Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site security.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!security!tfl From: tfl@security.UUCP (Tom Litant) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: re:re:materialism Message-ID: <313@security.UUCP> Date: Tue, 7-Jun-83 17:16:02 EDT Article-I.D.: security.313 Posted: Tue Jun 7 17:16:02 1983 Date-Received: Tue, 7-Jun-83 23:28:08 EDT Organization: MITRE Corp., Bedford MA Lines: 15 Emergent Property Theories are not an attempt to explain mind so much as to explain what the substance is. Thus saying that mind is an emergent property of a certain configuration of matter is the jumping off point for discussing theories of mind, and is not intended to be a complete characterization. In summary, then, we start off by saying that "mind is an emergent property of matter, and not a different substance..." and continue by characterizing the features of this property. Joe Margolis writes extensively from this point of view, but you can see the origins of it in writings by Peter Strawson, etc. As I mentioned in my earlier submission, the attractiveness of emergent property theories (EPT)is that Physicalism (everything can be explained in terms of physical objects) and dualism (there are two diference substances: mind and matter) each have grave difficulties, which EPTs avoid. cheers.