Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 8/7/84; site ucbvax.ARPA Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxj!ihnp4!ucbvax!medin From: medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Message-ID: <2271@ucbvax.ARPA> Date: Sat, 29-Sep-84 16:18:13 EDT Article-I.D.: ucbvax.2271 Posted: Sat Sep 29 16:18:13 1984 Date-Received: Sun, 30-Sep-84 03:56:13 EDT References: <204@tekigm.UUCP> <5000107@uokvax.UUCP> <310@fisher.UUCP> Organization: University of California at Berkeley Lines: 72 >Carl is right, it is implausible. It is also inconsistent. > >To assume a Soviet leader would not be disuaded by the balance of >terror from launching a first "limited" strike and to assume that same >leader will confidently rely upon his American counterpart to be >dissuaded from retaliation by the balance the Soviet ignored is to >assume an irrational Soviet leadership. There is no defense against >irrationality. > >Besides, even if a Soviet strike succeeded in wiping out US land-based >missiles, there is an available response which is approporiately >limited and therefore credible. An American leader need not respond by >launching a full retaliatory strike, but could instead launch a strike >against a few Soviet cities to bring casualties up to the same level. >Soviet leaders, even granted technical success, even assuming American >leaders would allow 10 million Americans to die rather than force the >Soviets into full retaliation, cannot put the US in the that dilemma. >The "limited" strike scenario assumes that the elimination of >land-based ICBM's would leave the US only two choices: surrender or >"unlimited" nuclear war. It doesn't hold water once other options are >recognized as available. > >The real "limited" war scenario to be concerned about is not a strike >on US siloes, but on European cities. US threats to sacrifice Chicago >to avenge Hamburg may not be convincing to Soviet leaders. > > David Rubin David, you are missing sveral points: 1) You talk about having to be irrational to launch a first strike ignoring the balance of terror. I hardly consider 93% casulties for the US and 10% for the Soviets a balance of anything. 2) You talk about the US leader trying to launch a small strike to equalize causlaities is impossible. First, its really hard to talk to submarines now, what makes you think you can talk to them at all during a nuclear war. It also takes about a hour or more to transmit the EAM to the SLBM alert force via VLF, what kind of adds are you willing to give that the few sites which can transmit at that frequency are going to be intact after a USSR first strike? This is why sub commanders can launch their missiles without the EAM, but how are they going to know what war plan to use? Odds are it'll be a spasmodic launch of everything if he launches at all which is questionable. 3) Even if you lobbed all our SLBM force at the Russians in a countervale strike, you will kill slightly more russians percentage wise than the collateral damage to Americans of a Soviet first strike (estimate of collateral damage = ~8%). 4) I agree that putting US cities at risk to avenge NATO country losses isnt credible. Thats why the British and French have their own nuclear forces. And why we are deploying pershing and cruise. I am glad that you support that act at least. In short, things arent nearly as simple as you make them out to be. The US and USSR are very dissimilar is population distribution, strategic doctrine, and force structure, you have to be very careful when making comparisons. Also, a whole range of techincal issues are raised when operating in a nuclear environment, the C^3 system we have is more vulnerable than our ICBM force, but thank goodness the present administration isnt ignoring C^3 like the past several. We are finally making major expenditures in C^3. Milo