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From: padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <755@utastro.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 31-Dec-69 18:59:59 EDT
Article-I.D.: utastro.755
Posted: Wed Dec 31 18:59:59 1969
Date-Received: Sun, 29-Sep-85 05:49:21 EDT
References: <1522@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1668@pyuxd.UUCP> <1552@umcp-cs.UUCP> <701@utastro.UUCP> <664@mmintl.UUCP> <739@utastro.UUCP> <680@mmintl.UUCP>
Organization: U. Texas, Astronomy, Austin, TX
Lines: 38

> 
> [Not food]
> 
> In article <739@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes:
> >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least
> >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as 
> >a statement of "selfness".
> 
> No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with
> the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is
> the same person.  What is this mystical concept of "selfness"?  Does it
> maybe mean "having the same soul"?
> 
> Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
> Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108

I thought this was made pretty clear in the "assembly line" analogy. I do
not really want to get into deep definitions on "selfness" but I think
the need to use it in the context of assigning unique identity to similar
objects is evident for Charley's case. I say this because the alternative
presents even more difficulties as indicated by the identical twin homicide
story. What all this seems to point to, from my perspective, is that quantities
like location, and time, serve to provide a working criterion for determining
"selfness" in every-day problems. These quantities however are externals
from the traditional set of aspects that define identity i.e. the statement
"you will be resurrected" is meaningless since everything would have to be
reconstructed so that the "externals" are satisfied. The matter transfer
scenario presents problems for identity if duplicates are produced. I think
it is garbage to try to say that the duplicates are indeed one and the same
as the person that entered in the sense that they both have the same "selfness"
as the original person.

 The duplicates are "copies" of the original, but
are not "the" original. Destruction of the original by death does not make
the copies, or any one of them the same as the original, except of course
one claims that the soul exists and survives to be resurrected.

Padraig Houlahan.