Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.13 $; site iuvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxj!houxm!ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: moRE omniscience and freedom Message-ID: <1600008@iuvax.UUCP> Date: Fri, 5-Oct-84 21:07:00 EDT Article-I.D.: iuvax.1600008 Posted: Fri Oct 5 21:07:00 1984 Date-Received: Sat, 6-Oct-84 05:43:51 EDT References: <396@wucs.UUCP> Lines: 48 Nf-ID: #R:wucs:-39600:iuvax:1600008:000:2358 Nf-From: iuvax!dsaker Oct 5 20:07:00 1984 [] >Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as *choosing* what you judge to be >the second best option. By "best", I thought you meant best according to some criterion, such as getting the most money for the least number of hours of work. My idea was that I could then choose what was second best according to that criterion. Now you seem to be using "best" to mean "what you most want to do", but that conflicts with ordinary usage. According to the way we usually use the word "best", a person can certainly choose to act contrary to what they consider best. >if you are suggesting that you change your mind about what is the best action >in light of the need to test this preknowledge thing, then (assuming you act >on your new evaluation) you didn't know what you were going to do (your >belief was wrong). "But suppose I'm a free being who really does know what >he's going to do!" Then, because FREEDOM IMPLIES ACTING ON YOUR EVALUATION, >it must be the case that you don't change your evaluation. I am wondering about what it could be like for me, in my mind, to know ahead of time what I am going to do. Let us first consider the situation in which I believe that I am going to, say, sit in my lounge chair at 10am tomorrow. In this case, I could certainly consider my belief and then decide to walk in the garden when 10am came around. That is, I could falsify my belief. So, if foreknowing what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow is like having in my mind a belief as to what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow-- a belief that just happens to be true -- then we have problems, for we are denying that I could decide to act contrary to my belief. So, foreknowing what I am going to do must be different to having in my mind a belief as to what I am going to do. Here is my problem, for whenever I envisage myself thinking at 9am that I am going to sit in my lounge chair at 10am, it always seems to me that I could consider that thought and decide to act contrary to it. I cannot reconcile foreknowing my actions with my freedom. I am left wondering what, as an experience in my mind, foreknowing my actions is supposed to be like. I could continue, but I will stop this response here. I can see questions coming up such as: "Can a free, omniscient being be within time?" Daryel Akerlind ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker