Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!david From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Message-ID: <344@fisher.UUCP> Date: Tue, 2-Oct-84 09:44:29 EDT Article-I.D.: fisher.344 Posted: Tue Oct 2 09:44:29 1984 Date-Received: Wed, 3-Oct-84 19:25:41 EDT References: <204@tekigm.UUCP> <5000107@uokvax.UUCP> <310@fisher.UUCP> <2271@ucbvax.ARPA> Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics Lines: 90 >David, you are missing sveral points: >1) You talk about having to be irrational to launch a first >strike ignoring the balance of terror. I hardly consider 93% >casulties for the US and 10% for the Soviets a balance of anything. Soviet casualties will be far greater than 10%. After perhaps a year, allowing the more serious cases of radiation poisoning to die off, Soviet casualties will run from 50-70%, while US casualties would probably run from 75-90%. The difference is due mostly to the greater urbanization of the US rather than civil defense. Moreover, the destruction to Soviet infrastructure will be so great as to cause the Soviet Union to cease existing as a unitary political entity, and this is the best deterrent for a Soviet leader. >2) You talk about the US leader trying to launch a small strike >to equalize causlaities is impossible. First, its really hard to >talk to submarines now, what makes you think you can talk to them >at all during a nuclear war. It also takes about a hour or more >to transmit the EAM to the SLBM alert force via VLF, what kind >of adds are you willing to give that the few sites which can transmit >at that frequency are going to be intact after a USSR first strike? >This is why sub commanders can launch their missiles without the >EAM, but how are they going to know what war plan to use? Odds >are it'll be a spasmodic launch of everything if he launches at >all which is questionable. Time delays are of little concern; retribution can wait an hour, a day, or a week. Also, since we are speaking of a response to a LIMITED nuclear strike, we are presuming that no warhead has landed on Washington, and thus central authority remains intact. A strike taking out all VLF sites would not be limited, as this would require strikes on the heavily populated Eastern seaboard (isn't one of the sites in Maryland?). Finally, even if the Soviets could take out all communications between the submarine fleet and the US, they would NOT do so if they intended a limited strike on land-based ICBM's, especially if they were told that the fleet's default instructions included launching everything if the commander is in doubt... >3) Even if you lobbed all our SLBM force at the Russians in >a countervale strike, you will kill slightly more russians >percentage wise than the collateral damage to Americans of >a Soviet first strike (estimate of collateral damage = ~8%). Whoa! There are enough SL warheads to blanket every Soviet city with a population greater than 50,000! The SLBM force can, by itself, kill nearly as many Russians as the entire nuclear force; what it can't do is conduct a "surgical" strike, but I'm not interested in conducting one. >4) I agree that putting US cities at risk to avenge NATO >country losses isnt credible. Thats why the British and French >have their own nuclear forces. And why we are deploying >pershing and cruise. I am glad that you support that act at >least. I support Cruise. I do not support Pershing, as their ability to reach Soviet cities in less than ten minutes might cause a Soviet leader to act rashly in a crisis. Slowness in delivery, so long as it does not make an attack ineffective, is a positive GOOD, not a liability. There is still a tremendous problem with European deterrence. The West Germans are prohibited from deploying nuclear weapons, yet are also the ones most threatened by Soviet attack. If we aren't willing to sacrifice Chicago for Hamburg, it probably follows that neither Marseilles nor Liverpool are available for such service, either. I'm not satisfied that this problem has been solved. It may not be soluble. >In short, things arent nearly as simple as you make them out >to be. The US and USSR are very dissimilar is population >distribution, strategic doctrine, and force structure, you >have to be very careful when making comparisons. >Also, a whole range of techincal issues are raised when operating >in a nuclear environment, the C^3 system we have is more >vulnerable than our ICBM force, but thank goodness the >present administration isnt ignoring C^3 like the past >several. We are finally making major expenditures in C^3. > Milo But it is ignoring conventional preparedness, unlike the Carter administration. The dilemma in Europe is that our conventional weakness may force us to go nuclear, and it is precisely because Soviet doctrine differs from ours that we cannot be sure that nuclear war can be contained. I applaud expenditures on C^3, but not on most of the nuclear arms programs. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david