Path: utzoo!utgpu!watmath!att!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!gem.mps.ohio-state.edu!csd4.csd.uwm.edu!uxc.cso.uiuc.edu!uxc.cso.uiuc.edu!m.cs.uiuc.edu!p.cs.uiuc.edu!gillies
From: gillies@p.cs.uiuc.edu
Newsgroups: comp.sys.next
Subject: Re: Diskless NeXT's??
Message-ID: <116900007@p.cs.uiuc.edu>
Date: 14 Aug 89 16:31:00 GMT
References: <192101@<1989Aug8>
Lines: 21
Nf-ID: #R:<1989Aug8:192101:p.cs.uiuc.edu:116900007:000:950
Nf-From: p.cs.uiuc.edu!gillies    Aug 14 11:31:00 1989


I think perhaps the NeXT machine needs a keyswitch that simultaneously
locks the case shut and forces it to boot from the hard disk (or
network).  In this way, you could prevent students from hacking on the
network using a public NeXT box.

On the other hand, I believe computer nets should be robust enough to
prevent students from doing dangerous hacking.  I once wrote TCP
software for a PC connected to the ARPAnet, and there was no problem.
However, one day my officemate crashed 3 vaxes using the PC's tftp.
Berkeley UNIX was just too flakey and non-robust (the TCP couldn't
handle zero-length packet options).

It seems like only MIT and Xerox care enough to put an authentication
protocol on their sensitive network services.  Maybe other sites should
start to care.


Don Gillies, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Illinois
1304 W. Springfield, Urbana, Ill 61801      
ARPA: gillies@cs.uiuc.edu   UUCP: {uunet,harvard}!uiucdcs!gillies