Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!csd4.csd.uwm.edu!gem.mps.ohio-state.edu!ginosko!uunet!philmtl!philabs!ccnysci!patth From: patth (Patt Haring) Newsgroups: misc.headlines.unitex Subject: Central America : The End of An Era Message-ID: <2697@ccnysci.UUCP> Date: 19 Aug 89 09:05:28 GMT Sender: patth@ccnysci.UUCP Lines: 177 Approved: patth@sci.ccny.cuny.edu Ported from PeaceNET: /* Written 12:00 am Aug 17, 1989 by cries in cdp:cries.regionews */ /* ---------- "CentAm Summit: End of an Era" ---------- */ CENTRAL AMERICA: THE END OF AN ERA (cries.regionews from Managua August 14, 1989 This time there were no helicopters hurriedly taking off from the roof of the embassy, with frantic soldiers grabbing onto the skids. It wasn't as dramatic as the fall of Saigon 14 years ago. But the results of the Central American presidential summit meeting in Tela, Honduras had the same flavor as the historic defeat for the United States. Some are calling the summit agreement the "second Central American declaration of independence". >From August 5 to 7, Presidents Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, Jose Azcona of Honduras, Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, Alfredo Cristiani of El Salvador, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua held marathon debates in the seaside town of Tela. On August 7, the five presidents finally reached a concrete agreement: the mechanism and procedure, along with set deadlines, for the disbandment of the Nicaraguan contra forces created eight years ago by the US to overthrow the Sandinista government. It came as somewhat of a surprise that from this meeting, the fifth regional summit and the first for Cristiani, that such a firm agreement would be signed. Pressures from Washington were intense. The presidents, all except Ortega, received personal telephone calls from President George Bush and visits from Under-secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Bernard Aronson, as well as from contra leaders. The message was clear and constant: the US government will continue to support the counterrevolutionary army as a "guarantee for the 1990 elections" in Nicaragua, a way of pressuring the Sandinista government to comply with the promise of holding free and fair elections. It would not be until after the elections that the contras be disbanded and then only if democratization effectively took place in Nicaragua. Honduran President Azcona came to the summit in Tela with the same position and stated that the bill for the disbandment of the 13,000 contra troops now situated in the southern Honduran zones of Olancho and El Paraiso should be footed by the US, since Washington armed and financed them from the start. The Nicaraguan government's position was that both the Honduran and US proposals ignored the measures for contra disbandment already approved by the Central American presidents at the summit meeting in February at Costa del Sol, El Salvador. "It represents the submission of Honduras to the interests of the United States," said Ortega, "to indefinitely maintain the contras in its territory." Ortega also warned his Honduran colleague that he would "push forward a suit in the International Court of Justice if that which was already agreed upon is not honored." This was seen as a very threatening bargaining chip by Honduras. Nicaragua presented a case against its northern neighbor in July 1986 for allowing contra camps to be established in its territory. If Honduras removed the contras, said Ortega, "they wouldn't be doing a favor for Nicaragua, but would simply avoid committing a crime." The seeds for yet another conflict were planted by El Salvador. President Cristiani had been maintaining the argument for symmetry between the forces of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the contras. He claimed that both should be disbanded simultaneously. Summit Ups And Downs The situation was tense at times as Cristiani insisted that his symmetry thesis prevail. However, a letter from the FMLN brought by Ortega carried much weight with its proposal from the Salvadoran guerrillas to open a dialogue with Cristiani's government. The proposal was elaborated after the FMLN held discussions with the political parties and social forces of El Salvador. Arias' opinion also played an important role, that contra disbandment cannot be conditioned on elections in Nicaragua. Another factor with heavy importance was the agreement reached by the Nicaraguan government and the country's 21 legal parties signed just the day before the summit began and brought to Tela by Ortega. A month before, President Ortega had announced his intention to convoke a national dialogue with all the parties that are to take part in the elections of next February to discuss guarantees in the electoral process. The marathon session, transmitted on TV and radio, concluded with the signing of two documents. One asked the Central American presidents to begin contra disbandment immediately and demanded that no foreign forces with interest in the region interfere. The other text contained 39 points related to guarantees of a fair electoral process in Nicaragua. "I'm convinced that today we took a very important step towards peace," said Ortega after the dialogue. No less important in Tela were Azcona's worries about upcoming elections in his country, scheduled for November of this year. He is counting a great deal on ridding the country of the 13,000 contras and their 50,000 relatives that presently occupy entire villages in Honduras, and cleaning up the image of his country internationally. The Summit Peaks On August 7, the two year anniversary of the signing of the Esquipulas II accords, the five Central American presidents approved a plan of disbandment that foresees the creation of an International Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV). Set up by the secretaries-general of the Organization of American States and the United Nations, the commission's objective will center around material organization for the resettlement of the contras, collection of funds to finance the move, recuperation of weapons, and verification of the conditions for the reentry of the ex-contras into Nicaragua. Apparently, the regional heads of state were satisfied with the Sandinista measures guaranteeing clean elections, freedom of the press, and safeguards for disbanded contra soldiers, for no new demands were placed on the Nicaraguan government such as those in prior summit accords. However, a separate agreement was signed stating that Nicaragua will withdraw its suit from the International Court of Justice when it has been verified that no armed contra troops remain in Honduras. With respect to the problem of El Salvador, the presidents called for both sides to take part in negotiations. The Central American governments "vehemently urge the FMLN to carry out a constructive dialogue with the objective of achieving a just and true peace," the document read. "In equal manner, the governments urge the government of El Salvador to arrange with full guarantees... the incorporation of FMLN members into peaceful life." Reactions Reactions to the accord varied. Contra leader Enrique Bermudez claimed, "We have the right not to take the accords signed by the Sandinistas seriously." Meanwhile, seven high ranking contra officials, including Israel Galeano Cornejo or "Franklin", chief of the contra High Command, and Osorno Coleman or "Blas", leader of the Miskito forces, asked the US for asylum in Miami. Among the contra rank and file, some troops look towards disbandment but don't know where to go. Nicaragua is offering full guarantees, but many contras have not received them in hand and threaten to continue with their own battles. In El Salvador, both Cristiani and the FMLN claimed that the summit was a big success, but the future remains just as unclear. The military has already announced that they are not prepared to honor the commitment to dialogue and negotiate a solution signed by the president. Many in the international community applauded the presidential summit results which signified a defeat of White House plans, symbolized by the sending of Bernard Aronson to Tela only one day before the summit was to begin. Contra leader Bosco Matamoros was prompted to say that the accord "represents a failure for the State Department of the policy it tried to impose in 24 hours." All in all, the presidents signed and sealed the end of an era: that of the unappealable dictates from Washington. --- Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations patth@sci.ccny.cuny.edu | Information patth@ccnysci.BITNET | Transfer Exchange