Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: freedom and unpredictability Message-ID: <1149@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Sat, 29-Jun-85 02:32:43 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1149 Posted: Sat Jun 29 02:32:43 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 30-Jun-85 00:11:07 EDT References: <325@spar.UUCP> <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP> <464@umcp-cs.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 53 Keywords: free will, predictability > My position emphasizes rational evaluation and corresponding action. Ellis > was close, but I would add that the knowledge and desires must be rational > (the more irrational, the less free). [TOREK] As usual, to paraphrase Arthur Dent, this must be a definition of the word "free" (as concocted by Paul) with which I was totally unfamiliar. Rationality and freedom are not congruent, nor are they parallel. You would seem to be defining free as "having the ability to choose the best way offering the most benefit". Free really means "having the ability to choose anything at a whim regardless of external variables". Based on your definition of "free" as having the means to choose the BEST way rather having the capability of choosing any way, I can see where your other definitions follow from. Your definition of free is simply tautologically imposed onto definitions of rational. >>... From the above definition, I would conclude >>that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising >>free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal >>control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is >>irrelevant to the argument). Addicts may think that they are free to quit >>their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice, >>*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free... > Yes, that's why I say that the beliefs and desires must be rationally > formed and (re)evaluated to be free. (And again, freedom as I under- > stand it admits of degrees.) Whoa! You've lost me. Is buying popcorn in the above example thus free will or not free will? Is buying popcorn in ANY example free will or not, remembering that there is little fundamental difference between direct subliminal manipulation (deliberate or not) and experiences that influence our minds and formulate the way we make decisions? > I agree, and I've made the same or similar point myself, namely that we > have enough "high-level" evidence (in our macroscopic everyday world of > people, etc.) of free choice that we don't have to withhold our verdict > on its existence until we understand the microscopic level. (Although, > I don't deny that we would learn something from such investigations on > the micro level.) What IS this evidence? I would contend that you are again referring to global perceptions of a similar vein to viewing the sun as "rising" and "falling". You may perceive human actions (even your own) as "free" only because YOU cannot comprehend the root causes. To YOUR eye they appear free, but at the root level they are not. In the AI world, designers may introduce randomness as an element to make the machines APPEAR more human. Do humans really operate that way, either randomly or through some agent, or are the causes of our actions so complex (rooted in all the catalogued experiences we've accumulated, different for all of us) that we are unable to predict them and thus they APPEAR to be "free". -- Like a vermin (HEY!), shot for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr