Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!david From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Re : Re: Re: Harold Brown and the arms race Message-ID: <477@fisher.UUCP> Date: Thu, 10-Jan-85 12:01:33 EST Article-I.D.: fisher.477 Posted: Thu Jan 10 12:01:33 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 14-Jan-85 13:31:53 EST References: <1133@drusd.UUCP> <2082@randvax.UUCP> Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics Lines: 55 >Nonsense. The Russians haven't attacked because it is not in >their best interest to attack. Why lose anything if you dont >have to? Clearly the Russians have gotten their way with the >US in the past without firing a shot, but by simply taking advantage >of various elements in the US which have a sympathetic viewpoint, >or by negotiating agreements which favor them, or various >other means. BUT, if they were pushed against the wall, as in >Cuba, what they would do is a different story entirely. >They bgacked down then, whether or not they would back down >now is not clear at all. > Milo Really, Milo, even the hardest of hard-liners cannot seriously maintain that the Soviets can reasonably expect to gain "everything". Eastern Europe will grow more restive so long as a prosperous and free Western Europe continues to exist. While the Soviets may expect to continue to dominate Southeast Asia through their Vietnamese proxies, it is little compensation for the Chinese rapprochment with the US and Japan. Soviet influence in the Middle East is virtually nil, as it Syria that pulls the strings in the Soviet-Syrian "friendship". In Africa, the Soviet advance of the '70s (Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia) has left the USSR with no advantages to speak of and no prospects. Even the primarly negative attempts (i.e. intent to damage US interests rather than to advance Soviet ones) in Latin America remain unconsolidated and, with even minimal diplomatic acuity by the US, will follow the course of Soviet gains in southern Africa a decade ago. The only tangible geopolitical gain that the Soviets may have some hope of keeping is Afghanistan, but this is not so great as to satisfy Soviet leaders with the course of events, nor so cheap as to make a similar occupation of Iran a plausible prospect. Don't focus so intently on American setbacks that you forget the Soviet ones. In the ebb and flow of global competition, it would be surprising if BOTH sides did not suffer a major setback (or score a substantial success) every so often. We ought not to worry about temporary gains of little import by the Soviets. So long as there's an Egypt for every Iran, to claim the Soviets are "winning" is a gross overstatement. Also, do not forget that the Soviet Union is not immune to factionalism, either, though such internal divisions are naturally far less apparent. Just as any decent Soviet negotiator would seek to exploit differences of opinion in the American political body, an astute American negotiator would presumably seek to take advantage of struggles for power within the Kremlin's heirarchy. Milo, if the Soviets felt they had the capabilities you ascribe to them and the loss functions you imply for them, missiles would have been reinstalled in Cuba a week ago last Tuesday. Surely, even if they would prefer not to start a nuclear war, if they considered their probable losses acceptable, they would make that clear to the US now and reap the political profits of successful nuclear blackmail. If the Soviet advantage is real, they need not use it to enjoy it. David Rubin