Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site cbscc.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!ihnp4!cbosgd!cbsck!cbscc!pmd From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) Newsgroups: net.religion Subject: Perceiving is Believing Message-ID: <4958@cbscc.UUCP> Date: Mon, 11-Mar-85 10:45:59 EST Article-I.D.: cbscc.4958 Posted: Mon Mar 11 10:45:59 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 12-Mar-85 09:59:54 EST References: <589@pyuxd.UUCP> <4898@cbscc.UUCP> <4899@cbscc.UUCP>, <3878@umcp-cs.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Columbus Lines: 71 Keywords: Occam, natural flow, objective [Paul Torek:] > My disposal of Occam's Razor was not intended as a denial >that the Occam fans are onto something about the need for evidence. I didn't mean to imply otherwise. I don't deny the need for evidence per se either. But I question the criteria some use to contend that certain evidence is conclusive. >Paul Dubuc suggests that God is the best explanation of certain >metaphysical questions (and perhaps he would also include subjective >experiences as indicating God as explanation, too). Including God in the picture seems best to me. I am not implying that they are the best explanations or the only ones. The point of my article is that my acceptance of the proposition that God exists is not more presumptive than the denial of that proposition. >I think that >is an interesting suggestion, but there is only metaphysical question >I see him discussing, and it won't do the job. > I have jotted down a few passages from his article and hope >I'm not taking them out of context. Dubuc says > "perceptions ... are ... [in Rich Rosen's world-view] > 'caused' in the natural flow ... But to be caused is not > to be proven. ... Cause does not imply proof... > ...Objective judgements require some measure of transcendance > over what is being judged ..." >The point seems to be that if Naturalism is[were] true, all our >perceptions and judgements about reality are *caused* -- sound >familiar? It should, since C.S. Lewis tried to make a *reductio >ad absurdum* out of this point. Lewis stated, and Dubuc is hinting, >that if our perceptions/judgements are caused then they can't be >trusted. WRONG. Cause does not imply proof, *but it doesn't rule >it out either*. Obviously a caused result doesn't rule out the possibility that it is proven. But what insures that they are? I don't see any necessary connection between cause and proof? Causing a certain number to appear on my calculator by pushing buttons at random does not exclude the posibility that that number is the correct answer to a particular problem. A stopped clock gives the correct time twice a day. What elevates the level of trust in our own caused judgements above the trust we would place in these examples? >Yes, our perceptions are caused, but they are accurate anyway (at least >most of the time). Is the judgement that our perceptions are accurate most of the time also caused? Do valid perceptions imply accurate judgements or conclusions about them? It seems to me that this statement is a judgement that presumes for itself a measure of independance (where cause is concerned) from the caused perceptions themselves. >Furthermore, there is >a good Naturalistic explanation (based on the evolutionary advantage >of accurate perceivers) of this fact -- *of course* our perceptions >are mostly trustworthy: if not, we wouldn't have survived. I don't see how survival is necessarily linked to accurate perceptions. Not all inaccurate perceptions ensure death, and neither would all accurate perceptions insure survival. Also, you treat accurate perception as an ability. Does the accuracy of my perception in one instance imply that I generally make accurate perceptions? Again this ability seems independant of "natural flow". How many instances of accurate perception does it take to make me an accurate perceiver? I don't see any necessary connection between instances of accurate perception and the ability to perceive accurately. -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd