• Tag Archives 4th Amendment
  • Why It’s Time to Revisit the 1970 Federal Requirement to Report Cash Transactions Exceeding $10,000

    Many readers will know that the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 requires that financial institutions must keep records of cash transactions summing to more than $10,000 in one day and report suspicious transactions to the federal government. In addition, people coming into the United States from foreign countries (including US citizens) must declare cash or other negotiable instruments they are bringing into the country if the amount exceeds $10,000.

    Monitoring large holdings of cash and cash transactions provides a way for the government to identify people who may be engaging in illegal activity. These reporting requirements open the potential for government to abuse them, especially because of civil asset forfeiture laws that allow governments to confiscate assets without proof of any wrongdoing and require the owners of the assets to prove they were not associated with any illegal activity to get their assets back. That’s an important point, but not my point here.

    One aspect of this requirement is that because the limit is stated as a dollar amount ($10,000), inflation lowers the real value of that limit year after year. Adjusting for inflation, $10,000 in 1970, when the Act was passed, would be $65,000 today. As inflation continues, the reporting requirement continues to shrink in terms of real purchasing power.

    Inflation and the 4th Amendment

    At today’s current inflation rate of 2.5 percent, the value of a dollar will fall by half in 29 years. If inflation picks up beyond that, it will take less time for the value of a dollar to decline by half. As time goes on, more and more cash transactions will be covered under the Act, enabling the government to monitor even more of our financial activities.

    Back in 1970 when the Act required reporting of cash transactions in excess of $65,000 in today’s prices, you can imagine people not objecting, thinking that there would be little reason to be holding that much cash. But there are some good reasons to have more than $10,000 in cash, and as inflation makes that number even smaller, more people and more transactions will be captured by government reporting requirements.

    I’m not an attorney, but it appears to me the Act violates the Fourth Amendment, which states in part, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…” The Act constitutes what appears to me to be an unreasonable search.

    Could a legal challenge be possible? If, when the Act passed, it required reporting of cash transactions exceeding $65,000 in today’s dollars, it appears that one could claim that, even if that was reasonable, the $10,000 limit today is not.

    Setting aside any legal issues, one hidden cost of inflation is that it makes an increasingly large share of cash holdings and transactions subject to government surveillance.

    Reprinted from the Independent Institute.


    Randall G. Holcombe

    Randall G. Holcombe is Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, DeVoe Moore Professor of Economics at Florida State University, past President of the Public Choice Society, and past President of the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics. His many books include Housing America (edited with Benjamin Powell) and Writing Off Ideas.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.



  • Local Cops Can Skirt State Limits on Surveillance By Joining Federal Task Forces

    By joining joint law enforcement task forces run by the federal government, local cops can often ignore stringent state and local laws governing surveillance and engage in warrantless spying.

    It’s well-known that a federal program known as “Equitable Sharing” allows local prosecutors and police to bypass more restrictive state asset forfeiture laws by passing cases off to the federal government through a process known as adoption. A Department of Justice directive issued last summer by Attorney General Jeff Sessions reiterates full support for the equitable sharing program, directs federal law enforcement agencies to aggressively utilize it, and sets the stage to expand it in the future.

    Through the adoption process, local police claim cases are federal in nature to justify transferring them to federal jurisdiction. Under these arrangements, state officials simply hand cases over to a federal agency, participate in the case, and then receive up to 80 percent of the proceeds.

    Participation in federal joint law enforcement task forces gives state and local police a similar means to circumvent restrictive state surveillance laws and conduct warrantless spying with immunity.

    How Local Cops Can Ignore Local Laws

    When state or local law enforcement officers join a federal joint task force, they are deputized as federal agents. As a result, they can operate under the exact same parameters as an FBI or DEA agent. That means they are no longer bound by state laws governing surveillance. In practice, this allows local cops to ignore state laws as they collect information on people in their communities.

    For instance, last year, Illinois passed the most restrictive law on cell site simulators in the country. Commonly referred to as “stingrays,” these devices essentially spoof cell phone towers, tricking any device within range into connecting to the stingray instead of the tower. This allows law enforcement to sweep up communications content, as well as locate and track the person in possession of a specific phone or other electronic device.

    Under the Illinois law, police must get a warrant before using a stingray to track an individual’s location in most situations, and they are barred from using the devices to access data on electronic devices or listen to conversations. But an Illinois police officer serving on a joint task force can ignore the warrant requirement and deploy a stingray despite the state law.

    According to a report by the Century Foundation, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) are particularly invasive due to their broad and sweeping mandate to “prevent terrorism.”

    The War on Terror Expands Law Enforcement’s Reach

    Prior to 9/11, there were about 30 JTTFs scattered around the US. Today, more than 180 such task forces operate all across the US. According to memoranda of understanding (MOUs) obtained by the ACLU, state and local law enforcement officers assigned to JTTFs follow federal rules for intelligence gathering.

    According to the New Century report, these JTTFs also allow state and local cops to operate in virtual secrecy and with little or no local oversight.

    Partnerships on JTTFs may also enable local and state police to conduct activities in secret, under cover of federal law protecting ‘classified information,’ where their activities would otherwise be subject to public scrutiny through state open records laws. Sometimes, local officers deputized to work as federal agents on JTTFs aren’t even subject to ordinary chain-of-command requirements, for example, if their local commanding officer doesn’t have security clearance to access information held by the JTTF member. These frameworks make it impossible to hold local and state law enforcement officials accountable for their work on JTTFs.

    In 2008, the DOJ established rules allowing FBI agents to conduct “assessments”—essentially an investigation without any indication of terrorist or criminal activity. Any FBI agent can unilaterally initiate an assessment for up to 30 days without any oversight. After 30 days, the agent must report to a supervisor. From that point, the supervisor can renew the assessment every 30 days. An agent does not have to have probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to open an assessment. He only needs to have an “authorized purpose” and a “clearly defined objective.” According to the Brennan Center for Justice, agents can engage in the following activities, among others, during the assessment phase.

    • Recruit informants to monitor the subject.
    • Question people without revealing their identity.
    • Search commercial and government databases.
    • Conduct physical surveillance of a person’s public movements.

    When operating within a JTTF, a local law enforcement officer can engage in all of these activities, regardless of state law or department policy.

    The Warrantless Collection of Data

    Deputization and membership in a JTTF also opens the door for local cops to access federal databases holding information that was collected without a warrant.

    Local and state police assigned to JTTFs and deputized as federal agents may even have access to information collected by the CIA, NSA, or foreign intelligence agencies, as their FBI counterparts do. Indeed, FBI guidelines allow agents to ask the CIA and NSA for information on people agents are investigating during an assessment. Again, agents and task force members do not even need to suspect someone of involvement in criminal activity before opening such an assessment. Local police assigned to the JTTF may therefore have access to information about Americans that was collected by the NSA without any judicial process, even if the targets of the spying aren’t suspected of any crime—let alone a serious offense connected to terrorism.

    The FBI calls JTTFs “our nation’s front line on terrorism: small cells of highly trained, locally based, passionately committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”

    The New Century report came up with a much less glowing assessment.

    Communities and individuals who have been monitored, harassed, or threatened by JTTF operations or their task force officers may see their role differently. To those groups, the JTTFs likely appear more interested in solidifying and expanding the power of their own bureaucracy, and protecting the political, social, and economic status quo—often at the expense and on the backs of marginalized communities. And despite the FBI’s claim that the JTTFs are the nation’s “front line on terrorism,” the FBI doesn’t have much to show, in terms of benefits to public safety, for the vast expenditures of public funds poured into them.

    State and Local Governments Need to Step Up

    Joint task forces further detach local peace officers from the communities they ostensibly serve. Federal deputization allows your local cops to operate outside of state law with virtually no local or state oversight or accountability. They can surveil you with impunity, even if your state has passed laws to protect your privacy.

    Joint task forces should not serve as a vehicle to circumvent state law. State and local governments need to take steps to regain control over their police departments. They should refuse to lend their officers to any joint task force that does not operate within the limits of state surveillance laws. They should also insist on having an oversight role when any of their officers are involved in joint investigations.

    Despite revelations by Edward Snowden and other whistleblowers revealing the total disregard of the Fourth Amendment by federal agencies like the NSA, Congress has shown no inclination to rein in the federal surveillance state. State and local government may not be able to completely shut down the federal surveillance state, but they certainly don’t have to participate.


    Michael Maharrey

    Michael Maharrey is the national communications director at the Tenth Amendment Center.

    This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.



  • 58 Human Rights and Civil Liberties Organizations Demand an End to the Backdoor Search Loophole

    EFF and 57 organizations, including American Civil Liberties Union, R Street, and NAACP, spoke out against warrantless searches of American citizens in a joint letter this week demanding reforms of the so-called “backdoor search” loophole that exists for data collected under Section 702.

    The backdoor search loophole allows federal government agencies, including the FBI and CIA, to, without a warrant, search through data collected on American citizens.

    The data is first collected by the intelligence community under a section of law called Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which provides rules for sweeping up communications of foreign individuals outside the United States. However, the U.S. government also uses 702 to collect the communications of countless American citizens and store them in a database accessible by several agencies.

    EFF and many others believe this type of mass collection alone is unconstitutional. The backdoor search loophole infringes American rights further—allowing agencies to warrantlessly search through 702-collected data by using search terms that describe U.S. persons. These terms could include names, email addresses, and more.

    This practice needs to end. And a proposal before Congress to require warrants on backdoor searches used only in criminal investigations—as recently reported by the New York Times—does not go far enough.

    As EFF, and several other organizations, said in an Oct. 3 letter:

    “Applying a warrant requirement only to searches of Section 702 data involving ‘criminal suspects,’ is not an adequate solution to this problem. Most fundamentally, it ignores the fact that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is not limited to criminal or non-national security related cases.”

    Further, carving out a warrant requirement solely for criminal investigations ignores the broader umbrella term under which the FBI conducts many searches—that of “foreign intelligence.” Because the FBI conducts investigations with both criminal and foreign intelligence elements, the agency could predictably bypass backdoor warrant requirements by ascribing their searches to foreign affairs matters, rather than criminal.

    Warrantless searches of American communications may especially impact those communities that may be speaking frequently to family outside of the United States of which have historically faced unjust surveillance. As we wrote: “Existing policies make it far too easy for the government to engage in searches that disproportionately target Muslim Americans and immigrants with overseas connections based merely on the assertion of a nebulous ‘foreign intelligence’ purpose.”

    These searches are happening. In 2016, the CIA and NSA reported they conducted 30,000 searches for information about U.S. persons. That number does not include metadata searches by the CIA, a related problem that can also be fixed by Congress before Section 702 sunsets in December.

    Backdoor searches of 702-collected data about U.S. citizens and residents should require a warrant based on probable cause. Congress can protect the rights of countless Americans by closing this loophole.

    Read the full letter.

    Source: 58 Human Rights and Civil Liberties Organizations Demand an End to the Backdoor Search Loophole | Electronic Frontier Foundation