Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP
Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!lll-crg!gymble!umcp-cs!mangoe
From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: What do people mean by free will?
Message-ID: <1195@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 11-Aug-85 22:13:11 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1195
Posted: Sun Aug 11 22:13:11 1985
Date-Received: Tue, 13-Aug-85 03:48:11 EDT
Distribution: net
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 38

The person who brought up the notion of 'mechanistic' brain action expressed
his opinion that his notion of free will couldn't be satisfied by any of the
models he proposed.  He never expressed exactly what this notion was.  I think
we should pause a minute and consider various ideas of where the decisions
in free will come from.

The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will.  I think that
at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until
there is better evidence.

Once we have set aside this notion of pure will, the whole question of will
becomes a problem.  It would seem reasonable to make analogies to present
day computers, which I think we can all agree do not have free will.  We can
then ask at which points is it possible for processing to differ in such a way
as to generate will?

We may first note that the 'program' of the brain is not loaded from the
outside, but is instead generated from within.  The initialization is
apparently directed from genetic information, although the mechanism is quite
unknown at this time.  It is possible that will originates here, before
outside factors can impinge upon the brain.

At the neural level, there are apparently random fluctuations.  Let us assume
for the moment that these fluctuations sometimes manifest themselves in gross
behavior.  Can we call this will?  If we can't, then we must call it something
besides constrained; nothing forces the particular behavior if the
fluctuations are truly random.  Yet it seems to me that the reluctance to call
it free choice seems to me to stem from an unconcious attachment to the first
model I presented.  Only if you perceive Will to be some sort of substance
does this present a problem.  If Will is simply the process of choosing, 
then I would submit that what we have here deserves the name of free will.

I would suggest that those who would deny free will please state what they
mean by the term, and particularly what they perceive Will to be.  No souls,
please.

C Wingate