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Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 1]
Message-ID: <768@mmintl.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 4-Nov-85 01:09:03 EST
Article-I.D.: mmintl.768
Posted: Mon Nov  4 01:09:03 1985
Date-Received: Tue, 5-Nov-85 07:45:36 EST
References: <306@umich.UUCP> <28200185@inmet.UUCP> <617@spar.UUCP> <545@qantel.UUCP>
Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Distribution: net
Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT
Lines: 67

In article <545@qantel.UUCP> gabor@qantel.UUCP (Gabor Fencsik@ex2642) writes:
>In article <617@spar.UUCP> Baba offers us the following riddle:
>> If you are in a free-rider situation with other individuals to whom
>> the discomfort of coercion is less significant than the benefits
>> accrued, a failure to coerce the lot of you is an injustice to those
>> others in exactly the same way as coercion is an injustice to you.
>> Is there a solution to this dilemma, or is libertarianism a system 
>> that can only be practiced in a closed religious community?
>
>Baba's move is to take a meta-rule in the game for trading preferences
>(the non-coercion principle) and turn it into just another chip in the
>game, arriving at a standard self-reference paradox.

No, we are debating whether to adopt the non-coercion principle.  The meta-
meta-principle forming the basis for that debate is "under what circumstances
are people better off" -- leaving lots of vagueness about who and in what
sense.  As a minimum, if everyone agrees that outcome A is better than
outcome B, then outcome A is better than outcome B.  If you accept the
non-coercion principle as a primary axiom, the discussion is irrelevant.

>1) Attack the static character of the free-rider paradigm and counter with
>   the principle of unconstrained secession. In most instantiations of
>   this paradigm one can escape the free-rider problem by changing the
>   rules of the game or opting out. If, by voluntary agreement, everyone
>   on my street is obligated to sweep the whole street once a year (there
>   are 365 of us) then a few free-riders can't ruin the scheme. Better,
>   abolish the arrangement altogether: let everyone sweep in front of their
>   own house (the technological solution).

This doesn't always work.  Consider street maintenance (very similar to your
example, but more realistic).  Let us assume that there is a voluntary
organisation to maintain the streets of a city.  Each individual is better of
if he opts out of the organization -- the remaining members will still
maintain the streets, and he doesn't have to pay for it.  Now, a few free
riders won't ruin this scheme.  But there is no reason why it should stop
with a few.  As more people opt out, the service becomes more expensive,
which encourages yet more people to opt out.  Eventually, the whole thing
collapses.

As for everyone maintaining their own section of the street.  First, some
people will fail to, and everyone who drives by will suffer as a result.
This doesn't quite meet the conditions above, but it is an example of
widespread inconvenience for the relatively minor gain of a small minority.

But even if everyone does maintain their own own section of the street,
they all lose.  There are real economies of scale in having it done
centrally.  (Yes, they can all hire the same company to repair the street.
But even if they can all agree on when it needs repair, they have to spend
time to coordinate hiring them.  The cost of doing so is not trivial.)

>2) Your paradox only shows that the failure to coerce leads to a result that
>   is suboptimal and unjust but I (with my libertarian hat on) refuse to be 
>   impressed. In order to cause my edifice to cave in you have to show 
>   that my refusal to be coerced can itself be coercive. [...]
>
>3) The last refuge is to challenge your original move of turning a meta-rule
>   into a chip in the trading game. The assertion is that the non-coercion
>   principle itself is not subject to trade-offs. [...]

As noted above, those who fall back on non-coercion as an a priori principle
will reject this arguement.  But they are trying to get the rest of us to
adopt libertarianism.  "No, we would all be worse off" is a perfectly valid
counter-argument.  (It may even convince some who thought they accepted the
non-coercion principle a priori.)

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108