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From: nrh@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 1]
Message-ID: <28200224@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 27-Oct-85 01:12:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200224
Posted: Sun Oct 27 01:12:00 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 31-Oct-85 08:02:07 EST
References: <306@umich.UUCP>
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Nf-ID: #R:umich:-30600:inmet:28200224:000:4582
Nf-From: inmet!nrh    Oct 27 00:12:00 1985


>/* Written 10:12 pm  Oct 24, 1985 by baba@spar in inmet:net.politics.t */
>>>>>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's
>>>>>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when
>>>>>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when 
>>>>>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational.
>>>>>...
>>>>>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over]
>>>>>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!]
>>>>>
>>>>>...  I think such a preference is not just 
>>>>>nonrational, but irrational:  it has no basis in observable harm to the
>>>>>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. 
>>>>
>>>>What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A
>>>>parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show
>>>>his mother having sex with an elephant?  None at all, of course!  
>>>
>>>Plenty, of course.  By "observable" I include "observable to the person
>>>in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation.  Of course,
>>>you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to
>>>himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced.  And you'd be
>>>right.   BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness
>>>may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem.
>>>So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off.
>> 
>> Quite possible.  It MAY happen, but you've opened the door, certainly
>> things MAY happen the other way, and if Baba admits that *I* may be so
>> affected by a coercion as to make it a net loss WHATEVER good is likely
>> to be accomplished, you certainly must admit that the possibility 
>> exists for things happening the other way, and that therefore 
>> it does NOT follow that the "bad feelings" may be ignored.
>
>You rang?
>
>What I "admitted" (an interesting choice of words) was that you might
>subjectively experience coercion as so odious as to negate in your
>mind any benefits that you might receive from being coerced.  I am
>pleased that you concede that such an attitude on your part has no
>rational basis, any more than anyone else's "religion" does.  But the
>free practice of your religion can impact others of different "faiths".
>If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom
>the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits
>accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those
>others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you.
>Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system 
>that can only be practiced in a closed religious community?

Indeed, Baba, I should indeed have used "agree" rather than "admit".
I certainly didn't mean to imply that you were conceding anything: I
meant to use the term "admit" in the other sense of "grant".  

And now to your point about the injustice of not introducing coercion.
There's a rough problem here.  How to weigh my dislike of being
coerced against other peoples dislike of losing a public good?

A similar situation exists with respect to socialism.
If it is clear that socialism leads to poorer economic performance,
is the US justified in invading socialist regimes and putting in
laissez-faire ones?  If not, why not?  *IF* the discomfort of
imposition of laissez-faire is less than that of (say) famine, then
it is an injustice to the people under the socialist regime not
to invade, but WHO IS TO JUDGE?  And how?

Because of the existence of NON-free-rider situations (ones where the
person producing the wealth may deny use of it to anyone he chooses)
socialist regimes typically must employ force  (tax collectors, threat
of jail) to impose a progressive income tax.  Does this mean that
socialism must always intrude greatly upon individual actions?  In
other words, that socialism, to be viable, must be implemented with a
police state?

With all this focus upon the free-rider aspects
of the marketplace, few seem to have remarked that a similar situation
exists (on a much more massive scale) with command-economy regimes.  In
particular, people who are politically well-connected may live at the
expense of everyone else, regardless of what they contribute to
everyone else.  The fact that a command economy suffers from free
rider problems that are no doubt as large as (though a little subtler than)
those suffered by a hypothetical libertarian society is something that
must be considered when comparing the two.