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From: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek )
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social
Message-ID: <253@umich.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 28-Sep-85 15:33:36 EDT
Article-I.D.: umich.253
Posted: Sat Sep 28 15:33:36 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 29-Sep-85 08:30:24 EDT
References: <234@umich.UUCP> <28200105@inmet.UUCP>
Reply-To: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek )
Followup-To: net.philosophy,net.politics.theory
Distribution: net
Organization: University of Michigan, EECS Dept., Ann Arbor, MI
Lines: 115
Summary: Some preferences are more rational than others

In article <28200105@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes:
>>[...] (it gets fun now):  whether a particular, conrete action is right
>>or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and
>>how many calories it expends.  For example ([one] very much to the point),
>>whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to
>>whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of
>>relevant information. [TOREK]
>
>The idea that a "particular action" is right or wrong according to
>some objective metric comparable to calories consumed or how long it
>takes strikes me as suspect.  The idea that such a thing could be
>empirical is ludicrous, unless you consider yourself able either to
>discount potential completely, or evaluate it accurately.  For
>example, how could one know empirically whether it was right to abort
>a particular fetus?  [NAT HOWARD]

If the person would have aborted it had she considered it rationally and with
relevant information, then her act was right.  We know what rational consider-
ation of an issue means, namely consideration free of irrational mistakes.
"Relevant information" is that information which tends to motivate the woman
in question -- and the question of what information tends to motivate her
is an *empirical* question.  Finally, though we (and she) might not know
the facts on some of the relevant issues -- for example, suppose that whether
the fetus has a nervous system is relevant information for her, but due to 
insufficient scientific investigation we don't know whether it has one --
still, the information is *empircally discoverable in principle*.

I conclude that whether a particular act is right or wrong turns on several
questions, each one of which is empirical.  Therefore, whether the act is
right is also an empirical question.

>>[...]  Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects
>>on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or
>>differently.  Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible;
>>for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself.
>
>Bingo!  You've agreed with me.  So long as the assignments of weights are
>indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have
>some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating
>a social system [...]

I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible.  Not all.  Some.
Here's an assignment that isn't:  my assignment of equal weights.

>>A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills
>>both of the following conditions:  it has no basis in logic or fact; a 
>>principle that does have such basis can conflict with it.  "Prisoners-
>>Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different 
>>objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off.  Since it is
>>compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits
>>everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in
>>all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect.  [...]
>
>Let's consider the "prisoner's dilemma" problem.  By adding the element
>of coercion, you've added a second factor to be figured in with the
>ostensible payoff.  

Yes, that's exactly why coercion should be used.

>[... but] some folks would rather spend the additional years in prison
>rather than have a military type tell them how to get out of it. [...]
> your assumption is that the years spent in prison are 
>absolutely more important than the degree of interference from outside.

No.  You misunderstand my point.  My point is that libertarianism is
unacceptable to any rational person.  The reason for this is that sometimes
libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's
dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when
everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion
is used, and nobody's preference is irrational.

>>One more point and then I'll rest.  If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down
>>to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline)
>>my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored
>>social order?  
>
>You've mistaken my purpose in posting.  I'm not trying to convince you
>and you alone.  I'm trying to make a position clear to whoever cares to 
>listen.  

Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already
converted", so to speak.

>>Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending
>>that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on?  
>
>[...] that preferences are irrational does not imply that they
>cannot be changed by logic.  Irrational preferences may RESPOND to
>logic, but may not be shaped entirely by them.  

You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  Love is nonrational,
in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it
is not *contrary to reason*.  When I argue that libertarianism is 
irrational, I am arguing that it is *contrary to* reason.

I take the above to mean that nonrational preferences may respond to 
logic.  Thus, in arguing with me, Huybensz, etc., you hope to get us
to "respond" to logic.  I'm sorry, but this is still ideological
mystification:  if our preferences are nonrational, then we have no 
compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic; and it is uncomfortable
to change one's preferences, especially one's politics.

>Excuse me, but it seems to me that you tried to argue this about
>the non-coercion principle: that it had no basis in fact or reason.
>My point was that such principles tend to be chosen on irrational grounds,
>and that I didn't know of ANY such principles that followed purely from
>reason, or history, so that such a criticism applies to all such principles,
>and therefore the statement was nugatory.  

That is indeed what one of my points was, and your reply would be a good
one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational
grounds.  That, however, is not the case.  Moreover, even if it were the
case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite.

--Paul V Torek, trying to cure my habit of "dense-pack" arguments