Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: Notesfiles $Revision: 1.6.2.17 $; site uokvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!ihnp4!inuxc!pur-ee!uiucdcs!uokvax!emks From: emks@uokvax.UUCP Newsgroups: net.unix-wizards Subject: Re: background investigations Message-ID: <6200039@uokvax.UUCP> Date: Fri, 11-Jan-85 07:12:00 EST Article-I.D.: uokvax.6200039 Posted: Fri Jan 11 07:12:00 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 14-Jan-85 01:39:31 EST References: <6958@brl-tgr.UUCP> Lines: 30 Nf-ID: #R:brl-tgr:-695800:uokvax:6200039:37777777600:1213 Nf-From: uokvax!emks Jan 11 06:12:00 1985 /***** uokvax:net.unix-wizar / brl-tgr!ARPA / 2:19 pm Jan 5, 1985 */ /* while i'm not keen on the idea of people snooping around, there is an easy solution: hire people who already have clearances and make the government do the work! */ /* ---------- */ Umm, There are a couple of problems with this: a) (Presuming you're hiring someone for a full-time position, since they're most likely the sensitive ones:) Security clearances DO NOT follow you. I mean that once you quit from one sensitive job, no matter whether it's due to "firing," "moving to a better job," or whatever, your security clearance is immediately cancelled, and you're debriefed (talk about the Federal Laws about secrecy that still apply, etc.). Ergo, you're not hiring someone who already has a "clearance"; you're hiring someone who HAD a clearance. b) And that brings up the point that just because someone was cleared once- upon-a-time does NOT mean that he's clearable now. I would say that the more sensitive a position is, the more chance the person might be tempted to accede to subversion--no matter how loyal he might have been (or appear to be). I wish it was easier, but I don't think it will ever be so... kurt