Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!bellcore!decvax!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!umcp-cs!flink From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: freedom and unpredictability Message-ID: <464@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Tue, 25-Jun-85 12:04:01 EDT Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.464 Posted: Tue Jun 25 12:04:01 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 29-Jun-85 02:59:12 EDT References: <325@spar.UUCP> <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP> Reply-To: flink@maryland.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 68 Keywords: free will, predictability Summary: But I *want* to be predictable! In article <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >as summarized by Ellis (" > Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable > agent can have free will, which consists of the ability > to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on > one's knowledge and desires."; >my archives are empty; if you can provide a more accurate statement of your >position, please do so) My position emphasizes rational evaluation and corresponding action. Ellis was close, but I would add that the knowledge and desires must be rational (the more irrational, the less free). >From the above definition, I would conclude that failure to obtain >satisfaction indicates lack of free will. I don't think most people would >agree; rather, it would be construed as the result of poor choices. Agreed; I would strike "satisfactorily". >... From the above definition, I would conclude >that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising >free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal >control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is >irrelevant to the argument). Addicts may think that they are free to quit >their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice, >*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free... Yes, that's why I say that the beliefs and desires must be rationally formed and (re)evaluated to be free. (And again, freedom as I under- stand it admits of degrees.) >... I believe your dismissal of >a connection between free will and predictability to be an error, although an >understandable one given that the issue of predictability is so often cast in >terms of absolute determinism. Free will and determinism of events are not >contradictory; but subjective free will and subjective knowledge of the >causes of one's own actions are inversely related, in my view. You were doing fine until now, but BZZZZZZ! Wrong answer, and here's why: I *want* to know the causes of my own actions (I also want them to be particular *sorts* of causes, but I digress); I want to be predictable, at least to myself (and I don't mind if others find me predictable, as long as they're not hostile -- and 99.44% of them aren't). If I want, choose, prefer -- rationally -- to know this, how can knowing it make me less free? It can't. >As a deeper flaw, definitions of free will that involve notions of an agent >manipulating the universe are mechanistic; they require defining and >identifying agents as distinct from their manipulations and the things >manipulated; this is where the "brains are chemicals" morass comes in. I'm not sure what your point is here, but the "manipulating the universe" talk is Ellis's, not mine. >... This [free will talk] has absolutely nothing >to do with whether the people are made up of chemicals, any more than the >fact that programs are made up of characters has any bearing on whether or >not they are structured ("How can a program be structured when it is >completely made up of components that have no inherent structure?"). >That Rich makes this level error is blatantly obvious; I agree, and I've made the same or similar point myself, namely that we have enough "high-level" evidence (in our macroscopic everyday world of people, etc.) of free choice that we don't have to withhold our verdict on its existence until we understand the microscopic level. (Although, I don't deny that we would learn something from such investigations on the micro level.) --Paul V. Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief