Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site wucs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxj!ihnp4!wucs!esk From: esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: moRE omniscience and freedom Message-ID: <396@wucs.UUCP> Date: Fri, 5-Oct-84 02:06:58 EDT Article-I.D.: wucs.396 Posted: Fri Oct 5 02:06:58 1984 Date-Received: Sat, 6-Oct-84 04:36:00 EDT Distribution: net Organization: Washington U. in St. Louis, CS Dept. Lines: 36 [the plot thickens...] >From Daryel Akerlind (...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker): > But, Paul Torek, imagine the following: > After contemplating my various courses of action, I choose what seems to me > to be the best. Then I note that that was what I knew I would do. > Having the desire to test this whole idea of preknowledge, I decide to > follow my second best course of action -- that is, I choose to do something > different from what I "know" I am going to do. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as *choosing* what you judge to be the second best option. Such would be an instance of irrationality not deserving of the name of choice. Admittedly, the selection of the second best option may sometimes *feel* free, but such feelings do no constitute evidence. For an excellent explanation, see Chin-Tai Kim, "Norms and Freedom", *The Philosophical Forum* 1981. Now, if you are suggesting that you change your mind about what is the best action in light of the need to test this preknowledge thing, then (assuming you act on your new evaluation) you didn't know what you were going to do (your belief was wrong). "But suppose I'm a free being who really does know what he's going to do!" Then, because FREEDOM IMPLIES ACTING ON YOUR EVALUATION, it must be the case that you don't change your evaluation. Thus, a free being can be omniscient only if it does not believe that it would be valuable to test this pre- knowledge thing. But of course, an omniscient being doesn't *need* to test! > I can imagine various solutions to the above problem, but each of them > conflicts with my sense of free will. We can resolve these conflicts > by denying me (my conception of) free will. However, if I were > omnipotent, then I do not see how these conflicts could be resolved, > because omnipotence would seem to guarantee (my conception of) free will. What IS your conception of free will, and what would it be to "deny" it? --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047