Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!seismo!ut-sally!im4u!rutgers!princeton!mind!harnad From: harnad@mind.UUCP (Stevan Harnad) Newsgroups: comp.ai,comp.cog-eng Subject: Re: The symbol grounding problem Message-ID: <976@mind.UUCP> Date: Sun, 5-Jul-87 01:29:02 EDT Article-I.D.: mind.976 Posted: Sun Jul 5 01:29:02 1987 Date-Received: Sun, 5-Jul-87 05:37:31 EDT References: <764@mind.UUCP> <768@mind.UUCP> <770@mind.UUCP> <6174@diamond.BBN.COM> <605@gec-mi-at.co.uk> Organization: Cognitive Science, Princeton University Lines: 24 Summary: Grounding is not just hooking peripherals to a computer Xref: mnetor comp.ai:624 comp.cog-eng:188 In Article 184 of comp.cog-eng: adam@gec-mi-at.co.uk (Adam Quantrill) of Marconi Instruments Ltd., St. Albans, UK writes: > It seems to me that the Symbol Grounding problem is a red herring. > If I took a partially self-learning program and data (P & D) that had > learnt from a computer with 'sense organs', and ran it on a computer > without, would the program's output become symbolically ungrounded?... > [or] if I myself wrote P & D without running it on a computer at all? This begs two of the central questions that have been raised in this discussion: (1) Can one speak of grounding in a toy device (i.e., a device with performance capacities less than those needed to pass the Total Turing Test)? (2) Could the TTT be passed by just a symbol manipulating module connected to transducers and effectors? If a device that could pass the TTT were cut off from its transducers, it would be like the philosophers' "brain in a vat" -- which is not obviously a digital computer running programs. -- Stevan Harnad (609) - 921 7771 {bellcore, psuvax1, seismo, rutgers, packard} !princeton!mind!harnad harnad%mind@princeton.csnet harnad@mind.Princeton.EDU