Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site security.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!security!tfl From: tfl@security.UUCP (Tom Litant) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: re: What evil is Message-ID: <332@security.UUCP> Date: Sat, 18-Jun-83 20:20:54 EDT Article-I.D.: security.332 Posted: Sat Jun 18 20:20:54 1983 Date-Received: Sun, 19-Jun-83 03:04:14 EDT Organization: MITRE Corp., Bedford MA Lines: 23 Actually, the question as introduced is a specific example of a larger question, which is: are acts (im)moral of themselves, or intentions, or just the results? The first is often called deontic (Kantian), the second tends to correspond to a number of orthadox catholic positions, while the third is called teleological. Each has their own problems, and their own virtues. The fun thing about situational ethics is that you can cook up any number of situations to make any one of the three above positions seem counter-intuitive. We can say some pretty definite things about immorality or evil. First, for an agent to be moral (as opposed to amoral), he/she must be capable of choosing between acts and/or goals. If I am constrained to perform a particularly distasteful act, and it is beyond my control to behave otherwise, then I can hardly be held culpabable, can I? Intention is also part of this notion, since while I can be blamed for my ignorance, I can hardly be blamed for situations that result un-intentionally. Evil and goodness, whatever they may be, thus can only be applyed to a moral agent if such acts or goals are sought intentionally. (in the phil of law the corresponding principle for legal culpability is "mens rea") cheers.