Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!seismo!rochester!fulk From: fulk@rochester.arpa (Mark Fulk) Newsgroups: sci.research,sci.med,talk.rumors,misc.headlines Subject: Re: Definition of science Message-ID: <485@sol.ARPA> Date: Wed, 8-Jul-87 13:44:57 EDT Article-I.D.: sol.485 Posted: Wed Jul 8 13:44:57 1987 Date-Received: Sat, 11-Jul-87 06:56:20 EDT References: <6693@allegra.UUCP> <1664@tekcrl.TEK.COM> Reply-To: fulk@rochester.UUCP (Mark Fulk) Organization: U of Rochester, CS Dept, Rochester, NY Lines: 36 Xref: mnetor sci.research:185 sci.med:2595 talk.rumors:904 misc.headlines:894 The main reference for the "falsification" theory of science has to be Karl Popper, _The Logic of Scientific Discovery_. A variant point of view can be found in Alfred Jules Ayer's book _Language, Thought, and Logic_. Both are classics and are required reading for anyone discussing philosophy of science. That much said, there are indeed problems with Popper's philosophy. For criticisms, read the works of Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn; not that I agree with everything they say either. In case you're interested (probably not, but I'll say it anyway) I like the notions of Charles Sanders Peirce the best, and I don't believe that they have received proper attention. He is the founder of pragmaticism, which has often been vulgarized under the name pragmatism. If you read criticisms of pragmatic philosophy, be sure that Peirce's thought is being directly addressed and not the thought of Thomas Dewey or the other, later, pragmatic philosophers. In a nutshell: Lakatos: "Scientific theories float in seas of anomalies." That is, the explanatory power of a scientific theory is normally (at least so far) minuscule compared to the mass of phenomena the theory attempts to explain. Kuhn: Paraphrased: Science is more driven by the social, economic, etc. concerns of its practitioners than by any logic of discoveries. Major changes in scientific theories ("paradigm shifts") are more due to the aging and death of old believers than to evidence, and do not usually increase the truthfulness of theories. Peirce: The purpose of science is to allow us better ability to predict the behavior of the world, and to better alter it. Scientific theories are never complete explanations of reality, but are rather elements in a sequence of inaccurate, but improving models. The existence of "absolute truth" or "absolute reality" can be argued either way, but is essentially irrelevant to science.