Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!mangoe From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) Newsgroups: net.religion.christian Subject: Re: Is General Goodness just a moral principle? Message-ID: <879@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Tue, 16-Jul-85 23:11:38 EDT Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.879 Posted: Tue Jul 16 23:11:38 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 18-Jul-85 08:18:16 EDT References: <852@umcp-cs.UUCP> <360@utastro.UUCP> Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 75 In article <360@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> >It is consistent to maintain a view point which accords protection to >> >members of society on the basis of the increased stability and comfort >> >resulting for the group as a whole. This approach does not require >> >absolute moralistic criteria. >> The hell it doesn't. You've simply transferred moral authority somewhere >> else, in this case to impart "rightness" to societal or group stability and >> comfort. >I don't understand this. The fact that "moral authority" has been transferred >in now way proves that it is absolute. The fact that it could be transferred >could be taken as evidence that it is not absolute. Sure it's absolute. you've elevated "increased stability and comfort for the group as a whole" to an absolute principle. >> ...Why should it matter? Why should I care about improving society? >From my perspective, you should care since you would be benefitting >directly from any improvements. It does not require an absolute >"moral authority" to justify this. But that's just the point. If I can see a way to improve my own position EVEN MORE, at the expense of others, why should I not take it? Mutual gain must be a goal that everyone should have, for that criticism to have merit-- unless there is some absolute principle backing it up. >> It should be clear that there still are moral principles here, but (as best >> I can ascertain) they derive out of some notion of human nature. Now, >> perhaps you can make an argument on that foundation, but you'll need some >> empirical evidence, and even then you'll need a defense as to why this >> supposed human nature should be catered to. >I'm not sure what is meant by "human nature" here. It is sufficient to >say that from my perspective, any rule of society that prevents someone >from hurting others is one that I approve of, since it will protect >me from violence, or at least try to dissuade someone from attempting >to harm me. One doesn't need a very sophisticated model of human nature >to understand this. Therefore there is no need for me to provide you >with any model, or a defense as to why it should be catered to, over >and above what has already been said. I didn't say that there had a complicated model. But you can't just state that the mutual good of society as a universal priniciple without some backing, and if you are going to abandon that, and take up pure relativism, then there's no reason why anyone should listen to you. >> I've yet to see an atheistic exposition of morality which deals effectively >> with the problem of why you should listen to some agregation of feelings >> which we will call shared human nature, instead oneself. >I don't see where your problem is. It is called democracy. Democracy is a political system. In the form that we practice it, it is based upon the supposition of certain rights and certain notions about human nature. It is somewhat empirical, in the sense that we can change what doesn't work out. But it is not an ethical or moral system. Especially, there are certain tests for moral systems which any sort of majority rule voting doesn't pass. >> ... And besides, you >> must also deal with the existentialist challenge: is there really any >> essential human nature? >Perhaps, but that is a separate issue. No, it is central. If you take a hard core existentialist position and assert that there is no discoverable shared human nature, then you can't appeal to any innate rights or characteristics. Again, you trap moral systems in pure relativism. THere is then every reason to expect that, used by another person, your moral system is WRONG. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe