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From: geb@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU (Gordon E. Banks)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Artificial Intelligence and Intelligence
Message-ID: <1847@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU>
Date: 6 Dec 88 22:42:08 GMT
References: <562@metapsy.UUCP> <2732@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <563@metapsy.UUCP> <1841@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> <817@quintus.UUCP>
Reply-To: geb@cadre.dsl.pittsburgh.edu (Gordon E. Banks)
Organization: Decision Systems Lab., Univ. of Pittsburgh, PA.
Lines: 16

In article <817@quintus.UUCP> ok@quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) writes:
>In article <1841@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> geb@cadre.dsl.pittsburgh.edu (Gordon E. Banks) writes:
>>Neither of these two propositions can be demonstrated reliably.
>>The behaviorists have shown that behavior which subjectively seems
>>to us to be caused by intention can be determined (even hypnotists
>>can demonstrate this), 
>
>Er, how do hypnotists demonstrate that?

People who were hypnotized usually report not that they were 
compelled to perform the suggested actions but that they "felt
like it".  In other words, the subjective impression was that the
actions were voluntary, yet they do ridiculous things that are clearly
determined by the suggestion.  If you wish to claim that post-hypnotic
suggestions are true free-will voluntary actions, then I can
only argue with your definition.