Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/3/84; site mhuxt.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxj!mhuxr!mhuxv!mhuxt!techpub From: techpub@mhuxt.UUCP (mcgrew) Newsgroups: net.jokes Subject: Re: Seminar announcement (party) Message-ID: <295@mhuxt.UUCP> Date: Tue, 16-Oct-84 08:56:38 EDT Article-I.D.: mhuxt.295 Posted: Tue Oct 16 08:56:38 1984 Date-Received: Wed, 17-Oct-84 05:36:09 EDT References: <2165@rochester.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill Lines: 138 > From: Gary Cottrell> > > > > University of Cottage Street > Dept. of Dog Science > 55 Cottage Street > Rochester, New York 14608 > > > SEMINAR > > > Saturday, 20 October, 1984 > 55 Cottage St. > 9:00 p.m. > > _M_o_d_e_l_l_i_n_g _t_h_e _I_n_t_e_n_t_i_o_n_a_l _B_e_h_a_v_i_o_r _o_f _t_h_e _D_o_g > > Garrison W. Cottrell > > > Many of us, while out for a stroll, have had the > experience of observing a dog trotting along, alone, > obviously _g_o_i_n_g _s_o_m_e_w_h_e_r_e. This raises many questions, such > as, "Where is he going?", "Why is he going there?", "Will it > be more fun than where I'm going?", and so forth. Such > questions motivate us to postulate the existence of (and > hence the efficacy of further study of) the intentional > behavior of the dog[1]. > > We propose a highly parallel, neurologically plausible > model of dog behavior based on a connectionist (neural > network) implementation of a subset of Reiter's (1980) > Default Logic, as reported in Cottrell (1984). As outlined > in that paper, there is a well specified mapping of default > rules to connectionist network fragments that implement > those rules, with the benefit that the network operates in > real time by continuously updating the truth value of all > predicates in parallel[2] (thus making Doyle's work, and > perhaps Doyle himself, superfluous). Currently, the > implementation only allows inference rules with one > universally quantified variable. While inadequate for many > purposes, we claim that this is all we need for dog > modelling, since it appears that dogs can only think about > one thing at a time anyway[3]. In this work we reinterpret > ____________________ > [1]Grembowitz (1982) proposed a model of the cat, but > only handled the case of the cat tripping on catnip, cata- > tonically staring at the wallpaper for hours with sporadic > leaps into space. This simple behavior was elegantly > modeled by the composition of only two standard UNIX calls, > random(3c) and sleep(1). > [2]The observant reader will recognize a certain similar- > ity to British Motor Corporation's oft-lamented experiment > of shoehorning an Austin Healey six cylinder engine into an > MGB. Early results support the contention that our bastard > child of a similar "marriage made in hell" will be more suc- > cessful. > [3]It is interesting to note that the set of things a dog > can think about as noted in "Dog: A Canine Architecture", > Cottrell (1981) may be _f_i_n_i_t_e and limited to food, squir- > rels, and other dogs. Further, the dog we have studied ap- > pears to only have three responses to other dogs, depending > on their sex. > > > > > > Reiter's default inference rules as precondition-action > behavior rules. An example behavioral rule is: > > Chase(x) > ----------------------- > Moving(x) : Squirrel(x) > > > An English interpretation of this rule is, "if > something is moving, and we don't have evidence that it > isn't a squirrel, then chase it." This models the observed > behavior of Jelly Bean chasing a paper bag. The real time > behavior of our implementation captures his stopping when it > turns out not to be a squirrel, since that blocks the > inference of Chase(x), which then slowly decays, much as > Jelly Bean slows to a confused halt. (As a simplifying > assumption, we ignore his subsequent pretense of not having > been chasing it at all.) Of course, we still have to > determine whether there might still be some peanut butter > and jelly in the bag, but this can be easily handled by the > addition of more rules. Note that since we are building a > model of behavior, the consequent of the rule is an action > (Chase(x)), not an addition of the useless information > Squirrel(x) to the already overtaxed knowledge base[4]. > > We have a grandiose long term research plan to model > the entire mind of the dog, which will generate grant > proposals _a_d _n_a_u_s_e_u_m. One of the new tools we plan to use > in this research is the previously unnoticed ability to > access the goal structures of the dog through measurement of > tail wagging (for a discussion of some other aspects of tail > wagging, including tail recursion, see "The Dog Papers", > Benson & Sloan (1984)). We claim that tail wagging will do > for dog modelling research what reaction times have done for > psychology. For example, we can use this technique to > assess the goal priorities of the dog. If we ask "do you > want to go out?" we get a vigorous wagging response, whereas > if we ask, "do you want to stay?", we get no tail wagging. > Further, we can map out all of the levels of the system by > studying the _t_i_m_e _c_o_u_r_s_e of the wagging behavior. > Demonstrations of the the time course of the wagging > response will be provided. > > > > > > > > > > > > ____________________ > [4]As evidence that the knowledge base is already full, > one only needs to note that when Squirrel(x) holds, and x > climbs a tree, the dog repeatedly attempts to climb the tree > by jumping on the trunk, even though this tactic has never > been observed to succeed. > > > > > > (Copies of the troff source available on request) > gary cottrell (allegra or seismo)!rochester!gary (USENET) > gary@rochester (ARPA)