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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Moody on Rosen on Searle
Message-ID: <2050@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 6-Nov-85 00:37:39 EST
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.2050
Posted: Wed Nov  6 00:37:39 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 8-Nov-85 08:17:22 EST
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>>My curiosity is piqued:  why is Moody going out of his way to make this sound
>>"bad"?  "Careless" about the exact type of machine?  One should note that
>>the central point of argument on this issue here has seemed to be the notion
>>held by some that the human brain CANNOT be represented in a mechanized
>>fashion as in a machine!  Amazing how Moody tries to make a concession on
>>his part (that the brain fits into the "*anything*" category he describes
>>above) be called "carelessness" on my part.  (The mark of a great
>>philosopher?) [ROSEN]

> To satisfy your curiosity: "anything" means "whatever there is."  Is it a
> "concession" to put the brain in this category?  No, because the brain
> is something.  What is bad about Rosen's "I could care less" comment
> is that it effectively blocks any effective inquiry into the problem.
> Rosen might as well have said "Mind and brain are something."  True,
> but hardly a contribution.  If Rosen has something more substantial in
> mind -- and I'm sure he does -- then he should just state it and
> present the arguments. [MOODY]

But I did, and your efforts to obscure what I am saying smack of yahoo
tactics.  We were talking about brain as machines, and the inability (or
not) of humans to build a machine that performs the same types of functions.

>>>>To throw yet another bone into this mix, I will quote from the oft-misquoted
>>>>(at least here) John Searle, from his "Minds, Brains, and Programs":
>>>  [Rosen, quoted material from Searle omitted]
>>
>>As it had been conveniently omitted the first time around, as well.

> The convenience is, I hope, that of the readers of this newsgroup, who
> might get tired of the repeated lengthy inclusions.  Those who are
> interested have no doubt saved the relevant sections.

Why does this sound so much like bland assertions made by political
manipulators who proudly state "the facts are there for all to see", in hopes
that no one will bother to look?

>>...his Searle's] opinion on the issues presented have been directly at odds
>>with those presented BY you and Ellis (i.e., deliberate omission of those
>>sections I included as if they were irrelevant).

> At last, a substantive claim.  Now, SHOW us exactly which claims Ellis
> and I have made that are at odds with exactly which claims of
> Searle's.  That way, Ellis and I have the opportunity to judge whether
> you are correct or not.  This is how the game is played.

The claim (for one) that you repeatedly make here regarding Searle's intent.
Where you would claim that I wasn't saying anything of substance because
I concur with the parts of Searle's writing that you deliberately left out
(and which, when they were posted, you twisted to your own ends to avoid
what was said).

>>> |______________________________ [Searle, quoted by Rosen]
>                                    {I've omitted it; check your
>                                     archives, folks}

"My record is open for public view, and if elected..."

>>> Now, let's look at Rich Rosen's argument.  The claim that formal
>>> symbol manipulations lack intentionality is the *conclusion* of
>>> Searle's arguments, which Searle recaps at the end of the paper.  Far
>>> from destroying his argument, Searle is merely summarizing its
>>> conclusions, in order to distinguish them from other positions.  The
>>> "right program" does *not* mean "the program that has intentionality";
>>> it means "the program that passes the Turing Test."

>>Now I see why you chose to omit the sections I quoted:  including them would
>>show the holes in your point of view and the fabrications surrounding it.
>>You deliberatele left out the questions (from that question/answer section)
>>that led up to that "ultimate" question, which in fact did not ONCE mention
>>the Turing test!  What was meant by being "the right program" WAS in fact
>>(despite your assertion to the contrary) having all the characteristics
>>necessary for "thought".  If intentionality (not present in the "Chinese room"
>>example) is one of them, so be it.  A program lacking that is NOT "the right
>>program" by Searle's OWN definition!

> I really have to insist that this is just wrong, and seriously
> misrepresents what Searle is doing.  In fact, I will do more than
> insist; I will *show* it.
> 
> First, a summary of the Q&A section from Searle's paper:  Can machines
> think? -- yes.  Could a man-made machine think? -- possibly.  Could a
> digital computer think? -- sure.  Could instantiating the "right"
> program be a sufficient for understanding? -- no.
> 
> So, we have to inquire what Searle might have meant by the "right
> program".  Rosen's contention appears to be that Searle could only
> have meant "a program having all the characteristics necessary for
> 'thought'".  Let's suppose that this is indeed what Searle meant, even
> though Rosen offers no support for his contention.

Hold your horses.  Assertion follows assertion here.  First you "summarize"
the section that I quotd directly (which, if posted, would make my points
very clear---again, is this the reason you leave this out???)  Then ...

> Would it follow
> that Searle's argument is viciously circular?  Hardly, because it
> wouldn't follow that the characteristics *necessary* for thought are
> *sufficient* for understanding (or intentionality in general).

Funny, I thought the characteristics necessary for thought INCLUDED
understanding and intentionality.  Without those things it simply wouldn't
be THINKING.  Now you arbitrarily claim that these are "extra" characteristics
that can be added on (like a sunroof).  Again, the "right program" for
thinking would include those facets.  If it didn't, it wouldn't be the right
program.

> And *that* is what the whole argument is about.  I contend that Searle
> is quite interested in criticizing the validity of the Turing Test,
> throughout his paper.  It would explain why he would say "But
> precisely one of the points at issue is the adequacy of the Turing
> test.  The example shows that there could be two 'systems,' both of
> which pass the Turing test, but only one of which understands..."

I don't disagree with the problems Searle is trying to evince.  I think there
are flaws in his argument, as I have shown above regarding the use of the term
"right program" in an erroneous way.

>>>  Note that the purpose of Searle's
>>> "Minds, Brains, and Programs" was not to develop a general theory of
>>> intentionality, but to criticize the notion that intentionality is
>>> just a matter of instantiating a Turing Machine program.  Hofstadter's
>>> insinuation that Searle vacillates on whether minds need to be
>>> embodied in neural stuff is a straw man.  Searle makes no such claim.

>>A thorough reading would show a good deal of vacillation.

> But I *have* read it thoroughly, more than a few times.  I can't find
> any vacillation on this point.  Neither Hofstadter nor Rosen has said
> anything to show that Searle does vacillate.  That's why I find these
> "arguments" weak. 

As Hofstadter said, sometimes the brain has exactly that "right stuff",
and other times it doesn't.  And of course there is the vacillation in
using the term "right program" in the first place.

>>> The last two sentences of Hofstadter, quoted by Rosen,
>>> cannot be called counterarguments; they are mere counterassertions.
>>> Rich Rosen offers no arguments of his own.  Indeed, he never clearly
>>> states just what it is that he is claiming about this Turing Machine
>>> issue.

>>Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but
>>(counter-)assertions.  Does the same rule apply to Moody's statements?

> An argument is the giving of reasons for one's claims.  I try to do
> that.  I do not see how counterassertions, or even
> counter-interrogatives, can count as arguments.

Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but
(counter-)assertions.

>>> I will grant that Hofstadter does offer *some* arguments in his
>>> remarks, but Rosen has not mentioned one of them.  Rosen also claims
>>> that those of us who have quoted him (Ellis and me) do so in defense
>>> of positions that Searle would reject.  Rosen does not name names, nor
>>> does he identify those positions, but it sure sounds good, doesn't it?

>>Perhaps it "sounds good" because it is true.  Note how Ellis was real big
>>on Searle, until it came to defining machine, at which point Ellis decided
>>to arbitrarily redefine things to suit his "needs" (i.e., desired
>>conclusions).

> Okay, I'll let Ellis speak for himself, if he is inclined to.  Note that
> Rosen has *still* not identified the positions, but at least he has
> identified the persons who are supposed to be adducing Searle in
> support of positions that Searle would reject.  Since I am one of
> those persons, I invite Rosen to *specify* the position, or to
> withdraw the claim.

I most certainly HAVE identified the positions, repeatedly, and to claim that
I haven't is both evasion and rhetorical babble.  To repeat:  Ellis suddenly
retracted his "support" of Searle when it came to the definition of machine.
And in a discussion revolving around free will, determinism, and mechanism in
the brain, Searle does NOT dispute notions of mechanism in the brain as has
been attempted here.  In fact, he would seem to support them.

>>And the substantive content of YOUR comments (as evidenced here) is not
>>zero, not even negative, but rather, imaginary.  [ROSEN]

I find it quaint that Moody elected to insert this sentence from MY posting,
evidently to put me in a bad light, while leaving out the section from his
own posting that this was in response to:

>>> In short, the substantive content of Rosen's comments on Searle and
>>> the relation of Turing Machines to minds is vanishingly close to zero.

I find it DOUBLY quaint in light of Moody's extended treatise on "ad hominem"
arguments.  Evidently using such arguments to find fundamental flaws in
reasoning and assumptions is a cardinal sin, whilst using them to kick your
opponent in the balls is acceptable philosophical discourse.  Your school must
have some curriculum in philosophy...
-- 
Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen.
					Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr