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From: david@fisher.UUCP (David Rubin)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense
Message-ID: <344@fisher.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 2-Oct-84 09:44:29 EDT
Article-I.D.: fisher.344
Posted: Tue Oct  2 09:44:29 1984
Date-Received: Wed, 3-Oct-84 19:25:41 EDT
References: <204@tekigm.UUCP> <5000107@uokvax.UUCP> <310@fisher.UUCP> <2271@ucbvax.ARPA>
Organization: Princeton Univ. Statistics
Lines: 90

>David, you are missing sveral points:

>1)  You talk about having to be irrational to launch a first
>strike ignoring the balance of terror.  I hardly consider 93%
>casulties for the US and 10% for the Soviets a balance of anything.

Soviet casualties will be far greater than 10%.  After perhaps a year,
allowing the more serious cases of radiation poisoning to die off,
Soviet casualties will run from 50-70%, while US casualties would
probably run from 75-90%.  The difference is due mostly to the greater
urbanization of the US rather than civil defense.  Moreover, the
destruction to Soviet infrastructure will be so great as to cause the
Soviet Union to cease existing as a unitary political entity, and this
is the best deterrent for a Soviet leader.

>2) You talk about the US leader trying to launch a small strike
>to equalize causlaities is impossible.  First, its really hard to
>talk to submarines now, what makes you think you can talk to them
>at all during a nuclear war.  It also takes about a hour or more
>to transmit the EAM to the SLBM alert force via VLF, what kind
>of adds are you willing to give that the few sites which can transmit
>at that frequency are going to be intact after a USSR first strike?
>This is why sub commanders can launch their missiles without the 
>EAM, but how are they going to know what war plan to use?  Odds
>are it'll be a spasmodic launch of everything if he launches at
>all which is questionable.  

Time delays are of little concern; retribution can wait an hour, a day,
or a week.  Also, since we are speaking of a response to a LIMITED
nuclear strike, we are presuming that no warhead has landed on
Washington, and thus central authority remains intact.  A strike
taking out all VLF sites would not be limited, as this would require
strikes on the heavily populated Eastern seaboard (isn't one of the
sites in Maryland?).  Finally, even if the Soviets could take out all
communications between the submarine fleet and the US, they would NOT
do so if they intended a limited strike on land-based ICBM's,
especially if they were told that the fleet's default instructions
included launching everything if the commander is in doubt...

>3)  Even if you lobbed all our SLBM force at the Russians in
>a countervale strike, you will kill slightly more russians
>percentage wise than the collateral damage to Americans of
>a Soviet first strike (estimate of collateral damage = ~8%).

Whoa!  There are enough SL warheads to blanket every Soviet city with
a population greater than 50,000!  The SLBM force can, by itself, kill
nearly as many Russians as the entire nuclear force; what it can't do
is conduct a "surgical" strike, but I'm not interested in conducting
one. 

>4)  I agree that putting US cities at risk to avenge NATO
>country losses isnt credible.  Thats why the British and French
>have their own nuclear forces.  And why we are deploying
>pershing and cruise.  I am glad that you support that act at 
>least.

I support Cruise. I do not support Pershing, as their ability to reach
Soviet cities in less than ten minutes might cause a Soviet leader to
act rashly in a crisis.  Slowness in delivery, so long as it does not
make an attack ineffective, is a positive GOOD, not a liability.

There is still a tremendous problem with European deterrence.  The
West Germans are prohibited from deploying nuclear weapons, yet are
also the ones most threatened by Soviet attack.  If we aren't willing
to sacrifice Chicago for Hamburg, it probably follows that neither
Marseilles nor Liverpool are available for such service, either.  I'm
not satisfied that this problem has been solved.  It may not be soluble.

>In short, things arent nearly as simple as you make them out
>to be.  The US and USSR are very dissimilar is population
>distribution, strategic doctrine, and force structure, you
>have to be very careful when making comparisons.

>Also, a whole range of techincal issues are raised when operating
>in a nuclear environment, the C^3 system we have is more
>vulnerable than our ICBM force, but thank goodness the
>present administration isnt ignoring C^3 like the past
>several.  We are finally making major expenditures in C^3.

>				Milo

But it is ignoring conventional preparedness, unlike the Carter
administration. The dilemma in Europe is that our conventional
weakness may force us to go nuclear, and it is precisely because
Soviet doctrine differs from ours that we cannot be sure that nuclear
war can be contained.  I applaud expenditures on C^3, but not on most
of the nuclear arms programs.

					David Rubin
			{allegra|astrovax|princeton}!fisher!david