Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site uwvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!think!harvard!seismo!uwvax!planting From: planting@uwvax.UUCP (W. Harry Plantinga) Newsgroups: net.religion.christian Subject: Re: God and suffering Message-ID: <328@uwvax.UUCP> Date: Tue, 24-Sep-85 17:28:01 EDT Article-I.D.: uwvax.328 Posted: Tue Sep 24 17:28:01 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 28-Sep-85 06:35:13 EDT References: <389@decwrl.UUCP> <2203@sdcc6.UUCP> <351@pyuxn.UUCP> Organization: U of Wisconsin CS Dept Lines: 46 > Is God is as powerful as you believe Him to be, > then He could do anything. I can only conclude that he must enjoy the > suffering we endure in His presence, since if He didn't, He could simply > will it away. I contend that the fact that he doesn't will it away is > proof of His evil intent. As near as I can make out, the argument Paul Zimmerman (pyuxn!pez) proposes is the following: (1) God is omnipotent (2) there is evil therefore, (3) God is evil. Obviously, this argument does not hold as it stands; some further premisses are required. I think Paul probably has in mind something like the following: (0.1) If there is evil, then God knows about it (0.2) God is capable of eliminating any evil (0.3) If God knows of some evil which he is capable of eliminating, and he doesn't eliminate it, then he is evil. This argument now sounds plausible, and indeed some respected philosophers have proposed something similar. Among philosophers today, however, this argument is generally rejected for the following reasons: (1) it is only possible for an omnipotent being to do things which are logically possible. For example, an omnipotent being can't create a round square, because there just ain't no such thing. (2) It could be that God could eliminate evil in the world, but not in way that people would still have free will, for if he prevented them from sinning, they would no longer be free. That is, it is possible that it is logically impossible and therefore impossible even for God to create free creatures who never sin. (3) It could be that in God's opinion, it is a greater good to have free people, some of whom choose to do good, than to have no sin in a world where people are not free. Thus, the argument that if God is omnipotent and wholly good, then he would eliminate all evil fails: it assumes premisses which may be false, such as that God can do anything and that if a good God saw any evil, he would eliminate it. Harry Plantinga planting@uwvax.arpa {allegra,ihnp4,seismo}!uwvax!planting