Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!henry From: henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) Newsgroups: can.politics Subject: Re: problems with Star Wars #2 (part 2: the crux) Message-ID: <5797@utzoo.UUCP> Date: Tue, 16-Jul-85 14:19:20 EDT Article-I.D.: utzoo.5797 Posted: Tue Jul 16 14:19:20 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 16-Jul-85 14:19:20 EDT References: <1197@utcsri.UUCP> <5772@utzoo.UUCP>, <1240@utcsri.UUCP> Organization: U of Toronto Zoology Lines: 150 > First, the matter of the need for absolute correctness, given that > verifiability is virtually impossible. If we are to protect our cities > from attack, a "small" leakage is absolutely unacceptable. Thus, the > battle management software must be perfect. John, that is propaganda, not rational reasoning. More specifically: 1. Zero leakage is unnecessary. Successful defence of populations, and in particular cities, demands that leakage be small. But a handful of warheads getting through, at semi-random places, is still far better than ten thousand warheads obliterating everything. Civilization will survive the former, but probably not the latter. The former is unlikely to cause anything more than a chill in the air; the latter almost certainly will cause Nuclear Winter. If you are going to claim that anything less than 100.000000% effectiveness is worthless, please justify this astounding statement. I agree that 85% effectiveness is pretty useless, but 99.999% would be a different story. (What level of effectiveness can be achieved in reality is a different issue; please don't confuse the two. *If* we can achieve 99.999% effectiveness, is it useful? YES!) 2. Even if complete effectiveness is required, this does not require that the software be perfect. It only requires that it be good enough to stop all the warheads. It really doesn't matter whether the software crashes six times in the first five minutes, *if* it has enough margin of capability that it nevertheless shoots down all the warheads. Whether such margin is possible is a different issue; if it is, then perfect effectiveness does *not* demand perfect software. Anything less than 100% correctness in the handling of my bank account is unacceptable to me, but I don't hide my money in a mattress just because I know the bank systems crash occasionally. They recover, and finish the job correctly. > If we use such follies as pop-up missiles, matters are much worse. A > missile rising out of a submarine is going to look hostile, no matter what > it does. Agreed. It is absolutely necessary that such a dangerous action not be initiated unless an attack is definitely already in progress (not merely feared to be imminent). > In fact, the mere starting up of ANY sort of BMD system is going > to look hostile; remember, current bets are that a BMD system adequate to > cope with a retaliatory strike is probably feasible, so firing it up may be > the first step of a first strike. In which case, the only way for the > Soviets to preserve their deterrent is to go to launch-on-warning so that > something will get through. They may consider some stage of BMD startup to > be "warning". And then they may not... They may consider some stage of "nuclear alert" to be warning. And then again they may not. Such alerts exist today. As warning times fall, the situation will get worse. It is not obvious that the problem can be avoided even in the absence of BMD. The Soviets may -- repeat, may -- have such a policy today; they are not nearly as well set up to ride out an attack. The obvious answer to this one is an idea I wholeheartedly support: major cuts in offensive weaponry coinciding with BMD deployment. > ... did you play "chicken" in your younger days? No, I tended to regard it as a bad idea. Much the same way I regard the offensive nuclear standoff today. > Note, by the way, that no straw-man tying of BMD to retaliatory ICBMs is > needed to cause an "accidental" war. Glad to hear you admit that it's a straw man; I hope it won't reappear yet again as an "important argument" against BMD. > >Furthermore, why should the decision to activate an SDI system against > >a major attack have to be automated at all? > > ...decision must be made within the first few seconds of boost. What kind > of meaningful information can a human absorb, let alone digest, in this time? "Oh no, look at that. Missile launches all over the place. OPEN FIRE!" I'm not talking about reading printouts, I'm talking about the same sort of real-time interaction that takes place when driving a car or flying an aircraft. Similarly, I am not talking about digging the President out of bed; I'm talking about trained observers standing regular watches. > And multiple decisions by multiple observers is even more ridiculous. How so? We're talking parallel simultaneous decisions, not one observer consulting another. If one observer would work, so would multiple observers. > Henry's speculation that humans could even handle the battle management > functions is surely the product of a hallucinogens in the Ramsey Wright > water supply. Read the Fletcher Report on Battle Management... Our water supply is pretty cruddy, but I don't drink from it... Remember, I didn't say I was sure it could be done; I just said that I suspected that human capabilities were being underestimated. I agree that it would take many highly-trained people, that breakdowns in coordination would have to be averted by extensive practice beforehand, and that some of the more speed-critical functions would need to be automated. And that DoD probably isn't capable of doing this right, especially since they have a fixation on computers that blinds them to the often-superior capabilities of human beings. But I am not 100% convinced that it is entirely impossible, given a lot of hard work and considerable reliance on those sadly-imperfect computers in our heads. It wouldn't surprise me if it was impossible. It wouldn't shock me if it was hard but possible. > >If one assumes an attack in progress, the benefits of success clearly > >outweigh the possibility of failure. > > On the other hand, if an attack isn't yet in progress, but is made far more > likely by a system that won't work perfectly for ICBMs... As before, the question is whether it's good enough, not whether it's perfect. I agree that the answer to this is not obvious, although I think that theoretical pontification is never going to answer this adequately; tests of real hardware are needed. > and not at all for bombers, cruise missiles... Bombers and cruise missiles we know how to defend against, although the overwhelming threat of ICBMs has resulted in near-complete disregard for air defences. (I don't claim it's easy, by the way.) > ...and SLBMs... How so? Ballistic missiles are ballistic missiles; the warning time may be shorter, but that is not a disqualification, just a problem. Note that submarines cannot fire their missiles simultaneously, so the warning time for the second, third, etc. missiles from the same submarine is quite substantial. Note also that there is an increasing tendency for missile subs (especially Soviet ones) to operate farther and farther away from their targets and closer and closer to "home base", for safety against antisubmarine efforts; this means that SLBM defence becomes increasingly similar to ICBM defence. > ...then the benefits of this incredibly > expensive system become very hard to see. I agree that if it's not pretty effective, it's worthless. The lack of effectiveness is not conclusively established. The degree of increased danger is very sensitive to details. > Henry, in light of what I've said here, please propose a non-dangerous SDI > system! John, please propose a non-dangerous alternative! The current situation is very dangerous, and getting steadily worse. Disarmament would be nice, if only there were some cause for confidence that it would succeed. I don't support BMD because I'm infatuated with the technology, or because I stand to benefit from it financially; I support BMD because I'm scared, and it looks like BMD might, repeat might, be our best/only chance of survival. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry