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From: hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John Hogg)
Newsgroups: can.politics
Subject: Re: problems with Star Wars #2 (part 2: the crux) (LONG)
Message-ID: <1269@utcsri.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 18-Jul-85 16:09:21 EDT
Article-I.D.: utcsri.1269
Posted: Thu Jul 18 16:09:21 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 18-Jul-85 16:29:53 EDT
References: <1197@utcsri.UUCP> <5772@utzoo.UUCP> <1240@utcsri.UUCP> <5797@utzoo.UUCP>
Reply-To: hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John Hogg)
Organization: CSRI, University of Toronto
Lines: 126
Summary: 

And here is the latest rebuttal of Henry's rebuttal of...  ...of problems
associated with SDI.  If I may gently correct my esteemed colleague on a
point or two...

First, on the question of "acceptable" leakage of warheads.  What exactly
is "acceptable"?  Everybody would love zero; I'd be willing to accept one
or maybe even two; generals who know that there's a war to be won will be
quite happy with forty.  This figure (random targets, so a small level of
redundancy will result in slightly less destruction) is what SDI proponents
now claim is reasonable, although they base this on current understanding
of the technology we'd require, and no simple and obvious countermeasures
being used by the Soviet Union.
This must be balanced off against the great increase in the probability of
nuclear war caused by the system.  Some reasons for this have been gone over
before and will appear again in this message; this point has been
sidestepped by Henry, but not answered.

Henry brings in the threat of nuclear winter as a reason to build SDI,
because the number of exploding warheads would be greatly decreased, even
by a leaky system.  At the risk of appearing a technophobe, could I point
out that a much simpler way of accomplishing the same task would be a
massive decrease in (not total destruction of) nuclear stockpiles?  Yes,
this is a political problem, but even though it involves the cooperation of
the Soviets, it is politically no more difficult than ramming
through SDI, given enough courage in high places.  It could be much
easier if an offer to the USSR were made which tied build-down to the
scrapping of SDI.

>2. Even if complete effectiveness is required, this does not require that
>the software be perfect...  Anything less than 100% correctness in the
>handling of my bank account is unacceptable to me, but I don't hide my
>money in a mattress just because I know the bank systems crash occasionally.
>They recover, and finish the job correctly.

Do you have faith that even this level of "correctness" can be achieved in
an untested system?

(Profuse apologies for the following DOUBLE excerpt - it seemed simplest.)
>> In fact, the mere starting up of ANY sort of BMD system is going
>> to look hostile; remember, current bets are that a BMD system adequate to
>> cope with a retaliatory strike is probably feasible, so firing it up may be
>> the first step of a first strike.  In which case, the only way for the
>> Soviets to preserve their deterrent is to go to launch-on-warning so that
>> something will get through.  They may consider some stage of BMD startup to
>> be "warning".  And then they may not...
>
>They may consider some stage of "nuclear alert" to be warning.  And then
>again they may not.  Such alerts exist today.  As warning times fall, the
>situation will get worse.  It is not obvious that the problem can be avoided
>even in the absence of BMD.  The Soviets may -- repeat, may -- have such
>a policy today; they are not nearly as well set up to ride out an attack.
>
>The obvious answer to this one is an idea I wholeheartedly support: major
>cuts in offensive weaponry coinciding with BMD deployment.

The difference here is not quantitative, it is qualitative!  A reasonable
assumption is that the Soviets do NOT currently have a launch-on-warning
policy, because their technology is (to put it mildly) no better than ours,
and they haven't yet blown us up accidentally.  If we force them to LOW by
making that the only way for them to ensure that their missiles are not
destroyed in a first strike, then ANY act which appears hostile, from a BMD
startup to a migration of geese, will be VERY dangerous.  The issue isn't
how many seconds THEY have to react - it's whether or not they have to
react before they actually hear the bangs.

How about major cuts (again, not total disarmament - I don't trust the
Soviets) WITHOUT BMD deployment instead?

The whole issue of humans versus computers running the system I will not
answer (unless urged to) for now.  I do not concede that they could do so,
but in any case, It Won't Work either way - although it might be more
comforting to know that the last mistake was human, not inanimate.

Henry says that "tests of real hardware" are required in order to say
whether the system will or won't work; theoretical pontification isn't
enough.  But, to the best of my knowledge (corrections invited), nobody has
yet proposed a possible design for a system which could overcome the
simplest countermeasures, even given components that perform up to their
theoretical potentials.  Before tests of real hardware can be done, design
of real hardware must take place.  And this will take (by estimation of the
Fletcher commission) about nine breakthroughs of the order of magnitude of
the Manhattan project.
   These breakthroughs won't occur; the "real hardware" that is tested will thus
be very leaky.  If at that point, the SDI pushers agreed to call it a day and
give up, I wouldn't worry so much; in fact, I MIGHT even be in favour.  But
based on my biased opinion of Pentagon thinking, the single-buttocked
system that will result from n*$26,000,000,000 of research will be
built, because it will be "vitally necessary to national security".  And
besides, Lockheed will be lobbying with all their might.

Henry claims that we know how to defend against bombers, missiles and
SLBMs, although he concedes that the first two aren't easy to handle.
Again, it's a matter of the leakage you're willing to put up with.  How
precisely DO we shoot them ALL down, or near as dammit?  (Again, even given
the greatly increased risk, I might accept one or two warheads.)  Or, as
Henry put it,
>I agree that if it's not pretty effective, it's worthless.

As far as SLBMs are concerned, I should explain why I considered them to be
more difficult to intercept than ICBMs.  Apart from detection, they can be
protected by the atmosphere IF they are launched on a very low trajectory
from a spot near their target.  Assuming that the Soviets make no attempt
to change their current basing strategy, they are indeed no harder to
handle than ICBMs.

>> Henry, in light of what I've said here, please propose a non-dangerous SDI
>> system!
>
>John, please propose a non-dangerous alternative!  The current situation is
>very dangerous, and getting steadily worse.  Disarmament would be nice, if
>only there were some cause for confidence that it would succeed.  I don't
>support BMD because I'm infatuated with the technology, or because I stand
>to benefit from it financially; I support BMD because I'm scared, and it
>looks like BMD might, repeat might, be our best/only chance of survival.

Sigh... back to square one.  Our current situation is not only less than
ideal, it's horrible.  Trying to technofix our way out through SDI,
however, will make it far worse.  The only truly viable answer is political
negotiation of a reduction in arms, which is unlikely to occur while a
peabrain with a badge and six-gun inhabits the White House.  Oh, for the
days of Nixon.  A crook, yes, but a sufficiently INTELLIGENT crook.
-- 

John Hogg
Computer Systems Research Institute, UofT
{allegra,cornell,decvax,ihnp4,linus,utzoo}!utcsri!hogg