Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Re: freedom and unpredictability Message-ID: <1123@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Mon, 24-Jun-85 15:33:45 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1123 Posted: Mon Jun 24 15:33:45 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 26-Jun-85 07:31:06 EDT References: <325@spar.UUCP> <27500082@ISM780B.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 123 >>> John Williams: The universe is deterministic but unknowable due to lack >>> of information about the universe's initial conditions. >>> Free Will somehow somehow derives from this built-in >>> lack of knowledge. [ELLIS] >>But OUR lack of knowledge on a subject surely does not have a bearing on its >>existence or non-existence. [ROSEN] > It most certainly does when the subject consists only of semantic constructs > used for conceptual organization and communication between human beings. > Such is the case with Free Will. It is even true of Determinism. [BALTER] On the contrary, it's NOT the case at all. To be free means to be unhindered by other controlling variables. If in fact the controlling variables are simply unknown to us at present or "non-determinable", that doesn't make us any more free than if we did know them. >>Paul has certainly given definitions that are not >>self-contradictory, but of course he defines it so that it DOES exist >>because he wants to believe in free will. > Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common sense. > I happen not to agree. >>What he refers to as "my" (Rich Rosen's) >>definition of free will is in fact the common accepted notion of what free >>will means, > If you expect people to accept the truth of this without proof, you are > simply an ass. You give definitions which you think are reasonable and > match common sense. I happen not to agree. To argue *ad hominem* that your > definitions are better is dishonest. *Demonstrate* to the satisfaction > of people who disagree with you that your definitions match common accepted > notions. You mean like quoting the dictionary definition of free will? I've done that repeatedly. "Simply an ass"? "Ad hominem"? "Dishonest"? Randomly throwing out these epithets as you've done strikes me as TRULY dishonest. Unlike some others, I don't expect people to accept my definitions because I say so: I quote sources and offer substantiation. I reiterate in case you missed it the first time: "the belief that man's choices ultimately are or can be voluntary AND NOT DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES" is the operative definition (or one of them offering a similar perspective). Paul's definition avoids this and is merely an assertion about a behavior, rational evaluative capability, which I agree does exist, simply tagging the label "free will" onto that because Paul wants free will to exist. Could you please refrain from really making this an ad hominem argument by calling me an ass for something you accuse me of doing that I do not and have not done. > Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree > with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated > and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in > reasonable-sounding defintions. The question is, do the > *conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your > definition match peoples' expectations. I stated the dictionary definition, not "mine". I still contend that the capability I just mentioned that Paul insists IS free will is not in fact free BECAUSE it IS dependent on other external variables, and that violates the definition of "free". >>how can an agent be truly free if it is a part of the >>world of cause and effect, since that agent itself is thus subject to its >>laws and is thus determined. > You keep asking this question, as though it is an obvious contradiction. > But it only is if you have a definition of "truly free" which is mutually > exclusive with "determined". Such a definition is not *necessary*. > I hold that it is nonsensical and contradictory to common meaning to hold > that "truly free" means "completely unrestrained", since this would mean > even free from restraints, e.g., to remain human. No one on the street > is going to demand the ability to stop being human as a requirement for > having Free Will. It is intellectually dishonest, or at least masturbatory, > to carry the definition of Free Will to such an extreme that it cannot > possibly be applied, and then say "look, see, there is no such thing". > Rather, one should try to *constrain* the definition in such a way as that it > becomes a meaningful and useful tool for discourse. We're talking about the means by which one's choices are reached. If that means was truly free, it would in fact be unconstrained. The ability to "remain human" or choose not to involves making physical changes to the body that the body is not physically capable of making. We are not talking about freedom of action, but freedom in what choices are produced. I contend that by whatever definition you choose, they still come out constrained. Redefining the limits of "constrainability" so that you can have your result become true strikes me as fine tuning your premises to adapt to your conclusion, and that is what would seem to be truly dishonest (not to mention masturbatory) in this argument. >>But then again, I think Mike is grasping for straws in that he >>is defining a universe that provides for free will based on his desire to >>have a universe in which there could be free will, rather than based on the >>evidence. > "the evidence." The evidence says that "Free Will" consists of certain > vibrations of elastic bands in our throats, or certain combinations of > straight lines, etc. But "the evidence" misses the point, because it > is operating at the wrong level of discourse. The evidence also indicates > that love, caring, and sensitivity don't exist, they are just manifestations > of evolutionarily produced behavior mechanisms. On the contrary, the evidence shows quite clearly that, at least in some people, those things do exist. They describe an attitude and feeling about other people which is evident in their behavior. How are love, caring, and sensitivity defined? If you're talking about the inner trappings of how they operate in our minds, that's another story: you were simply talking about whether or not they existed. Let's do the same for free will. Based on the definition. Does such a phenomenon manifest itself? In what way? > But then people *act* upon > such "evidence" and *choose* to write papers and subject people to > their beliefs and *feel* that they are justified. *You* know damn well > that you are choosing to type what you do. The fact that you may be > determined to do it is *irrelevant*. It operates on a different level > of discourse. If you ever come to understand the dichotomy, you may become > more interesting to talk to. As interesting as you perceive yourself to be? (and they call ME abusive?) Of course I am "choosing", we have already discussed the very process of choosing above. The question is: is that process "free"? I say no. -- Like aversion (HEY!), shocked for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr