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From: root@bu-cs.UUCP (Barry Shein)
Newsgroups: net.math
Subject: Re: Mind as turing machine
Message-ID: <745@bu-cs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 31-Oct-85 19:25:14 EST
Article-I.D.: bu-cs.745
Posted: Thu Oct 31 19:25:14 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 3-Nov-85 05:32:12 EST
Distribution: net.math,net.philosophy
Organization: Boston Univ Comp. Sci.
Lines: 37

There are only three arguments that can feasibly disprove that the mind
cannot be simulated by a computer:

	A. Semantic: If there were a computer which simulated the
	mind, we would not call it a computer (quite literally this
	is possible, consider for example that we needed to add
	biological components to accomplish the job, such as enzyme
	switches, this would no doubt cause semantic controversy.)

	B. Religious: This rests on attributing capabilities of the
	mind to non-physical components of a magical nature that,
	by their very definition, can not be simulated by physical
	systems.

	C. Existential: We could not prove that any given computer
	is simulating the mind, although a few clever arguments have
	been put forth for tests (Turing: if an observer cannot distinguish
	the machine from the human then it must be equivalent) these
	have generally been shown to be unsatisfactory primarily due
	to their lack of rigor (eg. who is to be chosen as the observer?)
	The problem of proving that a computer is simulating the mind
	I will claim is likely equivalent to simulating a mind. If we
	cannot prove something exists, then it does not exist.

The 'proof' of this claim by me is that the mind is a finite object
contained within the head of a human. It is a physical object composed
of physical materials. If something is physical and finite then it
should be possible to simulate its behavior -at least in theory- (eg.
the entire universe may well be physical and finite, but is not very
simulatable in practice.)  One suspects that any counter-argument
resting solely on the magnitude of the problem is only defining the
problem, not refuting it's solvability.  I claim the only
counter-arguments to this fall into one of the above three categories
and that none of these categories is a satisfactory proof of anything,
just a rhetorical subterfuge.

	-Barry Shein, Boston University