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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Re: Reply to Dubuc's Reply - Part 2 of 2
Message-ID: <655@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 11-Mar-85 14:09:35 EST
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.655
Posted: Mon Mar 11 14:09:35 1985
Date-Received: Tue, 12-Mar-85 09:12:03 EST
References: <589@pyuxd.UUCP>, <4898@cbscc.UUCP> <4899@cbscc.UUCP>
Organization: Huxley College
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|With that in mind, the only other reason that such people might readily accept
|the notion of the existence of a god is precisely because they already believe
|it to be so:  they hold the existence of god as an assumption, an axiom, and
|work ALL analysis of the world from there.  "Why is life full of problems? 
|Because god designed the world that way knowing that it would be best for us
|not to have a perfect life but rather to struggle and learn."  Contrast this
|with the simpler, less presumptive notion that life is full of problems because
|all those problems are simply a part of the natural flow of things, based on
|what we observe and codify as physical laws.  We experience them as problems
|because they conflict with our wishes for a world ordered around our lives,
|and because such conflicts are inevitable in a world with trillions of
|organisms and objects caught up in the "natural flow".  As opposed to assuming,
|for whatever reason, the existence of an ultimate "good" force that "designed"
|the universe to be a certain way.

> Here is where I think your argument gets off on the wrong tack.  You conlude
> that belief that there is a God to be an assumption.  There is another
> possibility:  It is a proposition held to explain questions (often
> metaphysical) that we encounter about our own existence and that of the world
> we live in.

As the question above:  "Why is life full of problems?"  If one chooses to
explain it in terms of the goals and intentions of a deity, one first must
assume the existence of that deity.  Contrast that with choosing to explain
that question without resorting to such a presumption.  Yes, the god idea
is a viable explanation for such questions, IF one chooses to add on extra
assumptions.  The less presumptive explanation by its very construct brings us
closer to reality.  Which is not to say that the god idea is WRONG, but rather
that if it IS true, it exists within the framework of the less presumptive
model.  Moreover, certain manifestations of the god idea are NOT viable
because they are rife with contradictions.  Such as:  the notion of god as an
arbiter of "absolute good".  Where "good" is actually defined as that which
benefits the person speaking the word, how can EVERYTHING be labelled
absolutely good or evil?  The notion that there is a being that can do so is
thus contradictory---if it defines something as good that others perceive as
evil (or vice versa), then it is only engaging in defining good from its own
perspective!  And that's not absolute---that's just dogmatic assertion!

> I think that your example only appears to be less presumptive on your part.
> You haven't removed the "deity" you have only renamed it "natural flow".

A deity is simply a natural flow with a consciousness and a sense of intent
and (potentially) the power to carry out its intent.  That's one of my
definitions of a possibility for a deity---what we perceive as a "natural
flow" having a consciousness and will of its own and we individual humans
would seem to have.  But:  I don't make assumptions about that "flow-entity"
with the will having been the creator of the universe it would be the
consciousness of, nor do I assume that it would set down rules for a bunch
of rather ordinary beings on some ordinary planet.  (I somehow hear Jeff
Sargent jumping up and down and saying:  "Why do you want to choose to
be considered insignificant when you choose to perceive yourself as a chosen
one?")  Furthermore, I see no reason to assume that the natural flow has such
a consciousness---it has as much of a deterministic nature as we would seem to.

> Are our wishes part of that natural flow or separate
> from it?  If they are part of it why do they conflict?  How did such
> conflict arise and why do we even percieve it as conflict?  

Of course our "wishes" are a part of that natural flow.  On what basis would
one exclude those wishes from something defined as anything and everything that
is going on?  As part of the curious and inquisitive nature that *is* human,
people came up with explanations for things based on limited knowledge.  Why
did such explanations revolve around certain wishes?  Because wishes for
security and order and being looked after permeate levels of human existence. 
Why do they "conflict"?  They just do, because what we want isn't always what
we get, no?  Are you assuming an intended reason that they conflict?

> Why and how is the perception sustained?  If our wishes are separate from the
> natural flow  [I DIDN'T SAY THAT THEY WERE] then you have opened the door to
> something that at least may not be rooted in what is natural.

But I see no reason to claim that they ARE separate.  Are you building a case
backwards from the conclusion, assuming god first and working back to "prove"
a claim about wishes not being part of a natural flow?  This is the kind of
assumption and reasoning I've been discussing.  Furthermore, once again (I
may go GRRRR! at any moment...).  You haven't been one of the very few who's
answered the questions about what the natural/supernatural definitional
dichotomy really means?  What is "not rooted in what is natural"?

> So your natural flow has produced something that to me seems to be unnatural;
> wishes and a consiousness that pretend to asess the natural world somewhat
> objectively as if it weren't itself controlled by that natural flow.

As you say, to *you* it *seems* to be unnatural.  It's not to me.  But, as you
say, that's subjective perception...

> Here you run into the possibility of you own objectivity being a delusion and
> I think you must ascribe to your "natural flow" some deific functions
> or charactistics (such are not demonstrable with "hard evidence") in order
> to trust your objectivity when considering things beyond the physical realm.

I "must"?  I don't see why except, again, if I assume your conclusion.

> Some arbitrary series of natural events must have led humans to the ability to
> hold these perceptions.

I've discussed that.  For reasons mentioned above.

>  The ability and even the perceptions themselves
> are somehow "caused" in the natural flow of things.  But to be caused is
> not to be proven.  Determining that something *is* is a different matter
> from determining wheter something is true or false.  Cause does not imply
> proof.  I can cause a certain number to appear on the display of my
> calculator by pushing buttons, but the fact that I caused the number
> doesn't make it meaningful and the determination as to wheter the number
> is true or false depends on some factors that are external to my causing
> the number to appear.

One phenomenon causing another phenomenon to occur does not imply that the
first phenomenon "intended" the second to occur.  A chain of "natural events"
does not imply direction from a controlling entity with intent.  Unless, of
course, you assume such a controlling entity in advance.

> Yet our own consciousness pretends to come to true/false perceptions about
> the very natural processes that supposedly brought it into being and sustain
> it?  How?  That question is beyond the grasp of your worldview, I think.

Not at all.  The one assumption that one is forced to make (though many
Eastern philosophies refuse to make even that) is the viability of sensory
input.  Now, although human minds impose patterns on what they perceive
(e.g., ink blots) that may have no bearing on any actual "function" or
"intent" of what is observed, we have the ability to whittle down much (or
sometimes all) of the imposed patterning and return to strict analysis of
the actual content of the observation.

>  Maybe all our perceptions and wishes are
> workable delusions,  but they are all we have  we must believe them or
> we get nowhere.  Very well.  But here lies your hidden "deity".  You
> cannot explain how something that is the product of the natural flow also
> trancends that flow in order to make "viable" asumptions about the very
> things that produce and control it.

I can't?  But, alas, I have.  Based on how the original wishes/explanations
were formulated, based on how these explanations were compounded by
non-verified phenomena over the years that is now accepted as fact, based on
how people today accept those things as part of a whole belief system.  No
hidden deity there at all.

> At this point I think your "natural
> flow" takes on the characteristics of a deity in order to achieve the feat.
> Your deity is pantheistic.  The only difference I see between a Naturalist
> and a Pantheist is that the former rules out religious experiences ...
> unnecessarily, I think.  (Could this be right, Laura?)

Sorry, it's quite wrong.  Because the pantheist believes (as I've described
earlier) in a will/consciousness imbuing the "natural flow", while the
"naturalist" makes no such assumptions.

|I contend that all such analysis of the world by religious believers, and the
|answers offered in such analysis, stem directly from an a priori assumption of
|the existence of god.  Lewis' works are prime examples.  Jeff Sargent, for
|example, has used the phraseology "Why would you want to believe that human
|beings are 'nothing but' lab specimens?"  (... when you have this other
|possibility to believe instead.)  "Wanting to believe", the desirability of
|holding certain beliefs as opposed to others owing to their intrinsic
|"aesthetic" value rather than their veracity, becomes a factor in forming
|belief systems for certain people.

> Another note about Lewis:  If you are going to assert that Lewis' works
> are a prime example of anything, I hope you have read them.  If you haven't
> and I have how do you expect to convince me if I disagree with your
> assertion?  What reason is there for me to believe that you might even
> know what you're talking about?  
> I think that you can only uses what you have read to support your position.
> Cite those particular works if you will, don't make blanket assumptions
> about all of it.  We've gone through all this before, I know.

Indeed.  One would think from Paul's comments that he is making more
assumptions about what I've read and haven't read.  My exposure to Lewis
may be limited, but it's not infinitesimal as he might make out.  But,
more importantly, you spent an entire paragraph dwelling on ONE SENTENCE in
the section extracted from my article.  Fine, forget I mentioned Lewis.
(I meant Emmanuel Lewis, OK? :-)  Let's talk about the remaining 95% of what
I said.

> Still, you haven't removed this factor for your own beliefs.  You say the
> same thing as Jeff in effect:  "Why do I have to beleive in a god to help
> explain certain things when I have this other possibility instead?" Your
> position doesn't make you inherently immune from "wanting to believe" any
> more than Jeff's does for him.  What makes yours the de facto standard?

In my case, the "other possibility" I choose is chosen precisely because it
makes fewer assumptions based on how you (or I) might WANT to perceive the
world.  Don't you think I'd agree that it would be "real nice" if there was a
god watching over us?  Just as it might be nice for all food to taste like
chocolate and for all ...  (never mind, you get the idea)

|Given that we are dealing with two forms of logic, one of which starts off
|making the assumption that god exists and the other of which does not, a person
|using one form of logic cannot possibly convince the person using the other
|form of logic to accept his position.  This is not always true, because the
|two forms of logic and their two sets of assumptions are NOT disjoint sets. 
|In fact, for most reasonable people, they are practically equivalent, with the
|addition of the a priori assumption of god being the only major difference
|between the two sets.  Conclusions drawn from the two sets of assumptions,
|however, can and will (and do) wind up being radically different.  The
|"impossibility of convincing" that I mentioned above only comes into play when
|the "extra" assumption has a role in the formation of some conclusion. 
|Religions have (individually and collectively) formed whole volumes of such
|conclusions and codified them.  In many cases, the "existence of god"
|assumption doesn't even enter into certain of these conclusions, and they form
|viable conclusions about the world at large and life itself. (Some have devoted
|entire lifetimes to thinking and writing about such analysis and conclusions.)
|In other cases, assumptions about the nature of god and "god's word" take
|precedence over both scientific investigation and individual human needs.

> However, when you talk about scientific investigation you are shifting
> gears.  Science often involves positing explanations for observable phenomena.
> These are not proven explanations in the logical sense.  They are positions
> to be disproven; working models that may allow us to make sense out of
> what we see.  *Anologous* to this (not identical to it) is the propositional
> truth that God exists.  There are many things that just make a lot more
> sense to me if I include him in the picture ... and I can't honestly rule
> him out of the picture.

Yes you can, if you are seriously engaging in analysis/investigation.  Why not
choose to answer all the questions that have answered based on a pre-assumption
of god, without resorting to that pre-assumption.  I gave an example above in
answer to the question "Why is life full of problems?"  I've noted that people
who do so may not "like" the answers.  For example, "charley" Wingate once
said that he couldn't accept (or didn't like) explanations of life that (due to
a deterministic/biological bent?) rule out "personal responsibility".  But it
would seem that the reason for "not liking" the answers is rooted in the
presumptions.  I would appreciate seeing answers to questions formulated
without the presumptions by religious believers.  Obviously doing it in reverse
(asking ME to answer the questions WITH the assumption) is too easy:  "Why is
that so?  Because god did it".  What I am asking for is much harder, much less
presumptive, and much more interesting.  I'd really love to hear some responses
(sort of like the reverso game no one wanted to play last year...)

|The conflict comes into play where "existence of god" assumptions (compounded
|by assumptions about what IS "god's word" and who is qualified to be god's
|authority representative on earth) are contradicted by rational inquisitive
|analysis and investigation of the world itself, or by individual human needs
|(arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word".  Those who make such
|assumptions may deny the claims of the investigators (in "protest") solely
|because the claims would force them to change their whole view of the
|universe based on the evidence.  If those people are in positions of earthly
|authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and of people who hold
|them.  We HAVE witnessed such repression in the past, and we may be witnessing
|it again today.

> Here you step a little over the threshold of whether or not God exists to
> the conflicts that arise when we accept ["ASSUME" -ED.] that he does.  This
> is stepping out of metaphysics into philosophy of religion or comparative
> theology.  

First of all, I don't see why that causes some sort of problem.  The very fact
that conflicts (i.e., contradictions) do arise is indicative of a flaw in,
if not the actual axiom (god exists), the model which describes the god that
is contended to exist.  What's more, I have the right to complain that such
a contradiction-laden system seeks to tell non-believers what is morally (
and legally) wrong and right.

> They [religions] all present their own answers
> to the same sort of questions.  (E.g. Who are we?  Why are we here?  For
> what purpose, if any?  What should we do, if anything, about evil?  What
> is evil?  Does God care?  Why do we often feel compelled to ask 'why?'? :-)

And why do we all wear digital watches?  :-)  Since I have my own
religion (according to so many of you readers :-?), let me present what
my religion says in answer to these questions:

WHO ARE WE?  We are human beings, because that's the name we give ourselves.
WHY ARE WE HERE?  Because we're not somewhere else.
NO, I MEAN, WHY DO WE EXIST, FOR WHAT PURPOSE?  You mean we have to have a
	"purpose" defined for us?  Can't we each define our own?
WHAT SHOULD WE DO, IF ANYTHING, ABOUT EVIL?  You haven't told me what evil is
	yet, how can I tell you what we should do about it!
WHAT IS EVIL?  Ah, that's better.  It's subjective:  something is called evil
	when it's detrimental to whoever is calling it evil.  We as a whole
	race or as individuals may see particular things as evil.  We should
	probably be very careful not to simply destroy anything we perceive as
	evil, especially as individuals, since what's evil to me (filthy
	disgusting sexual habits) might be good to someone else (right, and
	I'm not getting my share :-).  But ultimately, the only things that are
	truly evil are those which directly harm us individually or as a race,
	and that's where the limit of rights and wrongs lies.
DOES GOD CARE?  More importantly, does it exist?  If it does, *must* it care?
WHY DO WE OFTEN FEEL COMPELLED TO ASK WHY?  Hmm, depends where you put the
	emphasis in that sentence.  Why do *we* feel compelled?  Well,
	other animals didn't, and that's why they're still animals, I guess.
	I guess we're around to ask the question with all the elaborate
	language we've concocted to do so because we had the seminal seeds of
	curiosity to begin with.  And they resulted in putting us where we are
	today.

> I think your answer to "why?" reduces to "It just is", or "Never mind 'why',
> I'll explain 'how'".  "Why?" isn't really a valid question in your world
> view for some of these things, is it?  "Why" asks for a reason; an apparent
> purpose, not a mechanism.

Asking why and expecting more than just "it just is" is to imply that there
must be a controlling purpose.  That's exactly what I'm not assuming and what
you are.  Asking "why" means asking "for what *purpose*/*reason*, with what
*intention*/*motive*.  Assuming that the answer to one's question MUST imply
something that HAS deliberate intention, purpose, motive, etc. is to make
an erroneous assumption:  things need not necessarily be that way, and to
assume that they are or must be that way is erroneous, and judgments based on
that assumption are flawed.

|The points are: 1) Given that evidence contradicts, if not the basic assumption
|that there IS a god, further assumptions that certain texts labelled as god's
|word are what they are purported to be (absolute truth), what is the basis for
|retaining those assumptions? and 2) Given that repression as described above
|does indeed take place in the advent of that which contradicts the status quo,
|can we afford to let ANY group, religious or otherwise, wield enormous power
|over people's lives when the basis for their governing involves, not rational
|thinking, but "does it conform to pre-conceived assumed ways of thinking?"

> I cannot give you your first "given".  I disputed the notion that evidence
> speaks your conclusions the way you imply and even the notion of evidence
> itself as you use it.

Elsewhere in this article, I have offered the nature of the contradictions.

> I agree fully with point 2 above, provided that "ANY group" means the one
> you're in too and as long as my world view doesn't automatically exclude
> me from supporting my own ideas in the "public square" simply because they
> are religiously based.  One of the pre-concieved assumed ways of thinking
> I see here is that the atheistic viewpoint is inherently more objective
> than any theistic one; that the "evidence" is oviously on their side (obvious
> to whom?).  I see no reason to assume that, of course.

You don't have to "assume" THAT.  I've offered evidence here and previously to
support that claim.  The "naturalist" or "scientific" viewpoint evolves with
new knowledge, and its pre-eminent assumption is that of the scientific method,
but since those two words evoke fear and terror and dismay, try replacing them
with what they mean:  utilizing the best and most verifiable methods to draw
conclusions and eschewing that which is neither verifiable nor reliable.  Would
YOU prefer to use some other method to draw conclusions?

It would seem that you are in some sort of agreement with Don Black here.
(Now, THAT is a vicious attack against you, and I apologize.)  No, seriously,
he has made claims about movements out to eradicate and outlaw religion, which
is what you seem to insinuate here.  As I see it, the religious right sees the
influence of religion weakening and people shirk some of the presumptions and
learn about what rational inquisitive analysis is all about.  The religious
right calls this "secular humanism" and wants to see it banned, because its
existence is causing the deterioration of religious influence.  They then
claim that the problems of society are CAUSED (another teleological argument!)
by the coincident deterioration of so-called religious "values", and thus
they were ultimately caused by what caused that deterioration--secular
humanism.  In times of social change, there is uneasiness, as people's
formerly predictable roles become less well defined and as some things that
some people thought were their "rights" (at the expense of others) are now
gone.  The religious right makes use of that uneasiness to foster their
notions, to spread the belief that we MUST get back to the "old ways" and rid
ourselves of this evil buzzword with which no one can really point out a
problem.  One of the tactics associated with this movement is to claim "But
my rights as a Christian are being violated."  Or that they would be/will be.
(Gary Samuelson first entered the fray of this newsgroup by claiming that
Christians were being persecuted in this country because they weren't being
given special treatment that he seemed to feel that they deserved.)  I have
to question any such claim of persecution, present or future.

|Despite what some people feel obliged to point out, I do NOT assume that there
|is NO god, I simply do not assume that there is one.  The two are not
|equivalent.  My point is not to show that "god doesn't exist" (I've speculated
|on the net several times about what such a deity might be liked if it does
|exist), but rather to show that there may be something very wrong with certain
|notions of "god"-ness, when those notions were formulated based on presumptions
|about the nature of the universe that may seem "appealing", not based on
|evidence about reality, and when the premises surrounding those notions appear
|to be contradictory and malformed.

> I'll grant you your assertion that you don't assume that there is no God.
> But you made a lot of claims that that assumption was supported by 
> evidence.  Why was that necessary if you don't make the assumption?

GRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!
None of the claims I made stated that the assumption that there was no god
was supported by evidence.  Such a statement is fundamentally ridiculous.
How can one claim that there is evidence supporting there not being any
unicorns?  The claims I did make showed that the nature of the methods by
which certain models/pictures of god are formulated are tainted beyond
belief.  Though not beyond the belief of some.

> Also, as I have tried to point out the existence of God is not necessarily
> and assuption on which everything else is based.

But you were unable to support that assertion.  In fact, I managed to
point out a few instances where your conclusion is generated (occasionally in
advance) directly based from such an assumption.
-- 
"Which three books would *you* have taken?"
				Rich Rosen	ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
-- 
Life is complex.  It has real and imaginary parts.
					Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr