Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!harpo!whuxlm!whuxl!houxm!mhuxt!mhuxr!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Acausal Brain Activity, again Message-ID: <1523@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Sat, 17-Aug-85 07:27:59 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1523 Posted: Sat Aug 17 07:27:59 1985 Date-Received: Fri, 23-Aug-85 07:06:09 EDT References: <1243@sjuvax.UUCP> <27500091@ISM780B.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 46 > I think tmoody's discussion makes clear that, contrary to Rosen's statements > elsewhere, the notion that mental actions may be non-deterministic is > plausible, without violating Occam's maxim as his analogy of multi-dimensional > long-necked giraffes would; [BALTER] I never cared one way or the other whether the universe (and the brain) was ultimately deterministic or not. It is irrelevnat to the subject at hand, which is: can there be a "will" that controls human action independent of the status of the person's current chemical makeup and surrounding environment? > as Wingate has repeatedly stated, there is no > necessary implication of a soul; Rosen's statements that Wingate's position > necessarily implies same out of wishful thinking must be viewed as an > ad hominem argument. Alternatively, that last sentence could (and perhaps should) be viewed as an ad hominem argument. ("Must"???) Wingate "states" a lot of things. So do I. So do you. Wingate failed to show how such a will could exist without something on the order of a soul. So he (and you) can state all you want. Stating (asserting) doesn't make it so. Sorry, that's the way the world works. > This is clear when you consider that I > need not temporarily suspend a Christian moral outlook as Wingate has > attempted to do nor disconsider my belief in a soul, since I have no such > moral outlook or belief (lacking adequate definitions of God or soul), yet I > still find non-deterministic mental decisions quite plausible. Me, too, to a degree. So? What does THAT have to do with free will? > Someone who > wants to label that as wishful thinking has the burden of demonstrating that > I prefer or value a non-deterministic mind. I can't imagine why such a thing would be preferred or valued in any case. Such a thing cracks not just pure deterministic models but also free will. > I don't find the deterministic or > non-deterministic nature of the universe to be particularly relevant to the > notion of freedom of behavior (I quite agree that freedom obtained as a > result of quantum indeterminacy is "perverse"). So, from a neutral position > in terms of desire, I find non-determinacy plausible. Agreed. (But again, so?) -- "Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr