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From: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Re: Logic based on different sets of assumptions (part 1 of 2)
Message-ID: <389@cybvax0.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 6-Mar-85 11:26:47 EST
Article-I.D.: cybvax0.389
Posted: Wed Mar  6 11:26:47 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 9-Mar-85 20:09:48 EST
References: <589@pyuxd.UUCP> <4898@cbscc.UUCP>
Reply-To: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz)
Organization: Cybermation, Inc., Cambridge, MA
Lines: 106
Summary: 

Eeeeeyargh!  400 lines of illogical argument.  I'm going to snipe at some
of the jucier tidbits.

In article <4898@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) writes:
> ...  Trying to
> put things down in words helps me; even if everyone else thinks it's trash.

First, I hope to show that Paul is correct that everyone will think his
arguments trash.  "Helps" is a subjective notion: Paul may be "helped" to
more firmly believe in erroneous arguments.

For example, the following excerpt is from the "any analogy, no matter
how inappropriate constitutes an argument (so what if it isn't valid,
I said it wasn't exact anyway, didn't I?)" school of argument.

> ... As a crude illustration, pretend the evidence for the existence
> of screwdrivers had never "presented itself".  All you know about are hammers,
> nails, and wood screws.  You could then say that you are justified in assuming
> that screwdrivers don't exist, that hammers don't turn wood screws and
> therefore wood screws can't be turned.  We must pound both nails and screws
> in with hammers.  You could conclude that the screw is an inefficent sort of
> nail, because all you know about are hammers, or you might propose that
> something like a screwdriver exists though the hard evidence does not support
> it.  There you have two differing conclusions with the same "hard evidence".
> Either of them could completely explain the evidence.  If screwdrivers do
> not in fact exist, then the screw is a inefficent sort of nail which may
> look more interesting than a regular nail but is less functional.
> 
> But this is an object oriented analogy.  Is God an object like a screwdriver?
> If so then your method of analysis should work and sufficently encompass
> the issue of whether or not the object exists.  If God is not an object, he
> may still be a subject.  (The subject of this discussion for example.)  Then,
> at best your method of analysis is very limited.   It may only be able to grasp
> effects of God's existence which could be explained by something else.  
> God is not an object in the sense that we may be presented with his existence
> (like that of the screwdriver).  It seems that you are trying to say that since
> your methods cannot encompass the issue of whether or not God exists, then
> you feel justified in assuming he doesn't.  You can explain evidence presented
> for his existence in the same way you could explain the existence of screws
> without positing the existence of a screwdriver (Occam's Razor).

Did you spot how the analogy is bad?  Which of the several ways?  The most
appalling is the hammer.  What does that correspond to?  Does it correspond
to the God of some other religion, whom we are familiar with?

Having created a bad analogy, Paul then shamelessly tries to misapply Rich's
method of analysis to it.  This is the famous "straw man" fallacy of argument.

Much of the rest of Paul's argument is built on this foundation of sand
(to paraphrase from one of his favorite books.)

> ... So, we haven't excluded the possibility that although God isn't an
> object that you can go anytime and observe proof of its existence, he
> still may reveal himself to persons.  We may not be able to penetrate
> to God on our own, but that doesn't mean he can't penetrate to us.  Of
> course, you'll say this is subjective.  I agree.  But subjectivity
> doesn't automatically exclude accurate perceptions of reality.

Here, Paul says something that most of us would be willing to agree with.
The important question this raises is "how do we deal with contradictary
subjective perceptions?"  Let's see how Paul deals with this question.

> Another thing you seem to tacitly rule out is the testamony of others.  What's
> wrong with provisionally accepting God's existence based on the fact that
> many will tell me he exists and that I consider many of them to be rational
> people of sound judgement.  I know that South America exists in this way
> and also that Abraham Lincoln lived.  I think these are valid assumptions to
> make based on what I consider sound testamony.  They are provisional beliefs,
> however.  I can't prove that they're true.  I may someday find out that they
> are false, but as it is these beliefs help explain some things that I
> experience here in Columbus OH and now in 1985 (e.g. Headlines about political
> unrest in a South America and the fact that Blacks are no longer slaves).
> I cannot prove these things in their entirety (based on hard evidence that
> I have).  The same holds true for God's existence....

First, Paul lists a bunch of things that weren't and aren't contradicted.
Historical and geographical revisionism are rare enough that we usually
don't get contrasting subjective accounts.

Then SUDDENLY (_BOOM_) he tries to slip in "god's existence".  This is
another classical fallacy of argument, summarized as "overcoming resistance
to a doubtful proposition by a preliminary statement of a few easily
accepted propositions."  (Pg 175 of How To Think Straight, by Robert Thouless.)

People do have different subjective perceptions of gods.  Hindus are visited
by members of their pantheon, etc.  Jerry Falwell and Ayatollah Khomeni
both "talk to" putatively the same god, and can't agree on anything.

This fallacy, used to slip in "evidence" of god, is another basis of much
of Paul's argument.  Like the following rhetorical questions.

> Again, what constitutes "realistic" evidence?  I simply disagree that there
> is lack of realistic evidence.  You may look at the same evidence and say
> its not realistic.  So what is realistic?  What is real?  

Oooh.  What is real.  That's deep.  Lawdy, look at me shaking.  Here Paul
is threatening that if his "evidence" can't be "real", then neither is
yours, so there, nyah nyah.  Give us a break.  The essence of Rosen's
argument is being able to identify that which is NOT identifiable as
real (such as visions of god) and that which we can agree upon as real
(such as South America.)

More sniping in the next article.
-- 

Mike Huybensz		...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh