Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!bellcore!decvax!genrad!teddy!panda!talcott!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!flink From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) Newsgroups: net.religion Subject: Torek's wager != Pascal's Message-ID: <2376@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Wed, 9-Jan-85 15:56:58 EST Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.2376 Posted: Wed Jan 9 15:56:58 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 12-Jan-85 07:04:16 EST Distribution: net Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 31 From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) > > [me]...If you believe you have free will and you're wrong, it was out of > > your power to be correct anyway so you haven't lost anything. But if > > you're right, you have gained something by exercising your power > > correctly. Therefore, anything that implies lack of free will can be > > dismissed right there. > Essentially, this is a reworking of Pascal's argument for belief > in God. If you believe in Him, and are wrong, you lose nothing, since > there is no Heaven or Hell; if you *disbelieve* and are wrong, however, > you do hard time in the flamey place. No, there's a crucial difference: Pascal's argument doesn't cover all the bases. If there's a Ubizmo that wants the exact opposite of what the Christian G-d is s'posed to want, who will send you to the flamey place for obeying the big 10 -- then making Pascal's wager can cost you big. A priori, Pascal's argument gives one no more reason to believe in one G-d than in its opposite. > Unfortunately, it shares the same flaw as Pascal's reasoning, > namely, that we do not believe or disbelieve in things based on the belief's > utility. I base my beliefs on reason, and believe in them because they > seem correct, not convenient. Kenn Barry Your dichotomy is a false one. You can't divorce practical reason from epistemology (theory of knowledge). Reason dictates believing what one has reasons to believe, and that includes can't-lose propositions like belief in free will. It may be true that you don't or even can't bring your beliefs to follow such reasoning, but that's *your* problem. --Paul V. Torek, [send replies to new address:] ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047