Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site ISM780B.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!bonnie!akgua!whuxlm!harpo!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!think!ISM780B!jim From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Acausal Brain Activity, again Message-ID: <27500091@ISM780B.UUCP> Date: Sun, 11-Aug-85 15:25:00 EDT Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500091 Posted: Sun Aug 11 15:25:00 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 18-Aug-85 02:51:46 EDT References: <1243@sjuvax.UUCP> Lines: 79 Nf-ID: #R:sjuvax:-124300:ISM780B:27500091:000:4828 Nf-From: ISM780B!jim Aug 11 15:25:00 1985 I think tmoody's discussion makes clear that, contrary to Rosen's statements elsewhere, the notion that mental actions may be non-deterministic is plausible, without violating Occam's maxim as his analogy of multi-dimensional long-necked giraffes would; as Wingate has repeatedly stated, there is no necessary implication of a soul; Rosen's statements that Wingate's position necessarily implies same out of wishful thinking must be viewed as an ad hominem argument. This is clear when you consider that I need not temporarily suspend a Christian moral outlook as Wingate has attempted to do nor disconsider my belief in a soul, since I have no such moral outlook or belief (lacking adequate definitions of God or soul), yet I still find non-deterministic mental decisions quite plausible. Someone who wants to label that as wishful thinking has the burden of demonstrating that I prefer or value a non-deterministic mind. But as I have stated before, I think that the true underlying semantics of free will is involved with lack of knowledge of the causes of the subject's behavior, and given the unsolvability of the halting problem I don't find the deterministic or non-deterministic nature of the universe to be particularly relevant to the notion of freedom of behavior (I quite agree that freedom obtained as a result of quantum indeterminacy is "perverse"). So, from a neutral position in terms of desire, I find non-determinacy plausible. > Paul Torek ... > pointed out that the large number of such interactions >involved in typical congitive processes might tend to make the quantum >indeterminacy negligible. >... > If the debate were strictly concerned with the >prediction of human behavior, then I would agree that neural >indeterminacy might indeed be negligible, although it *need* not be. >This is an interesting question in its own right. It is, and since it has been raised I'd like to briefly discuss it. In the past others have stated more strongly than Paul (he said "might") that micro-indeterminacy does not have macro effects, but I consider this very far from obvious. If synaptic events were Brownian, then I would give such averaging out a high probability. But instead synaptic firings are threshold-driven, so there is a quantization which could translate a micro-quantum decision into a less micro quantum decision. Given that large numbers of firings are involved, but that many macro effects are of a binary nature (e.g., fight or flight; see catastrophy theory) where the payoffs are very close, at least within the subject's set of knowledge (i.e. deciding one way is not blatantly obviously preferable to deciding the other way), it doesn't seem hard to imagine that either of the two macro results could arise from the same initial brain state, depending upon the sum results of the total set of quantum bifurcations. I favor a multiple worlds model which contains a separate universe for each possible configuration of quantum outcomes. (Please note that favoring such a model simply means that I like to use it to organize thought; it does not make any statement about how the world "really" works! As far as I can see, it pointless to argue whether there is "really" just one universe with random outcomes or whether all the different universes "exist", since there is no way for us to observe a difference between the two cases, and since the semantics of "alternate universes exist" is not well established. But, just as the "external world" model seems to provide more analytic meat than the solipsistic model, or the evolution model seems to provide more analytic meat than the "God created the fossil record to tempt us" model, even though neither model can be demonstrated to be more true, so the multiple worlds model allows us to continue playing the analysis game where the chance model seems to stop.) Coupling the multiple worlds model with the "quantum decisions can lead to macro effects in the brain" possibility provides a plausible model wherein all sides of all major decisions have been made in various alternate universes, and this universe happens to be the one that contains the particular constellation of events that these us'es have been subjected to. Full contemplation of this should give rise to a deep sense of humility, and a deeper understanding of the statement "There, but for fortune, go I." By providing a model that replaces randomness with parallel occurrences of multiple possibilities, we reestablish determinism at a higher level: a given initial state gives rise to a tree of futures; not all possible futures can arise; the tree is determinable; in a quantum universe it is even enumeratable. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim) "Mature player of philosophy as a cooperative mind game seeks others for multiple mutual enjoyment. Send photo."