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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: freedom and unpredictability
Message-ID: <1149@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 29-Jun-85 02:32:43 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1149
Posted: Sat Jun 29 02:32:43 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 30-Jun-85 00:11:07 EDT
References: <325@spar.UUCP> <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP> <464@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week
Lines: 53
Keywords: free will, predictability

> My position emphasizes rational evaluation and corresponding action.  Ellis
> was close, but I would add that the knowledge and desires must be rational
> (the more irrational, the less free).  [TOREK]

As usual, to paraphrase Arthur Dent, this must be a definition of the word
"free" (as concocted by Paul) with which I was totally unfamiliar.  Rationality
and freedom are not congruent, nor are they parallel.  You would seem to be
defining free as "having the ability to choose the best way offering the most
benefit".  Free really means "having the ability to choose anything at a whim
regardless of external variables".  Based on your definition of "free" as
having the means to choose the BEST way rather having the capability of
choosing any way, I can see where your other definitions follow from.  Your
definition of free is simply tautologically imposed onto definitions of
rational.

>>...  From the above definition, I would conclude
>>that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising
>>free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal
>>control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is
>>irrelevant to the argument).  Addicts may think that they are free to quit
>>their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice,
>>*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free...

> Yes, that's why I say that the beliefs and desires must be rationally
> formed and (re)evaluated to be free.  (And again, freedom as I under-
> stand it admits of degrees.)

Whoa!  You've lost me.  Is buying popcorn in the above example thus free will
or not free will?  Is buying popcorn in ANY example free will or not,
remembering that there is little fundamental difference between direct
subliminal manipulation (deliberate or not) and experiences that influence our
minds and formulate the way we make decisions?

> I agree, and I've made the same or similar point myself, namely that we
> have enough "high-level" evidence (in our macroscopic everyday world of
> people, etc.) of free choice that we don't have to withhold our verdict
> on its existence until we understand the microscopic level.  (Although,
> I don't deny that we would learn something from such investigations on
> the micro level.)

What IS this evidence?  I would contend that you are again referring to
global perceptions of a similar vein to viewing the sun as "rising" and
"falling".  You may perceive human actions (even your own) as "free" only
because YOU cannot comprehend the root causes.  To YOUR eye they appear
free, but at the root level they are not.  In the AI world, designers may
introduce randomness as an element to make the machines APPEAR more human.
Do humans really operate that way, either randomly or through some agent,
or are the causes of our actions so complex (rooted in all the catalogued
experiences we've accumulated, different for all of us) that we are unable
to predict them and thus they APPEAR to be "free".
-- 
Like a vermin (HEY!), shot for the very first time...
			Rich Rosen   ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr