Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP
Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!ucbvax!decvax!yale!inmet!nrh
From: nrh@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 2]
Message-ID: <28200223@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 27-Oct-85 01:00:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200223
Posted: Sun Oct 27 01:00:00 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 31-Oct-85 08:01:47 EST
References: <305@umich.UUCP>
Lines: 169
Nf-ID: #R:umich:-30500:inmet:28200223:000:8641
Nf-From: inmet!nrh    Oct 26 23:00:00 1985


>/* Written  3:32 pm  Oct 23, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */
>In article <28200184@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>>>>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is
>>>>>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them
>>>>>respond to logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond
>>>>>to logic -- on the (hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are
>>>>>by nature nonrational. [TOREK]
>>
>>As I've pointed out, the fact that there's a reason NOT to change
>>your preferences doesn't mean that there is ONLY that reason in someone's
>>mind.  (If you were right, nobody would EVER change his mind).  [NRH]
>
>But, on your hypothesis, the other reasons in that person's mind are
>illusory.  

	Il-lu-so-ry ... adj producing, based on, or having the nature
	of, illusion; deceptive; unreal; illusive.

My hypothesis is that there are things in a persons mind that make
him prefer reason over other ways of making decisions.  These 
"things" are irrational.  I don't recall using the word illusory to
describe them, and you are on dangerous ground indeed to describe 
everything that is irrational as illusory.  Madmen are irrational, but
none the less real for all that.  Things in your head that help you
have preferences are irrational (I contend) but only "unreal" in the
sense of not being amenable to outside testing (your reason is only
somewhat more amenable to outside testing, by the way).

It doesn't MATTER what degree of reasonableness that the preference
making mechanisms have (except insofar as a preference to be reasonable
will make you ignore some and not others).  That they are irrational
doesn't make them illusory, and I suspect you're attacking the
wrong hypothesis.

>Therefore, when you try to convince him to change his preferences
>(note, not his beliefs, his preferences), there is something weird going on.
>You are asking him to do something which, if he accepted something else you
>believe and have argued for (about reason and preference), he would not do.

People do this all the time.  It's called "putting it in terms the other
person can understand".  It's about as mundane an activity as one
could imagine.  

That people disagree upon certain values is the basis of all commerce,
by the way.  If EVERYBODY wanted food (absolutely) more than they wanted
money, no food would be sold (because no person would accept food for money).

>It is as if the person were a creationist, and you were trying to get him to
>believe in evolution on the basis that God, in which you did not believe,
>is such that He likes to see things evolve.

If I could find scripture that would support this notion, I would probably
quote it.  Why not?  *I* don't know if someone's religion is right or
a bunch of hogwash, but if a religious person could be convinced to
agree with me in a way that made sense in his terms (even if it didn't
make a great deal of sense in mine) what's the harm?  In fact, I find
that people appreciate the effort to accept them as they are, without
trying to change all their conceptual framework to match mine.

I don't DISBELIEVE in the value of logic (in the case of our
conflict).  I simply believe that logical values don't form the basis
for postulates.  This is practically a definition of postulate.

>>>>>>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  [TOREK]
>>
>>If love makes one act contrary to what one's reasoned actions would be
>>in the absence of love, love makes one irrational.  If love does not
>>follow reason, love is irrational.  Don't like it?  Tough:
>>
>>	ir-ra-tio-nal .. adj: ... a(1): not endowed with reason or
>>understanding a(2): lacking usual or normal mental clarity or
>>coherence b : not governed by or according to reason (~ fears) 
>
>OK, love is irrational under definition (b), and SOME people in love are
>irrational under definition a(2).  But not ALL people.  Therefore, there is
>still a distinction here, even though, contrary to what I thought, 
>"nonrational" counts as a species of "irrational".  "Nonrational" refers
>to whatever satisfies definition (b).  Let's use "contrary to reason" to
>replace what I thought "irrational" meant.  Now, an emotion would be
>"contrary to reason" if ALL people all the time satisfied a(2) when they
>had that emotion.

I think you overstate the case.  Any sensation whatever makes one
less reasonable in the sense that they must now respond to sensation
instead of whatever might be the dictates of reason at that moment.
In short, fear, hate, love, itching, sudden noises, and being told in 
high-sounding ways that there IS a free lunch, are all contrary to reason.

You're emphasizing the sensation of emotion (that is, how it feels
to be in love) rather than the consequence of emotion (how one's goals shift to
meet the contingency of feeling an emotion.  If Romeo kills himself from
despair, because he cannot live without Juliet, then his act may be logical
in the framework of what he feels, but what he feels (despair, love) 
is not itself based upon reason but upon emotion.

>...

>>>>My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe
>>>>your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic.  Especially if you
>>>>BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact.
>>>
>>>In other words, you'll use this belief against me, pretending when it's
>>>convenient that you share it?  Ideological mystification!
>>
>>Paul, if you maintain your beliefs are rational and I can show a contradiction
>>in them, or a flaw in your reasoning, it hardly matters what *I*
>>believe about them, does it?  
>
>It doesn't matter to the way I'll make up my mind.  But it does matter to
>the attitude I'll take toward my interlocutor.  Again, I think other people
>will feel similarly (if they are aware of your stance).

I value your goodwill, and hope you value mine.  But the earth moves,
regardless of how the people Galileo told felt about it.  The logic
holds (and sometimes does not hold), regardless of how YOU feel about
me, and I'm glad to hear we agree on this point.  While I naturally
hope that people agree with me AND like me, I find it more pleasing
to be right than to be popular.  Anyone who's run a medium-sized 
computer should know this feeling: you have to tell someone
that he can't put all those users on the machine AND have it be fast.
It would be fun to tell him otherwise, but no kindness, in the end.

Likewise, I'm sorry if it disturbs you that my personal beliefs disturb
you to the point that I might sacrifice your goodwill, but I'm hardly
willing to lie about them, or abandon them for that reason alone.

>>If you're saying: "A person must agree with me about reason before
>>I would be willing to change my beliefs because of something he said",
>>you're being rather pig-headed.
>
>Try: "a person must agree with me about reason before I would be willing
>to accept any argument WHICH HE PUTS FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF HIS VIEWS
>ABOUT REASON."

But I'm *NOT* putting forward anything on the basis of my views about
reason: I'm putting something forward on the basis of YOUR views about
reason.  Just in case someone has forgotten, I'm arguing that it makes
sense for us to argue reasonably about the basis for preferences, even
though I don't believe reason is the ultimate basis of preference.
The  basis of my argument is that YOU believe it makes sense to choose
preferences consistent with logic, and therefore YOU may be convinced
by reason that in fact not all of your postulates were chosen this way.

>>It means that you have discovered
>>a set of beliefs incapable of being shaken by reason, unless the
>>reason is given you by a fellow-believer.
>
>Yup, something like that.

Tsk.  If you ask me what time it is, and I tell you something like
the correct time as you estimate it, does it matter that I'm known 
to believe that time should be in some sort of metric measure rather
than hours?  I've clearly responded (in this example) in the
familiar hour notation of the correct time, so why be suspicious?

>>>I'll take any reasoning you offer with a HUGE grain of salt!  (And, I 
>>>think, any not-already-converted reader who has read the above will also.)
>>
>>Feel free!  Feel free!  But take what reasoning I offer as just that,
>>reasoning. ... It doesn't matter WHO advances an argument...
>
>Fair enough.  (But subject to the caveats above.)
>
>--Paul V Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief			torek@umich
>/* End of text from inmet:net.politics.t */

Paul, should I take anything you say as needlessly iconoclastic because
you make iconoclasm a trademark?