Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxt!houxm!vax135!cornell!uw-beaver!tektronix!hplabs!qantel!dual!lll-crg!seismo!harvard!think!inmet!nrh
From: nrh@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social
Message-ID: <28200117@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 25-Sep-85 00:43:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200117
Posted: Wed Sep 25 00:43:00 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 30-Sep-85 01:47:39 EDT
References: <234@umich.UUCP>
Lines: 101
Nf-ID: #R:umich:-23400:inmet:28200117:000:5215
Nf-From: inmet!nrh    Sep 25 00:43:00 1985


>/* Written  6:07 pm  Sep 24, 1985 by janw@inmet.UUCP in inmet:net.politics.t */
>[Nat Howard]
>> >...  I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact.
>
>
>> >As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you 
>> >prefer.  I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any
>> >social order that has a basis in "logic or fact".
>
>[Paul Torek]
>> Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can.
>
>*Both* logic and fact can. Either can *falsify* one choice, and by
>so doing, dictate another.
>
>Consider two persons, Alpha and Beta. Alpha favors social order
>(a), based on (irrationally chosen) criterion A. Beta favors so-
>cial order (b), based on criterion B. Now suppose Beta has been
>able to show Alpha an unknown fact F, or an unexpected logical
>connection L between known facts, that proves, to Alpha's satisfac-
>tion, that A is better served by (b) than by (a). Alpha is now a
>convert; his new preferred social order is (b), and the basis
>for his preference is *both A and L, or both A and F*.  
>
> E.g., a creationist is shown that evolution is really in the Bible.
>
> Now you might say: Alpha and Beta have become allies, but that is
>superficial.  Their basic postulates are still A and B, respec-
>tively: *they* can't be changed by logic or fact.
>
> In a way, effectively, they can: by *reduction*.  Suppose I max-
>imize health, while you maximize wealth.  Now suppose you show me
>that the more wealth, the more health.  Then I  can effectively
>substitute your criterion for mine everywhere: I can *forget* all
>about health and concentrate on making money.

But the REASON the health-maximizer is after money is to 
make himself more healthy.  Agreed that their actions would
be (as in your later example of the scientific creationist) very
similar -- their motives would not.  In particular, a refutation
of the notion that wealth leads to health would cause one person
to change his behavior but not the other.  

At this point, the logic is pretty far removed from behavior, but I
point out that the preferences of the health-maximizer have not
changed, that his preference for health has simply found a new outlet
that leads him to actions similar to someone whose goal is wealth.
Convincing the health-maximizer to become wealthy IN ORDER THAT HE BE
HEALTHY doesn't change how he chooses his goals, nor what goals are
pursued -- merely how he pursues them.

> Consider a less implausible example: our biblical creationist is
>persuaded to make science his criterion of truth.  The argument
>runs thus: according to the Bible (his original criterion), God
>made all of nature directly, while for the Bible  human
>co-authors were used. Nature is therefore his (OK, His, to be con-
>sistent) great book, greater than the Bible.  (Galileo, I recol-
>lect, said something to this effect).  Whatever you read in this
>book - by observation, experiment and other scientific methods  -
>is true. Now our ex-creationist is more than a casual ally of the
>evolutionist - not for one occasion only. They go hand in hand
>indefinitely, except for such disagreements as arise between
>scientists. The basic postulate is effectively changed.

The postulate is changed, and changed by the presence of "logic", but
as I've pointed out, this doesn't mean the choice of postulate is
rational.  That a rational argument may cause one's position to shift
merely means that a person has chosen new postulates in the light of
the facts or logic you've given him.  Why does this not mean that the
preferences are logical?  Because an irrational argument might
accomplish the same thing (for example, if the person is shown a
chapter of the bible that says "believe whatever people with the
initials "NRH" tell you), or a beautifully phrased (but not rigorous)
speech convinces him to re-evaluate (irrationally, of course) his
postulates.  In other words, arguments need not make SENSE to  cause a
shift -- they need merely have impact.

I do agree with you though that a flaw in the logic of a position
can lead someone to drop that position, but consider what that implies --
that the person believes in logic to the extent that it influences
his other positions.  Why believe in logic?  I do because I think
it gives me a good lever on things, but that doesn't mean that
I could defend the proposition that "the universe is logical" in
a rigorous sense -- I believe the universe is logical, and therefore
logic worth following, but I can't PROVE it by logic, nor (given
the limits of our knowledge) marshall anything on the fact
side but a list of the successes of the application of logic.  Not
rigorous at all.

Why all this in net.politics.theory?  Because *WHY* people believe
what they believe, and how to change their beliefs are probably the
most interesting political questions, with profound implications
for practicing politicians.

I'm about done with this topic (I hope).  As Bastiat said:

	Good Lord!  What a lot of trouble to prove in political
	economy that two and two make four; and if you succeed in
	doing so, people cry, "It is so clear that it is boring." Then
	they vote as if you had never proved anything at all.