Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site sjuvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!bellcore!petrus!scherzo!allegra!princeton!astrovax!sjuvax!tmoody From: tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Moody on Rosen on Searle Message-ID: <2497@sjuvax.UUCP> Date: Sat, 2-Nov-85 11:28:29 EST Article-I.D.: sjuvax.2497 Posted: Sat Nov 2 11:28:29 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 5-Nov-85 06:55:38 EST References: <2447@sjuvax.UUCP> <1987@pyuxd.UUCP> Reply-To: tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) Organization: St. Joseph's University, Phila. PA. Lines: 157 Summary: In article <1987@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>I could care less about the exact type of machine that the human mind really >>>is, but I have no disagreement with the notion that the mind and brain are >>>represented as some sort of machine. [Rosen] > >> Indeed, Rich Rosen should have no disagreement, since as long as "the >> exact type of machine" is not specified, agreement or disagreement >> would be without content. As long as one is careless about the exact >> type of machine, *anything* can be represented as some sort of >> machine. [MOODY] > >My curiosity is piqued: why is Moody going out of his way to make this sound >"bad"? "Careless" about the exact type of machine? One should note that >the central point of argument on this issue here has seemed to be the notion >held by some that the human brain CANNOT be represented in a mechanized >fashion as in a machine! Amazing how Moody tries to make a concession on >his part (that the brain fits into the "*anything*" category he describes >above) be called "carelessness" on my part. (The mark of a great philosopher?) To satisfy your curiosity: "anything" means "whatever there is." Is it a "concession" to put the brain in this category? No, because the brain is something. What is bad about Rosen's "I could care less" comment is that it effectively blocks any effective inquiry into the problem. Rosen might as well have said "Mind and brain are something." True, but hardly a contribution. If Rosen has something more substantial in mind -- and I'm sure he does -- then he should just state it and present the arguments. >>>To throw yet another bone into this mix, I will quote from the oft-misquoted >>>(at least here) John Searle, from his "Minds, Brains, and Programs": >> [Rosen, quoted material from Searle omitted] > >As it had been conveniently omitted the first time around, as well. The convenience is, I hope, that of the readers of this newsgroup, who might get tired of the repeated lengthy inclusions. Those who are interested have no doubt saved the relevant sections. >...his Searle's] opinion on the issues presented have been directly at odds >with those presented BY you and Ellis (i.e., deliberate omission of those >sections I included as if they were irrelevant). At last, a substantive claim. Now, SHOW us exactly which claims Ellis and I have made that are at odds with exactly which claims of Searle's. That way, Ellis and I have the opportunity to judge whether you are correct or not. This is how the game is played. >> |______________________________ [Searle, quoted by Rosen] {I've omitted it; check your archives, folks} >> Now, let's look at Rich Rosen's argument. The claim that formal >> symbol manipulations lack intentionality is the *conclusion* of >> Searle's arguments, which Searle recaps at the end of the paper. Far >> from destroying his argument, Searle is merely summarizing its >> conclusions, in order to distinguish them from other positions. The >> "right program" does *not* mean "the program that has intentionality"; >> it means "the program that passes the Turing Test." > >Now I see why you chose to omit the sections I quoted: including them would >show the holes in your point of view and the fabrications surrounding it. >You deliberatele left out the questions (from that question/answer section) >that led up to that "ultimate" question, which in fact did not ONCE mention >the Turing test! What was meant by being "the right program" WAS in fact >(despite your assertion to the contrary) having all the characteristics >necessary for "thought". If intentionality (not present in the "Chinese room" >example) is one of them, so be it. A program lacking that is NOT "the right >program" by Searle's OWN definition! I really have to insist that this is just wrong, and seriously misrepresents what Searle is doing. In fact, I will do more than insist; I will *show* it. First, a summary of the Q&A section from Searle's paper: Can machines think? -- yes. Could a man-made machine think? -- possibly. Could a digital computer think? -- sure. Could instantiating the "right" program be a sufficient for understanding? -- no. So, we have to inquire what Searle might have meant by the "right program". Rosen's contention appears to be that Searle could only have meant "a program having all the characteristics necessary for 'thought'". Let's suppose that this is indeed what Searle meant, even though Rosen offers no support for his contention. Would it follow that Searle's argument is viciously circular? Hardly, because it wouldn't follow that the characteristics *necessary* for thought are *sufficient* for understanding (or intentionality in general). And *that* is what the whole argument is about. I contend that Searle is quite interested in criticizing the validity of the Turing Test, throughout his paper. It would explain why he would say "But precisely one of the points at issue is the adequacy of the Turing test. The example shows that there could be two 'systems,' both of which pass the Turing test, but only one of which understands..." >> It's true that Hofstadter and Dennett do not accept Searle's >> arguments. Rich Rosen proceeds to quote some of Hofstadter's >> responses, from _The_Mind's_I_. Presumably, Rosen agrees with >> Hofstadter. But Hofstadter's arguments are weak. Rather than "merely >> asserting" that some systems possess intentionality in virtue of their >> causal powers, Searle has written several books on the subject (one >> was written after _The_Mind's_I_). > >Odd that all Moody had to say about "Hofstadter's arguments" was an assertion >that they "are weak". (Why? Because he doesn't like them?) > >> Note that the purpose of Searle's >> "Minds, Brains, and Programs" was not to develop a general theory of >> intentionality, but to criticize the notion that intentionality is >> just a matter of instantiating a Turing Machine program. Hofstadter's >> insinuation that Searle vacillates on whether minds need to be >> embodied in neural stuff is a straw man. Searle makes no such claim. > >A thorough reading would show a good deal of vacillation. But I *have* read it thoroughly, more than a few times. I can't find any vacillation on this point. Neither Hofstadter nor Rosen has said anything to show that Searle does vacillate. That's why I find these "arguments" weak. >> The last two sentences of Hofstadter, quoted by Rosen, >> cannot be called counterarguments; they are mere counterassertions. >> Rich Rosen offers no arguments of his own. Indeed, he never clearly >> states just what it is that he is claiming about this Turing Machine >> issue. > >Odd that when *I* make statements, they are not (counter-)arguments but >(counter-)assertions. Does the same rule apply to Moody's statements? An argument is the giving of reasons for one's claims. I try to do that. I do not see how counterassertions, or even counter-interrogatives, can count as arguments. >> I will grant that Hofstadter does offer *some* arguments in his >> remarks, but Rosen has not mentioned one of them. Rosen also claims >> that those of us who have quoted him (Ellis and me) do so in defense >> of positions that Searle would reject. Rosen does not name names, nor >> does he identify those positions, but it sure sounds good, doesn't it? > >Perhaps it "sounds good" because it is true. Note how Ellis was real big >on Searle, until it came to defining machine, at which point Ellis decided >to arbitrarily redefine things to suit his "needs" (i.e., desired conclusions). Okay, I'll let Ellis speak for himself, if he is inclined to. Note that Rosen has *still* not identified the positions, but at least he has identified the persons who are supposed to be adducing Searle in support of positions that Searle would reject. Since I am one of those persons, I invite Rosen to *specify* the position, or to withdraw the claim. >And the substantive content of YOUR comments (as evidenced here) is not >zero, not even negative, but rather, imaginary. Todd Moody | {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody Philosophy Department | St. Joseph's U. | "I couldn't fail to Philadelphia, PA 19131 | disagree with you less."