Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site ISM780B.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!bonnie!akgua!whuxlm!harpo!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!think!ISM780B!jim From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Re: Definitions of free (and neurosi Message-ID: <27500095@ISM780B.UUCP> Date: Sun, 11-Aug-85 18:18:00 EDT Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500095 Posted: Sun Aug 11 18:18:00 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 18-Aug-85 02:59:53 EDT References: <1181@umcp-cs.UUCP> Lines: 69 Nf-ID: #R:umcp-cs:-118100:ISM780B:27500095:000:4261 Nf-From: ISM780B!jim Aug 11 18:18:00 1985 This argument is a mess on about 20 different levels, but I would like to stick my head in and debate what appears to be the standard argument against relative morality, one which I find completely erroneous: >If there isn't any freedom, then you can hardly rationally >object to what the wife-beater's parents did wrong. You can hardly object >to Jerry Falwell. You can hardly object to ME. The fact that you do object, >and on moral grounds, suggests a large inconsistency. One can rationally find fault with an action; one can blame the perpetrator, if blame is taken in a non-pejorative sense of causation, rather than ascription of sin or evil. I hold morality to be an evolved, social phenomenon, not some sort of divine absolute. People object morally to things which threaten them, their well-being, their families (gene-relatives), their species; they also have moral objections which develop as symbolic transformations of those basic concrete evolutionary concerns. They incorporate and rationalize these moral objections as part of their personalities. Thus morality is a part of one's personal makeup, not merely something chosen. Much morality is shared due to common circumstances. Groups tend to internalize morality by passing laws, invoking religion, and generally trying to "absolutize" it, since individuals not sharing the group morality are seen as a threat to the group. Questioning or debating morality, exploring its origins, displaying its relative nature, make it easier to diverge from the group morality and endanger the group. Many moderately rational beings notice that they can obtain benefit by such divergence, although this benefit may be only short term; highly socialized rational beings may see the benefit but may have the group morality so deeply ingrained and incorporated into their own personalities/egos that they value group benefit above their own in many circumstances. The latter is why many atheists appear highly altruistic even in the absence of moral coercion via religion. In some cases high rationality may allow one to see the self-benefit of group-benefiting behavior that appears on the surface to be self-degrading. Some of Douglas Hofstadter's experiments demonstrate this: in a situation where defectors always do at least as well as cooperators but the more cooperators there are the better everyone does, defecting is only the better strategy if others defect too; if you assume that others are as rational as you, you can assume they will cooperate, since if they assume the same of you their payoff will be higher. That is, a society of cooperators, as an aggregate, is better off than a society of defectors. Thus, evolution favors cooperating societies (Darwin proposed survival of the fit, not the fittest; Social Darwinists be damned!). Even if Jerry Falwell is not inherently evil, and is a product of his environment, and is not morally responsible, it is still rational to criticize him on moral grounds. The criticizer finds him dangerous, appeals to others in the society who also find him dangerous; suuficient opposition will either cause Jerry to change his behavior in the face of social pressure (evolution has favored our being susceptible to various ego-oriented social pressures, not just physically coercive ones), and/or will neutralize him by reducing his social credibility and acceptance, which he needs to retain power in the absence of coercive means under his direct control, and/or by imposing physical sanctions against him (censorship, imprisonment, execution, assassination, whatever (I am not advocating assassination!)). Those who wish to argue philosophically against ethical relativism need to first argue against the plausibility of morality as a evolved mechanism for governing relatively rational and autonomous beings operating within a society. If I am faced with a choice between saving my own ass or the asses of millions, I may well violate my own self-preservation without recourse to rationality or divine nature; guilt and altruism have been built into my psyche, and fear of mental or physical damage inflicted by my fellows is quite justified. These are the basic components of my flesh and blood morality. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)