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From: esk@wucs.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: moRE Omniscience and Freedom
Message-ID: <406@wucs.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 12-Oct-84 16:54:15 EDT
Article-I.D.: wucs.406
Posted: Fri Oct 12 16:54:15 1984
Date-Received: Sat, 13-Oct-84 08:21:47 EDT
Distribution: net
Organization: Washington U. in St. Louis, CS Dept.
Lines: 69

From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind)  (>> =me, > =dsaker)
>> Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as *choosing* what you judge 
>> to be the second best option.
> By "best", I thought you meant best according to some criterion,
> such as getting the most money for the least number of hours of work.
> My idea was that I could then choose what was second best according to
> that criterion.  Now you seem to be using "best" to mean "what you most
> want to do", but that conflicts with ordinary usage.  

I mean best according the ultimate criterion; best overall.  Hopefully,
that's exactly the same as what you most want to do, but if not, either
your wants or your value judgements or both (usually both!) need to be
changed.  I think my use agrees with ordinary usage.

> According to the way we usually use the word "best", a person 
> can certainly choose to act contrary to what they consider best.

No she can't.  If she fails to choose what she considers best overall,
she has either been in the grip of a compulsion, or has slipped (made
a mistake).  The point is, FREEDOM IS A NORMATIVE CONCEPT.  Think about
what kinds of beings can be free; are agents.  They are those who can
rationally evaluate prospective future actions.  To be free is to use
one's agency -- i.e., to make evaluations and act on them.

> Let us first consider the situation in which I believe that I am going 
> to, say, sit in my lounge chair at 10am tomorrow.  In this case, I could 
> certainly consider my belief and then decide to walk in the garden when 
> 10am came around.  That is, I could falsify my belief.
> So, if foreknowing what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow is like having
> in my mind a belief as to what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow-- a 
> belief that just happens to be true -- then we have problems, for we are 
> denying that I could decide to act contrary to my belief.

No, we are only denying that you *will* decide to do otherwise.  The word
"could" is ambiguous; it should be eschewed, in favor of "would if ..." 
or "has a nonzero probability of".

> So, foreknowing what I am going to do must be different to having in my 
> mind a belief as to what I am going to do.  Here is my problem, for 
> whenever I envisage myself thinking at 9am that I am going to sit in my 
> lounge chair at 10am, it always seems to me that I could consider that 
> thought and decide to act contrary to it.  I cannot reconcile foreknowing 
> my actions with my freedom.

Indeed, AS LONG AS YOU ARE THIS TYPE OF PERSON who wants to do otherwise
than what he thinks he's going to do -- i.e. one who wants to test this
"foreknowledge" thing -- YOU CAN NEVER FOREKNOW any of your actions. 
(Exception:  if you thought it was extremely important to do what you 
think you will do, you might do it anyway.  Suppose that you think you 
will sit in your chair at 10am, and having had similar apparent instances
of foreknowledge recently, you want to test this foreknowledge thing. 
But alas, you know that if you don't sit in the chair you will die (for
some reason -- use your imagination).  You decide to sit at 10am.)

> I am left wondering what, as an experience in my mind, foreknowing
> my actions is supposed to be like.

There are two possibilities corresponding to free actions and to unfree
actions.  I'll concentrate on free actions.  In this case you must firmly
believe that you will do the actions AND that they are the best actions
available.  If you are the type (apparently you are) who would see a gain
to knowing whether you do indeed foreknow, then either 1) you are aware of
reasons to do the specific actions you anticipate that override this gain,
or 2) you KNOW that you have foreknowledge and thus you don't need to test
it.  Note that condition 2) always applies to an omniscient being.

				--Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
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