Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site teklabs.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!wivax!decvax!harpo!floyd!vax135!cornell!uw-beaver!tektronix!tekchips!teklabs!dennisf From: dennisf@teklabs.UUCP Newsgroups: net.religion Subject: Response to Second Response of Jeff Mayhew Message-ID: <2096@teklabs.UUCP> Date: Fri, 17-Jun-83 21:55:28 EDT Article-I.D.: teklabs.2096 Posted: Fri Jun 17 21:55:28 1983 Date-Received: Sat, 25-Jun-83 22:43:55 EDT Organization: Tektronix, Beaverton OR Lines: 206 In view of your last response, we seem to tbe failing to communicate. I'll accept (at least part of ) the blame for this and be much more specific. I have re-examined all the "Plunge" discussion articles, and will here respond to specific parts of your articles. >From "Taking the Plunge" (18 APR), first two paragraphs - about the parable of the munchkins: this argument (which is similar to Anthony Flew's invisible-gardener argument) assumes, first of all, that (unlike Flew) the word "God" is not meaningless. The word is recognized to have (presumably the Xn) meaning; otherwise talk about "correctness" and "criticizing what Xns say about God" would itself be meaningless. The crux of this argument (like Flew's) is bound up in the meaning of words like "validity", "evidence", and what constitutes "reasons to believe". My belief in (the biblical) God is not based on any sensual observation of him. And even if I did "see" him, my perception of him would still be limited at least by my own limitations and thus would be subject to various interpretations. The existence of God could not possibly be established on the basis of experimental observation (as munchkins, in principle, could be) but only on a basis commensurate with the nature of the being in question. The scope of munchkin activity is limited to refrigerators, nothing more;so we would be entitled to limit our investigations of munchkins to this scope. Similarly, for Santa, etc. Since God is not a localized, observable, physical entity, applying the munchkin argument fails in the analogy. Evidence for the Creator of the whole of our space-time is a very different kind than for spatio-temporial entities. My point is: the wrong kind of evidence is being sought for God. If we stick with the biblical meaning of who God is, then the kind of evidence we should reasonably expect to find of such a being will be evident to us on a more abstract level than physical perception. This in itself should not be unfamiliar to you, since scientific theories are abstractions from perception which we regard as true and not as merely a way to catalog our observations. But scientific theories are limited in their subject-matter and methodology and could not, even in principle, give a total account of human experience. So we can't look to science as a means of obtaining the kind of evidence we need for God. I know of only two disciplines that have sufficient scope for the evidence we seek: philosophy and theology. Both deal with the totality of reality and consequently have the same subject-matter (but different purposes). At this level, we are dealing with our greatest abstractions from physical reality (i.e., raw sensual impressions), and it is here (if at all) that God will be "evident" to us. *Whatever* our ultimate view of reality is at this level, it is a heuristic vision, an intuitive recognition, which is achieved on the basis of our entire experience of life. Our rational efforts to formalize this "world-view" give rise to talk about beliefs we hold. But my point is: whatever we believe at this level is an intuitive, heuristic achievement, not a logical conclusion. (Our reasoning about basic beliefs assumes them intuitively.) Thus, the reasons I gave before are admissible as this *kind* of evidence for God; they are intuitive clues to his nature, not logical deductions of his existence. Are you excluding this kind of evidence? If so, then doesn't the kind of evidence you are willing to admit also place limits on the kind of God you are willing to consider? In this case, you'll have to say what your meaning of "God" shall be. If it's not the biblical God, I'll be inclined to agree with your assertions. So when you say ("Taking the Plunge"): " ... there is, to my knowledge, absolutely NO EVIDENCE FOR THE VALIDITY OF CHRISTIAN BELIEFS. In other words, there is no evidence which compels a reasoning individual to change from a non-Christian to a Christian ..." shouldn't you qualify this claim (which has universal intent among rational beings) by specifying just what evidence you are limiting the claim to? You ask (same article): " Am I being unreasonable to expect a thoroughly explained (i.e., "good") reason? If so, tell me why." This request, in itself, is not unreasonable, but is a thorough explanation all you really want? It doesn't look like it. How can something so basic as a world-view - a heuristic vision - be thoroughly explained independent of it? Are you asking to be convinced of Xny purely on the grounds of another, incompatible, heuristic vision (namely, naturalism)? Is this reasonable to attempt for *any* world-view? Moving on to "Response to Dennis Feucht" (17 MAY): Point 1: By transcendence I simply mean that God is not a (necessary) part of our space-time. If we take the Xn meaning of God, he *is* the ultimate - the final "meta", by "definition". "Does this serve as a justification for your religious beliefs, or is it merely a reflection of the same needs which cause you to adopt those beliefs?" Neither. It is a clue to God, just as maxims serve as clues to a skillful performance. Of course, some story on the level of psychological needs must be true, but it is the wrong logical level for this discussion. I didn't become a Xn because it satisfied my psychological needs but rather (partly) because my previous naturalistic view failed to satisfy them. Point 2: There is no "threshold" below which intelligence and personality would not, for me, compel an explanation of their existence. I am not relating "complexity" to "rational explanation" in the way these questions suggest. My point here is simply that if personality has "arisen" in an otherwise impersonal universe, then if personality (or other forms of meaningful complexity) have any meaning to us, they must have a rational explanation for their existence. To say they originated from the impersonal is just another way of saying they have no real meaning; otherwise, where did the meaning come from? So I am affirming a rational source for that meaning (i.e., God) rather than an argument from (metaphysical) chance, which is irrational. That is, to argue that meaning has its source in random chance is to me the "blind leap" of naturalism since we don't otherwise ascribe meaning to random behavior. Point 3: Yes, this one is dependent upon what is meant by a Xn society. I mean societies with a dominant citizenry living by the lifestyle of the first-century church, according to their world-view. Their appeal is a token of Xn truth. These qualities are, in principle, possible in generic non-Xn societies, but their actual tendency of non-occurrance suggests that this social quality is related to the world-view of the societies demonstrating it. As to representative Xn societies, I gave the criterion (again above). But what you make of, say, Dutch Reformation society is, in the final act, a personal judgement. Our judgements may differ. Point 4: Here you refer to circularities in the argumant: "If 'trustworthiness' means you believe what they say is true, how can this be used to justify ... your belief that what they say is true ...?" Again, this is a personal assessment of character. I find the Bible authors to be trustworthy because they held values which I find correlate strongly with trustworthy people I know. "If the process of 'reasoning' associated with evolving from your axioms to your religious beliefs is totally unlike the process of reasoning I use when discussing things accessible via my own perceptions, then we're up a creek." First, I meant "axioms" ("values") to be the world-view - the fundamental beliefs, since they are not deduced by reason but envisioned intuitively. Intuition is the inescapable ground of conscious activity upon which reason serves us as a (very important but limited) mental tool. We're not up a creek because both of us excercise *both* modes of mind as essential in dealing with our beliefs. (Surely you don't believe that all your beliefs are deduced from perception?) "If the act of 'encountering' God assumes an arbitrary belief IN God, we have no need for evidence of ANY kind ..." I agree. This is a purely existential approach to God, devoid of objective reference. What I'm suggesting is a more appropriate kind of evidence for the task at hand. "I have never equated 'knowing' God with rationally arriving at a belief in God." " Please describe in detail how I can test the claim of Christian beliefs ..." "What IS the 'methodology' whereby you 'know' the God in question?" Biblically, the person who knows (and is known by) God is the person who is in right standing with him. This is largely an issue of personal values. As one comes to believe in God, the importance of one's relationship with/to him is found in being in right standing with him. This, first of all, involves recognizing him for who he is - the Lord of the universe, and good to us, though we don't deserve it, and secondly, who he tells us we are - made "in his image" but morally fallen and in need of the free gift of redemption from our fallen state through his work done in Christ on our behalf. This is not an argument for why you should become a Xn but a brief statement of the "methodology" - rather, what you face in considering it. I don't expect you to blindly leap into "trying" to believe since this "trying" to believe something one doesn't actually believe is itself a denial of Xn belief about intellectual honesty. But you *can* think through the consequences of belief. If you do begin to become persuaded that God exists, you'll be better prepared for the consequences of that belief. And actually, the consequences often play a big role in the matter of belief itself. Many people are not prepared to acknowledge God because this would mean having to deal with the consequences of that acknowledgement. Values do affect belief! Finally, in "Second Response to Dennis Feucht": I don't see this as a different approach but a statement *about* previous reasons. But more significantly, you state that you don't believe that " ...only 'non-materialists' can honestly believe their lives have 'meaning, value, and purpose.'" More precisely, I don't doubt that they believe their lives *can*, but I don't believe they do on the basis of their materialistic beliefs for reasons stated earlier here about the source of meaning. And I'm not using the word "meaning" in some uniquely "religious" sense either. So I would like to know why you "don't buy this at all". If my view of materialism or naturalism is in error, please inform me of it. "Dennis, this is hardly a justification for your belief." Of course it isn't. It's a statement on the ultimate limitations of justifying activity, and where to go from there. By "personal involvement" I mean personally considering what the consequences for both your ethical and metaphysical orientations would be from a Xn framework. (I can do this for atheism without becoming an atheist.) At last, I accept your comment about ad hominem arguments to the extent you can say that the argument is independent of the person making it. Beliefs and motives for them are not independent of arguments about beliefs and motives for them, are they? ... in the cases cited? Apologizingly long, Dennis Feucht Tek Labs