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From: mat@hou4b.UUCP (Mark Terribile)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: poll
Message-ID: <1353@hou4b.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 11-Mar-85 01:13:14 EST
Article-I.D.: hou4b.1353
Posted: Mon Mar 11 01:13:14 1985
Date-Received: Tue, 12-Mar-85 21:57:20 EST
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>> More and more countries would adopt stances hostile to the U.S. (and pro-
>> Soviet, since they have a far superior conventional military presence that
>> can pressure  little governments out of the way)
>
>I believe the Soviet conventional superiority ploy to be a myth.  Military
>power cannot be measured simply by counting weapons, a number of other
>factors are CRUCIAL. ... Russia has thousands of miles of hostile boarders,
>while the U.S. doesn't ... The Russian fleet must plow through narrow bottle-
>necks to get to the open ocean and is divided into four widely separated
>groups.  Soviet 'allies' in Eastern Europe have repeatedly revolted and could
>not be trusted in a major war.

In a long, protracted war, the USSR's size and available natural resources
(petroleum, almost every metal needed for production of almost every kind of
machinery, etc) would work in her favor.  In a short war, massive stockpiles
of weapons, properly used, can win the day.  And the population of the USSR
can be formed into armies in a few months.  Given a large stockpile of war
supplies and an essentially expendable army, the USSR could see herself in a
very favorable position.  This could lead to a willingness to use or threaten
force.  As to alliances coming apart, I seriously doubt that the USSR ever
plans on relying on any ``ally'' that she does not control.  When the British
passed Stalin information (gleaned from Enigma decrypts -- see The ULTRA SECRET
by FW Wintherbottom) about the forthcoming attack upon the USSR, Stalin did
not believe them.  After all, what did the British have to gain by genuinely
warning him?

> ... when Hitler invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941 the Red Army outnumbered
>the Wermacht in tanks, men, planes, and almost everything else.  In some cases
>by margins of 2 and 3 to one.  Yet the Germans went through the Russians like
>a hot knife through butter - almost reaching Moscow in a few months.
>When Japan attacked Russia in 1905, Russia's fleet heavily outnumbered
>that of the Japaneese.  By the end of the war most of the Russian fleet
>was on the bottom while the Japanese lost only a few ships.

Yes, due to superior tactics employed by the German armies.  Given the number
of ``brushfire'' wars and the technology employed in them, it seems unlikely
that either side will have the revolutionary abilities to use new weaponry
that Rommel, Yammamoto, Patton, or Nimitz demonstrated.  New technologies and
tactics have been exercised in Viet Nam, in or around Isreal, at the Falklands,
and in many other places as well.

>Only recently has the Russian fleet recovered, but the cause of the defeat
>still remains - an inescapable geographic distribution of the fleet into small
>parts that can support each other only with great difficulty.

This is how Japan was turned back at Midway -- a failure to concentrate.
Remember, however, that our fleet -- and all of NATO's -- has global
commitments.  Remember that a modern Navy is an air force at sea.  No surface
fleet can survive, much less operate, under hostile air control.  Remember
that the USSRs air force outnumbers all of NATO's by about 2 to 1.  Consider
that the USSR is not likely to make the mistakes that have cost her so dearly
in the past ... and that we would be ill-advised to make it clear to the world
that we count on those mistakes.

Remember also the effectiveness of Soviet disinformation.  They learned it
from the British after WWII and have become the undisputed master of it.  It's
simple:  make preposterous statements about your own good intentions and the
other guy's bad intentions often enough and people will believe them in spite
of clear evidence.  Penetrate the other guy's intelligence service and you
will know everything that he knows ... and more.  Discredit those who speak
against you, using both open deprecation and clandestine character assasination
and soon there will be no credible speakers against you.  (Read INTREPID'S LAST
CASE)

>Also, never forget that Russia is essentially a land power while the
>US is primarily a naval power.  This is important in any analysis of
>relative military strength.

Much of that land is hostile to invading forces.  Look at what happened to
Napoleon's army ... or Hitler's.  Both were defeated as much by the Russian
winter as by any military operation.

Yes, the factors are complex.  But can we afford to rely on complex factors
that no one can agree upon to overcome clear numerical superiority?  As for
qualitative superiority, the only hope I have is massivly decreased MTBF
and maintenance requirements that newer weapons are supposed to have.  In the
Battle of Britian, where the 700+ strong RAF fighter command faced daily attack
by an enemy with an air force 30 000 strong, reliability and a massive effort
at emergency repair were vital to holding the thin line of resistance.
At Midway, the herculean effort that put Yorktown back to sea in less than
72 hours was vital.  So were the damage control and repair efforts that put
her back in the fight less than seven hours after she was hit -- by about the
same destructive force that the Akagi took before she had to be scuttled.

But how long will it take before all of our ``40 maintenance hours per flight
hour'' aircraft are replaced?  Before all of the original model Sidewinders
and Sparrows that were only marginally effective are replaced by later models
or by ASRAAM/AMRAAM series weapons?  And will these even work?  The USSR has
had six or seven new fighters in the last decade or so.  We've had three,
going on four.  Other NATO and allied nations and consortiums have had a few
more, but how many of these can they afford to build?  And how many will they
build with socialists influential in government?

Remember that when the USSR was Germany's ally in WWII, ``central committees''
of labor federations urged their members NOT to do any war-related work, but
to strike and abandon any production or shipping that could be used to endanger
Axis efforts.
-- 

	from Mole End			Mark Terribile
		(scrape .. dig )	hou4b!mat
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