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From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Subjective reality
Message-ID: <1160@ames.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 25-Sep-85 21:04:41 EDT
Article-I.D.: ames.1160
Posted: Wed Sep 25 21:04:41 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 29-Sep-85 05:46:26 EDT
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Organization: NASA-Ames Research Center, Mtn. View, CA
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>>     No, subjective TRUTH -- incorrigible and immediate self knowledge of
>>     one's own internal mental state. [ELLIS]
>
>1) Thank you for admitting the limitations of your subjectivity.  They involve
>knowledge of your "own internal mental state", not of the rest of the world.
>2) Often this "incorrigible and immediate self knowledge" is blatantly at odds
>with what is really going on in your brain.  Like when hidden motivations
>prompt certain actions on your part.  People often do not admit to themselves
>(perhaps not until much later) the real reasons that they may take some
>actions.  With this in mind, you have no "knowledge", you have only
>subjective beliefs.[ROSEN]

	Rich, I really think you misunderstand. Your response shows you
think more is being asserted by your opponents than I believe is the case. I
agree completely about hidden motives and subjective beliefs, and I suspect
Mr. Ellis would, too. The "incorrigible and immediate self knowledge" that is
being asserted is not knowledge of the abstract sort, like understanding your
own motivations. It is simple awareness. I am unable to deny my present
experience of typing on a keyboard. I could be mistaken about *why* I'm doing
it; I could even be mistaken about the true nature of the experience - perhaps
I'm only hallucinating it. But what I *can't* deny is the simple fact that I'm
experiencing the sensations, whatever their source.

>>     Like pain (even imagined pain) is still pain.  Or visions (even
>>     hallucinations) are still visions.  Awareness, love, etc.. likewise.
>
>Yes, indeed, they physically represent themselves inside the brain.  They may
>involve some "bad connection" (bad is too judgmental a word) in the brain that
>that believes that an imagined vision is a real vision, coming through the
>"input ports" of the eyes from the outside world.  And we've already gone
>through phantom pains, so I won't repeat.

	Right; no problem with "bad" connections. No one is asserting we
always understand our experiences correctly, only that we are unable to deny
to ourselves that we *have* experiences. Nonetheless, there is no way we can
demonstrate that *other* people have experiences. Experience is subjective by
definition, and irreducibly private. We cannot *know* that anyone else has
"experiences", only that they have behaviors. This is what is meant by
subjective knowledge. It shouldn't be thought of as a competitor with
objective knowledge, but as complementary, for each has its appropriate place,
and they need not conflict.

>>     Whether or not you chose to attribute reality to such entities, the
>>     fact is, they are viewed in most philosophical and psychological schemes
>>     as possessing reality, in some cases greater than that of rocks.
>
>Fine.  I find such "schemes" to be completely bogus if what they are saying
>is that these "entities" represent anything other than internal thoughts
>within the brain which may have no correlation to reality.

	Right, but suppose they're *not* asserting any more reality to these
thoughts than what you describe. The fact that the thoughts occurred, and that
their reality *as* *thoughts*, not their accuracy in describing objective
events, was undeniable to the person thinking them at the time they thought
them, is all that is being asserted. My, what an awful sentence that was!

>Thus, because you now admit that the mind contains external images gleaned
>from reality outside the brain as well as internally developed images which
>may be interpretations (faulty or not) of outside events or just imaginations,
>you need a method to distinguish between faulty interpretation of external
>events by the brain (either due to misconceptions about something really
>external or something completely imagined) and accurate interpretations of
>real external events.  One such method, one which allows serious scrutiny
>and careful thorough analysis is a method that has been bandied about and
>tarred in this very newsgroup.  I'll leave it to the readers to recall the
>name of that method.

	I think I recall it. We are in accord. The way to deal with external,
objective events is with objective methods, science. What is being suggested
is that the "act" of having an experience is irreducibly subjective. To
*understand* the experience in objective terms may be possible, in the sense
of understanding the relevant stimuli, the brain chemistry, etc., but this is
knowledge about the experience, and not the experience, itself.

>>>You can't just stick in the word "true" in that corollary just because you
>>>feel like it.
>
>>     Who else can tell you what you are sensing besides yourself?
>
>What makes you so sure that in all cases, without a means of verification,
>you are accurately sensing yourself?  Another important reason why a method
>of verification is necessary to gain knowledge.

	To reiterate: *misinterpreting* one's experiences is not only
possible, it's quite common. While I suppose I could be wrong, I don't think
anyone in this discussion has meant to imply otherwise. What is unmistakable,
and undeniably real, is the fact of *having* experiences.
	I honestly think you think there are assertions of a supernatural
nature being made when none are intended. I don't really mean to be speaking
for Michael Ellis, and perhaps it is I who am misinterpreting his remarks, and
not you. But, speaking for myself, I find his statements about subjective
awareness reasonable, and free of supernatural suppositions. Far from being
unscientific, he seems to be attempting to make the minimal number of
presumptions necessary to account for his experiences. In the simplest terms,
it seems to be no more than Descartes' 'cogito, ergo sum', combined with the
related observation that our own existence is a necessary precondition for our
knowing about anything else.
	I hope all interested parties will feel free to set me straight :-).

-  Hi, Mom!  -		                        Kenn Barry
                                                NASA-Ames Research Center
                                                Moffett Field, CA
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