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From: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu (Michael P. Smith)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: The nature of knowledge
Message-ID: <9900@duke.cs.duke.edu>
Date: Sat, 11-Jul-87 10:41:28 EDT
Article-I.D.: duke.9900
Posted: Sat Jul 11 10:41:28 1987
Date-Received: Sun, 12-Jul-87 16:02:10 EDT
Reply-To: mps@duke.UUCP (Michael P. Smith)
Distribution: world
Organization: Duke University, Durham NC
Lines: 31
Keywords: knowledge, belief, logic
Summary: Epistemic logic references

References:<9877@duke.cs.duke.edu> <1537@ubc-cs.UUCP>


In article <1537@ubc-cs.UUCP> andrews@ubc-cs.UUCP (Jamie Andrews) writes:
>     So Michael feels that ( \exists X (Bel(X) & ~X) ) ...but he cannot
>actually exhibit such an X, because he also feels that
>( \forall X (Bel(X) -> ~Bel(~X)) ).  However, he does feel that there
>is a "knows" connective, with the property that
>( \forall X (Kn(X) -> X) ).  Is this a good summary?  

Yes.  

>Can anyone suggest a good summary paper of logics which encompass the
>notion of belief?

Jaakko Hintikka's KNOWLEDGE & BELIEF started it all 25 years ago, and
is still one of the best and most accessible treatments.  Hintikka is
a philosopher, and many philosophical problems are considered.
Wolfgang Lenzen's RECENT WORK IN EPISTEMIC LOGIC covers results
through the 70s. Neither of these are summary papers, though.  I
believe you would find one in Dov Gabbay's HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL
LOGIC (v.2, I think).  I don't have these volumes in front of me, and
I don't remember what is there.  I do remember that the quality of the
articles in uneven, so *caveat lector*.

>--Jamie.
>...!seismo!ubc-vision!ubc-cs!andrews

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"The absurd assumption ... that a performance ... inherits its title to
 intelligence from some anterior internal operation of planning..." G. Ryle

Michael P. Smith	ARPA  mps@duke.cs.duke.edu
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