Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!genrad!decvax!harpo!floyd!vax135!ariel!hou5f!orion!houca!hogpc!houxm!ihnp4!ixn5c!inuxc!pur-ee!CSvax:Pucc-H:acg From: CSvax:Pucc-H:acg@pur-ee.UUCP Newsgroups: net.unix-wizards,net.bugs.4bsd Subject: Re: TIOCCDTR (bug|feature) Message-ID: <133@pucc-h.UUCP> Date: Fri, 17-Jun-83 10:28:08 EDT Article-I.D.: pucc-h.133 Posted: Fri Jun 17 10:28:08 1983 Date-Received: Wed, 22-Jun-83 03:08:39 EDT Lines: 16 We have a local mod on the PUCC systems that only permit an ioctl to proceed if the process has IREAD permission on the inode or if the device is the process's controlling tty. We have yet to see anything that this breaks. Philosophically, this is justifyable if one considers executing an ioctl on a terminal in the same class as forcing characters to the terminal's input stream. Permission to execute an ioctl on a terminal should be bound to input (read) permission not write (output) permission. - Jeff Schwab Purdue University Computing Center