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From: eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: the nature of knowledge
Message-ID: <112@snark.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 5-Jul-87 21:36:51 EDT
Article-I.D.: snark.112
Posted: Sun Jul  5 21:36:51 1987
Date-Received: Tue, 7-Jul-87 03:35:25 EDT
References: <3587e521.44e6@apollo.uucp> <680@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU> <103@snark.UUCP> <8706301520.AA01304@brahms.Berkeley.EDU>
Organization: Thyrsus Enterprises, Malvern PA 19355
Lines: 71
Summary: well, maybe...

In article <48@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
> At any particular moment, from the viewpoint of an individual, knowledge and
> belief (meaning not a weak opinion but a firmly-held conviction) are one and
> the same thing.  If I believe something (such as the truth of *this*
> philosophical position), I say "I *know* it's true."  In other words, it is
> knowledge, to me.  If you agree with my belief, you also call it knowledge,
> because then it is a belief of *yours* and therefore knowledge for you.  If
> you don't agree or aren't sure, you call it a "belief" of *mine*.  It isn't,
> then, a belief of *yours*, in the sense of belief I gave above.  That, in my
> view, is what knowledge actually is.

This is a correct *psychological* view of the relation of 'belief' and
'knowledge' to the believing mind, but it sidesteps the real issue, which
is the degree of confirmation of beliefs and how confirmation happens.

Also, it is quite possible for two people to have a shared 'belief'
that is not defined as 'knowledge' between them. Have you ever discussed
theology with a couple of Unitarians (for example)? 

Even if one were to accept your proposal as stated, there are problems.

	1. Your terminology doesn't solve any problems. "What are the
	   proper criteria for forming beliefs?" is not formally superior
	   to "What strategies lead to valid knowledge?", though I agree
	   that the connotations and emphases are different.

	2. Your terminology erases a useful distinction between

	   belief = weakly confirmed or not yet predictively checked
	   knowledge = strongly confirmed, successfully used for prediction

You later state that you think that one's method for evaluating beliefs
should vary, depending on context. This I completely disagree with, because
it takes you right back to a subjectivist "truth is what I *choose* to believe"
frame. Furthermore, this premise is unnecessary.

All the 'truth' cases you describe can be viewed as assertions about the
predictive value of statements. What varies is the kind of prediction being
made. In the case of (say) an equation in physics, one is predicting the
behavior of particles and forces; in the case of 'better' judgements about
musical chords, one is predicting the future responses of one's own auditory
and nervous system (and possibly the auditory/nervous systems of others).

Whether you accepted a belief on authority may be psychologically important
or not, but should have nothing to do with your methods for *checking*
beliefs. If I tell you that oxygen has an atomic number of 8, and remark
that I learned this from the CRC Handbook, I am making a predictive
statement about weighing oxygen which should be *tested* by weighing
oxygen; the question of my 'authority' response to the book only needs
to be opened if a) you find that I predicted incorrectly and b) upon seeing
your results I fail to be convinced.

Translating 'x is true' or 'x is a valid belief' into 'x predicts future
consequences y' and then testing y in some way isn't just a pragmatically
good thing, it is the *only* test of 'truth' that doesn't degenerate into
circularity or babble. If you doubt this, try to come up with a
counterexample. Try very hard. I shall be interested to see what, if
anything, you evolve.

And, BTW, welcome to the discussion. I criticize (and may continue to do
so) but I liked your posting.
-- 
      Eric S. Raymond
      UUCP:  {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric
      Post:  22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355
      Phone: (215)-296-5718
-- 
      Eric S. Raymond
      UUCP:  {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric
      Post:  22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355
      Phone: (215)-296-5718