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From: planting@uwvax.UUCP (W. Harry Plantinga)
Newsgroups: net.religion.christian
Subject: Re: God and suffering
Message-ID: <328@uwvax.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 24-Sep-85 17:28:01 EDT
Article-I.D.: uwvax.328
Posted: Tue Sep 24 17:28:01 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 28-Sep-85 06:35:13 EDT
References: <389@decwrl.UUCP> <2203@sdcc6.UUCP> <351@pyuxn.UUCP>
Organization: U of Wisconsin CS Dept
Lines: 46

> Is God is as powerful as you believe Him to be,
> then He could do anything. I can only conclude that he must enjoy the
> suffering we endure in His presence, since if He didn't, He could simply
> will it away. I contend that the fact that he doesn't will it away is
> proof of His evil intent. 

As near as I can make out, the argument Paul Zimmerman (pyuxn!pez)
proposes is the following:
            (1) God is omnipotent
            (2) there is evil
therefore,  (3) God is evil.

Obviously, this argument does not hold as it stands; some further
premisses are required.  I think Paul probably has in mind something
like the following: 
            (0.1) If there is evil, then God knows about it
            (0.2) God is capable of eliminating any evil
            (0.3) If God knows of some evil which he is capable of
                  eliminating, and he doesn't eliminate it, then he is
                  evil.

This argument now sounds plausible, and indeed some respected
philosophers have proposed something similar.  Among philosophers
today, however, this argument is generally rejected for the following
reasons:

(1) it is only possible for an omnipotent being to do things which are
  logically possible.  For example, an omnipotent being can't create a
  round square, because there just ain't no such thing.
(2) It could be that God could eliminate evil in the world, but not in
  way that people would still have free will, for if he prevented them
  from sinning, they would no longer be free.  That is, it is possible
  that it is logically impossible and therefore impossible even for 
  God to create free creatures who never sin.
(3) It could be that in God's opinion, it is a greater good to have
  free people, some of whom choose to do good, than to have no sin
  in a world where people are not free.

Thus, the argument that if God is omnipotent and wholly good, then he
would eliminate all evil fails:  it assumes premisses which may be
false, such as that God can do anything and that if a good God saw 
any evil, he would eliminate it.

							Harry Plantinga
							planting@uwvax.arpa
							{allegra,ihnp4,seismo}!uwvax!planting