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Path: utzoo!linus!security!tfl
From: tfl@security.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: materialism
Message-ID: <309@security.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 4-Jun-83 21:43:36 EDT
Article-I.D.: security.309
Posted: Sat Jun  4 21:43:36 1983
Date-Received: Mon, 6-Jun-83 20:41:20 EDT
Organization: MITRE Corp., Bedford MA
Lines: 30

Let me offer a distinction from academic Philosophy (as distinct from net
philosophy! flame off.).  An often used distinction is between Materialism and
Physicalism.  In somewhat superficial terms, Materialism states that all that
is contained in one's ontology is matter, while Physicalism states that all
can be explained in terms of physical objects.  This rather subtle distiction
can be made clearer by pointing out that most emergent property theories are
compatible with Materialism, but not Physicalism.  Emergent property theories
state that not all properties of material objects are explainable in terms of
merely physical attributes, but that some properties emerge, gestalt-like,
from certain configurations of matter. A good example is a computer program.
The program itself could exist as electrons, or water (as in one of those neat
hydo-computers), and resides on that media, and yet is not explainable merely
in terms of the media.
Emergent property theories have some interesting results.  For example, it
might be contended that if what we are is simply information, then we could be
transferred to any media with the bandwidth and processing ability that our
brains (the material object) happens to have.
I find emergent property theories more interesting than either physicalism or
dualism(that there are two materials: mind and matter, which are fundamentally
different).  The problem with physicalism is that it yet is able to cash in
its promise to explain away everything (like feelings) in terms of physical
objects, while dualism is unable to explain how two fundamentally different
materials --- mind and matter --- actually interact (look to Descartes to see
how one can swet this point).  Emergent properties seem to be able to explain
a wide range of things, from aesthetics to the philosophy of mind.  Which of
the three I agree with (as opposed to finding more *interesting* as a
card-carrying philosopher left adrift in a sea of engineers), you'll never
find out. (actually, my ontology contains three types of material: mind,
matter, and New Jersey.  Each is incompatible with the other, to whit: there
are no minds in New Jersey, and it doesn't seem to matter.)