Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site bu-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!philabs!cmcl2!harvard!bu-cs!root From: root@bu-cs.UUCP (Barry Shein) Newsgroups: net.math Subject: Re: Mind as turing machine Message-ID: <745@bu-cs.UUCP> Date: Thu, 31-Oct-85 19:25:14 EST Article-I.D.: bu-cs.745 Posted: Thu Oct 31 19:25:14 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 3-Nov-85 05:32:12 EST Distribution: net.math,net.philosophy Organization: Boston Univ Comp. Sci. Lines: 37 There are only three arguments that can feasibly disprove that the mind cannot be simulated by a computer: A. Semantic: If there were a computer which simulated the mind, we would not call it a computer (quite literally this is possible, consider for example that we needed to add biological components to accomplish the job, such as enzyme switches, this would no doubt cause semantic controversy.) B. Religious: This rests on attributing capabilities of the mind to non-physical components of a magical nature that, by their very definition, can not be simulated by physical systems. C. Existential: We could not prove that any given computer is simulating the mind, although a few clever arguments have been put forth for tests (Turing: if an observer cannot distinguish the machine from the human then it must be equivalent) these have generally been shown to be unsatisfactory primarily due to their lack of rigor (eg. who is to be chosen as the observer?) The problem of proving that a computer is simulating the mind I will claim is likely equivalent to simulating a mind. If we cannot prove something exists, then it does not exist. The 'proof' of this claim by me is that the mind is a finite object contained within the head of a human. It is a physical object composed of physical materials. If something is physical and finite then it should be possible to simulate its behavior -at least in theory- (eg. the entire universe may well be physical and finite, but is not very simulatable in practice.) One suspects that any counter-argument resting solely on the magnitude of the problem is only defining the problem, not refuting it's solvability. I claim the only counter-arguments to this fall into one of the above three categories and that none of these categories is a satisfactory proof of anything, just a rhetorical subterfuge. -Barry Shein, Boston University