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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: Definitions of free (and neurosi
Message-ID: <27500095@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 11-Aug-85 18:18:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500095
Posted: Sun Aug 11 18:18:00 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 18-Aug-85 02:59:53 EDT
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Aug 11 18:18:00 1985


This argument is a mess on about 20 different levels, but I would like to
stick my head in and debate what appears to be the standard argument against
relative morality, one which I find completely erroneous:

>If there isn't any freedom, then you can hardly rationally
>object to what the wife-beater's parents did wrong.  You can hardly object
>to Jerry Falwell.  You can hardly object to ME.  The fact that you do object,
>and on moral grounds, suggests a large inconsistency.

One can rationally find fault with an action; one can blame the
perpetrator, if blame is taken in a non-pejorative sense of
causation, rather than ascription of sin or evil.

I hold morality to be an evolved, social phenomenon, not some sort of
divine absolute.  People object morally to things which threaten them,
their well-being, their families (gene-relatives), their species;
they also have moral objections which develop as symbolic transformations
of those basic concrete evolutionary concerns.  They incorporate and
rationalize these moral objections as part of their personalities.
Thus morality is a part of one's personal makeup, not merely something
chosen.  Much morality is shared due to common circumstances.
Groups tend to internalize morality by passing laws, invoking religion,
and generally trying to "absolutize" it, since individuals not sharing
the group morality are seen as a threat to the group.  Questioning or
debating morality, exploring its origins, displaying its relative
nature, make it easier to diverge from the group morality and
endanger the group.  Many moderately rational beings notice that they
can obtain benefit by such divergence, although this benefit may be only
short term; highly socialized rational beings may see the benefit but
may have the group morality so deeply ingrained and incorporated into
their own personalities/egos that they value group benefit above their
own in many circumstances.  The latter is why many atheists appear
highly altruistic even in the absence of moral coercion via religion.
In some cases high rationality may allow one to see the self-benefit of
group-benefiting behavior that appears on the surface to be self-degrading.
Some of Douglas Hofstadter's experiments demonstrate this:  in a situation
where defectors always do at least as well as cooperators but the more
cooperators there are the better everyone does, defecting is only the better
strategy if others defect too; if you assume that others are as rational as
you, you can assume they will cooperate, since if they assume the same of
you their payoff will be higher.  That is, a society of cooperators,
as an aggregate, is better off than a society of defectors.
Thus, evolution favors cooperating societies (Darwin proposed survival
of the fit, not the fittest; Social Darwinists be damned!).

Even if Jerry Falwell is not inherently evil, and is a product of his
environment, and is not morally responsible, it is still rational to criticize
him on moral grounds.  The criticizer finds him dangerous, appeals to others
in the society who also find him dangerous; suuficient opposition will either
cause Jerry to change his behavior in the face of social pressure (evolution
has favored our being susceptible to various ego-oriented social pressures,
not just physically coercive ones), and/or will neutralize him by reducing
his social credibility and acceptance, which he needs to retain power in the
absence of coercive means under his direct control, and/or by imposing
physical sanctions against him (censorship, imprisonment, execution,
assassination, whatever (I am not advocating assassination!)).

Those who wish to argue philosophically against ethical relativism need to
first argue against the plausibility of morality as a evolved mechanism for
governing relatively rational and autonomous beings operating within a
society.  If I am faced with a choice between saving my own ass or the asses
of millions, I may well violate my own self-preservation without recourse to
rationality or divine nature; guilt and altruism have been built into my
psyche, and fear of mental or physical damage inflicted by my fellows
is quite justified.  These are the basic components of my flesh and blood
morality.

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)