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From: amdcad!adrian%cs.heriot-watt.ac.uk@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK (Adrian Hurt)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Learning in War
Message-ID: <9860@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 3 Oct 89 13:05:14 GMT
References: <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM>
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From: Adrian Hurt 

In article <27443@amdcad.AMD.COM> cdr@amdcad.amd.com (Carl Rigney) writes:
>
>Adrian Hurt  writes:
>> The French (and everyone else, for that matter) couldn't make up defence
>> plans against blitzkrieg until someone had shown them what it was.

>Note that the German Blitzkrieg of the 40s was influenced strongly by
>the writings in the 20s of B.H. Liddell-Hart, a British military
>historian and theorist.

Did Liddell-Hart mention anything about co-operation between air-force and
land force? I was under the impression that one of the key principles of
blitzkrieg was in getting, then using, air superiority; e.g. using Stukas as
airborne artillery. The Germans' first move was always to try to knock out
the enemy air force, preferably on the ground. They could then knock out
communications and transport, e.g. railways; attack vehicles on the move;
and attack cities; as well as use aircraft in direct battlefield support.
The Germans failed to wipe out the R.A.F. (only just, but they didn't know
that), therefore would not have had unchallenged air superiority over
Britain, therefore did not invade. (They weren't totally unchallenged over
France, either, but they did have things pretty much their own way.)

 "Keyboard? How quaint!" - M. Scott

 Adrian Hurt			     |	JANET:  adrian@uk.ac.hw.cs
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