Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site lasspvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!cbdkc1!desoto!packard!hoxna!houxm!vax135!cornell!lasspvax!kevin From: kevin@lasspvax.UUCP (Kevin Saunders) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Wisdom of European Heads of State Message-ID: <134@lasspvax.UUCP> Date: Thu, 29-Nov-84 12:02:09 EST Article-I.D.: lasspvax.134 Posted: Thu Nov 29 12:02:09 1984 Date-Received: Sat, 1-Dec-84 19:59:31 EST References: <6166@mcvax.UUCP> <3171@ucbvax.ARPA> <47@uwvax.UUCP> <106@talcott.UUCP> <679@erix.UUCP> <2797@ucbcad.UUCP> <358@whuxl.UUCP> <> Reply-To: kevin@lasspvax.UUCP (Kevin Saunders) Organization: Theory Center (Cornell University) Lines: 22 Summary: In article <> alan@sdcrdcf.UUCP (Alan Algustyniak) writes: >WWII started because the leaders of the past did *not* have the wisdom >to keep their country prepared to defend itself, both in terms of >modern and plentiful weaponry, and in terms of morale. The type of I guess you never heard of the Maginot Line (which was the 1930's equivalent of the Strategic Defense Initiative in both scale and military usefulness) and are unaware that a massive world-wide arms buildup preceded WWII, starting around 1937. The problem was not a lack of money, but the fact that military and political leaders prepared for the last war. Alistair Horne's _1940: The Battle of France_ (? this title is not guaranteed correct) has offers some interesting insights into this period, including the possibility that French conservatives were more worried about the Popular Front than the Germans. Their post-1940 political behavior seems to bear this notion out. The Best Defense is a Strong Offense, sadly enough, Kevin Eric Saunders kevin.lasspvax@cornell.arpa