Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!bonnie!akgua!whuxlm!harpo!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!think!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!flink From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: free choice as rational evaluation and action Message-ID: <817@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Thu, 11-Jul-85 20:34:07 EDT Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.817 Posted: Thu Jul 11 20:34:07 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 17-Jul-85 03:35:32 EDT References: <1043@pyuxd.UUCP> <6155@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1191@pyuxd.UUCP> Reply-To: flink@maryland.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 104 Keywords: internal causes of behavior In article <1191@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>So, that means that any r-e-a leading to a decision (e.g., to take action) >>>is dependent on the prior experiences and xposures, and hence is not free. > >>True up to the last comma, but "and hence is not free" doesn't follow. > >Why stop at the comma? If it's DEPENDENT, it's not FREE, no matter how much >you want to assert that it is. It's that simple. If it's dependent on things that are a crucial part of one's identity, reasoning and evaluations, i.e. that are INTERNAL to the "man" and his "volition", then it is free. >Point is that EVERY experience in your life has an affect on the way in which >you act and think thereafter, from the traumatic ones down to the trivial >ones and all those in-between, with degree of effect proportional to severity. >And often those experiences form a basis for the way in which you reason. Yes, but the way in which one reasons, one's experiences -- which form a crucial basis of one's identity and a basis for one's evaluations (and thus one's "volition") -- are INTERNAL in the relevant sense. >> Far from needing to be independent from past experiences to be free, a >> choice NEEDS TO DEPEND on them to be free -- past experiences form the >> basis of an intelligent choice. (E.g., "should I reach into the fire? >> No, last time I did something like that, I was painfully burned.") > >Ah, freedom is slavery again. The definition of free (there are a few) that >pertains to this discussion (from Random House this time) is as follows: >"exempt from external authority, interference, restriction, etc. INDEPENDENT, >unfettered". Got it? Freedom implies INdependence from interference, >restriction, etc. which includes the restrictions of the chemicals within your >own body. Can you unshackle yourself from those restrictions? I don't think >so. "Unshackle"? "Interference"? In what way do the chemical processes that constitute my thought processes "interfere" with me or "shackle" me? The fact that "chemical process XYZ caused his behavior" is just THE SAME FACT as "his decision caused his behavior", given that "chemical process XYZ" and "his decision" REFER TO THE SAME EVENT. Must one be independent from HIMSELF (ain't that a contradiction in terms?) before you will call him free? Independence means that *one's own* experiences motivate one's behavior, NOT that *no* experiences do. >>>choice is all about: one's choices not being dependent on other things. > >> Aha -- but that's NOT what it's all about. (See my discussion of "other" >> things in a previous article). > >No more moebius strip pointers to other articles, OK? In those other articles >I recall that I stripped out your notions of "other things" to the bone. I don't think so; those "other things" have to be strictly external to "man" and his "volition" for dependence on them to be unfreedom. So far all you've come up with are factors that *crucially depend* on something *internal*. >> [...] > >But where is the freedom? What you choose to refer to as the agents of r-e-a >are clearly bound and restricted by what they are chemically. They cannot >will something different from what their make-up would point to. Great, so >you (according to you) have an agent, and control, but YOU AIN'T GOT FREEDOM! You have an agent and *self*-control, which IS freedom. (I think that if you look at a detailed dictionary definition of freedom you'll find "self-control" listed as one of the synonyms.) >>[...] This strong sense of "can" would seem to be presupposed by >>statements that someone "ought" to do something. > >But is it an "option", or (when you get down to it and look at what's >happening chemically) is it the only "choice" available? If it's not an option, then why criticize Laura by saying that she ought not to believe in free will? If it's a foregone conclusion that she's going to believe it anyway, your criticism is pointless! That's my point. >>>I can "rationally criticize" her [Laura] for it [believing in free choice] >>>because there are inherent flaws in the belief. I'm not pinning "blame" >>>on her for believing it, I'm simply showing the fallacies therein. "Can't- >>>lose propositions" aren't necessarily true (e.g., Pascal's reason for >>>believingh in god) > >> As I pointed out before, Pascal's wager was NOT truly can't-lose, so that >> is a straw man argument against me. > >It's the one you had compared all this to, no? No. Someone else made (tried to make) that comparison. >[...] And contrary to your "fearful thinking" concept that >claimed that I reject wishful thinking because I fear its truth (you never >did respond to that after I made it clear where you were coming from) For the last time: I never claimed you reject wishful thinking because you fear its truth, I claimed that you reject it automatically without examining its truth. >and because I reject out of hand all wishful thinking, I reject beliefs >that are based ONLY in wishful thinking and have no other foundation [...] But do you always *examine* the possibility of other foundations -- i.e. evidence -- for such beliefs? --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink