Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site fisher.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!fisher!bae
From: bae@fisher.UUCP (The Master of Sinanju)
Newsgroups: net.math
Subject: Re: Iterated prisoners dilemma
Message-ID: <327@fisher.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 26-Sep-84 10:57:30 EDT
Article-I.D.: fisher.327
Posted: Wed Sep 26 10:57:30 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 27-Sep-84 06:14:42 EDT
References: <1363@cvl.UUCP>
Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics
Lines: 26

>	There is a strategy that I think can do better than tit-for-tat
>	(tit-for-tat cooperates int the first round and in all other rounds
>	does whatever its partner did in the last round).
>
>	I call my strategy parting-shot. It plays as follows.
>
>	All moves but the first and last
>		- do what the opponent did in the last move
>	First move
>		- cooperate
>	Last move
>		- defect
>
>	Regardless of the opponent, parting-shot always gets a better score
>	than tit-for-tat.
>
>					Ralph Hartley

Unfortunately, the rules of the game specify that competition shall continue
for a random number of rounds, so it is not possible for your program to 
determine when the 'last move' will occur.

-- 
            Brian A. Ehrmantraut

    {ihnp4, twg, decvax, ucbvax}!allegra!fisher!bae