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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Acausal Brain Activity, again
Message-ID: <1523@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 17-Aug-85 07:27:59 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1523
Posted: Sat Aug 17 07:27:59 1985
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> I think tmoody's discussion makes clear that, contrary to Rosen's statements
> elsewhere, the notion that mental actions may be non-deterministic is
> plausible, without violating Occam's maxim as his analogy of multi-dimensional
> long-necked giraffes would; [BALTER]

I never cared one way or the other whether the universe (and the brain)
was ultimately deterministic or not.  It is irrelevnat to the subject at
hand, which is:  can there be a "will" that controls human action independent
of the status of the person's current chemical makeup and surrounding
environment?

> as Wingate has repeatedly stated, there is no
> necessary implication of a soul; Rosen's statements that Wingate's position
> necessarily implies same out of wishful thinking must be viewed as an
> ad hominem argument.

Alternatively, that last sentence could (and perhaps should) be viewed as an
ad hominem argument.  ("Must"???)  Wingate "states" a lot of things.  So do
I.  So do you.  Wingate failed to show how such a will could exist without
something on the order of a soul.  So he (and you) can state all you want.
Stating (asserting) doesn't make it so.  Sorry, that's the way the world works.

>  This is clear when you consider that I
> need not temporarily suspend a Christian moral outlook as Wingate has
> attempted to do nor disconsider my belief in a soul, since I have no such
> moral outlook or belief (lacking adequate definitions of God or soul), yet I
> still find non-deterministic mental decisions quite plausible.

Me, too, to a degree.  So?  What does THAT have to do with free will?

>  Someone who
> wants to label that as wishful thinking has the burden of demonstrating that
> I prefer or value a non-deterministic mind.

I can't imagine why such a thing would be preferred or valued in any case.
Such a thing cracks not just pure deterministic models but also free will.

> I don't find the deterministic or
> non-deterministic nature of the universe to be particularly relevant to the
> notion of freedom of behavior (I quite agree that freedom obtained as a
> result of quantum indeterminacy is "perverse").  So, from a neutral position
> in terms of desire, I find non-determinacy plausible.

Agreed.  (But again, so?)
-- 
"Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?"    Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr