Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!lll-crg!gymble!umcp-cs!mangoe From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: What do people mean by free will? Message-ID: <1195@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Sun, 11-Aug-85 22:13:11 EDT Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1195 Posted: Sun Aug 11 22:13:11 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 13-Aug-85 03:48:11 EDT Distribution: net Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 38 The person who brought up the notion of 'mechanistic' brain action expressed his opinion that his notion of free will couldn't be satisfied by any of the models he proposed. He never expressed exactly what this notion was. I think we should pause a minute and consider various ideas of where the decisions in free will come from. The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until there is better evidence. Once we have set aside this notion of pure will, the whole question of will becomes a problem. It would seem reasonable to make analogies to present day computers, which I think we can all agree do not have free will. We can then ask at which points is it possible for processing to differ in such a way as to generate will? We may first note that the 'program' of the brain is not loaded from the outside, but is instead generated from within. The initialization is apparently directed from genetic information, although the mechanism is quite unknown at this time. It is possible that will originates here, before outside factors can impinge upon the brain. At the neural level, there are apparently random fluctuations. Let us assume for the moment that these fluctuations sometimes manifest themselves in gross behavior. Can we call this will? If we can't, then we must call it something besides constrained; nothing forces the particular behavior if the fluctuations are truly random. Yet it seems to me that the reluctance to call it free choice seems to me to stem from an unconcious attachment to the first model I presented. Only if you perceive Will to be some sort of substance does this present a problem. If Will is simply the process of choosing, then I would submit that what we have here deserves the name of free will. I would suggest that those who would deny free will please state what they mean by the term, and particularly what they perceive Will to be. No souls, please. C Wingate