Xref: utzoo comp.ai:2805 talk.philosophy.misc:1686 Path: utzoo!utgpu!watmath!clyde!att!osu-cis!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!mailrus!cornell!rochester!pt.cs.cmu.edu!cadre!geb From: geb@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU (Gordon E. Banks) Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc Subject: Re: Artificial Intelligence and Intelligence Message-ID: <1847@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> Date: 6 Dec 88 22:42:08 GMT References: <562@metapsy.UUCP> <2732@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <563@metapsy.UUCP> <1841@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> <817@quintus.UUCP> Reply-To: geb@cadre.dsl.pittsburgh.edu (Gordon E. Banks) Organization: Decision Systems Lab., Univ. of Pittsburgh, PA. Lines: 16 In article <817@quintus.UUCP> ok@quintus.UUCP (Richard A. O'Keefe) writes: >In article <1841@cadre.dsl.PITTSBURGH.EDU> geb@cadre.dsl.pittsburgh.edu (Gordon E. Banks) writes: >>Neither of these two propositions can be demonstrated reliably. >>The behaviorists have shown that behavior which subjectively seems >>to us to be caused by intention can be determined (even hypnotists >>can demonstrate this), > >Er, how do hypnotists demonstrate that? People who were hypnotized usually report not that they were compelled to perform the suggested actions but that they "felt like it". In other words, the subjective impression was that the actions were voluntary, yet they do ridiculous things that are clearly determined by the suggestion. If you wish to claim that post-hypnotic suggestions are true free-will voluntary actions, then I can only argue with your definition.