Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!godot!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!flink From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul Torek) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: imposing morality revisited Message-ID: <2157@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Sat, 29-Dec-84 07:07:27 EST Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.2157 Posted: Sat Dec 29 07:07:27 1984 Date-Received: Sun, 30-Dec-84 00:15:34 EST Distribution: na Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 97 From: kin@laidbak.UUCP (Kin Wong) > >Then you have already conceded one of my main points, namely that > >"imposing morality" isn't always wrong! Granted? ... > Well, neither is imposing morality always right! therefore, opposing > imposition of morals isnt always wrong! OK, fine, I agree. > >Try 3) I am using the word "moral" (as opposed to NONmoral, not as in the > >opposite of IMmoral) to mean "having to do with people's beliefs about > >right and wrong, esp. w.r.t. beliefs about proper treatment of others". > >Got it? See the (huge) difference? [I guess he does -- he didn't disagree!] > >The primary motivation is self interest, BUT crucial to support for > >such laws is people's (at least implicit) belief that the laws do not > >wrongfully interfere with free speech, etc. You are probably aware > >of the current controversy over Reagan's secrecy rules for scientific > >exchanges of info. Do you deny that the controversy involves moral > >beliefs? No? Q.E.D.! [substituting in his apple-and-peach analogy, I get: [he has an interest in national security but also in free speech, [so he favors a law that balances both. Now, he argues that I [could maybe say that he took only SOME measures to promote [national security (as opposed to going all-out), but surely [I can't say that he promoted national security because he [likes free speech! Well... I never argued that you promote your interest in nat'l security *because* you have the moral belief that this doesn't interfere too greatly with free speech. The point is this: you have a moral belief (even if this is just the belief that doing so-and-so is NOT wrong -- that's a moral belief too) which, if you had the opposite view, would make the difference in your support for the law. Do you see what I'm getting at? Now, if you impose a secrecy law on scientists in order to promote national security, you are imposing morality. The scientists may believe that this is a wrongful interference with their free speech (some of them at least, otherwise you wouldn't have to make the law). You are imposing on them your moral belief that it is not wrongful restriction on speech. > Now you can group all of these (and presumably other, which I have > not thought of for the moment) considerations and call them morals if > you like, but it is these considerations that GIVE RISE to what you > would call "morals", not the other way round. Thus, self-interest may give > rise to "morals", not "morals" that give rise to self-interest ... I agree, individuals' benefits and harms give rise to moral considerations. > From your replies to Brian Peterson, I'd gather that you think > that a fetus/embryo should be considered as a "person", i.e. the rights > of the ordinary person should be granted to the fetus/embryo. No. Not the full rights of the ordinary adult. But not no rights either. Like the label says, a third side. But let me applaud something you just wrote -- your rephrasing of "considered as a person" to "granted the rights of the ordinary person". I'm glad you put it that way; I think that much wasted mental energy is spent on questions that just postpone or worse, obscure the issue of how it should be treated. Arguments about "human life" or "personhood" usually just beg questions, because the terms are used equivocally. But I digress. > However, if this is the case, abortion ...[should be considered] > murder. Now except for one or two raving lunatics, hardly anyone > would consider prosecuting the person(s) involved for murder, why? Well, I've already deflected the question but I can answer it anyway. Because people feel (rightly) that the motives of the lawbreaker, what kind of person they are, should make a huge difference in how they are treated. Now obviously (except maybe in an *extremely* few cases) the woman does not believe that she is unjustly killing a (moral equivalent of a) human being. Therefore, her action does not indicate that she is cold-blooded or dangerous or (etc.), in contrast to most [other?] people who unjustly take human life. SO: different punishment. Any questions? Weren't ready for such a good answer, were you? > The "can be adopted" argument can hardly be reasons against abortion, > .... Now, as one way to provide such a guarantee, I suggest that > names of all anti-abortionists be registered, so that whenever an unwanted > child is born, the child be taken care of by a randomly chosen person from > the anti-abortion list. > ihnp4!iwlc8!klw Well, sounds like a fair solution to me (providing you allow them to *try* to get the kid adopted if they wanted). Oh, and: I think the "can be adopted" is offered not as a reason against abortion but as a defensive argument (as a rebuttal to a reason *for* allowing abortion). And of course a lot depends on the care the state is willing to give to unadoptables, and who supports such state programs (I guess). --The undefeated iconoclast, until 1/11/85: umcp-cs!flink then back to: ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047