Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cs.utexas.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: amdcad!adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Learning in War Message-ID: <9860@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 3 Oct 89 13:05:14 GMT References: <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM> Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: Computer Science, Heriot-Watt U., Scotland Lines: 30 Approved: military@att.att.com From: Adrian HurtIn article <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM> cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) writes: > >Adrian Hurt writes: >> The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't make up defence >> plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it was. >Note that the German Blitzkrieg of the 40s was influenced strongly by >the writings in the 20s of B.H. Liddell-Hart, a British military >historian and theorist. Did Liddell-Hart mention anything about co-operation between air-force and land force? I was under the impression that one of the key principles of blitzkrieg was in getting, then using, air superiority; e.g. using Stukas as airborne artillery. The Germans' first move was always to try to knock out the enemy air force, preferably on the ground. They could then knock out communications and transport, e.g. railways; attack vehicles on the move; and attack cities; as well as use aircraft in direct battlefield support. The Germans failed to wipe out the R.A.F. (only just, but they didn't know that), therefore would not have had unchallenged air superiority over Britain, therefore did not invade. (They weren't totally unchallenged over France, either, but they did have things pretty much their own way.) "Keyboard? How quaint!" - M. Scott Adrian Hurt | JANET: adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs UUCP: ..!ukc!cs.hw.ac.uk!adrian | ARPA: adrian@cs.hw.ac.uk