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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: The Principle of Non-interference
Message-ID: <1809@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 29-Sep-85 02:20:59 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1809
Posted: Sun Sep 29 02:20:59 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 2-Oct-85 01:15:32 EDT
References: <588@mmintl.UUCP> <1525@pyuxd.UUCP> <617@mmintl.UUCP>
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>>Are you restraining me from looking away, or moving elsewhere?  If so, then
>>you are harming me.  If not, then I'll just go elsewhere.  Unless of course,
>>you're on my property doing this, in which case you'll go elsewhere.  How
>>are you being harmed by my wearing a red shirt, even if you don't like it?
>>Why are you out to introduce problems where none exist?

> Do you wish to exclude mental pain from the meaning of harm?  I know it's
> hard to measure, but physical pain is hard to measure, too.

Indeed I do, precisely because what you call mental pain is not only
immeasureable, it merely represents "I don't like this" as "mental pain".

>>I just gave criteria.  If someone is wearing a red shirt and I don't like
>>it, I can always not look.  If someone is forcing me to stare into a bright
>>light that causes me physical harm (forcing, as in restraining me and leaving
>>me no choice, or shining the light on my property in my personal space, or
>>in a public thoroughfare traversed by many people, that is clearly an act
>>of interference.

> The assumption is that you are wearing the shirt *in public*, e.g., on a
> busy thoroughfare traversed by many people.  Also, I can't "not look" before
> seeing it the first time -- and seeing it once may be bad enough.

Bad enough?  God, how awful!  Imagine this:  you don't like seeing fat,
skinny, or otherwise "unattractive" people on the street either.  You
find their fatness/skinniness/whatever revolting, and find it "painful" to
see them on the street.  What then?

Let's try something more productive.  Pretend we've got a whole group of
people together to build a consensus for a morality.  For simplicity, let's
take persons A, B, & C.  Let's see what laws each comes up with:

	A:  No one should be allowed to wear shirts that are a single solid
		color, because it is too stark and damages my sensibilities.
		Also, B should not be allowed to have any rights, because I
		don't like his/her "kind", and allowing him/her to exercise
		rights of free speech/action would hurt me mentally.

	B:  No one should be allowed to wear shirts that are not solid in
		color, because patterns of any non-unicolor sort hurt my
		brain.  Also, A should not have any rights, because I
		say so, my Bible says that A-types should not have rights.

	C:  I think I should have the right to take anyone's property that
		I like, because not being able to do so would harm me
		and prevent me from living out my individuality.

Now, we could take the union or maximalization of all the requests.  By
that reasoning, neither A's nor B's would have rights, no one would ever
be allowed to wear shirts of any kind, and C would be free to pillage at
will.  Sound good?  Now let's take the minimalization of the requests.
Does C have the right to steal?  Of course not, that is an act of direct
interference in other people's lives.  What about the "shirt rules"?  It
seems clear to me that both sets are bogus, neither A nor B would have
their lives interfered with by allowing any sort of shirt that anyone likes,
provided it doesn't provide a "clear and present danger".  And (the crux)
should any group of people be able to restrict the actions of another group
of people solely at whim, solely because of personal taste?  Clearly not.
Can other people doing what they want where you are not harmed by it ever
be the basis of a restriction?  Clearly not, not in this scheme.

> Please define what you mean by "interference".  If the definition depends on
> the idea of "harm", please tell us what that means, as well.

Obviously it does, and I think I said this in an earlier article that may not
have gotten out there yet.  In any case, I think the above paragraph makes
things at least a little clearer.

>>Not nearly as complex as you seem to want to make it.
>>Personal dislike and inconvenience are NOT examples of deliberate interfering
>>harm by any stretch of the imagination.  If this stretching the notion of
>>harm were taken to deliberate extremes (for the purpose of restricting
>>people's freedom?), you could just as easily say that the car in front of
>>you at the intersection sitting there while you want to turn right on red is
>>"interfering" with you.  

> Quite.

Then what are we arguing about?

>>The way you seem to be treating the notion of minimal interference
>>is egocentric:  "minimal interference with ME".  The goal is minimal
>>interference to all.

> Why do you think you can compare the amount of interference with one person
> with the amount of interference with another?  I ask this not because I
> think you can't, but because you reject the same kind of comparison in
> other contexts.  "How do you know what is in my interests?  You don't."
> (This quote may not be word for word, but I don't think it misrepresents
> your viewpoint.)  How are the two cases different?

I don't see any similarity in the first place.  Is it ever to be considered
a person's RIGHT to interfere in another person's life, such that restriction
from doing this is interpreted as harm?  I would certainly hope not.

>>When you claim that the example I just gave (or the
>>red shirt example) is worth restricting, you are interfering in that person's
>>life.  Why?  Because someone is being harmed and interfered with?  Or because
>>someone childishly doesn't like it?

> I don't really think you should be prevented from wearing a red shirt.  I
> think there are such things as rights, and that you have a right to wear a
> red shirt.  I just think you have things backwards -- you want to define
> morality in terms of rights, while I claim that rights are defined in terms
> of morality.

And I think you have it backwards.  Morality is a code for the society.  To
claim that the societal code comes before the individual human needs and rights
strikes me as preposterous.  Morality must of necessity be built from people's
needs and wants, not the other way around.

>>Since you're anxious to make the problem tough, let's make it so.  Suppose
>>it wasn't a red shirt this guy wanted to wear.  Suppose he wanted to wear a
>>red dress.  What then?  In what way is he interfering with you?  In what way
>>do you feel you should be able to interfere with him?  Maybe this is meatier
>>and less hypothetical than "bright lights" versus "red shirts".

> I see no real difference between the two cases, except that the chance that
> someone actually *would* be harmed is higher in your example, *because of
> social attitudes*.

Ah, here we go.  Because other people have an irrational morality that says
that interfering in another person's life because you don't like it is "OK",
something should be restricted.  Hmmm....  The individual who seeks personal
freedom should be restricted, not those who irrationally seek to restrict
and/or harm.  Does that make sense to you?
-- 
"Meanwhile, I was still thinking..."
				Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr