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From: rlh@cvl.UUCP (Ralph L. Hartley)
Newsgroups: net.math
Subject: Iterated prisoners dilemma
Message-ID: <1363@cvl.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 24-Sep-84 09:53:44 EDT
Article-I.D.: cvl.1363
Posted: Mon Sep 24 09:53:44 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 27-Sep-84 02:33:16 EDT
Organization: Computer Vision Lab, U. of Maryland
Lines: 19

There is a strategy that I think can do better than tit-for-tat
(tit-for-tat cooperates int the first round and in all other rounds
does whatever its partner did in the last round).

I call my strategy parting-shot. It plays as follows.

All moves but the first and last
	- do what the opponent did in the last move
First move
	- cooperate
Last move
	- defect

Regardless of the opponent, parting-shot always gets a better score
than tit-for-tat.

				Ralph Hartley
				rlh@cvl
				siesmo!rlgvax!cvl!rlh