Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site cvl.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!decvax!genrad!wjh12!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!cvl!rlh From: rlh@cvl.UUCP (Ralph L. Hartley) Newsgroups: net.math Subject: Iterated prisoners dilemma Message-ID: <1363@cvl.UUCP> Date: Mon, 24-Sep-84 09:53:44 EDT Article-I.D.: cvl.1363 Posted: Mon Sep 24 09:53:44 1984 Date-Received: Thu, 27-Sep-84 02:33:16 EDT Organization: Computer Vision Lab, U. of Maryland Lines: 19 There is a strategy that I think can do better than tit-for-tat (tit-for-tat cooperates int the first round and in all other rounds does whatever its partner did in the last round). I call my strategy parting-shot. It plays as follows. All moves but the first and last - do what the opponent did in the last move First move - cooperate Last move - defect Regardless of the opponent, parting-shot always gets a better score than tit-for-tat. Ralph Hartley rlh@cvl siesmo!rlgvax!cvl!rlh