Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!jfbuss From: jfbuss@water.UUCP Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: The nature of knowledge Message-ID: <1029@water.UUCP> Date: Wed, 8-Jul-87 11:00:35 EDT Article-I.D.: water.1029 Posted: Wed Jul 8 11:00:35 1987 Date-Received: Thu, 9-Jul-87 06:12:56 EDT References: <3587e521.44e6@apollo.uucp> <680@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU> <1022@water.UUCP> <51@thirdi.UUCP> <121@cavell.UUCP> Reply-To: jfbuss@water.waterloo.edu (Jonathan Buss) Distribution: world Organization: U. of Waterloo, Ontario Lines: 29 Keywords: knowledge belief truth certainty In article <121@cavell.UUCP> jiml@cavell.UUCP (Jim Laycock) writes: > Consider a much smaller scenario--one in which I have but three beliefs: > > 1. Bel(p) > 2. Bel(q) > 3. Bel(~(p^q)) > >Surely if such a situation were to come about, you'd have no trouble >considering me to be inconsistent. Yet my proposal is that we all >entertain a much greater version of precisely the same notion. Are >we inconsistent, or just unreflective (are certain beliefs not questioned)? A friend of mine claims the following happened to him: 1) He believed that he would run a particular errand at 2:00pm Friday. 2) He believed that he would attend his 2-hour class, which met Fridays starting at 1:00. These beliefs co-existed quite comfortably for several days, because he did not perform any logical analysis of them. (For example, he did not keep a planning calendar.) I think that this kind of situation is common and not an exception. Although the beliefs that are never tested or questioned are few, many beliefs are not fully examined for a considerable period. Hence one's set of beliefs may be formally inconsistent.