Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site mmintl.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: What do people mean by free will? Message-ID: <596@mmintl.UUCP> Date: Tue, 13-Aug-85 14:42:50 EDT Article-I.D.: mmintl.596 Posted: Tue Aug 13 14:42:50 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 19-Aug-85 06:17:57 EDT References: <1195@umcp-cs.UUCP> Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) Distribution: net Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT Lines: 85 Summary: In article <1195@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >The person who brought up the notion of 'mechanistic' brain action expressed >his opinion that his notion of free will couldn't be satisfied by any of the >models he proposed. He never expressed exactly what this notion was. I think >we should pause a minute and consider various ideas of where the decisions >in free will come from. > >The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that >at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until >there is better evidence. > >Once we have set aside this notion of pure will, the whole question of will >becomes a problem. It would seem reasonable to make analogies to present >day computers, which I think we can all agree do not have free will. We can >then ask at which points is it possible for processing to differ in such a way >as to generate will? > >We may first note that the 'program' of the brain is not loaded from the >outside, but is instead generated from within. The initialization is >apparently directed from genetic information, although the mechanism is quite >unknown at this time. It is possible that will originates here, before >outside factors can impinge upon the brain. > >At the neural level, there are apparently random fluctuations. Let us assume >for the moment that these fluctuations sometimes manifest themselves in gross >behavior. Can we call this will? If we can't, then we must call it something >besides constrained; nothing forces the particular behavior if the >fluctuations are truly random. Yet it seems to me that the reluctance to call >it free choice seems to me to stem from an unconcious attachment to the first >model I presented. Only if you perceive Will to be some sort of substance >does this present a problem. If Will is simply the process of choosing, >then I would submit that what we have here deserves the name of free will. > >I would suggest that those who would deny free will please state what they >mean by the term, and particularly what they perceive Will to be. No souls, >please. > >C Wingate I didn't say what I meant by free will because I am not sure exactly what it is I do mean. Actually, I don't think free will is a form of will, at all. Paul Torek, in answer to a point I made, makes a distinction between free will, which is the absence of internal constraint, and freedom (simpliciter), which is the absence of external constraint. I would suggest that free will be further broken up into free thought, and free will proper. Free will proper refers to one's ability to convert one's intentions into volition. (This is violated more often than might be thought. It occurs any time sloth or emotion overcomes one's intentions.) I do not think there is any question about the existence of free will proper, as defined here. It is free thought whose existence and/or meaning is in question. This includes both ideas and decisions, although the latter is more closely related to the original idea of free will. Subjectively, it seems that my decisions are neither determined nor random. Certainly many decisions are made on a purely rational basis. But decisions about objectives do not have this property in general. This gets a bit muddled here, because the distinction between ends and means is not at all clear-cut. It is not entirely clear that one can ever make decisions which are truly about ultimate objectives, and not about intermediate objectives. But it seems like one can. Certainly, one has multiple ultimate objectives: pleasure, desire for knowledge, revenge, survival of family, etc. (Not that everyone shares all these objectives.) And one can make decisions balancing one desire against another. Are such decisions mechanistic? They don't seem to be, but this may be an illusion. I'm afraid I don't see randomness as being any closer to freedom than determinism is. If I flip a coin, is it "free" to come up either heads or tails? (Leave aside the question of whether it's movement is truly random; assume it is.) There is some sense of the word free in which it is -- it is not externally constrained. But it makes no choices; it is just random. Ultimately, this gets down to the question of subjective reality -- a debate raging right now (that's raging, as in raging forest fire). Perhaps I will express my opinions on that later, if I can figure out what they are.