Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!seismo!mcnc!duke!mps From: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith) Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Logic and Coercion Message-ID: <9962@duke.cs.duke.edu> Date: Sun, 26-Jul-87 10:24:09 EDT Article-I.D.: duke.9962 Posted: Sun Jul 26 10:24:09 1987 Date-Received: Sun, 26-Jul-87 21:20:09 EDT References: <68@thirdi.UUCP> Reply-To: mps@duke.UUCP (Michael P. Smith) Distribution: world Organization: Duke University, Durham NC Lines: 27 Keywords: belief, proof, explanation, Nozick Summary: Nozick's distinction between *proof* & *explanation* In article <68@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: >The notion of what truly constitutes compulsion in the area of thought is >somewhat unclear (to me). Is logic a form of application of force? Does >demonstration enforce agreement? Or should force be regarded as the >application of pain and duress (or a threat of some kind)? My inclination is >to apply the term to the latter. If anyone has views on the topic of what >consititutes the use of force or coercion, I'd be interested to hear them. You might be interested in the introduction to Robert Nozick's PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (Harvard 1981). He characterizes typical philosophical argument as coercive, and adopts instead the mode of "philosophical explanation" (hence the book's title). The basic idea is that instead of trying to *prove* philosophical position P true, one should try to *explain* how P is possible. Besides being nicer, Nozick argues (explains?), the explanatory approach tends to produce understanding, as opposed to mere conviction, and so fits better the end of philosophy. Note that both *proof* and *explanation* employ logic, but in different ways. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- "I do not take the skeptic seriously enough to want to teach him; I do take what he says seriously enough to want to learn from it." R. Nozick Michael P. Smith ARPA: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------