Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site cbscc.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!ihnp4!cbosgd!cbsck!cbscc!pmd From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) Newsgroups: net.religion Subject: Re: Logic based on different sets of assumptions (part 1 of 2) Message-ID: <4932@cbscc.UUCP> Date: Thu, 7-Mar-85 16:15:54 EST Article-I.D.: cbscc.4932 Posted: Thu Mar 7 16:15:54 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 9-Mar-85 06:26:57 EST References: <589@pyuxd.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Columbus Lines: 185 This two part response to Rich was posed last week. I apparently did not propagate so I'm reposting. Rich, your article definitely shows that you are capable presenting argument in a reasonable tone. I appreciate that. It also stands above your other writing for a couple of other reasons: 1) You are not just destroying argument with a sledge hammer, but seem to be giving the subject more carful consideration. 2) You are trying to give some support for your own view, not just tearing apart that of others. Even with all this I still feel like I must be crazy to post this response. What remains to be seen is if my response will be given any thoughtful consideration or a malicious hacking and twisting. I still have a very bad taste in my mouth from what you've done with some of my articles, Rich. I'm starting to care less, though. Trying to put things down in words helps me; even if others don't think much of it. >Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity, one would >normally work (in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) >from the assumption that the thing for which there is no evidence does not >exist. Without evidence showing proof of a thing's existence, or its observed >effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally assume that >it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents itself. The >*possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a possibility evinces >itself if and only if evidence is presented to support it. What makes you think that evidence used to analyse non-religious phenomena also applies to religious phenomena? Does this really point to the conclusion that God doesn't exist or could it be showing the limited applicability of your methods? As a crude illustration, pretend the evidence for the existence of screwdrivers had never "presented itself". All you know about are hammers, nails, and wood screws. You could then say that you are justified in assuming that screwdrivers don't exist, that hammers don't turn wood screws and therefore wood screws can't be turned. We must pound both nails and screws in with hammers. You could conclude that the screw is an inefficent sort of nail because all you know about are hammers, or you might propose that something like a screwdriver exists though the hard evidence does not support it. There you have two differing conclusions with the same "hard evidence". Either of them could completely explain the evidence. If screwdrivers do not in fact exist, then the screw is a inefficent sort of nail which may look more interesting than a regular nail but is less functional. But this is an object oriented analogy. Is God an object like a screwdriver? If so then your method of analysis should work and sufficently encompass the issue of whether or not the object exists. If God is not an object, he may still be a subject. (The subject of this discussion for example.) Then, at best your method of analysis is very limited. It may only be able to grasp effects of God's existence which could be explained by something else. I don't think God is an object in the sense that we may be presented with his existence (like that of the screwdriver). It seems that you are trying to say that since your methods cannot encompass the issue of whether or not God exists, then you feel justified in assuming he doesn't. You can explain evidence presented for his existence in the same way you could explain the existence of screws without positing the existence of a screwdriver (Occam's Razor). The problem with your critierion for proof is that it demands that God be an object that is available for examination. If he isn't you assume he doesn't exist. So for God to prove himself to you he would have to make himself an object; a type of machine that produces conclusive evidence on demand. If God actually isn't this way then you justify the assumption that he doesn't exist. There are problems with this objectified constraint for God's existence. Just about any physical proof you could name (some act for God to perform to prove his existence) would fall short of being conclusive for a number of reasons. 1) It could be attributed to natural as yet unexplained causes. This happens alot. Some phenomena will convince some but not others. 2) If it is sufficient to prove God's existence it will only do so for those who actually see or experience it. So there is the additional requirement that everyone be able to see it. Even then there's no gaurentee that everyone will draw the same conclusion from the evidence. So if God has sufficiently proven himself to me but not to you the question still remains (i.e "Does God exist or not?"). 3) An observable event may only have temporal impact. That is, it may have to be repeated generations later. But if the original event was sufficent to prove that God definitely exists why should it have to be reproduced in every place and in every time? 4) If God is not a machine but has a will for those who beleive in him, then why should he be concerned about just proving the mere fact of his existence to everyone? If he did, what is to prevent them from saying, "OK, God exists. So What?". There is no gaurentee that people will follow the implications of his existence or even understand them. They might as well not believe. The whole point if the previous long paragraph is that I could take any concieveable "evidence" that meets your criterion for viability and "skepticize" it. It seems to me that by insisting that God objectify himself you necessarily require that he not be God at all, but a continual evidence producing machine or some kind of genie in a bottle. All I can conclude is that the existence of God (especially the Christian God) cannot be proven under your constraints. But I don't think that it compells me to assume God dosn't exist. Why should I agree that your constraints encompass the issue of God's existence well enough to even justify the assumption that he doesn't? You may say that your constraints are all we have. I say that that's not all *I* have. So, we haven't excluded the possibility that although God isn't an object that you can go anytime and observe proof of its existence, he still may reveal himself to persons. We may not be able to penetrate to God on our own, but that doesn't mean he can't penetrate to us. Of course, you'll say this is subjective. I agree. But subjectivity doesn't automatically exclude accurate perceptions of reality. They aren't as tangible with God as with physical, object oriented things. There is no reason to assume God is less real because of this. I understand Newton's physics much better than Einstein's. Sometimes the concepts of the latter make my head spin when I try to grasp them. But I can still except them and work with them when "hard evidence" often escapes me. Another thing you seem to tacitly rule out is the testamony of others. What's wrong with provisionally accepting God's existence based on the fact that many will tell me he exists and that I consider many of them to be rational people of sound judgement. I know that South America exists in this way and also that Abraham Lincoln lived. I think these are valid assumptions to make based on what I consider sound testamony. They are provisional beliefs, however. I can't prove that they're true. I may someday find out that they are false, but as it is these beliefs help explain some things that I experience here in Columbus OH and now in 1985 (e.g. Headlines about political unrest in a South America and the fact that Blacks are no longer slaves). I cannot prove these things in their entirety (based on hard evidence that I have). The same holds true for God's existence. Scientific investigation does not encompass the issue of his existence by virtue of God's nature. His existence does explain some things I exprience and questions I ask. I'm not claiming that it's the only thing that could adaquately explain them, but to me it seems resonable and the best. So is evidence self interpreting? I think not. You assume your own framework for interpreting evidence allows you to draw valid conclusions. What constitutes evidence of a "viable" nature? To me and you, it may be different things. So how does evidence "present itself"? I maintain that in the act of its being presented some interpretation has gone unnoticed. You assume that the explanation that is consistent with your worldview is correct. At the end of this article you deny that you assume there is no God. Yet here you are defending that very assumption. You expect everyone to agree that there is insufficient evidence for God's existence (and that the lack of "hard" evidence validates your assumption). I don't think the methods you limit yourself to can ever address the issue completely enough to justify the assumption that God does or doesn't exist. Now here you go again slipping Occam's razor in as your authority. Lot's of explainations that turn out to be correct would fail Occam's razor (e.g. the existence of screwdrivers in the above example. The existence of a screwdriver is not necessary to explain the existence of screws). It's a rusty tool. This has been gone over before between you and others (viz. Torek and Wingate). I am in agreement with their position. >However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of a deity despite >the lack of realistic evidence. One can only assume that 1) these people have >a different set of criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have >some vested interest in believing that particular outcome of analysis that they >believe to be true. Quite possibly both. Again, what constitutes "realistic" evidence? I simply disagree that there is lack of realistic evidence. You may look at the same evidence and say its not realistic. So what is realistic? What is real? Also your position can easily be reversed and applied to those believe God does not exist. You have different criteria than I, or you may have a vested interest in God's non-existence, or both. It seems that the purpose of your article here is to demonstrate that your position has some inherent advantage over mine (less presumptive). I don't see how it does. I think mine is at least equally valid. >I think we have shown endless times >that the nature of the subjective evidence offered in favor of religious belief >is tainted: How come your subjectivity shows a different world view than >someone else's? Which one is right? WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right? >If he/she is being deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been >deceived? (Not to mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns onto >events/phenomena/observations that upon closer examination are shown to be >quite wrong---like "recognizing" someone at the airport and realizing that it >wasn't them after all.) Who is "we"? Anyway, the argument cuts both ways. All subjective evidence is tainted. You haven't shown any advantage of your point of view over mine. Why is my assment of the evidence tainted and yours not? Is it not just as likely that you are being decieved as I? You seem to make demands for evidence (events/phenomena/observations presumably) as if you expect to make an objective asessment (at least more so than mine). Yet here you brush aside the asessment of others on the basis of their faulty perceptions. What makes yours more reliable than anyone else's? What makes you able to come to more realistic conclusions about the things I experience than me? *** CONTINUED *** -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd