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From: renner@uiucdcs.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: The real issue about nuclear weapons
Message-ID: <29200167@uiucdcs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 29-Nov-84 20:45:00 EST
Article-I.D.: uiucdcs.29200167
Posted: Thu Nov 29 20:45:00 1984
Date-Received: Sat, 1-Dec-84 05:51:55 EST
References: <29200165@uiucdcs.UUCP>
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Nf-ID: #R:uiucdcs:29200165:uiucdcs:29200167:000:1986
Nf-From: uiucdcs!renner    Nov 29 19:45:00 1984

>  Do you have some better answer to preventing nuclear war than stopping
>  the arms race? 		-- Tim Sevener (orb@whuxl)

I believe that to prevent nuclear war we must guard against two things:
    	
    1.  Deliberate first strike by the Soviet Union.
    2.  Accidental war started by either side.

Taken together, these mean that the United States must:

    1.  Maintain a credible second-strike capability.  The Soviet Union
	must be certain that their attack will result in their destruction.

    2.  Avoid constructing a first-strike capability.  The Soviet Union
	must also have a second-strike capability; deterrance must work 
	both ways.

My objection to the bilateral, verifiable nuclear freeze is that it is
inferior to the "build-down" proposition.  In order to maintain a
second-strike capability in the face of changing non-nuclear
technology, the US may need to build different weapons.  If the weapons
built are second-strike only, and the weapons removed have first-strike
uses, then the risk of nuclear war is reduced in a fashion impossible
under a freeze.  Indeed, a freeze agreement might *increase* the risk of
war by prohibiting a switch to less-dangerous weapons.

(An example:  our second-strike capability relies heavily on the presumed
invulnerability of the submarine fleet.  SSBNs are "invulnerable" only
because the enemy cannot find them at sea.  But this may not last; a
technique called "synthetic aperture radar" can locate objects at
considerable depths.  We may need to switch from a few large Trident-class
SSBNs to a larger number of smaller, "stealth" submarines.  "Build-down"
would permit this; a freeze would not.)

Now it's up to the freeze proponents.  You need to show why a nuclear
freeze would be better at preventing nuclear war than the "build-down"
approach.  I wish you luck; I believe you will find that *demonstrating*
the advantages of a freeze is more difficult than *assuming* them.

Scott Renner
{pur-ee,ihnp4}!uiucdcs!renner