51:52 GMT References: <770@onion.cs.reading.ac.uk> <1177@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> Reply-To: ken@vedge.UUCP (Ken Stevens) Distribution: comp Organization: Visual Edge Software, St. Laurent, PQ Lines: 22 Posted: Tue May 10 09:51:52 1988 In article <1177@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu> vu0112@bingvaxu.cc.binghamton.edu (Cliff Joslyn) writes: >Why not instead (define) freedom as simply the *lack* of *complete* external >control? Although this definition intuitively concurs with our every-day notion of freedom (e.g. free to leave my country), I would question whether it is meaningful to our discussion of free will. I am concerned with the term "external". In our every-day lives we have a concept of that which comes from us (e.g. our speech) and that which comes from sources exterior to ourselves (e.g. a postcard from a friend). But in the realm of the infinitesimal, the realm of uncertainty, "mystery"; the place where quantum phenomenon live... how do we distinguish the "external" from the "internal"? If the laws which govern the motion of the partical/waves which compose my brain are external to me, then are also their individual motions? If we believe that the physical brain is wholly responsible for all the goings on in the mind, then are we left with any "internal" at all? In short, I question the value of your definition for its understanding of freedom in terms of "external" control. float ken(); /* fourth year student of Pure Math/Philosophy at U of Waterloo (Ontario) */