Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!cbdkc1!desoto!packard!hoxna!houxm!ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes From: carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Libertarianism & freedom Message-ID: <266@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP> Date: Wed, 2-Jan-85 21:36:07 EST Article-I.D.: gargoyle.266 Posted: Wed Jan 2 21:36:07 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 3-Jan-85 04:56:25 EST References: <2148@umcp-cs.UUCP> <> Reply-To: carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) Distribution: net Organization: U. Chicago - Computer Science Lines: 126 Summary: Gary F. York, responding to my comments on the libertarian conception of freedom: > > Libertarians also seem to think that freedom is merely the absence of > > coercion. ... > >Correct! My dictionary thinks so too. > > > .... But it seems to me that freedom must include the means or power > > to effect one's will. ... > >I think the word you are looking for, Richard, unless of course you >INTEND to equivocate, is ability, not freedom. Cliff Matthews also posted an article quoting his dictionary on the definition of freedom. Here we have an interesting sample of the alleged libertarian thought process. Not only do libertarians seem to derive their political theory from dictionaries, they don't seem to read past the first definition given. The Oxford English Dictionary, generally regarded as the most authoritative and complete English dictionary, contains the following definition, among others, of freedom: "The quality of being free from the control of fate or necessity, the power of self-determination attributed to the will." --the sense I was referring to. Here is a quotation from the favorite classical political philosopher of libertarians: "In this then consists Freedom, (viz.) in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose, or will." [Locke, _An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_] Here's another quote from Locke: "How can we think anyone freer than to have the power to do what he will?" (I don't have the source, but it is quoted in Dr. Johnson's dictionary under "Free".) Through centuries of political and moral philosophy from Plato to the present, "the power to do as one wills" has been one of the principal threads running through discussions of the complex notion of freedom. Libertarians, beginners in the study of political philosophy, and anyone who believes that "the absence of coercion" is the only meaning that may legitimately be attached to the term *freedom* (or *liberty*, which I am treating as synonymous), may wish to read the essay "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty (not that I am in complete agreement with Berlin). Berlin brilliantly delineates the concepts of "negative" and "positive" liberty and traces their history in political thought. It is the positive sense that I am bringing into the discussion and that is either ignored or dismissed by libertarian thought. All right--let's not argue about definitions. Since the terms "freedom" and "liberty" seem to be generating more heat than light, I will replace them with less ambiguous phrases. Thus when Bob Stewart writes, "The objective of libertarians is not to minimize government, but to maximize liberty," I will rephrase that to read, "The objective of libertarians is to minimize coercion, not government"--a statement I believe we can all agree with (as a statement about libertarian belief). Now I claim that it is obvious even to children that a poor man has less power to do as he wills, is more dependent on circumstances and external forces, has less freedom (excuse me) from the control of necessity, has less ability to realize goals of his own, is more dependent and has less individual autonomy, than a rich man. The reason is simple: the possession of goods and money expands one's power and one's range of choice. Why do you suppose it is, libertarians, that people DESIRE more goods and money than they already have? Isn't one of the chief reasons to expand their power of self-determination and range of choice? A trivial example: If I owned a car I could do many things more easily than I now can and many things that I cannot now do at all. For another example, if I possessed assets worth $10 million, my power to do as I wish and my range of choice would be expanded enormously. I could tell my boss to take this job and shove it, if I wished, and live off the income from my wealth. I could take long vacations, buy houses, or write books in support of libertarianism (as a wealthy man, I would be inclined to). My actual situation, however, practically forces me to keep working at my job, since I would quickly run into serious difficulties if I quit. How does my inability to leave my job differ in its effect from the Soviet citizen's inability to emigrate? The result in either case is the same: being confined in a relatively unpleasant situation. To return to Gary York's comments: >You may not achieve your own "freedom to" at the expense of another's >"freedom from". Why not? You are making an assertion, not an argument. >I can conceive of innumerable things worth doing which do not at all involve >coercing others. Can't you? Yes, and I can conceive of some worthwhile things that do involve coercion, such as the redistribution of wealth, if it increased the aggregate of individual autonomy, power, and happiness. As A. C. Pigou, the founder of welfare economics, wrote in _The Economics of Welfare_: "It is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfactions." Cliff Matthews had another comment on my discussion of freedom: > Rather than assuming I know what you mean by "true freedom implies > knowledge," I will let you explain it to me and the net. I have no need to explain this to libertarians, who make this assumption when they argue that a government may legitimately prevent fraud in the marketplace. Fraud means disinformation; a person who has been defrauded is one whose freedom has been abridged precisely because he was deprived of knowledge of the true state of affairs when he made the transaction. Or do libertarians have some other reason to oppose fraud? In any case, libertarians do not extend this principle beyond the marketplace. I am not the first person to claim that knowledge is power; I wish to extend power by extending knowledge. Back to Gary: >Libertarians, as libertarians, want this and only this: > A world where there is broad agreement that the only proper use > of force is in responding to those who initiate its use. Again, why should we agree that that is the only proper use of force? I think Robin Hood had an excellent idea about the use of force, contrary to the sheriff of Nottingham. Libertarians keep repeating that the best society is one in which coercion is minimized, and we keep asking them why without getting a response. Why is a libertarian society better than one in which the power of self-determination, individual autonomy, and freedom from control by external forces (fate, necessity) is maximized? Convince me--I'm listening. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes