Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!csd4.milw.wisc.edu!mailrus!ncar!gatech!psuvax1!psuvm!uh2
From: UH2@PSUVM.BITNET (Lee Sailer)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.next
Subject: Re: Diskless NeXT's??
Message-ID: <89222.100550UH2@PSUVM>
Date: 10 Aug 89 14:05:50 GMT
References: <1989Aug8.192101.3060@ee.rochester.edu>
Distribution: na
Organization: Penn State University - Center for Academic Computing
Lines: 39

In article <1989Aug8.192101.3060@ee.rochester.edu>, jal@ee.rochester.edu (John Lefor) says:
>
>Thus the question - is it possible to defeat the optical disk for
>purposes of system boot without completely disabling the optical?
>If this is not possible now, would NeXT consider such an option i nthe
>near future.
>

   I don't have  a NeXT, so this is just an idea:

To boot from the floptical, a user has to have the "system" on it, right?
To build a lab of NeXTs (booting from a file server) but at the same time
stop hordes of students from booting from their own flopties, a partial
(very partial!) solution would be to not give students the "system".

1.  The average student -- wouldn't take the time to figure out that
he or she could copy the relevant system files from the server and
construct a bootable disk.

2.  The dedicated hacker -- could construct a bootable flopty, or
simply obtain one elsewhere, but is by this time mature enough not to
be malicious.

3.  The malicious hacker -- will figure out a way to beat the system,
anyway.

In short, the thrust of this simple, though only parital solution is to
throw a few organizational hurdles in front of the unauthorized system
booter that will stop the ignorant meddler, plus throw a heavy dose
of socialization at those who will eventually acquire the technical skills
so that by the time they figure out how to be an unathorized booter they
know better.

Tangent--these same students could, at most schools, easily steal any and
all faculty mail (paper--from faculty mail boxes).  They don't.  Because,
at least in part, of socialization. We need the same community rules with
regard to tampering with computer systems.

                                          lee