Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site spar.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!ucbvax!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: External Influences Message-ID: <538@spar.UUCP> Date: Tue, 24-Sep-85 11:27:02 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.538 Posted: Tue Sep 24 11:27:02 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 26-Sep-85 08:28:47 EDT References: <3518@decwrl.UUCP> <1451@pyuxd.UUCP> <661@psivax.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 106 >> I wouldn't call it free will either; however, those who stress >> rationality as the highest possible virtue would be entirely >> justified in selecting r-e-a as their definition of free will. [ELLIS] > >I don't understand, you mean based on our other beliefs, we get to "select" >the definitions we like for given words or terms? Hmmm. Thank you for >clarifying (at last) your position on language and definition. You have your own ideas about what you consider `freedom' to be, and I accept them as reasonable for you -- but I fail to understand why others must accept your insistence that they are the only reasonable ones, especially in light of the huge amount of philosophical divergence on this issue. Most people consider themselves to be constrained only when unwanted realities compel behavior against their will. Dennett offers a strong argument of this point: Jones hates Smith and decides, in full possession of his faculties, to murder him. Meanwhile, Black, the nefarious neurosurgeon.. , who also wants Smith dead, has implanted something in Jones' brain so that just in case Jones changes his mind (and chickens out), Black, by pushing his special button, can put Jones back on his murderous track.. Black doesn't have to intervene; Jones does the deed all on his own. Jones could not have done otherwise, yet he behaved according to his own choice! Black's total control never subverted Jones decision process. I'd say that Jones behaved of his own free will. Likewise, even if I am constrained by physical causality, I only consider such constraints to be external when they prevent me from following my will. After all, what could I do without a physical body? And how could I gain new knowledge if I did not remember past experiences? Freedom without experience or physical abilities requires a mystical viewpoint, and that would be most unscientific! And I fail to see how those who desire to be totally rational are not free when behave according to rational conscious choice... >Highly dubious? If you don't believe in a non-physical soul as the cause of >the willing of your actions, then clearly our actions are determined by the >make-up of our brains, which are determined by what we have gone through >throughout our lives. I wasn't aware that obvious tautologies were >"assertions" that are "dubious" and must be "proved". The below are not `obvious tautologies', they are a priori assertions: (1) Our minds are totally determined by our brain state (2) Our brain states are totally determined by antecedent causes I'm willing to suppose (1) if that's what it takes to hold a philosophical discussion with you, Rich. Especially since I can offer no evidence that it is obviously wrong. However, I'll gladly drop this assumption in philosophical discourse with those who are more skeptical than yourself, since subjective decisions clearly affect physical events. (1) is reasonable, but not yet fact. However, (2) has been scientifically disproven. Nobody knows what determines the outcome of individual random quantum events, but those occurring in our brains arguably can and do manifest themselves as high-level conscious phenomena (unlike the quantum phenomena in rocks, which have no perceptible effect on a rock's high-level behavior). One thing we do know is that quantum events are only partially determined antecedent causes; we also know that they are partially determined by synchronous noncausal connections. >> At most, the empirical evidence shows that past experiences only >> partially restrict my behavior -- and QM downright contradicts >> strict behaviorism. > >It does? Strict behavioristic assertions that one's choices are totally determined by past causal chains rooted in the past would have been clearly validated by strict causal determinism. First, quantum considerations provide empirical evidence that events are apparently not totally determined by known physical causes (admittedly, future discoveries may change this). Secondly, rigorous analysis proves that any future deterministic theories will have to be noncausally deterministic (ie- not determined by spatially and temporally impingent events). Thus, I conclude that one's behavior is partially determined by noncausal considerations, and strict Behaviorism is false. >> Furthermore, I am frequently quite successful at NOT monitoring my >> behavior -- except when I really need to. > >Your articles here are evidence of that. :-( At least I restrict my flamage to the only flamer here (besides myself). I'll correct that omission -- Ellis, you are an ignorant and arrogant fool!! "Others are so bright and intelligent" -michael