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From: dht@druri.UUCP (Davis Tucker)
Newsgroups: net.flame
Subject: Re: Doublespeak & Peace (Von Clauswitz)
Message-ID: <1018@druri.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 5-Dec-84 17:31:33 EST
Article-I.D.: druri.1018
Posted: Wed Dec  5 17:31:33 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 6-Dec-84 06:49:26 EST
Organization: AT&T Information Systems Laboratories, Denver
Lines: 68


One thing you have to remember about the Baron - he was and still is
the foremost military genius of modern warfare. Bar none (you might
make an exception for Rommel or Guderian, but they were primarily tactical
geniuses, not strategic ones). Che Guevara didn't fight "modern wars",
and he certainly didn't understand what he was doing and why to the
extent that Von Clauswitz did.

Among his many important points in his books, I think the paramount
one is that a *war*, not just a battle, has to have clearly defined
objectives or it will eventually fail, and *once those objectives
are reached*, the war must cease. He was also a firm beleiver in
limited warfare, and the need for popular support, at a time when
Europe was still in the Dark Ages, militarily speaking. The best
example of his thinking put into practice was the Franco-Prussian
war. Alsace and Lorraine were held, Paris was threatened, certain
concessions were gained after the French surrendered, and the 
German forces withdrew to their stated objectives' boundary. It all
occurred in a manner of weeks, even days, and with very minimal
loss of life on both sides. If there can be such a thing,
it was a "perfect war", or as close as one can get in the modern
era. The Japanese used much the same tactics against the Tsar
during the Russo-Japanese war, borrowing heavily from Von 
Clauswitz's example.

It's been pretty much an open secret how much Von Clauswitz has
pervaded the post-Vietnam U.S. officer corps. "On War" has become
the Bible of the Army War College, and the other armed forces
take it just as seriously. When the Marine commanders were trying
to get their forces out of Beirut prior to the bombing, they were
using language straight out of Von Clauswitz to try and make
the President see reason. And they were backed up to the hilt
by the Chiefs Of Staff. In any discussion about military intervention
in Central America, you will note that every representative of
thhe military has stressed that they will refuse to fight a war
without stated objectives and popular support. It seems highly
unlikely that we will get involved in another Vietnam, although
strangely enough, if we do, it will not be the fault of the
military hierarchy. We have seen a radical shift in the relation
of our military to our government - much more vocal, much less
willing to fall in step and spout the party line. I think the
biggest thing we have to fear is our politicians getting us
into a war, not our generals. And Von Clauswitz is to thank
(or blame) for this. 

The Germany of Von Clauswitz's time was unformed, insecure,
consisting of a myriad of little entities. Of course he would 
see peace as "that period of hostility between wars"; he had
no other way of looking at it, besides the fact that he was
probably right. Much of "On War" is about peace - the importance
of maintaining it, what extreme circumstances are required to
break it, and what actions should be taken to restore it.
Von Clauswitz was a pragmatist; war was and is a fact of national life,
and since it is going to happen, whether we like it or not,
we must try to make it as short and painless as possible
while still achieving certain goals, such as border integrity.
I think his definition of peace is closer to the truth than
anyone else's I have ever heard - if there's a better one,
let me know.

Davis Tucker
AT&T Information Systems
Denver, CO