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From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Re : Re: Re: Harold Brown and the arms race
Message-ID: <477@fisher.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 10-Jan-85 12:01:33 EST
Article-I.D.: fisher.477
Posted: Thu Jan 10 12:01:33 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 14-Jan-85 13:31:53 EST
References: <1133@drusd.UUCP> <2082@randvax.UUCP>
Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics
Lines: 55

>Nonsense.  The Russians haven't attacked because it is not in
>their best interest to attack.  Why lose anything if you dont
>have to?  Clearly the Russians have gotten their way with the
>US in the past without firing a shot, but by simply taking advantage
>of various elements in the US which have a sympathetic viewpoint,
>or by negotiating agreements which favor them, or various
>other means.  BUT, if they were pushed against the wall, as in
>Cuba, what they would do is a different story entirely.
>They bgacked down then, whether or not they would back down
>now is not clear at all.
>					Milo

Really, Milo, even the hardest of hard-liners cannot seriously
maintain that the Soviets can reasonably expect to gain "everything".
Eastern Europe will grow more restive so long as a prosperous and free
Western Europe continues to exist.  While the Soviets may expect to
continue to dominate Southeast Asia through their Vietnamese proxies,
it is little compensation for the Chinese rapprochment with the US and
Japan.  Soviet influence in the Middle East is virtually nil, as it
Syria that pulls the strings in the Soviet-Syrian "friendship".  In
Africa, the Soviet advance of the '70s (Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia)
has left the USSR with no advantages to speak of and no prospects.
Even the primarly negative attempts (i.e. intent to damage US
interests rather than to advance Soviet ones) in Latin America remain
unconsolidated and, with even minimal diplomatic acuity by the US,
will follow the course of Soviet gains in southern Africa a decade
ago.  The only tangible geopolitical gain that the Soviets may have
some hope of keeping is Afghanistan, but this is not so great as to
satisfy Soviet leaders with the course of events, nor so cheap as to
make a similar occupation of Iran a plausible prospect.

Don't focus so intently on American setbacks that you forget the
Soviet ones.  In the ebb and flow of global competition, it would be
surprising if BOTH sides did not suffer a major setback (or score a
substantial success) every so often.  We ought not to worry about
temporary gains of little import by the Soviets.  So long as there's
an Egypt for every Iran, to claim the Soviets are "winning" is a gross
overstatement.

Also, do not forget that the Soviet Union is not immune to
factionalism, either, though such internal divisions are naturally far
less apparent.  Just as any decent Soviet negotiator would seek to
exploit differences of opinion in the American political body, an
astute American negotiator would presumably seek to take advantage of
struggles for power within the Kremlin's heirarchy.

Milo, if the Soviets felt they had the capabilities you ascribe to
them and the loss functions you imply for them, missiles would have
been reinstalled in Cuba a week ago last Tuesday.  Surely, even if 
they would prefer not to start a nuclear war, if they considered 
their probable losses acceptable, they would make that clear to the US
now and reap the political profits of successful nuclear blackmail.
If the Soviet advantage is real, they need not use it to enjoy it.

					David Rubin