Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site druri.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!drutx!druri!dht From: dht@druri.UUCP (Davis Tucker) Newsgroups: net.flame Subject: Re: Doublespeak & Peace (Von Clauswitz) Message-ID: <1018@druri.UUCP> Date: Wed, 5-Dec-84 17:31:33 EST Article-I.D.: druri.1018 Posted: Wed Dec 5 17:31:33 1984 Date-Received: Thu, 6-Dec-84 06:49:26 EST Organization: AT&T Information Systems Laboratories, Denver Lines: 68 One thing you have to remember about the Baron - he was and still is the foremost military genius of modern warfare. Bar none (you might make an exception for Rommel or Guderian, but they were primarily tactical geniuses, not strategic ones). Che Guevara didn't fight "modern wars", and he certainly didn't understand what he was doing and why to the extent that Von Clauswitz did. Among his many important points in his books, I think the paramount one is that a *war*, not just a battle, has to have clearly defined objectives or it will eventually fail, and *once those objectives are reached*, the war must cease. He was also a firm beleiver in limited warfare, and the need for popular support, at a time when Europe was still in the Dark Ages, militarily speaking. The best example of his thinking put into practice was the Franco-Prussian war. Alsace and Lorraine were held, Paris was threatened, certain concessions were gained after the French surrendered, and the German forces withdrew to their stated objectives' boundary. It all occurred in a manner of weeks, even days, and with very minimal loss of life on both sides. If there can be such a thing, it was a "perfect war", or as close as one can get in the modern era. The Japanese used much the same tactics against the Tsar during the Russo-Japanese war, borrowing heavily from Von Clauswitz's example. It's been pretty much an open secret how much Von Clauswitz has pervaded the post-Vietnam U.S. officer corps. "On War" has become the Bible of the Army War College, and the other armed forces take it just as seriously. When the Marine commanders were trying to get their forces out of Beirut prior to the bombing, they were using language straight out of Von Clauswitz to try and make the President see reason. And they were backed up to the hilt by the Chiefs Of Staff. In any discussion about military intervention in Central America, you will note that every representative of thhe military has stressed that they will refuse to fight a war without stated objectives and popular support. It seems highly unlikely that we will get involved in another Vietnam, although strangely enough, if we do, it will not be the fault of the military hierarchy. We have seen a radical shift in the relation of our military to our government - much more vocal, much less willing to fall in step and spout the party line. I think the biggest thing we have to fear is our politicians getting us into a war, not our generals. And Von Clauswitz is to thank (or blame) for this. The Germany of Von Clauswitz's time was unformed, insecure, consisting of a myriad of little entities. Of course he would see peace as "that period of hostility between wars"; he had no other way of looking at it, besides the fact that he was probably right. Much of "On War" is about peace - the importance of maintaining it, what extreme circumstances are required to break it, and what actions should be taken to restore it. Von Clauswitz was a pragmatist; war was and is a fact of national life, and since it is going to happen, whether we like it or not, we must try to make it as short and painless as possible while still achieving certain goals, such as border integrity. I think his definition of peace is closer to the truth than anyone else's I have ever heard - if there's a better one, let me know. Davis Tucker AT&T Information Systems Denver, CO