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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Acausal Brain Activity, again
Message-ID: <27500091@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 11-Aug-85 15:25:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500091
Posted: Sun Aug 11 15:25:00 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 18-Aug-85 02:51:46 EDT
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Aug 11 15:25:00 1985


I think tmoody's discussion makes clear that, contrary to Rosen's statements
elsewhere, the notion that mental actions may be non-deterministic is
plausible, without violating Occam's maxim as his analogy of multi-dimensional
long-necked giraffes would; as Wingate has repeatedly stated, there is no
necessary implication of a soul; Rosen's statements that Wingate's position
necessarily implies same out of wishful thinking must be viewed as an
ad hominem argument.  This is clear when you consider that I
need not temporarily suspend a Christian moral outlook as Wingate has
attempted to do nor disconsider my belief in a soul, since I have no such
moral outlook or belief (lacking adequate definitions of God or soul), yet I
still find non-deterministic mental decisions quite plausible.  Someone who
wants to label that as wishful thinking has the burden of demonstrating that
I prefer or value a non-deterministic mind.  But as I have stated before,
I think that the true underlying semantics of free will is involved with lack
of knowledge of the causes of the subject's behavior, and given the
unsolvability of the halting problem I don't find the deterministic or
non-deterministic nature of the universe to be particularly relevant to the
notion of freedom of behavior (I quite agree that freedom obtained as a
result of quantum indeterminacy is "perverse").  So, from a neutral position
in terms of desire, I find non-determinacy plausible.

> Paul Torek ...
> pointed out that the large number of such interactions
>involved in typical congitive processes might tend to make the quantum
>indeterminacy negligible.
>...
> If the debate were strictly concerned with the
>prediction of human behavior, then I would agree that neural
>indeterminacy might indeed be negligible, although it *need* not be.
>This is an interesting question in its own right.

It is, and since it has been raised I'd like to briefly discuss it.
In the past others have stated more strongly than Paul (he said "might")
that micro-indeterminacy does not have macro effects, but I consider this
very far from obvious.  If synaptic events were Brownian, then I would
give such averaging out a high probability.  But instead synaptic firings
are threshold-driven, so there is a quantization which could translate
a micro-quantum decision into a less micro quantum decision.  Given that
large numbers of firings are involved, but that many macro effects are of
a binary nature (e.g., fight or flight; see catastrophy theory) where the
payoffs are very close, at least within the subject's set of knowledge
(i.e. deciding one way is not blatantly obviously preferable to deciding the
other way), it doesn't seem hard to imagine that either of the two macro
results could arise from the same initial brain state, depending upon the
sum results of the total set of quantum bifurcations.

I favor a multiple worlds model which contains a separate universe for each
possible configuration of quantum outcomes.  (Please note that favoring
such a model simply means that I like to use it to organize thought; it does
not make any statement about how the world "really" works!  As far as I can
see, it pointless to argue whether there is "really" just one universe
with random outcomes or whether all the different universes "exist", since
there is no way for us to observe a difference between the two cases, and
since the semantics of "alternate universes exist" is not well established.
But, just as the "external world" model seems to provide more analytic meat
than the solipsistic model, or the evolution model seems to provide more
analytic meat than the "God created the fossil record to tempt us" model,
even though neither model can be demonstrated to be more true, so the
multiple worlds model allows us to continue playing the analysis game where
the chance model seems to stop.)
Coupling the multiple worlds model with the "quantum decisions can lead to
macro effects in the brain" possibility provides a plausible model wherein
all sides of all major decisions have been made in various alternate
universes, and this universe happens to be the one that contains the
particular constellation of events that these us'es have been subjected to.
Full contemplation of this should give rise to a deep sense of humility, and
a deeper understanding of the statement "There, but for fortune, go I."

By providing a model that replaces randomness with parallel occurrences of
multiple possibilities, we reestablish determinism at a higher level:
a given initial state gives rise to a tree of futures; not all possible
futures can arise; the tree is determinable; in a quantum universe it is
even enumeratable.

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)

"Mature player of philosophy as a cooperative mind game seeks others for
multiple mutual enjoyment.  Send photo."