Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!CINCOM.UMD.EDU!todd From: todd@CINCOM.UMD.EDU.UUCP Newsgroups: mod.computers.vax Subject: request for help re: proving a file is deleted Message-ID: <8612071737.AA14985@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> Date: Fri, 5-Dec-86 10:46:00 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8612071737.AA14985 Posted: Fri Dec 5 10:46:00 1986 Date-Received: Sun, 7-Dec-86 14:34:57 EST Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: "TODD AVEN"Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 35 Approved: info-vax@sri-kl.arpa Well, all you VMS security buffs out there. Here's a puzzle to stretch your minds and ease my worries: One of our employees created and edited three technical reports of a hitherto unclassified nature. The files sat on the disk (an RA81) for approximately two weeks, before being TeXed and deleted. After presentation of the reports, they were classified (SECRET-level only). I have none of the wonderful VMS security features enabled. No ACLs, no highwater marking, no erase on delete, etc. Now my questions are (there are several, of course): 1) Is there any option available to me now short of a backup-entire-disk/format-and-write-special-pattern/ restore-entire-disk to ensure (to DIS) that all information in the reports is absolutely unscavengable? 2) Is this backup/overwrite/restore cycle *sufficient* to ensure this (in the eyes of DIS)? You and I both know that the odds of any of the data remaining is slim (the disk subsequently reached 90% capacity), but not slim enough for DoD, I think. I really don't want to have to backup/overwrite/restore an RA81 with a less-than-reliable 1600bpi drive! Anyone got a suggestion to help me out? Thanks, Todd Aven Systems Engineering, Inc. (301)345-1692 ------