Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site utcsri.UUCP Path: utzoo!utcsri!hogg From: hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John Hogg) Newsgroups: can.politics Subject: Re: problems with Star Wars #2 (part 2: the crux) (LONG) Message-ID: <1269@utcsri.UUCP> Date: Thu, 18-Jul-85 16:09:21 EDT Article-I.D.: utcsri.1269 Posted: Thu Jul 18 16:09:21 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 18-Jul-85 16:29:53 EDT References: <1197@utcsri.UUCP> <5772@utzoo.UUCP> <1240@utcsri.UUCP> <5797@utzoo.UUCP> Reply-To: hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John Hogg) Organization: CSRI, University of Toronto Lines: 126 Summary: And here is the latest rebuttal of Henry's rebuttal of... ...of problems associated with SDI. If I may gently correct my esteemed colleague on a point or two... First, on the question of "acceptable" leakage of warheads. What exactly is "acceptable"? Everybody would love zero; I'd be willing to accept one or maybe even two; generals who know that there's a war to be won will be quite happy with forty. This figure (random targets, so a small level of redundancy will result in slightly less destruction) is what SDI proponents now claim is reasonable, although they base this on current understanding of the technology we'd require, and no simple and obvious countermeasures being used by the Soviet Union. This must be balanced off against the great increase in the probability of nuclear war caused by the system. Some reasons for this have been gone over before and will appear again in this message; this point has been sidestepped by Henry, but not answered. Henry brings in the threat of nuclear winter as a reason to build SDI, because the number of exploding warheads would be greatly decreased, even by a leaky system. At the risk of appearing a technophobe, could I point out that a much simpler way of accomplishing the same task would be a massive decrease in (not total destruction of) nuclear stockpiles? Yes, this is a political problem, but even though it involves the cooperation of the Soviets, it is politically no more difficult than ramming through SDI, given enough courage in high places. It could be much easier if an offer to the USSR were made which tied build-down to the scrapping of SDI. >2. Even if complete effectiveness is required, this does not require that >the software be perfect... Anything less than 100% correctness in the >handling of my bank account is unacceptable to me, but I don't hide my >money in a mattress just because I know the bank systems crash occasionally. >They recover, and finish the job correctly. Do you have faith that even this level of "correctness" can be achieved in an untested system? (Profuse apologies for the following DOUBLE excerpt - it seemed simplest.) >> In fact, the mere starting up of ANY sort of BMD system is going >> to look hostile; remember, current bets are that a BMD system adequate to >> cope with a retaliatory strike is probably feasible, so firing it up may be >> the first step of a first strike. In which case, the only way for the >> Soviets to preserve their deterrent is to go to launch-on-warning so that >> something will get through. They may consider some stage of BMD startup to >> be "warning". And then they may not... > >They may consider some stage of "nuclear alert" to be warning. And then >again they may not. Such alerts exist today. As warning times fall, the >situation will get worse. It is not obvious that the problem can be avoided >even in the absence of BMD. The Soviets may -- repeat, may -- have such >a policy today; they are not nearly as well set up to ride out an attack. > >The obvious answer to this one is an idea I wholeheartedly support: major >cuts in offensive weaponry coinciding with BMD deployment. The difference here is not quantitative, it is qualitative! A reasonable assumption is that the Soviets do NOT currently have a launch-on-warning policy, because their technology is (to put it mildly) no better than ours, and they haven't yet blown us up accidentally. If we force them to LOW by making that the only way for them to ensure that their missiles are not destroyed in a first strike, then ANY act which appears hostile, from a BMD startup to a migration of geese, will be VERY dangerous. The issue isn't how many seconds THEY have to react - it's whether or not they have to react before they actually hear the bangs. How about major cuts (again, not total disarmament - I don't trust the Soviets) WITHOUT BMD deployment instead? The whole issue of humans versus computers running the system I will not answer (unless urged to) for now. I do not concede that they could do so, but in any case, It Won't Work either way - although it might be more comforting to know that the last mistake was human, not inanimate. Henry says that "tests of real hardware" are required in order to say whether the system will or won't work; theoretical pontification isn't enough. But, to the best of my knowledge (corrections invited), nobody has yet proposed a possible design for a system which could overcome the simplest countermeasures, even given components that perform up to their theoretical potentials. Before tests of real hardware can be done, design of real hardware must take place. And this will take (by estimation of the Fletcher commission) about nine breakthroughs of the order of magnitude of the Manhattan project. These breakthroughs won't occur; the "real hardware" that is tested will thus be very leaky. If at that point, the SDI pushers agreed to call it a day and give up, I wouldn't worry so much; in fact, I MIGHT even be in favour. But based on my biased opinion of Pentagon thinking, the single-buttocked system that will result from n*$26,000,000,000 of research will be built, because it will be "vitally necessary to national security". And besides, Lockheed will be lobbying with all their might. Henry claims that we know how to defend against bombers, missiles and SLBMs, although he concedes that the first two aren't easy to handle. Again, it's a matter of the leakage you're willing to put up with. How precisely DO we shoot them ALL down, or near as dammit? (Again, even given the greatly increased risk, I might accept one or two warheads.) Or, as Henry put it, >I agree that if it's not pretty effective, it's worthless. As far as SLBMs are concerned, I should explain why I considered them to be more difficult to intercept than ICBMs. Apart from detection, they can be protected by the atmosphere IF they are launched on a very low trajectory from a spot near their target. Assuming that the Soviets make no attempt to change their current basing strategy, they are indeed no harder to handle than ICBMs. >> Henry, in light of what I've said here, please propose a non-dangerous SDI >> system! > >John, please propose a non-dangerous alternative! The current situation is >very dangerous, and getting steadily worse. Disarmament would be nice, if >only there were some cause for confidence that it would succeed. I don't >support BMD because I'm infatuated with the technology, or because I stand >to benefit from it financially; I support BMD because I'm scared, and it >looks like BMD might, repeat might, be our best/only chance of survival. Sigh... back to square one. Our current situation is not only less than ideal, it's horrible. Trying to technofix our way out through SDI, however, will make it far worse. The only truly viable answer is political negotiation of a reduction in arms, which is unlikely to occur while a peabrain with a badge and six-gun inhabits the White House. Oh, for the days of Nixon. A crook, yes, but a sufficiently INTELLIGENT crook. -- John Hogg Computer Systems Research Institute, UofT {allegra,cornell,decvax,ihnp4,linus,utzoo}!utcsri!hogg