Path: utzoo!utgpu!watmath!att!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!gem.mps.ohio-state.edu!csd4.csd.uwm.edu!uxc.cso.uiuc.edu!uxc.cso.uiuc.edu!m.cs.uiuc.edu!p.cs.uiuc.edu!gillies From: gillies@p.cs.uiuc.edu Newsgroups: comp.sys.next Subject: Re: Diskless NeXT's?? Message-ID: <116900007@p.cs.uiuc.edu> Date: 14 Aug 89 16:31:00 GMT References: <192101@<1989Aug8> Lines: 21 Nf-ID: #R:<1989Aug8:192101:p.cs.uiuc.edu:116900007:000:950 Nf-From: p.cs.uiuc.edu!gillies Aug 14 11:31:00 1989 I think perhaps the NeXT machine needs a keyswitch that simultaneously locks the case shut and forces it to boot from the hard disk (or network). In this way, you could prevent students from hacking on the network using a public NeXT box. On the other hand, I believe computer nets should be robust enough to prevent students from doing dangerous hacking. I once wrote TCP software for a PC connected to the ARPAnet, and there was no problem. However, one day my officemate crashed 3 vaxes using the PC's tftp. Berkeley UNIX was just too flakey and non-robust (the TCP couldn't handle zero-length packet options). It seems like only MIT and Xerox care enough to put an authentication protocol on their sensitive network services. Maybe other sites should start to care. Don Gillies, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Illinois 1304 W. Springfield, Urbana, Ill 61801 ARPA: gillies@cs.uiuc.edu UUCP: {uunet,harvard}!uiucdcs!gillies