Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site randvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!ihnp4!houxm!whuxl!whuxlm!akgua!sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!randvax!rohn From: rohn@randvax.UUCP (Laurinda Rohn) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: poll (nuclear disarmament verifiability) Message-ID: <2324@randvax.UUCP> Date: Tue, 26-Feb-85 11:41:32 EST Article-I.D.: randvax.2324 Posted: Tue Feb 26 11:41:32 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 3-Mar-85 05:42:18 EST References: <527@decwrl.UUCP> <680@sdcsvax.UUCP> <610@tty3b.UUCP>, <609@mhuxt.UUCP> <613@tty3b.UUCP> Organization: Rand Corp., Santa Monica Lines: 47 >> From: js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) >> ------------------------------------- >> You're going to 'listen' for hidden nuclear missiles? Suprise! They >> actually *don't* make ticking noises. Get serious! How could a thing like >> that be verified without extensive searching (over the whole world) by both >> sides, continuously? Test-ban treaties are easy to verify, of course, but >> that's not what we're talking about here. >> >> Seriously, almost *everyone* would be for disarmament if we thought it could >> be mutual and verifiable. I wouldn't trust my *own* government to actually >> disarm, though, much less the USSR's. >> ------------------------------------- > > from Mike Kelly > First, our satellites *do* extensively search the world continuously. Unfortunately, not all satellites can see through concrete buildings. Things which are small enough *can* be hidden. > Second, the means of verification would have to be built into the treaty. > That might require on-site inspection. Both sides are quite well aware of > the number, size and location of strategic missiles. Both sides know this because ICBMs are very difficult to hide. And said info was obtained *NOT* by on-site inspection but by recon satellites. The Soviets are quite reluctant to allow on-site inspections. > The fact that cruise and other missiles are much more difficult to verify is > precisely why arms control becomes more urgent by the day. While it becomes more urgent, it also becomes more difficult precisely because an agreement on limiting cruise missiles may not be verifiable by the means we currently use. The Tomahawk GLCM, for example, is about 6 meters long and about 52 cm in diameter. It wouldn't be hard to hide at all. > And a comprehensive test-ban would be just fine, as a first step, because it would > mean an end to development of new technology within short order. However, there are possibly unverifiable weapons, like cruise missiles, which have already been developed and tested (something about a lake in Finland....). Lauri rohn@rand-unix.ARPA ..decvax!randvax!rohn