Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: Notesfiles $Revision: 1.7.0.5 $; site sneaky Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxn!ihnp4!inuxc!pur-ee!uiucdcs!convex!sneaky!gordon From: gordon@sneaky Newsgroups: net.sources.bugs Subject: Re: SPS - a useful replacement for ps(1 Message-ID: <-4660798@sneaky> Date: Mon, 8-Jul-85 21:38:00 EDT Article-I.D.: sneaky.-4660798 Posted: Mon Jul 8 21:38:00 1985 Date-Received: Fri, 12-Jul-85 00:22:29 EDT References: <1920@ukma.UUCP> Lines: 23 Nf-ID: #R:ukma.UUCP:-192000:sneaky:-4660798:000:874 Nf-From: sneaky!gordon Jul 8 20:38:00 1985 > /* Written 2:43 pm Jul 3, 1985 by hslrswi.U!robert in sneaky:net.sources.bu */ > ... > One solution, suggested by Jeffrey Mogul, is to renice sps only for root. > This also means that sps need not be a setuid program. > ... > > (Robert Ward, Hasler AG, Belpstrasse 23, CH-3000 Bern 14, Switzerland). > /* End of text from sneaky:net.sources.bu */ I sure hope sps still needs to be a privileged program! Maybe on your system you can get away with using setgid sys instead of setuid root, but if your system has /dev/mem, /dev/kmem, and/or /dev/swap readable by everyone, you are just asking to have your root password stolen by someone's "clist watcher" program. Sps, by the way, should do its setuid(getuid()) AFTER it gets /dev/mem, /dev/kmem, and /dev/swap open. Gordon Burditt ...!convex!ctvax!trsvax!sneaky!gordon ...!ihnp4!sys1!sneaky!gordon