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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Mechanism and Determinism
Message-ID: <1559@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 19-Aug-85 22:24:06 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1559
Posted: Mon Aug 19 22:24:06 1985
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>>>As I understand it, free will is essentially the assertion that the
>>>process of consciousness can in fact decide; it is the antithesis
>>>of the assertion that all human behavior is caused. [WINGATE]

>>If a decision is not a cause, then what is?  If you are referring to a
>>decision outside the realm of so-called "physical" cause and effect,
>>you are talking about something on the order of a soul, though you have
>>denied this repeatedly.  But, yes indeed, you got it right:  free will
>>is the notion that there can be behavior and thought and action external
>>to "physical" cause.  To believe in such a notion requires a willful agent
>>external to the realm of cause and effect. [WINGATE]

> This is a very strange definition to me; sounds precisely like a definition
> of spiritualism, having nothing to do with free will at all.

Spiritualism has everything to do with true free will, because it is
a consequence *of* it.  In order for a will (by your own definition) to
be free, it must be unconstrained by feeble constraints like your wants
and beliefs as manifested chemically in your brain.

>>Unless you're just claiming that quantum physics winds up causing things
>>at the macro level.  Such random elements, limited in effect, have as
>>much to do with free will as...  hot fudge sauce.

> Demonstrate this assertion.

I have, in other articles.  Quantum randomness doesn't bring freedom for
your will, it merely makes your will dependent on yet another variable:
quantum randomness.

>>>To deny free will, therefore, I think you must show two things:
>>>  (1) That random fluctuations in processing are unimportant.
>>>  (2) That all behavior can be traced inevitably to external causes.

>>Or internal causes that are caused by the innate make-up of the person
>>(surely not "self"-determined, more likely determined by parental genes)
>>AND any experiences thereafter (clearly external by definition).

> But ya gotta demonstrate this scientifically, and this hasn't been done.
> And isn't genetics an external cause?

Certainly there's more basis for the solid ground that this model walks
upon than the swamp of presumption and wishful thinking where Charlie's
model can be found.  Fine, you've just proved my point:  yet another external
cause to trace things to.  I was glad to call genetics innate and internal,
but your point is well taken:  it's another dependency on externals.

> Given our current understanding of the origin of individual minds, I think
> that the hypothesis that random processes are important in establishing the
> deciding process (i.e., will).

To quote a famous scholar of the human mind (a Charley Wignatz),  "Demonstrate
this assertion."

>>>This leads us to to a long list of positions:
>>>(A) Soulism: A supernatural entity is the ultimate cause of behavior.

>>A necessity if you are speaking in terms of a will independent of the
>>constraints of physical reality.

> Which I am not.

Then you're not talking about FREE will at all.  End of discussion.
--
Anything's possible... but wait, there's more...

>>>(B) Physical Soulism: A physical entity unlike matter or energy as we
>>>    know it is the ultimate cause of behavior.

>>1) Why?  Why even speculate about other forces, physical or not (?) that are
>>the ultimate cause of behavior?  Why not just the physical things we know
>>about and love?  Or are you specifically seeking a causative force
>>that allows such independence because you want to think of yourself
>>that way?  What's more, if you are talking about some other physical
>>entity, it would thus be a part of the physical universe and thus subject
>>to the laws of cause and effect.

> Before I go jump all over Rich, let me look at this on its merits.  First of
> all, causation is NOT physical law.  Some observable quantum effects are
> demonstably random, and NOT caused.  Second of all, who are you to demand that
> new physical laws follow your preconceptions?  IF the universe is that way,
> then it is that way.

I didn't say that it "had to".  But you are coming up with blueprints of
the new universe model, not based on speculations in light of evidence,
but based on what you want the outcome to be:  a world with free will.

> As for the silly allegation that I think this is a desirable model:
>>>I think we can ignore the first two. [me]

>>But they are NECESSARY if you are talking some real form of free will.
>>I guess you've just thrown the baby out with the bath water.  Good riddance.

> They are only necessary if you want disembodied wills (i.e., spirits).  If
> you are willing to get rid of your homonuculus theory of will and stick to
> mental processes, then neither of these theories gets you anything.

I'm more than willing.  In fact, I see it as a step in the right direction.
Unfortunately, by doing that, you shut the door on free will.  Fini again.
--
Like aversion (HEY!)...  wait a minute, what's going on here?

>>>(C) Quantum indeterminism: Quantum events are so important that the sources
>>>    of behavior are truly random.

>>Now THIS is wishful thinking if ever I heard it.  Because the behavior
>>of particles at the quantum level is indeterminate to human observers, THIS
>>gives us free will???  What about rocks?  Don't THEY have quantum level
>>actions going on?  Why aren't rocks conscious and decision making objects?
>>Why can't the rock decide not to fall or roll?  Surely it has those same
>>quantum events going on...

> It's quite apparent that rocks don't undergo quantum fluctuations that
> we can measure.

Oh?  This is news.  Now it's rocks that are different from the rest of the
universe...

> As for the first two sentences, I can only hope that you are arguing
> out of utter ignorance.  The sad facts are that quantum mechanics,
> as anyone has been able to formulate it, DEMANDS acausality.  Theoreticians
> have been trying to get rid of this for years, but it appears the the
> randomness is real, and not just hidden variables.  The fluctuations can be
> measured with fairly simple instrumentation (certainly much simpler than
> a brain).  There is no evidence that the brain does not similarly amplify
> these fluctuations.

1) So?  All you have proven is that the human will is not only constrained
by "hard" chemical make-up, but also by "soft" quantum fluctuations.
2) This sounds an awful lot like religion.  Which is more religious sounding
to you?  "Quantum mechanics provides us with no perceivable means of
making determinations" "Quantum mechanics proves that there are things that
have no cause, because we are unable to find any."

> Rich keeps acting as if there is solid proof that this does not happen.

Give an example.

>>>(D) Natal Independence: The initial presence of randomness in the brain 
>>>    precludes the development of causality in the mind.

>>This may be an explanation of why some people never learn to think, too
>>much randomness (perceived) in their brains.  (Directed at no one in
>>particular, just an observation.)

> Do you have an intelligent criticism to make, Rich? [a flame, in case you
> didn't notice]

Yes, this may be an explantion of why some people never learn to think,
too much randomness (perceived) in their brains.  (Directed at no one in
particular, just an observation.)  Seriously, did you have an intelligent
*statement* to make (as long as we're flaming)?  What does this mean?  
The brain, like everything else in the universe, has quantum events
occurring within it, thus direct causality is impeded?  What does this have
to do with any of our arguments pro or con?  In what way does it affect
"will", let alone "free will"?

>>>The third essentially denies mechanism,
>>>since it asserts that gross behavior is truly not predictable, even
>>>probabilistically.  One can argue at length whether or not this constitutes
>>>free will.

>>Or one can argue briefly:  "No it doesn't, because will implies an agent
>>determining action, not just random events."  "Oh, OK."  Very brief.

> If the mind itself is the only determiner, though, we have free will.  Free
> will isn't water, that we have to pump it out of the supernatural.  End of
> brief rebuttal.

Since the mind doesn't determine itself, since it is formed based on external
dependencies and since it grows and develops continuously based on further
external events, it is not the "only" determiner, and thus we don't have
free will.  End of somewhat longer but more to the point rebuttal with a very
long sentence at the end of it that would have been a lot shorter had I ended
it with the first instance of the word rebuttal.

(Yes, I've been reading too much Gebstadter. :-)

>>>Position D, however, is the most potent.  It essentially asserts
>>>that, however the brain works, there is an initial random component at
>>>birth which does not dissipate.  In this case, processing can be
>>>mechanistic, yet there is still free will in the strongest sense.

>>Whatever random component you wish to insert, it offers little "willful"
>>agency, just a random variable thrown in with the mechanism.  Hardly "free"
>>or "will".

> That's because you have never advanced past the homonuculus theory of
> consciousness, Rich.

No, that's because I understand what the difference between "free" and
"constrained" is.
-- 
"I was walking down the street.  A man came up to me and asked me what was the
 capital of Bolivia.  I hesitated.  Three sailors jumped me.  The next thing I
 knew I was making chicken salad."
"I don't believe that for a minute.  Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is
 La Paz."				Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr