Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!godot!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!flink From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: harming, refusing-aid: no diff Message-ID: <2156@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Sat, 29-Dec-84 05:53:52 EST Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.2156 Posted: Sat Dec 29 05:53:52 1984 Date-Received: Sun, 30-Dec-84 00:15:19 EST Distribution: na Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 43 From: saquigley@watmath.UUCP (Sophie Quigley) > Ah! here we come to the crux of it!! WHY is someone's right to live greater > than someone's right to control their own body? I for one disagree... > If I was to be a judge in a court case involving one person who needs > a part of another person's body (maybe a patch of skin for grafts or > a kidney, you name it) and the second person refusing to provide that > part of their body, I would rule in favour of the person refusing to > provide the part, even though I would know very well that this would > mean the death of the first person. From: "Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs" Ken Montgomery > Oppression is wrong. Refusing aid is not. The humanity of the > fetus is irrelevant to this distinction. As is the distinction itself -- irrelevant. Interesting court case. Suppose we construct a slightly different case. A mad scientist is about to take out one of my kidneys against my will, and you are the only one who can stop him; but if you stop him, he will kill you (somehow -- use your imagination). But for whatever reason, you decide you don't want to even though it would mean my loss of control over what happens to my own body. Here we have a situation where my right to control over my own body directly depends on your giving up your life. I'll bet that Quigley and others who agree with her will say that her right to life should prevail in this case. But how can anyone justify giving different answers in these two cases? It would seem to be inconsistent. It should not matter what the status quo is or who needs to act (vs. being inactive) to save the other. But I submit that that is the only difference that motivates anyone to judge the cases differently. Also, Quigley's case was suggested as an analogy to abortion. But I suggest another analogy to abortion. You and I are siamese twins. If we are separated I will die but you won't (let's say I depend more on certain shared blood channels). You claim that you have a right to control over your own body that includes the right to separate. Now, which is the better analogy? On my opponents' views, I suspect, it makes a big difference which analogy is closer; for they would judge that you do not have the right to separate. --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul Torek, umcp-cs!flink (until 1/11, then back to: wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 )