Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!cmcl2!rutgers!topaz.rutgers.edu!mcgrew From: mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles) Newsgroups: sci.misc Subject: Re: Daylight precision bombing in WW II Message-ID: <16999@topaz.rutgers.edu> Date: 12 Dec 87 22:12:25 GMT References: <317@uhmanoa.UUCP> <19253@linus.UUCP> Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J. Lines: 49 To: jfjr@mbunix Cc: mcgrew >Just how effective was the daylight precision bombing of Germany >in WWII. Was it worth it? Tricky question. The easy answer is no, since the original intentions of the bombing (to completely cripple the German production and transport systems) were not acheived. A more thorough answer is maybe. 8th and 15th AF attacks on the German aircraft and other production industries were not particularly successful, but attacks on its oil industry were quite effective in limiting the mobility of the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, particularly from 1944 on. (The strategic bombing survey (undertaken by the US after the war) showed that attacks on the aircraft industry were ineffective, but oil was a prime and useful target. An interesting statistic is that 83% of all bomb tonnage dropped on Germany were dropped in 1944 and 1945.) Also, a significant amount of German production was spent on home (i.e. air) defence that could have gone to the front without the allied air offensive. The Luftwaffe, having to split its strength between tactical roles at the front and strategic air defence, wasn't able to do either effectively. On the other hand, heavy bombers and fighter escorts are very expensive to make, and required the most intelligent personel of the US and British armed forces to fly and maintain them, people who might have been of more use in tactical air and ground roles. In directly winning the European war, the tactical air forces on the Western allies were of equal, if not more value. They limited the tactical mobility of the Germans during the early weeks of the Normandy invasion and allowed the Allies to build up overwhelming strength. Throughout the campaign in France and Germany, no German plan could afford not take allied fighter-bombers into account. The problem is there are a lot of if's involved. If the daylight strategic offensive against Germany hadn't been undertaken (the British night bombing had negligible effect on the German war effort, since a 'good strike' was when the bombs fell within 5 miles of their target), the Germans would have had more of everything to hand. The war in France might have turned out differently, so might the war in Russia. Certainly the Germans would have eventually lost (if only by losing the a-bomb sweepstakes to the Japanese). Hope this helps, Charles