Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!uunet!seismo!husc6!cmcl2!brl-adm!brl-smoke!gwyn From: gwyn@brl-smoke.ARPA (Doug Gwyn ) Newsgroups: comp.unix.questions Subject: Re: Passwords in /etc/group Message-ID: <6113@brl-smoke.ARPA> Date: Sun, 12-Jul-87 17:26:41 EDT Article-I.D.: brl-smok.6113 Posted: Sun Jul 12 17:26:41 1987 Date-Received: Mon, 13-Jul-87 04:58:04 EDT References: <5740010@hpfcdc.HP.COM> <207@macom1.UUCP> <3671@cisunx.UUCP> <2812@ncoast.UUCP> <3703@cisunx.UUCP> Reply-To: gwyn@brl.arpa (Doug Gwyn (VLD/VMB)) Organization: Ballistic Research Lab (BRL), APG, MD. Lines: 16 In article <3703@cisunx.UUCP> nk233514@cisunx.UUCP (Deus) writes: >After all, if they were, why would the passwd file be world readable on most >machines ? It contains user information (name<->UID mapping, for instance) that is of general use to nonprivileged applications. However, having the encrypted passwords publicly visible IS a botch, even though it seemed cute at the time. With modern technology it is not hard to discover several passwords in a reasonable amount of time if the encrypted passwords are available for inspection. What is needed is a trusted password verifier (which might maintain encrypted passwords as an extra level of safety, but would not have its password database readable by untrusted programs in any case). It would not be hard to design such a beast and adapt the few programs and routines ]that currently verify passwords. Somebody skilled in UNIX security should check any implementation of this idea, however, BEFORE it is used -- there are lots of loopholes that one must be aware of and deal with.