Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!bae From: bae@fisher.UUCP (The Master of Sinanju) Newsgroups: net.math Subject: Re: Iterated prisoners dilemma Message-ID: <327@fisher.UUCP> Date: Wed, 26-Sep-84 10:57:30 EDT Article-I.D.: fisher.327 Posted: Wed Sep 26 10:57:30 1984 Date-Received: Thu, 27-Sep-84 06:14:42 EDT References: <1363@cvl.UUCP> Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics Lines: 26 > There is a strategy that I think can do better than tit-for-tat > (tit-for-tat cooperates int the first round and in all other rounds > does whatever its partner did in the last round). > > I call my strategy parting-shot. It plays as follows. > > All moves but the first and last > - do what the opponent did in the last move > First move > - cooperate > Last move > - defect > > Regardless of the opponent, parting-shot always gets a better score > than tit-for-tat. > > Ralph Hartley Unfortunately, the rules of the game specify that competition shall continue for a random number of rounds, so it is not possible for your program to determine when the 'last move' will occur. -- Brian A. Ehrmantraut {ihnp4, twg, decvax, ucbvax}!allegra!fisher!bae