Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site utastro.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!ut-sally!utastro!padraig From: padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) Newsgroups: net.religion Subject: Re: Logic based on different sets of assumptions (part 1 of 2) Message-ID: <1079@utastro.UUCP> Date: Sat, 9-Mar-85 16:18:38 EST Article-I.D.: utastro.1079 Posted: Sat Mar 9 16:18:38 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 11-Mar-85 04:38:32 EST References: <589@pyuxd.UUCP> <4932@cbscc.UUCP> Organization: U. Texas, Astronomy, Austin, TX Lines: 89 Here are some comments regarding some of the points raised in the above article. >>Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity, one would >>normally work (in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) >>from the assumption that the thing for which there is no evidence does not >>exist. Without evidence showing proof of a thing's existence, or its observed >>effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally assume that >>it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents itself. The >>*possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a possibility evinces >>itself if and only if evidence is presented to support it. > >What makes you think that evidence used to analyse non-religious phenomena >also applies to religious phenomena? Does this really point to the conclusion >that God doesn't exist or could it be showing the limited applicability of >your methods? As a crude illustration, pretend the evidence for the existence >of screwdrivers had never "presented itself". All you know about are hammers, >nails, and wood screws. You could then say that you are justified in assuming >that screwdrivers don't exist, that hammers don't turn wood screws and >therefore wood screws can't be turned. We must pound both nails and screws >in with hammers. You could conclude that the screw is an inefficent sort of >nail, because all you know about are hammers, or you might propose that >something like a screwdriver exists though the hard evidence does not support >it. There you have two differing conclusions with the same "hard evidence". >Either of them could completely explain the evidence. If screwdrivers do >not in fact exist, then the screw is a inefficent sort of nail which may >look more interesting than a regular nail but is less functional. >...................... >...................... >Now here you go again slipping Occam's razor in as your authority. Lot's of >explainations that turn out to be correct would fail Occam's razor (e.g. >the existence of screwdrivers in the above example. The existence of >a screwdriver is not necessary to explain the existence of screws). It's >a rusty tool. This has been gone over before between you and others (viz. >Torek and Wingate). I am in agreement with their position. This is just the argument from design in a clever guise. It is easy to cite the hammer and screw since we cannot remove from our minds knowledge of the existence of screwdrivers. Why not, instead, try to deduce the existence of bug-eyed-monsters in the Andromeda galaxy from the hammer and screw? >Again, what constitutes "realistic" evidence? I simply disagree that there >is lack of realistic evidence. You may look at the same evidence and say >its not realistic. So what is realistic? What is real? > ...All subjective evidence >is tainted. You haven't shown any advantage of your point of view over mine. >Why is my assment of the evidence tainted and yours not? Is it not just >as likely that you are being decieved as I? You seem to make demands for >evidence (events/phenomena/observations presumably) as if you expect to make >an objective asessment (at least more so than mine). Yet here you brush >aside the asessment of others on the basis of their faulty perceptions. What >makes yours more reliable than anyone else's? What makes you able to come >to more realistic conclusions about the things I experience than me? >Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd These quotations seem to indicate the existence of confusion when determining whether certain evidence is permissible, or not. The problem with the above argument is that it relies on the poorest quality evidence to draw the most profound conclusions. This is not to say that the conclusions are incorrect, or that the evidence is not to be believed, but the fact remains that subjective evidence is notoriously shakey. Yes, you can know of the existence of S. America based on the testamony of individuals, but credibility must be taken into consideration. There are some who will swear that they can project themselves to other dimensions, planets etc. There are others who will tell you that this sentence is in front of you. These are all testamonies. But the former is the more profound, and unless we are willing to recognize how foolhardy it would be to say 'it must be true, since it's a testamony...' then we are going to end up a most ludicrous personal philosophy. This I think is the thrust of RR's point. There is of course the danger that we refuse to commit our lives to something of great importance, by waiting for sufficiently good data, but on the other hand there are so many philosophies around with poor supporting evidence that if we do otherwise, we must accept them all if we are to be honest and consistent with ourselves - it's too late then to complain that "this evidence is more subjective than ours..." Padraig Houlahan.