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From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: net.ignorant.opinion
Message-ID: <525@spar.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 31-Dec-69 18:59:59 EDT
Article-I.D.: spar.525
Posted: Wed Dec 31 18:59:59 1969
Date-Received: Sat, 21-Sep-85 03:49:44 EDT
References: <1495@pyuxd.UUCP> <2197@pucc-h> <1510@pyuxd.UUCP> <1001@sphinx.UChicago.UUCP> <1562@pyuxd.UUCP> <164@gargoyle.UUCP> <1663@pyuxd.UUCP>
Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis)
Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA
Lines: 114

>> There seems to be a consensus in net.philosophy that "free will" in
>> the sense preferred by RR is incompatible with determinism of any
>> kind, and also that some form of determinism holds true for the real
>> world (perhaps one or two people would take exception to either of
>> these statements). [CARNES]
>
>Unfortunately, it is precisely because that definition is incompatible with
>the form of determinism seemingly present in this world, AND precisely
>because that IS the definition of free will (and its implications) that leads
>us (at least me) to the conclusion that this phenomenon called free will does
>not exist.  Those that it doesn't lead to that conclusion have unilaterally
>altered the definition so that it does exist, which by the rules of language,
>it just plain playing dirty. [Rosen]

    Huh? Playing dirty!!??

    You claim that your pet definition is the ONE TRUE DEFINITION -- yet
    when practically everybody here disagrees, you accuse us of PLAYING
    DIRTY? May I humbly suggest that you are simply ignorant?

    Since you have previously criticized Dennett's book on free will without
    ever bothering to read it, by empirical induction, I conclude that you
    have read very little about free will in general.

    As the most vocal critic of free will in DrivelNet history, I hope to
    correct an appalling gap in your philosophical knowledge.

    Here are some quotes from Copleston's `History of Philosophy' regarding
    the views of some of the classic philosophers regarding free will.  Each
    view is quite different, and you will notice that all of the ideas
    presented to date in this newsgroup (rational choice, spontaneity, lack
    of constraint, the subjective nature nature of mind...) all appear.

    Remember that divine omniscience and/or strict determinism were the
    fashion of the day for most of these folks:

    Descartes:
	That we possess free will is self-evident: We had before a very
	clear proof of this; for, at the same time as we tried to doubt all
	things and even assumed that He who created us employed His
	unlimited powers in deceiving us in every way, we perceived  in
	ourselves such a liberty such that we were able to abstain from
	believing what was not perfectly certain and indubitable...We are in
	a special way the masters of our actions and thereby merit praise or
	blame.
    Leibniz:
	Though it was certain that Caesar would resolve to cross the
	Rubicon, his decision was a free decision. He made a rational
	decision, and therfore acted freely.. To ask whether there is
	freedom in our will is the same as to ask whether there is choice in
	our will.
    Hobbes: 
	Effect follows necessarily from cause..all the effects that have
	been, or shall be produced, have their necessity in things
	antecedent.  This at once rules out all freedom in man, at least if
	freedom is taken to imply absence of necessity.. A man's volitions,
	desires, and inclinations are necessary in the sense that they are
	the results of a chain of determining causes; but when he acts in
	accordance with these desires and inclinations, he is said to act
	freely. A free man is thus "he that in those things which by his own
	strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has
	the will to do.
    Hume: 
	Necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently,
	liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very
	same thing as chance. Free action would be uncaused action...the
	assertion of freedom involves denial of necessity.
    Voltaire: 
	The idea of free will is absurd; for a free will would be a will
	without sufficient motive, and it would be outside the course of
	Nature... It would act by chance, and there is no chance.
    Rousseau:
	Every free action is produced by two causes. One is a moral cause,
	namely the will which determines the act; the other is the physical
	namely the physical power which determines the act. Both causes are
	required. A paralytic may will to run, but, lacking the physical
	power to do so, he stays where he is.
    Kant:
        ..the idea of freedom involves.. our regarding ourselves as
	belonging, not only to the physical world of sense, the world ruled
	by causality, but also to the intelligible or noumenal world. How
	can a man be called completely free at the same moment and in
	regard to the same action in which he is subject to an inevitable
	natural necessity?  In so far as a man's existence is subject to
	time-conditions, his actions form part of the mechanical system of
	Nature and are determined by antecedent causes. But the very same
	subject, being being on the other hand conscious of himself as a
	thing-in-itself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not
	subject to time-conditions, and he regards himself as determinable
	only through laws which he gives himself through reason. And to be
	determinable through self-imposed laws is to be free.

    Of the above, Hume and Voltaire seem closest to your position --
    likewise, their anti-libertarian arguments are weakened in light of 20th
    century physics.  The others hold free will as reasonable in spite of
    their belief in the same strict determinism that upholds your
    Behaviorist position.

    Modern philosophers are similarly varied, although few since ~1930
    are foolish enough to deny free will using deterministic arguments.
    If there is the time and interest, I might dig up some more for you.

>They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: the
>ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) to make
>decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of either the
>impositions of the external environment upon them.

    In light of the quotes from Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes, Rousseau, and
    Kant (all of whom believed in strict determinism), not to mention many
    recent philosophers I could supply, and the overwhelming opposition from
    contributors to this newsgroup, I can only wonder how you can support
    this blatantly false statement.

-michael