Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: Notesfiles $Revision: 1.6.2.17 $; site uiucdcs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!inuxc!pur-ee!uiucdcs!renner From: renner@uiucdcs.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: The real issue about nuclear weapons Message-ID: <29200167@uiucdcs.UUCP> Date: Thu, 29-Nov-84 20:45:00 EST Article-I.D.: uiucdcs.29200167 Posted: Thu Nov 29 20:45:00 1984 Date-Received: Sat, 1-Dec-84 05:51:55 EST References: <29200165@uiucdcs.UUCP> Lines: 42 Nf-ID: #R:uiucdcs:29200165:uiucdcs:29200167:000:1986 Nf-From: uiucdcs!renner Nov 29 19:45:00 1984 > Do you have some better answer to preventing nuclear war than stopping > the arms race? -- Tim Sevener (orb@whuxl) I believe that to prevent nuclear war we must guard against two things: 1. Deliberate first strike by the Soviet Union. 2. Accidental war started by either side. Taken together, these mean that the United States must: 1. Maintain a credible second-strike capability. The Soviet Union must be certain that their attack will result in their destruction. 2. Avoid constructing a first-strike capability. The Soviet Union must also have a second-strike capability; deterrance must work both ways. My objection to the bilateral, verifiable nuclear freeze is that it is inferior to the "build-down" proposition. In order to maintain a second-strike capability in the face of changing non-nuclear technology, the US may need to build different weapons. If the weapons built are second-strike only, and the weapons removed have first-strike uses, then the risk of nuclear war is reduced in a fashion impossible under a freeze. Indeed, a freeze agreement might *increase* the risk of war by prohibiting a switch to less-dangerous weapons. (An example: our second-strike capability relies heavily on the presumed invulnerability of the submarine fleet. SSBNs are "invulnerable" only because the enemy cannot find them at sea. But this may not last; a technique called "synthetic aperture radar" can locate objects at considerable depths. We may need to switch from a few large Trident-class SSBNs to a larger number of smaller, "stealth" submarines. "Build-down" would permit this; a freeze would not.) Now it's up to the freeze proponents. You need to show why a nuclear freeze would be better at preventing nuclear war than the "build-down" approach. I wish you luck; I believe you will find that *demonstrating* the advantages of a freeze is more difficult than *assuming* them. Scott Renner {pur-ee,ihnp4}!uiucdcs!renner