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From: tfl@security.UUCP (Tom Litant)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: re: What evil is
Message-ID: <332@security.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 18-Jun-83 20:20:54 EDT
Article-I.D.: security.332
Posted: Sat Jun 18 20:20:54 1983
Date-Received: Sun, 19-Jun-83 03:04:14 EDT
Organization: MITRE Corp., Bedford MA
Lines: 23

Actually, the question as introduced is a specific example of
a larger question, which is: are acts (im)moral of themselves,
or intentions, or just the results? The first is often called
deontic (Kantian), the second tends to correspond to a number
of orthadox catholic positions, while the third is called 
teleological.  Each has their own problems, and their own
virtues.  The fun thing about situational ethics is that you
can cook up any number of situations to make any one of the
three above positions seem counter-intuitive.
We can say some pretty definite things about immorality or
evil.  First, for an agent to be moral (as opposed to amoral),
he/she must be capable of choosing between acts and/or goals.
If I am constrained to perform a particularly distasteful act,
and it is beyond my control to behave otherwise, then I can hardly
be held culpabable, can I?  Intention is also part of this
notion, since while I can be blamed for my ignorance, I can
hardly be blamed for situations that result un-intentionally.
Evil and goodness, whatever they may be, thus can only be applyed
to a moral agent if such acts or goals are sought intentionally.
(in the phil of law the corresponding principle for legal
culpability is "mens rea")

                                    cheers.