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From: esk@wucs.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: evaluating hypotheses, etc.
Message-ID: <541@wucs.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 8-Dec-84 12:24:45 EST
Article-I.D.: wucs.541
Posted: Sat Dec  8 12:24:45 1984
Date-Received: Sun, 9-Dec-84 05:37:55 EST
Distribution: net
Organization: Washington U. in St. Louis, CS Dept.
Lines: 81

[]
From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
> The problem I see with trying to extrapolate from current experience 
> is that we have an explanation which says "This event represents 
> interference with natural law, AND all other reports of such events are 
> false", 

Well, I see lots of explanations that say that about their favorite 
event.  In the absence of differences in evidence (eyewitness testimony
etc.), it would seem rational to accord them all equal probability.  If
there are N such claims, all inconsistent, this sets an upper limit on
the probability of any one of them at 1/N.

> ... I will deny that you can decide this claim scientifically;...

I'm not convinced.  Can't we evaluate the evidence (eyewitness 
testimony, etc.) scientifically, and then, accounting for any 
differences in it, apply the probabilistic reasoning above?

> I don't agree.  What do scientists do now when faced with a datum 
> which cannot be reproduced?  They do not bring up a new theory (unless 
> the evidence is really tremendously strong); they throw out the datum...

So, the evidence has to be tremendously strong -- I'm not sure I see
what's wrong with that.

> To [demonstrate that there are interruptions in nature's conformity
> to natural law] would require that the interruptions did themselves
> have a pattern, and thus would evidence not for interrruptions,
> but for a higher order law of nature. 

But why do you insist on non-patternedness?  Must there be no method
to divine madness?  You know, I think the "assumption of the 
uniformity of nature" is a direct consequence of (philosophical)
realism; to wit, if things have real properties, those properties
would seem to determine what events can follow what.  If something
is real in this sense, it seems to me it would possible to predict
its activity if we knew its properties.  Now, if this applied to
your God, He wouldn't fit your definition of the supernatural, but
-- so what?

From: kjm@ut-ngp.UUCP (Ken Montgomery)"Shredder-of-hapless-smurfs"
> Postulating a new particle requires that we assume that we were
> previously ignorant of it....  Postulating a temporary violation
> of the natural order, however, requires that we assume that the
> natural order even *can* be violated.  If the natural order can be
> violated, then we can't know that it isn't just a fluke that reality
> happens to appear to follow certain rules right now.

Unless the natural order is only rarely violated, as Wingate suggests.
If that were the case I don't think your arguments would apply.
Anyway, I seem to have found the difference in the two postulates
according to Wingate's definition of the supernatural (see above).

> BTW, if rationality is invalid, what do you propose that we should
> use instead?

> Anyway, the complaint about "proliferation of hypotheses" is bogus;
> to propose that the natural order can be violated is to propose a
> hypothesis.

> If we set our standards of evidence too low, we may believe 
> anything, thus crippling our ability to understand the world.

I've quoted these three comments together because they all deserve
the same answer:  just whom do you think you are arguing against?
It's not me.  The first item quoted is totally off the wall.  As
to the second, my point was to suggest by comparison that saying
that the natural order has been violated is just as dangerous as
hypothesizing a new force, if either is done too freely.  As to the
third, my remark about setting standards too high should not be 
taken out of the context of my analysis of weighing the possible 
damages of alternative explanations.  Obviously if (as Wingate
apparently admits) the evidence for an unusual event is not great, 
the balance favors not hypothesizing a new force (let alone a 
suspension of natural law) to explain it.

			--Paul V. Torek, unshredded hapful human
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