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Path: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!CINCOM.UMD.EDU!todd
From: todd@CINCOM.UMD.EDU.UUCP
Newsgroups: mod.computers.vax
Subject: request for help re:  proving a file is deleted
Message-ID: <8612071737.AA14985@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: Fri, 5-Dec-86 10:46:00 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8612071737.AA14985
Posted: Fri Dec  5 10:46:00 1986
Date-Received: Sun, 7-Dec-86 14:34:57 EST
Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: "TODD AVEN" 
Organization: The ARPA Internet
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Approved: info-vax@sri-kl.arpa


Well, all you VMS security buffs out there. Here's a
puzzle to stretch your minds and ease my worries:

One of our employees created and edited three technical
reports of a hitherto unclassified nature. The files sat
on the disk (an RA81) for approximately two weeks, before
being TeXed and deleted. After presentation of the reports,
they were classified (SECRET-level only). I have none of
the wonderful VMS security features enabled. No ACLs, no
highwater marking, no erase on delete, etc. Now my questions
are (there are several, of course):

1)  Is there any option available to me now short of 
a backup-entire-disk/format-and-write-special-pattern/
restore-entire-disk to ensure (to DIS) that all information
in the reports is absolutely unscavengable?

2) Is this backup/overwrite/restore cycle *sufficient* to
ensure this (in the eyes of DIS)?

You and I both know that the odds of any of the data remaining
is slim (the disk subsequently reached 90% capacity), but not
slim enough for DoD, I think.

I really don't want to have to backup/overwrite/restore an
RA81 with a less-than-reliable 1600bpi drive!

Anyone got a suggestion to help me out?

Thanks,
Todd Aven
Systems Engineering, Inc.
(301)345-1692
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