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From: gwyn@brl-tgr.ARPA (Doug Gwyn )
Newsgroups: net.crypt
Subject: Re: DES not available outside US?
Message-ID: <4788@brl-tgr.ARPA>
Date: Fri, 21-Sep-84 12:37:43 EDT
Article-I.D.: brl-tgr.4788
Posted: Fri Sep 21 12:37:43 1984
Date-Received: Wed, 26-Sep-84 04:11:22 EDT
References: <21bdf834.1de6@apollo.uucp>, <999@ulysses.UUCP>
Organization: Ballistics Research Lab
Lines: 10

I think the foofaraw over exporting DES software/hardware is due
primarily to bureaucratic rule enforcement, rather than realistic
evaluation of the risk of this one PARTICULAR encryption scheme.

If NSA can't crack a long stream of DES-encrypted text, then they
are not as good as they used to be.  Doubling the key size should
make the length of text required go up by a factor of something
like 4 to 8, which does not help much.  The nonsense about arrays
of thousands of DES chips is absurd; one should use cleverness
in preference to brute force.