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From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: freedom and unpredictability
Message-ID: <464@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 25-Jun-85 12:04:01 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.464
Posted: Tue Jun 25 12:04:01 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 29-Jun-85 02:59:12 EDT
References: <325@spar.UUCP> <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP>
Reply-To: flink@maryland.UUCP (Paul V. Torek)
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 68
Keywords: free will, predictability
Summary: But I *want* to be predictable!

In article <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes:
>as summarized by Ellis ("
>		    Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable
>    	 	    agent can have free will, which consists of the ability
>		    to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on
>		    one's knowledge and desires.";
>my archives are empty; if you can provide a more accurate statement of your
>position, please do so)

My position emphasizes rational evaluation and corresponding action.  Ellis
was close, but I would add that the knowledge and desires must be rational
(the more irrational, the less free).

>From the above definition, I would conclude that failure to obtain
>satisfaction indicates lack of free will.  I don't think most people would
>agree; rather, it would be construed as the result of poor choices.

Agreed; I would strike "satisfactorily".

>...  From the above definition, I would conclude
>that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising
>free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal
>control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is
>irrelevant to the argument).  Addicts may think that they are free to quit
>their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice,
>*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free...

Yes, that's why I say that the beliefs and desires must be rationally
formed and (re)evaluated to be free.  (And again, freedom as I under-
stand it admits of degrees.)

>...  I believe your dismissal of
>a connection between free will and predictability to be an error, although an
>understandable one given that the issue of predictability is so often cast in
>terms of absolute determinism.  Free will and determinism of events are not
>contradictory; but subjective free will and subjective knowledge of the
>causes of one's own actions are inversely related, in my view.

You were doing fine until now, but BZZZZZZ!  Wrong answer, and here's why:
I *want* to know the causes of my own actions (I also want them to be
particular *sorts* of causes, but I digress); I want to be predictable,
at least to myself (and I don't mind if others find me predictable, as
long as they're not hostile -- and 99.44% of them aren't).  If I want,
choose, prefer -- rationally -- to know this, how can knowing it make
me less free?  It can't.

>As a deeper flaw, definitions of free will that involve notions of an agent
>manipulating the universe are mechanistic; they require defining and
>identifying agents as distinct from their manipulations and the things
>manipulated; this is where the "brains are chemicals" morass comes in.

I'm not sure what your point is here, but the "manipulating the universe"
talk is Ellis's, not mine.

>...  This [free will talk] has absolutely nothing
>to do with whether the people are made up of chemicals, any more than the
>fact that programs are made up of characters has any bearing on whether or
>not they are structured ("How can a program be structured when it is
>completely made up of components that have no inherent structure?").
>That Rich makes this level error is blatantly obvious;

I agree, and I've made the same or similar point myself, namely that we
have enough "high-level" evidence (in our macroscopic everyday world of
people, etc.) of free choice that we don't have to withhold our verdict
on its existence until we understand the microscopic level.  (Although,
I don't deny that we would learn something from such investigations on
the micro level.)
			--Paul V. Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief