Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site randvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxj!houxm!vax135!cornell!uw-beaver!tektronix!hplabs!sdcrdcf!randvax!david From: david@randvax.UUCP (David Shlapak) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Re: Strategic Arms (reply to Tim Sevener) and Apologia Message-ID: <1996@randvax.UUCP> Date: Thu, 20-Sep-84 16:21:16 EDT Article-I.D.: randvax.1996 Posted: Thu Sep 20 16:21:16 1984 Date-Received: Wed, 26-Sep-84 13:19:32 EDT References: <204@tekigm.UUCP>, <1822@ucbvax.ARPA> <493@tty3b.UUCP> Organization: Rand Corp., Santa Monica Lines: 194 ---------- NOTE TO THE NET: This message was originally posted to Tim Sevener in response to a mail reply on his part to some comments of mine. I have chosen to submit it for more general review in reply to Mr. Sevener's latest articles. Bulleted (>) paragraphs are citations from Mr. Sevener's message to me. [****************************************************************************] >If I have misrepresented your position on the nuclear arms race, then >I apologize. Obviously arms experts have for years believed that >they were preventing nuclear war by deploying more weapons. But >after 40 years of this strategy and various halfhearted attempts to >stop the most technically obsolescent parts of the arms race with treaties >while allowing the most technologically advanced parts of the arms race >to be exempted from such treaties, I think, along with many other supporters >of the Nuclear Freeze, that it is time to say stop. This strategy has NOT >made us any more secure. It has NOT stopped the Soviets. (except in the >limited areas covered by treaties) First of all, your first statement is a typical context-less assertion that misrepresents the intentions of "arms experts." "More weapons" are not deployed, as you imply, merely for the sake of acquiring new toys...they are deployed in order to enhance this vague phenomenon known as "deterrence," which I (among many others) believe has kept us from revisiting the horrors of World War II for forty years. Sure, deterrence is an emotionally unsatisfying thing to rely on for the safety of millions of people; however, it has the virtue of at least seeming to work. Until somebody can propose an alternative that is both an improvement (like total world disarmament) and workable (UNlike total world disarmament), I don't see what's wrong with making the world unsafe for both nuclear and conventional war...like it is today. You might note, too, that the treaty that most arms-control advocates call the most successful arms-control effort since the end of the war is the ABM Treaty...this certainly was not a "...halfhearted attempt to stop the most technically obsolescent parts of the arms race with treaties;" in fact, it was a successful effort to slow down (at least) the most cutting-edge efforts on both sides; an attempt, in fact, to keep a whole new arms race from starting. Again, I mean no affront, but when you make statements like that one which are so obviously at odds with the common consensus amongst even those on "your side" who do have competence in this area, I have to question your erudition on this topic. Nothing personal, but if it looks like a duck, smells like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck... As for whether or not deterrence has made us "more secure," well, I guess that depends upon one's definition of security. If one means by security the confidence that one will be able to live his years in peace and freedom without any real threat of imminent violent death hanging over his head, then yes, I would say that the West, at least, is at least as secure today as ever before. If, however, one means by "security" the ability to total quell all ones fears (including paranoia), which is my impression of "your" view, than all I can say is the only place in space-time you're going to find "security" is when you're dead. Sorry. Also, to assert that the only places we've stopped the Soviets is in those areas where we've induced them to sign treaties, well, that's downright laughable. Even with the "best" treaty (the ABM agreement) the Soviets have not only deployed systems in excess of the treaty but have continued R&D far in excess of US efforts to the point where a "breakout" from the treaty on their part is a distinct possibility. Let's not even go into SALT...coincidentally, SALT I and SALT II accomplished quite parallel things for both Western disarmers and the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces: it gave them each more ammunition. In fact, the evidence of multiple violations of those strategic arms treaties that do exist provides an interesting case study of what I consider the "disarmers mentality," to wit: "Don't tell the world about the Soviets' cheating; that'll just make them more reluctant to negotiate a new treaty!" In other words, the important things is the symbolic signature on a piece of paper; that, in and of itself, is supposed to make the world safer, despite the fact that we can be pretty damn sure that one side ain't going to abide by the terms on the paper. I don't see any sense in that at all. >I am not an ignorant student of the nuclear arms race. I have read numerous >books on the subject, as well as Foreign Affairs and other such magazines >periodically. But while some knowledge of technical issues is important >it is trivial and inconsequential to delve into arcane arguments about the >exact effects of this or that weapon, or the exact numbers of this or that >weapon. This is the snare and delusion that arms experts have been locked >into for the past 40 years- arguing so much about weapons as weapons that >they forget the very human and potentially devastating effects of those >weapons. It is a fundamental fact that nuclear war would devastate mankind. >Whether it would lead to the absolute extinction of the species--nobody >knows. Well, I've read a bunch of books on neurology, but that unfortunately doesn't make me a brain-surgeon. It all depends upon what books you read. If you've read Brodie, Schelling, Kahn, Freedman, Kissinger, etc., then you may be ok...however, if you've been browsing through Ground Zero books, "Scientific American" articles, the "No-first-use" series in Foreign Affairs, or "Missile Envy," then you're quite likely worse off than if you'd read nothing to begin with. The old saw about a little knowledge is all too true, I'm afraid. Nobody, least of all me, is trying to fog things up with "arcane arguments ...about weapons." However, when you come out and say that US SLBMs "probably have more than 5000 megatons" worth of warheads, and make that a key element in an argument, I think I'm completely justified in informing you that your numbers are more than a factor of ten too high, in the hopes that this datum will assist you in re-thinking that argument. The fact that you want to brush my correction asides as inane quibbling says more about your thought processes than perhaps you might wish to have known. As for the "fundamental fact that nuclear war would devastate mankind," well, OK...so would a re-play of World War II...if fear of nuclear war keeps not only the atomic wolf but the tank-and-dive-bomber one from our door, then I agree with Chruchill: let safety be the sturdy twin of terror (note that the key word in that phrase is "sturdy," not "terror."). >>From this basis, citizens don't need to know the exact devastation details >of this or that weapon system--what is most important is to try to >prevent nuclear war. There are two basic approaches to this question: >1)continue with the past emphasis on developing new arms, and > promoting essentially the military solution >2)stop developing new arms through bilateral agreement >The former has been the policy for 40 years--it has worked in the sense >that we haven't yet actually had a nuclear war. It hasn't worked in the >sense that we are now threatened with more nuclear weapons than ever >before in history, and the amount of warning/decision time before a nuclear >counterattack to the other's sides attack has gottened progressively >shorter. So short that the dangerous next phase of this vicious cycle >will be to make such counterattacks automatic with launch on warning systems. >I think it is long past time to pursue the second course of diplomacy >and mutual agreement to stop ALL new nuclear weapons systems. >I hope that you agree . . . In the panel discussion following ABC's broadcast of "The Day After," Kissinger made one of the most profound statements I have heard yet in this ongoing dialogue...to paraphrase he said, "This movie was at best useless. We don't need to be told how bad nuclear war would be...we all know that it would be terrible. The question is, how best do we prevent it from occuring, and the hysteria whipped up by a film such as this does nothing but cloud that issue." First of all, the factual errors in your statement (sorry, but I can only call 'em like I see 'em). We are not "threatened with more nuclear weapons than ever before;" in fact, US megatonnage (the only number that really matters if we're talking about hell's-bells, balls- out counter-city nuclear-winter nuclear war) has been DROPPING steadily for almost twenty years...it will continue to do so. While installing Pershing II and GLCM in Europe (what, 572 warheads, each much, much less than a megaton) NATO is WITHDRAWING 1,500 other weapons. The only real growth in the destructiveness of nucelar arsenals has come on the Soviet side. And this growth has taken place during an arms race with only one contestant; the US has actually DISMANTLED ICBMs whilst the Soviets were building close to 800 new ones. Secondly, the amount of warning time available has not decreased noticably since the first SSBNs went on station for both sides in the early 1960s. I don't know where you got that impression. Thirdly, no one has ever seriously proposed an "automatic...launch on warning system;" this is not "War Games" we're talking about; it's the Real World. As for your two means of reducing the likelihood of nucelar war (that fear can never be eliminated)---well, to the best of my knowledge, arms control has never prevented a war that somebody wanted. The period from 1920 til the mid-1930s was the heyday of disarmament. There was parchment flying everywhere---naval treaties, nonagression pacts, "rules of war" agreements, you name it. Once the balloon went up, however, they became "so many scraps of paper." The interesting thing is that the one weapon not used against combatants in WWII was poison gas, which was also a weapon NOT covered by any treaty. Why wasn't it used? Because everybody knew that anybody they used it against could reply in kind, with nobody gaining any advantage. This is called "deterrence." Unlike arms control, it has been known to work. Don't get me wrong...I have nothing against negotiating with the Soviets. I just don't see any value in signing a treaty merely for the sake of the "scrap of paper." I'm also a realist (you might say pessimist) who accepts the dismal history of arms control efforts as an object lesson that we stand to learn a great deal from. No, I'm sorry Tim, I don't agree at all. --- das PS---A good starter's book on most aspects of nuclear strategy is "Arms and Influence" by Thomas Schelling. If as I suspect you haven't read it, pick up a copy (your neighborhood college bookstore should have it, or at least your neighborhood college library). PPS---Again, I have to apologize for my "attitude." I just get sick of hearing people say that everything they don't know anything about is irrelevant.