Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site uwai.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!uwvax!uwai!tom From: tom@uwai.UUCP Newsgroups: net.unix-wizards Subject: Re: hazards of linking directories Message-ID: <141@uwai.UUCP> Date: Thu, 11-Oct-84 11:27:20 EDT Article-I.D.: uwai.141 Posted: Thu Oct 11 11:27:20 1984 Date-Received: Fri, 12-Oct-84 06:04:19 EDT References: <466@wdl1.UUCP> Organization: U of Wisconsin CS Dept Lines: 22 > This is a strong argument against running utilities such as the > line printer spooler as ``setuid to root''. Such programs should > open the file of interest while running as the requestor and then > exec a second program which is set-uid to a service user id which owns > the spooling directory, after which a copy can be performed. This > is a little more complex but much safer. Why the added work of an extra exec? Just make sure that the real uid (not the effective one) can access the file. Also: please make sure the subject line has *some* bearing on the content. I don't see what setuid programs have to do with the hazards of linking directories. tom -- Tom Christiansen University of Wisconsin Computer Science Systems Lab ...!{allegra,heurikon,ihnp4,seismo,uwm-evax}!uwvax!tom tom@wisc-crys.arpa