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From: jim@ism780b.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: Omniscience and Freedom - (nf)
Message-ID: <55@ism780b.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 10-Oct-84 00:27:53 EDT
Article-I.D.: ism780b.55
Posted: Wed Oct 10 00:27:53 1984
Date-Received: Fri, 12-Oct-84 03:47:57 EDT
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#R:hou2a:-42300:ism780b:27500046:000:1039
ism780b!jim    Oct  8 15:25:00 1984

>... let's focus on "already knowing what you're going to do."  Does
>such knowledge rule out freedom?  Not at all.  If you know that you
>are going to do such-and-such at time t, and you rationally judge that
>that's the best thing to do, and you act on this judgement at t, then
>your doing such-and-such is free... 
>"[D]eterminism" and "predestination" [are both] compatible with freedom.
>                               --Paul Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047

Come on, Paul.  What if you rationally judge that it is *not* the best
thing to do.  But if you *know* that you will do it anyway (in the sense
that you think you will and you are in fact correct) then in what possible
way are you free not to do it?
Free will is a reflection of lack of certainty.  Any reasonable formal
definition would necessarily involve that notion.  I agree that
determinism and predestination are compatible with freedom, but only to
the degree that you do not have access to their implications (which makes
us pretty free).

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)