Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!wuarchive!mailrus!purdue!gatech!amdcad!military
From: cperlebe@encad.Wichita.NCR.COM (Chris Perleberg)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Learning in War
Message-ID: <27530@amdcad.AMD.COM>
Date: 28 Sep 89 07:12:27 GMT
References: <27388@amdcad.AMD.COM> <27442@amdcad.AMD.COM> <27493@amdcad.AMD.COM>
Sender: cdr@amdcad.AMD.COM
Organization: NCR Corporation Wichita, KS
Lines: 25
Approved: military@amdcad.amd.com



From: cperlebe@encad.Wichita.NCR.COM (Chris Perleberg)

In article <27493@amdcad.AMD.COM> 
mimsy!oddjob.uchicago.edu!uokmax!jeffm%uokmax@uunet.UU.NET (Jeff Medcalf) writes:
>When an
>effective new offense WAS developed (tanks by the British), the battle that
>followed (at Cambrai), went the way of the attacker for the first time

I personally think Cambrai (and the battles in August 1918 leading to the
"Black Day of the German Army") were strategic defeats for the Allies.  They
learned the wrong lessons.  They won, and thought they were right.  They
should have been studying Caporetto, or the Kaiserschlachten in March 1918, 
or even the German counterattack at Cambrai. In each case, the Germans
achieved breakthroughs without tanks.  They developed a "software" solution --
the Stosstruppen ("storm troopers").  The Allies won the war, and had "tanks
on the brain."  They couldn't see that tanks were not an end in themselves,
but only a means to an end, a tool to use with the proper tactics.

The losers payed more attention.  Perhaps that is typical.  And, for the
U.S., frightening.

Chris Perleberg
cperlebe@encad.wichita.ncr.com