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From: dee@linus.MITRE.ORG (David E. Emery)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: The death of mobile war
Message-ID: <26787@amdcad.AMD.COM>
Date: 16 Aug 89 06:16:06 GMT
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From: dee@linus.MITRE.ORG (David E. Emery)
It is true that a single (NATO) observer can mass all the guns in range 
on a single target.  The problems are:

	1.  there are many more targets than guns and bullets
	2.  counterfire

I can give you 'back of the envelope' calculations for the former, but
take my word for it that the Soviets have a heluva lot more targets
than we have cannon.  One thing you have to remember is that artillery
is never 100% effective.  For instance, if I remember right, we plan
about 100-200 rounds to inflict 10% casualties on an attacking
maneuver company.  200 rounds is the equivalent of firing 2 rounds
from every cannon assigned and routinely attached to a division.

Counterfire is the real problem.  We can acquire the Soviet artillery
on the first round, seeing only ~500 meters of trajectory.  They are
not far behind.  Even in a SP unit, it still takes a long time to
displace.  To save your behind, you move constantly, so assume 50% of
your artillery is moving.  

The problem is then the traditional 'battle management' problem,
selecting the few targets that give you significant payback, based on
the availability and expenditure of ammunition, and the availability
and exposure (to counterfire) of firing units.

Direct Fire is still more efficient than indirect fire at killing
things that can be seen.  That means that a tank is a better tank
killer than a cannon, and will remain so for a while.

				dave emery
				emery@aries.mitre.org
				(CPT, Field Artillery, NH Army NG)