Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site cybvax0.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!bonnie!akgua!whuxlm!harpo!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh From: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Libertarianism and the Police Message-ID: <611@cybvax0.UUCP> Date: Thu, 11-Jul-85 15:50:54 EDT Article-I.D.: cybvax0.611 Posted: Thu Jul 11 15:50:54 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 15-Jul-85 07:18:20 EDT References: <55@umcp-cs.UUCP><1594@dciem.UUCP> <1617@dciem.UUCP> <354@kontron.UUCP> Reply-To: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) Organization: Cybermation, Inc., Cambridge, MA Lines: 49 Summary: In article <354@kontron.UUCP> Clayton Cramer writes: > Private quality testing groups are in a position to put a stamp of > approval (much like Underwriters Labs) on products that meet standards. > (Very much like the Food and Drug Administration does with meat.) You > can be sure that grocery store chains would make a big hype that, > "We carry only Consumer Research Institute approved foods." as a way > of encouraging customers to shop there. In short order, I suspect that > all chain stores, and almost all independent grocery stores, would > do so. Sounds good, but there are a variety of reasons why it wouldn't work as well as the current system. Once you have consumer research groups competing to certify quality, there are basic conflicts of interest. First, the research group has a high value placed on keeping information about the products private for two major reasons: 1) so that your competitors have to conduct expensive certification procedures themselves, and 2) to protect yourself from potential discovery of negligence. These are not large problems for the FDA. Second, no information that would allow comparison of client's products to those of others will be released unless it shows the client's product is better. Non-profit groups don't have this problem. Third, neither the client nor the research organization will be willing to bear the cost of failure to maintain quality: they will try to offload it as much as possible on the consumer, and let the consumer attempt to prove "fraud". These sorts of gambles can be quite economic, especially in a case like the recent Lindane contamination of watermelons. The melons were ordered off the shelves by a government agency, after another agency detected the pattern of poisoning. Competing organizations would not be willing to share information that makes them potentially vulnerable, and would be more hesitant to order possibly dangerous foods off the shelves because of the costs to their clients: the markets and growers. They would not want to publicize the danger of already-purchased melons because of the bad PR. They would want to conceal their own knowledge of the problem to justify inaction in case of later torts. My sister is a safety director for a large pharmeceutical firm. This is quite an analogous position, because she is essentially competing with other safety directors who could do her job, yet faces the conflicts of interest of keeping the facilities safe for employees, not creating many many expenses, and not leaving herself or the company liable. She faces all of the above problems, but is glad (as a conscientious, pro-worker professional) that there are government agencies to provide the minimal framework of things that must be done. -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh