Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site brl-tgr.ARPA Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxj!houxm!vax135!cornell!uw-beaver!tektronix!hplabs!hao!seismo!brl-tgr!gwyn From: gwyn@brl-tgr.ARPA (Doug Gwyn) Newsgroups: net.crypt Subject: Re: DES not available outside US? Message-ID: <4788@brl-tgr.ARPA> Date: Fri, 21-Sep-84 12:37:43 EDT Article-I.D.: brl-tgr.4788 Posted: Fri Sep 21 12:37:43 1984 Date-Received: Wed, 26-Sep-84 04:11:22 EDT References: <21bdf834.1de6@apollo.uucp>, <999@ulysses.UUCP> Organization: Ballistics Research Lab Lines: 10 I think the foofaraw over exporting DES software/hardware is due primarily to bureaucratic rule enforcement, rather than realistic evaluation of the risk of this one PARTICULAR encryption scheme. If NSA can't crack a long stream of DES-encrypted text, then they are not as good as they used to be. Doubling the key size should make the length of text required go up by a factor of something like 4 to 8, which does not help much. The nonsense about arrays of thousands of DES chips is absurd; one should use cleverness in preference to brute force.