Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!ptsfa!ames!rutgers!mit-eddie!uw-beaver!ubc-vision!alberta!jiml From: jiml@alberta.UUCP Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: The nature of knowledge Message-ID: <121@cavell.UUCP> Date: Mon, 6-Jul-87 16:46:04 EDT Article-I.D.: cavell.121 Posted: Mon Jul 6 16:46:04 1987 Date-Received: Fri, 10-Jul-87 02:42:46 EDT References: <3587e521.44e6@apollo.uucp> <680@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU> <1022@water.UUCP> <51@thirdi.UUCP> Reply-To: jiml@cavell.UUCP (Jim Laycock) Distribution: world Organization: U. of Alberta, Edmonton, AB Lines: 43 Keywords: knowledge belief truth certainty In article <51@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: [discussion of philosophical knowledge] > >I don't think, from this particular, here-and-now individual >viewpoint, that one can make a valid distinction between belief and true >belief. To a person at a given time, *all* his beliefs are true beliefs. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >They only become false if he later disagrees with them (at >which point they are, of course, no longer beliefs, but *former* beliefs), or >if others disagree with them (at which points, they are not beliefs for those >others). So knowledge = belief = true belief, from the viewpoint of an >individual at a given time. > >Sarge Gerbode >Institute for Research in Metapsychology >UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge I'm not convinced of the portion high-lighted above. It seems to me that not all of my beliefs reflect true propositions (unless I'm incredibly skilled in choosing what to believe). Nonetheless, it is not true of any particular belief p that I consider it to be false, otherwise I would reject it and believe ~p. Let us also assume that I have a finite number of beliefs. Consider a much smaller scenario--one in which I have but three beliefs: 1. Bel(p) 2. Bel(q) 3. Bel(~(p^q)) Surely if such a situation were to come about, you'd have no trouble considering me to be inconsistent. Yet my proposal is that we all entertain a much greater version of precisely the same notion. Are we inconsistent, or just unreflective (are certain beliefs not questioned)? Is this to deny 4. Bel(Bel(p)) for some p? -- Jim Laycock Philosophy grad, University of Alberta alberta!Jim_Laycock@UQV-MTS OR decvax!bellcore!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxn!ihnp4!alberta!cavell!jiml