Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!umcp-cs!mangoe From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: What is morality anyways? Message-ID: <1222@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Wed, 14-Aug-85 11:53:15 EDT Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1222 Posted: Wed Aug 14 11:53:15 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 18-Aug-85 22:01:03 EDT References: <27500096@ISM780B.UUCP> Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 48 In article <27500096@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >>>[warack] >>>Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs. >>>Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do? >>>In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical >>>function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system >>>would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] >>[wingate] >>I think it's reasonable to include the restriction that we consider only >>those systems which actually attempt to deal with the question of "Why >>shouldn't I do what I want to do?" >Only if you want to insist on presuming your conclusions. I hold that you >and other religious ethicists make errors because you have confused notions >about what morality is, mixing it up with absolutes. If we follow your >restriction above, we will inevitably be led to an absolute authority as the >only way to answer your question. QED, from your POV. But: >morality tells us what we should do. If we want to do something that we >shouldn't, the reason not to, by definition, is that it is immoral. >That is, the morality is a model that labels actions "should do" and >"shouldn't do". But the deeper question, what perhaps you really mean, >is why shouldn't we from the point of view of benefit to ourselves; >morality says we shouldn't, but is it *really* true that we shouldn't? >You see, *should* is a very fuzzy term; it is dependent upon point of view; >it is relative, not absolute. All absolute moralists totally ignore this >issue. What I should do from my POV, what I should do from your POV, what >I should do from the POV of any given morality, are all different. >The very *meaning* of "should" is relative. For any "should" statement, >I can respond "Says who?". >So back to the deeper question, what should I do from the point of view of >my own benefit? Well, it depends on how you define benefit. >See, it is all relative. But I think that's the whole point. If I'm walking down the street, and I want an ice cream cone, so I buy one: do we really care about that as a moral dilemma? It seems to me that you can't be talking about morality in any meaningful way until you are dealing with conflicting wants. To simply define morality as "that which tells us what to do" is plainly wrong to me. There are a number of different reasons why we decide things. We can do it on the basis of simple desires, as in the above case. We can reason out a course of action. But it seems to me that most everyone acknoledges the existence of a faculty called the conscience, which only acts to forbid a desire from being acted out. C Wingate