Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!husc6!cmcl2!rutgers!topaz.rutgers.edu!mcgrew
From: mcgrew@topaz.rutgers.edu (Charles)
Newsgroups: sci.misc
Subject: Re: Daylight precision bombing in WW II
Message-ID: <16999@topaz.rutgers.edu>
Date: 12 Dec 87 22:12:25 GMT
References: <317@uhmanoa.UUCP> <19253@linus.UUCP>
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.
Lines: 49
To: jfjr@mbunix

Cc: mcgrew


>Just how effective was the daylight precision bombing of Germany
>in WWII. Was it worth it?

   Tricky question.  The easy answer is no, since the original
intentions of the bombing (to completely cripple the German production
and transport systems) were not acheived.  A more thorough answer is
maybe.

   8th and 15th AF attacks on the German aircraft and other production
industries were not particularly successful, but attacks on its oil
industry were quite effective in limiting the mobility of the
Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, particularly from 1944 on.  (The strategic
bombing survey (undertaken by the US after the war) showed that attacks
on the aircraft industry were ineffective, but oil was a prime and
useful target.  An interesting statistic is that 83% of all bomb
tonnage dropped on Germany were dropped in 1944 and 1945.)  Also, a
significant amount of German production was spent on home (i.e. air)
defence that could have gone to the front without the allied air
offensive.  The Luftwaffe, having to split its strength between
tactical roles at the front and strategic air defence, wasn't able to
do either effectively.

   On the other hand, heavy bombers and fighter escorts are very
expensive to make, and required the most intelligent personel of the
US and British armed forces to fly and maintain them, people who might
have been of more use in tactical air and ground roles.  

   In directly winning the European war, the tactical air forces on
the Western allies were of equal, if not more value.  They limited the
tactical mobility of the Germans during the early weeks of the
Normandy invasion and allowed the Allies to build up overwhelming
strength.  Throughout the campaign in France and Germany, no German
plan could afford not take allied fighter-bombers into account.

   The problem is there are a lot of if's involved.  If the daylight
strategic offensive against Germany hadn't been undertaken (the
British night bombing had negligible effect on the German war effort,
since a 'good strike' was when the bombs fell within 5 miles of their
target), the Germans would have had more of everything to hand.  The
war in France might have turned out differently, so might the war in
Russia.  Certainly the Germans would have eventually lost (if only by
losing the a-bomb sweepstakes to the Japanese).

  Hope this helps,

Charles