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From: nrh@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social
Message-ID: <28200105@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 24-Sep-85 03:07:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200105
Posted: Tue Sep 24 03:07:00 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 29-Sep-85 05:05:18 EDT
References: <234@umich.UUCP>
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Nf-From: inmet!nrh    Sep 24 03:07:00 1985


>/* Written  3:49 pm  Sep 17, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */
>/* ---------- "Logic, fact, preference, and social" ---------- */
>
>Nat Howard (nrh@inmet.UUCP) writes:
>>>... you might personally experience coercion as so galling as to 
>>>negate in your own mind any positive result it might bring about, but there 
>>>is no *logic* in such a perspective.  Just preference.
>>>						Baba
>
>>Agreed. ...
>>...  I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact.
>
>>As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you 
>>prefer.  I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any
>>social order that has a basis in "logic or fact".
>
>Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can.  Facts about
>what's good for you can be a basis for non-moral preferences ("moral" used
>here in the narrow sense of evaluations of ways of treating others).  More
>generally (it gets fun now):  whether a particular, conrete action is right
>or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and
>how many calories it expends.  For example (an example very much to the point),
>whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to
>whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of
>relevant information.

The idea that a "particular action" is right or wrong according to
some objective metric comparable to calories consumed or how long it
takes strikes me as suspect.  The idea that such a thing could be
empirical is ludicrous, unless you consider yourself able either to
discount potential completely, or evaluate it accurately.  For
example, how could one know empirically whether it was right to abort
a particular fetus?  Suppose it were the fetus of a new Einstein?  A
new Hitler?  In one case the abortion may be (according to some
irrationally-chosen metric) a bad idea.  In the other case, by the
same metric, it was a good idea.  But one doesn't know how a
particular fetus would turn out, so one cannot experience empirical
rightness or wrongness to such an act (because one doesn't have the
information available to evaluate it against the metric). [PRO/ANTI
ABORTIONISTS: SEE NOTE BELOW BEFORE RESPONDING]

>Relevant information includes (and as far as I can tell only includes) facts
>about benefits/harms to myself and others flowing from the social system
>under consideration.  Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects
>on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or
>differently.  Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible;
>for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself.

Bingo!  You've agreed with me.  So long as the assignments of weights are
indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have
some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating
a social system -- any such basis itself depends on what weights you
choose, which in turn (at least partially, according to your statement)
depends upon irrational criteria.

>(Either assignment would be self-defeating, given that caring about others
>improves one's own life and vice versa.  Furthermore, neither position could
>be agreed on by a rational community, for reasons which I hope are not hard
>to see.)
>
>A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills
>both of the following conditions:  it has no basis in logic or fact; a 
>principle that does have such basis can conflict with it.  "Prisoners-
>Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different 
>objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off.  Since it is
>compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits
>everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in
>all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect.  UNLESS of course,
>it has some independent basis in logic or fact -- and if you think so,
>then dammit, SUPPLY IT!

Let's consider the "prisoner's dilemma" problem.  By adding the element
of coercion, you've added a second factor to be figured in with the
ostensible payoff.  Instead of "years in prison" being the only basis
for choosing a particular cell in the payoff matrix, one must now
choose "years in prison AND accept/deny coercive input".  In other
words, some folks would rather spend the additional years in prison
rather than have a military type tell them how to get out of it.  Is
this rational? Why certainly NOT, but the point is that ALL such 
weighting decisions are at base, irrational.  

In short, your assumption is that the years spent in prison are 
absolutely more important than the degree of interference from outside.
That's YOUR rationally-indefensible weighting.  If people acted 
rationally in such situations, why aren't Clarke taxes widespread?
If they DON'T act rationally, is it right to seize power (violently) and
impose Clarke taxes?  Why not?

>One more point and then I'll rest.  If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down
>to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline)
>my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored
>social order?  

You've mistaken my purpose in posting.  I'm not trying to convince you
and you alone.  I'm trying to make a position clear to whoever cares to 
listen.  

>Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending
>that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on?  

I'm pointing out holes in your logic where I see them -- if Daniel
McK. can convince you of the wrongness of public schools, perhaps I
can convince you of the danger of imposing "rational" weightings on
people who must choose their own weightings on irrational grounds.
Besides, that preferences are irrational does not imply that they
cannot be changed by logic.  Irrational preferences may RESPOND to
logic, but may not be shaped entirely by them.  For example, I prefer
the evolutionist argument to the creationist.  Why? Because I believe
one to be more closely corresponding to reality than the other.  Why
should I prefer evolution? Because the irrational opinion-generator in
my head says that while neither one can be absolutely verified or
discounted, one of them is nicely-formed and the other is full of
kludges.  Either one MIGHT be correct, but I prefer the well-formed to
the poorly-formed.  That is an irrational preference, so far as I
know.

>When
>someone says there is no rational support for one set of values or another,
>yet expects me to accept his thesis for reasons, why should I take the trouble
>of concentrating on the issue and testing my opinions?  

Excuse me, but it seems to me that you tried to argue this about
the non-coercion principle: that it had no basis in fact or reason.
My point was that such principles tend to be chosen on irrational grounds,
and that I didn't know of ANY such principles that followed purely from
reason, or history, so that such a criticism applies to all such principles,
and therefore the statement was nugatory.  Why should I bother to point
this out?  For irrational reasons of my own, I prefer that pointless
criticisms of ANY viewpoint be exposed as such.

>Why should I not
>say, "I don't feel like thinking very hard, and I don't like the noises this
>two-legged animal is making -- I think I'll walk away"?!

Feel free!  I doubt one can discover a rational reason for participating
in net.politics.* -- for my part, I do it because I enjoy it.

[NOTE: I'm using abortion here merely as an illustration of a situation
in which it is impossible to evaluate the rightness of something against
a certain set of rules.   This is an ENTIRELY theoretical exercise, and
any comment on this article from the pro/anti abortion stance
(it would never be right to abort a fetus/it's always up to the mother
no matter if a child would turn out to be Einstein) should be
directed to net.abortion, or better yet, not posted at all -- NRH]