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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: freedom and unpredictability
Message-ID: <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 23-Jun-85 01:04:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500084
Posted: Sun Jun 23 01:04:00 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 30-Jun-85 00:34:39 EDT
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Jun 23 01:04:00 1985


>I appreciated much of what Jim Balter (ima!jim) said,

Thanks (independent of inferences as to whether you agreed with any of it).

>but I want to
>know why he writes:
>>
>>Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common
>>sense.  I happen not to agree.
>
>You've been largely silent until now.  What are your objections?

I withdrew for a while when it appeared that much of what I wrote dropped
into a netsink somewhere.

As I said in the earlier note, I consider your definition, as least as
summarized by Ellis ("
		    Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable
    	 	    agent can have free will, which consists of the ability
		    to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on
		    one's knowledge and desires.";
my archives are empty; if you can provide a more accurate statement of your
position, please do so) as begging the question; how does one determine
whether ones satisfaction and desires are freely derived?

>>...  Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree
>>with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated
>>and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in
>>reasonable-sounding defintions.  The question is, do the
>>*conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your
>>definition match peoples' expectations.
>
>I take it this means you find some conclusions/predictions about what is
>a free choice, given my definition, to be defective.  Which?

From the above definition, I would conclude that failure to obtain
satisfaction indicates lack of free will.  I don't think most people would
agree; rather, it would be construed as the result of poor choices.
Freedom and satisfaction are poorly correlated *in my opinion* (are you
paying attention, Rich?).  From the above definition, I would conclude
that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising
free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal
control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is
irrelevant to the argument).  Addicts may think that they are free to quit
their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice,
*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free, even if they
rationalize that they are continuing to take the drug because it is makes
them feel good (satisfactory manipulation of the universe).  I consider your
definition defective because it doesn't yield an accurate mapping of what we
do and do not consider free choice in practice.  I believe your dismissal of
a connection between free will and predictability to be an error, although an
understandable one given that the issue of predictability is so often cast in
terms of absolute determinism.  Free will and determinism of events are not
contradictory; but subjective free will and subjective knowledge of the
causes of one's own actions are inversely related, in my view.

As a deeper flaw, definitions of free will that involve notions of an agent
manipulating the universe are mechanistic; they require defining and
identifying agents as distinct from their manipulations and the things
manipulated; this is where the "brains are chemicals" morass comes in.
I think the only useful and meaningful definition of such terms must be
restricted to the subjective domain.  Free Will talks about how people
view their actions; its definition must operate on the same level of
discourse as the presumptions that there are people and that they have views.
It really is meaningful to talk about there being people, having views and
wills, free or otherwise; that is why we do it.  This has absolutely nothing
to do with whether the people are made up of chemicals, any more than the
fact that programs are made up of characters has any bearing on whether or
not they are structured ("How can a program be structured when it is
completely made up of components that have no inherent structure?").
That Rich makes this level error is blatantly obvious;
that it is the most widespread and fundamental rhetorical error is apparently
less so.

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
"Is a Euglena animal or vegetable?"  (What, you *still* don't get it?)