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From: esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Torek on Skinner (determinism & free will)
Message-ID: <397@wucs.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 5-Oct-84 02:12:19 EDT
Article-I.D.: wucs.397
Posted: Fri Oct  5 02:12:19 1984
Date-Received: Sat, 6-Oct-84 04:36:41 EDT
Distribution: net
Organization: Washington U. in St. Louis, CS Dept.
Lines: 102

From: rlr@pyuxn.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
> [Some] have proposed the notion that the "mind" is not a physical 
> or extraphysical entity, but is analogous to a program (software)
> running on the hardware (brain).  Remember though, that programs exist as
> load modules (physical entities).  

I would avoid saying that a program is a physical entity.  It is more like
*the functioning process* in that entity.  The program is identical with
certain mathematical properties of that process; it is not identical with
any particular physical entity.  But I should say that I do not believe in
the "mind as program" view; my view is what is called in philosophy, "type-
type materialism".  See a recent issue of the journal *Synthese* for a
defense of type-type materialism.

>> Let me put it this way for you:  the agent IS those chemicals;
>> or more precisely, is constitued by (or if the "mind as program" view is
>> correct, is instantiated by) those chemicals.  [PAUL TOREK]

> This would mean that a program "chooses" to do certain things based on the
> "current" state of its "chemicals" (e.g., the CPU instruction address 
> counter, the data in "memory" and input through sensory channels).  

YES, IF the "mind as program" view is true, then SOME programs (Douglas
Hofstadter (sp?) says "sufficiently complex" programs) do (can) choose.

> Can the program "choose" arbitrarily to do something (like set fire to the 
> disk drive, or cause the computer to explode----just like in the movies!!) 

An arbitrary action is BY THAT VERY FACT not a choice.  (Contrary to popular
opinion.)

> ... or can it only ...

ONLY?

> make the "decision" it is programmed to make based on the contents of its
> "chemicals".  As you say, the agent of decision making in the brain is in
> fact the chemicals, and the successive current states of the chemicals
> themselves (the ones that "make the decisions" causing other chemical/
> physical actions in the body) are DETERMINED by the same physical laws 
> that govern action in rocks and trees!

FINE.  SO??????????????????  The operations of a human brain are, *viewed on
a sufficiently high level* (Hofstadter makes some excellent points on distin-
guishing between levels), characteristically (one may hope) RATIONAL.  THAT
MAKES THE DIFFERENCE.  (See some of my earlier articles.  Read Chin-Tai Kim.)

>> ...if I feel like I'm in pain, I AM in pain.  This has nothing to do with 
>> the free will issue, but I felt it was worth picking this bone too.

> This is akin to saying "if enough people believe there is a god, there is 
> one".  Yes, feelings are decisive.  But when you feel like you are in pain 
> even if there is no direct physical cause ...

Then you are still in pain, even though you may be wrong about its nature or
origin.  This is not so with a god.  The analogy fails.  Also, one can be
mistaken in *belief* about pain, but not in feeling it.  The feeling just is.

> It's wrong to say "the subjective isn't real".  

Yay, we agree!  That's all I was trying to get at on this tangential issue.

>> To deny that there is an agent on the
>> ground that it is "just" a bunch of chemicals makes about as much sense as
>> denying that there is warmth in the room on the ground that there is "just"
>> a bunch of molecules moving around.

> Again, this is like saying that a program has free will.  

See above.

> On the contrary,

No it's not.

> barring system errors, a program's functions are deterministic.   

Fine.  So?

> ... You might say "but then, there's an agent of choice:  the chemicals 
> themselves 'choose' based on the external input data!"  

EXACTAMOONDO! (--The Fonz)  BY GEORGE, I THINK HE'S GOT IT!

> Sorry, again.  The chemicals just do what they're supposed to
> do given a certain set of circumstances (external variables).  

I guess he doesn't got it.  There's that word "just" again.

> Thus, it's the world around you, consisting of external variables input into 
> the brain through sensory channels, that is the agent of your free will.  

Non sequitur.  Just because the chemicals give a specifiable output for any
input doesn't mean they aren't doing anything.  It's a typical reductionist
fallacy:  show that you can explain B in terms of A, and then pretend that
B is somehow less real or less important than A.  It ain't so.  Explaining
human behavior does not explain it away.

				--The aspiring iconoclast,
				Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
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