Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!mnetor!seismo!rutgers!cbmvax!snark!eric From: eric@snark.UUCP (Eric S. Raymond) Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech Subject: the nature of knowledge Message-ID: <112@snark.UUCP> Date: Sun, 5-Jul-87 21:36:51 EDT Article-I.D.: snark.112 Posted: Sun Jul 5 21:36:51 1987 Date-Received: Tue, 7-Jul-87 03:35:25 EDT References: <3587e521.44e6@apollo.uucp> <680@gargoyle.UChicago.EDU> <103@snark.UUCP> <8706301520.AA01304@brahms.Berkeley.EDU> Organization: Thyrsus Enterprises, Malvern PA 19355 Lines: 71 Summary: well, maybe... In article <48@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes: > At any particular moment, from the viewpoint of an individual, knowledge and > belief (meaning not a weak opinion but a firmly-held conviction) are one and > the same thing. If I believe something (such as the truth of *this* > philosophical position), I say "I *know* it's true." In other words, it is > knowledge, to me. If you agree with my belief, you also call it knowledge, > because then it is a belief of *yours* and therefore knowledge for you. If > you don't agree or aren't sure, you call it a "belief" of *mine*. It isn't, > then, a belief of *yours*, in the sense of belief I gave above. That, in my > view, is what knowledge actually is. This is a correct *psychological* view of the relation of 'belief' and 'knowledge' to the believing mind, but it sidesteps the real issue, which is the degree of confirmation of beliefs and how confirmation happens. Also, it is quite possible for two people to have a shared 'belief' that is not defined as 'knowledge' between them. Have you ever discussed theology with a couple of Unitarians (for example)? Even if one were to accept your proposal as stated, there are problems. 1. Your terminology doesn't solve any problems. "What are the proper criteria for forming beliefs?" is not formally superior to "What strategies lead to valid knowledge?", though I agree that the connotations and emphases are different. 2. Your terminology erases a useful distinction between belief = weakly confirmed or not yet predictively checked knowledge = strongly confirmed, successfully used for prediction You later state that you think that one's method for evaluating beliefs should vary, depending on context. This I completely disagree with, because it takes you right back to a subjectivist "truth is what I *choose* to believe" frame. Furthermore, this premise is unnecessary. All the 'truth' cases you describe can be viewed as assertions about the predictive value of statements. What varies is the kind of prediction being made. In the case of (say) an equation in physics, one is predicting the behavior of particles and forces; in the case of 'better' judgements about musical chords, one is predicting the future responses of one's own auditory and nervous system (and possibly the auditory/nervous systems of others). Whether you accepted a belief on authority may be psychologically important or not, but should have nothing to do with your methods for *checking* beliefs. If I tell you that oxygen has an atomic number of 8, and remark that I learned this from the CRC Handbook, I am making a predictive statement about weighing oxygen which should be *tested* by weighing oxygen; the question of my 'authority' response to the book only needs to be opened if a) you find that I predicted incorrectly and b) upon seeing your results I fail to be convinced. Translating 'x is true' or 'x is a valid belief' into 'x predicts future consequences y' and then testing y in some way isn't just a pragmatically good thing, it is the *only* test of 'truth' that doesn't degenerate into circularity or babble. If you doubt this, try to come up with a counterexample. Try very hard. I shall be interested to see what, if anything, you evolve. And, BTW, welcome to the discussion. I criticize (and may continue to do so) but I liked your posting. -- Eric S. Raymond UUCP: {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric Post: 22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355 Phone: (215)-296-5718 -- Eric S. Raymond UUCP: {{seismo,ihnp4,rutgers}!cbmvax,sdcrdcf!burdvax}!snark!eric Post: 22 South Warren Avenue, Malvern, PA 19355 Phone: (215)-296-5718