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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Mechanism and Determinism
Message-ID: <1223@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 14-Aug-85 15:29:19 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1223
Posted: Wed Aug 14 15:29:19 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 18-Aug-85 22:02:18 EDT
References: <1485@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 141

In article <1485@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

>> As I understand it, free will is essentially the assertion that the
>> process of consciousness can in fact decide; it is the antithesis
>> of the assertion that all human behavior is caused. [WINGATE]

>If a decision is not a cause, then what is?  If you are referring to a
>decision outside the realm of so-called "physical" cause and effect,
>you are talking about something on the order of a soul, though you have
>denied this repeatedly.  But, yes indeed, you got it right:  free will
>is the notion that there can be behavior and thought and action external
>to "physical" cause.  To believe in such a notion requires a willful agent
>external to the realm of cause and effect.

This is a very strange definition to me; sounds precisely like a definition
of spiritualism, having nothing to do with free will at all.

The outcome of a decision causes other things, and, for some decisions,
the choice made is determined.  But the fact that something causes other
things deterministically does not imply that it was itself determined.

>Unless you're just claiming that quantum physics winds up causing things
>at the macro level.  Such random elements, limited in effect, have as
>much to do with free will as...  hot fudge sauce.

Demonstrate this assertion.

>> To deny free will, therefore, I think you must show two things:

>>   (1) That random fluctuations in processing are unimportant.

>>   (2) That all behavior can be traced inevitably to external causes.

>Or internal causes that are caused by the innate make-up of the person
>(surely not "self"-determined, more likely determined by parental genes)
>AND any experiences thereafter (clearly external by definition).

But ya gotta demonstrate this scientifically, and this hasn't been done.
And isn't genetics an external cause?

Given our current understanding of the origin of individual minds, I think
that the hypothesis that random processes are important in establishing the
deciding process (i.e., will).

>> This leads us to to a long list of positions:

>> (A) Soulism: A supernatural entity is the ultimate cause of behavior.

>A necessity if you are speaking in terms of a will independent of the
>constraints of physical reality.

Which I am not.

>> (B) Physical Soulism: A physical entity unlike matter or energy as we
>>     know it is the ultimate cause of behavior.

>1) Why?  Why even speculate about other forces, physical or not (?) that are
>the ultimate cause of behavior?  Why not just the physical things we know
>about and love?  Or are you specifically seeking a causative force
>that allows such independence because you want to think of yourself
>that way?  What's more, if you are talking about some other physical
>entity, it would thus be a part of the physical universe and thus subject
>to the laws of cause and effect.

Before I go jump all over Rich, let me look at this on its merits.  First of
all, causation is NOT physical law.  Some observable quantum effects are
demonstably random, and NOT caused.  Second of all, who are you to demand that
new physical laws follow your preconceptions?  IF the universe is that way,
then it is that way.

As for the silly allegation that I think this is a desirable model:

>> I think we can ignore the first two. [me]

>But they are NECESSARY if you are talking some real form of free will.
>I guess you've just thrown the baby out with the bath water.  Good riddance.

They are only necessary if you want disembodied wills (i.e., spirits).  If
you are willing to get rid of your homonuculus theory of will and stick to
mental processes, then neither of these theories gets you anything.

>> (C) Quantum indeterminism: Quantum events are so important that the sources
>>     of behavior are truly random.

>Now THIS is wishful thinking if ever I heard it.  Because the behavior
>of particles at the quantum level is indeterminate to human observers, THIS
>gives us free will???  What about rocks?  Don't THEY have quantum level
>actions going on?  Why aren't rocks conscious and decision making objects?
>Why can't the rock decide not to fall or roll?  Surely it has those same
>quantum events going on...

It's quite apparent that rocks don't undergo quantum fluctuations that
we can measure.  As for the first two sentences, I can only hope that you
are arguing out of utter ignorance.  The sad facts are that quantum mechanics,
as anyone has been able to formulate it, DEMANDS acausality.  Theoreticians
have been trying to get rid of this for years, but it appears the the
randomness is real, and not just hidden variables.  The fluctuations can be
measured with fairly simple instrumentation (certainly much simpler than
a brain).  There is no evidence that the brain does not similarly amplify
these fluctuations.

Rich keeps acting as if there is solid proof that this does not happen.  I
suggest he produce it if he can.

>> (D) Natal Independence: The initial presence of randomness in the brain 
>>     precludes the development of causality in the mind.

>This may be an explanation of why some people never learn to think, too
>much randomness (perceived) in their brains.  (Directed at no one in
>particular, just an observation.)

Do you have an intelligent criticism to make, Rich? [a flame, in case you
didn't notice]

>> The third essentially denies mechanism,
>> since it asserts that gross behavior is truly not predictable, even
>> probabilistically.  One can argue at length whether or not this constitutes
>> free will.

>Or one can argue briefly:  "No it doesn't, because will implies an agent
>determining action, not just random events."  "Oh, OK."  Very brief.

If the mind itself is the only determiner, though, we have free will.  Free
will isn't water, that we have to pump it out of the supernatural.  End of
brief rebuttal.

>> Position D, however, is the most potent.  It essentially asserts
>> that, however the brain works, there is an initial random component at
>> birth which does not dissipate.  In this case, processing can be
>> mechanistic, yet there is still free will in the strongest sense.

>Whatever random component you wish to insert, it offers little "willful"
>agency, just a random variable thrown in with the mechanism.  Hardly "free"
>or "will".

That's because you have never advanced past the homonuculus theory of
consciousness, Rich.

C Wingate

  "The greatest witch in all Europe is a horse?"