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From: carnes@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP (Richard Carnes)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Libertarianism & freedom
Message-ID: <266@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 2-Jan-85 21:36:07 EST
Article-I.D.: gargoyle.266
Posted: Wed Jan  2 21:36:07 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 3-Jan-85 04:56:25 EST
References: <2148@umcp-cs.UUCP> <>
Reply-To: carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes)
Distribution: net
Organization: U. Chicago - Computer Science
Lines: 126
Summary: 

Gary F. York, responding to my comments on the libertarian conception of
freedom:
> > Libertarians also seem to think that freedom is merely the absence of
> > coercion. ...
>
>Correct!  My dictionary thinks so too.
>
> > ....  But it seems to me that freedom must include the means or power
> > to effect one's will. ...
>
>I think the word you are looking for, Richard, unless of course you 
>INTEND to equivocate, is ability, not freedom.

Cliff Matthews also posted an article quoting his dictionary on the
definition of freedom.  Here we have an interesting sample of the alleged
libertarian thought process.  Not only do libertarians seem to derive their
political theory from dictionaries, they don't seem to read past the first
definition given.  The Oxford English Dictionary, generally regarded as the
most authoritative and complete English dictionary, contains the following
definition, among others, of freedom:  

	"The quality of being free from the control of fate or necessity,
	the power of self-determination attributed to the will."

--the sense I was referring to.  Here is a quotation from the favorite
classical political philosopher of libertarians:

	"In this then consists Freedom, (viz.) in our being able to act,
	or not to act, according as we shall choose, or will."  [Locke,
	_An Essay Concerning Human Understanding_]

Here's another quote from Locke:  "How can we think anyone freer than to
have the power to do what he will?"  (I don't have the source, but it is
quoted in Dr. Johnson's dictionary under "Free".)  

Through centuries of political and moral philosophy from Plato to the
present, "the power to do as one wills" has been one of the principal
threads running through discussions of the complex notion of freedom.
Libertarians, beginners in the study of political philosophy, and anyone who
believes that "the absence of coercion" is the only meaning that may
legitimately be attached to the term *freedom* (or *liberty*, which I am
treating as synonymous), may wish to read the essay "Two Concepts of
Liberty" in Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays on Liberty (not that I am in
complete agreement with Berlin).  Berlin brilliantly delineates the concepts
of "negative" and "positive" liberty and traces their history in political
thought.  It is the positive sense that I am bringing into the discussion
and that is either ignored or dismissed by libertarian thought.

All right--let's not argue about definitions.  Since the terms "freedom" and
"liberty" seem to be generating more heat than light, I will replace them
with less ambiguous phrases.  Thus when Bob Stewart writes, "The objective
of libertarians is not to minimize government, but to maximize liberty," I
will rephrase that to read, "The objective of libertarians is to minimize
coercion, not government"--a statement I believe we can all agree with (as a
statement about libertarian belief).  

Now I claim that it is obvious even to children that a poor man has less
power to do as he wills, is more dependent on circumstances and external
forces, has less freedom (excuse me) from the control of necessity, has less
ability to realize goals of his own, is more dependent and has less
individual autonomy, than a rich man.  The reason is simple:  the possession
of goods and money expands one's power and one's range of choice.  Why do
you suppose it is, libertarians, that people DESIRE more goods and money
than they already have?  Isn't one of the chief reasons to expand their
power of self-determination and range of choice?  A trivial example:  If I
owned a car I could do many things more easily than I now can and many
things that I cannot now do at all.

For another example, if I possessed assets worth $10 million, my power to do
as I wish and my range of choice would be expanded enormously.  I could tell
my boss to take this job and shove it, if I wished, and live off the income
from my wealth.  I could take long vacations, buy houses, or write books in
support of libertarianism (as a wealthy man, I would be inclined to).  My
actual situation, however, practically forces me to keep working at my job,
since I would quickly run into serious difficulties if I quit.  How does my
inability to leave my job differ in its effect from the Soviet citizen's
inability to emigrate?  The result in either case is the same:  being
confined in a relatively unpleasant situation.  

To return to Gary York's comments:
>You may not achieve your own "freedom to" at the expense of another's 
>"freedom from". 

Why not?  You are making an assertion, not an argument.  

>I can conceive of innumerable things worth doing which do not at all involve
>coercing others.  Can't you?

Yes, and I can conceive of some worthwhile things that do involve coercion,
such as the redistribution of wealth, if it increased the aggregate of
individual autonomy, power, and happiness.  As A. C. Pigou, the founder of
welfare economics, wrote in _The Economics of Welfare_:

	"It is evident that any transference of income from a relatively
	rich man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it
	enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less 
	intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfactions."

Cliff Matthews had another comment on my discussion of freedom:
> Rather than assuming I know what you mean by "true freedom implies
> knowledge," I will let you explain it to me and the net.

I have no need to explain this to libertarians, who make this assumption
when they argue that a government may legitimately prevent fraud in the
marketplace.  Fraud means disinformation; a person who has been defrauded is
one whose freedom has been abridged precisely because he was deprived of
knowledge of the true state of affairs when he made the transaction.  Or do
libertarians have some other reason to oppose fraud?  In any case,
libertarians do not extend this principle beyond the marketplace.  I am not
the first person to claim that knowledge is power; I wish to extend power by
extending knowledge.  

Back to Gary:
>Libertarians, as libertarians, want this and only this:
>	A world where there is broad agreement that the only proper use
>	of force is in responding to those who initiate its use.

Again, why should we agree that that is the only proper use of force?  I
think Robin Hood had an excellent idea about the use of force, contrary to
the sheriff of Nottingham.  Libertarians keep repeating that the best
society is one in which coercion is minimized, and we keep asking them why
without getting a response.  Why is a libertarian society better than one in
which the power of self-determination, individual autonomy, and freedom from
control by external forces (fate, necessity) is maximized?  Convince me--I'm
listening.  

Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes