Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site ut-ngp.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!bellcore!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!seismo!ut-sally!ut-ngp!kjm From: kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: Re: Several replies in one article Message-ID: <1400@ut-ngp.UUCP> Date: Fri, 1-Mar-85 10:15:43 EST Article-I.D.: ut-ngp.1400 Posted: Fri Mar 1 10:15:43 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 4-Mar-85 06:03:59 EST References: <749@wucs.UUCP> Distribution: net Organization: U.Texas Computation Center, Austin, Texas Lines: 53 [] From esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) >[This is a reply to ariel!norm, alice!ark, and whuxlm!mag (J. V. Sanders)] > >From: Andrew Koenig (ark@alice) >> I define "humanity" as "ability to think". I believe that there is a >> great deal of difference between the ability to think and the ability >> to feel pain. It is exactly this difference that leads me to the >> conclusion that eating animal flesh is OK but murder is not. > >That difference doesn't lead me to quite the same conclusion. The ability >to feel pain means that animals deserve some protections, like some of >the animal welfare protection laws we have now. Why does the ability to feel pain imply that protection is deserved? By that standard, if someone were to show that bacteria feel pain, we'd have to stop using antibiotics! > ... >From: mag@whuxlm.UUCP (Joel V. Sanders, using Gray Michael A's account) >> [ Mr. Sanders contends that "natural right" has no meaningful >> definition, and that perhaps "permission" or "consent" should >> be used in place of "natural right", since rights ultimately >> depend on social agreement. -KJM ] > >A meaningful definition of the concept of a natural right: a person A >has a (moral, natural) right against person(s) B to do X iff B ought, >out of respect for A, not interfere with A's doing X. Please define "respect". My dictionary does not give a definition which makes sense in the above context. > ... >"But haven't you just pushed the problem back a step, to 'ought'?" No >problem: a person ought to do X in a particular situation iff she >would do X if she were informed, rational, and free. This is not a >definition of right action, just an empirical test. But it's a valid >test. It's not a valid test, since two "informed, rational, and free" people confronted with identical situations may do two different things. This definition has another hole: one person's rational self-interest may conflict with that of another. > Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 -- The above viewpoints are mine. They are unrelated to those of anyone else, including my cats and my employer. Ken Montgomery "Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs" ...!{ihnp4,allegra,seismo!ut-sally}!ut-ngp!kjm [Usenet, when working] kjm@ut-ngp.ARPA [for Arpanauts only]