Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!david From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Message-ID: <310@fisher.UUCP> Date: Tue, 18-Sep-84 09:40:57 EDT Article-I.D.: fisher.310 Posted: Tue Sep 18 09:40:57 1984 Date-Received: Tue, 25-Sep-84 03:17:54 EDT References: <204@tekigm.UUCP> <5000107@uokvax.UUCP> Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics Lines: 57 >> /***** uokvax:net.politics / tty3b!mjk / 5:26 pm Sep 10, 1984 */ >> Look at this from the Soviet point of view. We have submarines which we >> are virtually certain they can't track. Reason: we are ahead of the Soviets >> in almost every important technology area and WE can't track them. The >> missiles on those submarines are enough to take out the 50 largest cities in >> the USSR. So of course they're going to launch a strike against our land-based >> missiles, right? What have the got to lose but their 50 largest cities? >> Amazed they haven't done it already. >> >> Mike Kelly >Mike is missing a point. The fear of vulnerable land based icbms >is that the Soviets could destroy them, then hold U.S. cities >hostage for the good behavior of our submarines. Would the U.S. >President launch a punitive counter-value strike on Russian >cities if it meant the utter destruction of the U.S. as well, or >would he just accept the damage. What would you do, Mike? (Note >that asking what someone would do in a no-win situation is not a >counterargument, and is not intended as such. I'm just curious.) > >Personally I find this scenario rather implausible, but if you >ignore this scenario and the need for the nuclear deterrent for >Europe, you might as well junk all the ICBMs and depend solely on >the Subs. For that matter, you could probably junk all the subs >except 4 (50% on patrol, and you'd want to have a sub on backup >in case something happened to the first). > > Carl Carl is right, it is implausible. It is also inconsistent. To assume a Soviet leader would not be disuaded by the balance of terror from launching a first "limited" strike and to assume that same leader will confidently rely upon his American counterpart to be dissuaded from retaliation by the balance the Soviet ignored is to assume an irrational Soviet leadership. There is no defense against irrationality. Besides, even if a Soviet strike succeeded in wiping out US land-based missiles, there is an available response which is approporiately limited and therefore credible. An American leader need not respond by launching a full retaliatory strike, but could instead launch a strike against a few Soviet cities to bring casualties up to the same level. Soviet leaders, even granted technical success, even assuming American leaders would allow 10 million Americans to die rather than force the Soviets into full retaliation, cannot put the US in the that dilemma. The "limited" strike scenario assumes that the elimination of land-based ICBM's would leave the US only two choices: surrender or "unlimited" nuclear war. It doesn't hold water once other options are recognized as available. The real "limited" war scenario to be concerned about is not a strike on US siloes, but on European cities. US threats to sacrifice Chicago to avenge Hamburg may not be convincing to Soviet leaders. David Rubin {allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david