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From: alex@sdcsvax.UUCP (Alex Pournelle)
Newsgroups: net.space
Subject: Re: High frontier (reasonably long defense discussion)
Message-ID: <866@sdcsvax.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 5-Jun-84 18:55:56 EDT
Article-I.D.: sdcsvax.866
Posted: Tue Jun  5 18:55:56 1984
Date-Received: Thu, 7-Jun-84 19:27:39 EDT
References: <299@ames-lm.UUCP>
Organization: U.C. San Diego; freelance writer
Lines: 98


Well, the following is a reply to a message by dmw@cmu-cs-vlsi, but it
applies to the latter half of the latest message, too:

(His:)
The arguments on both sides of this issue have been described in many
other places.  I will confine myself to the main points.

1) Directed energy weapons are a long time and a lot of dollars away.
There are a number of cheap straightforward countermeasures that makes
their task much harder, such as finishing boost phase in the atmosphere.

(my replies follow his arguments:)
I never mentioned DE weapons.  "Shotguns in space" are fine for me.

2) Homing warheads still don't work very well and are subject to the
usual countermeasures.

EH?  Hmm, I guess SAMs, HAWKs, AMRAAMs, and Sparrows should all be
scrapped as useless.  After all, they are nothing but homing warheads.
It's a shame that the Air Force has never hit Kwajalein with any of
their RVs, either.

3) Space defenses must be in space, where they are vulnerable.  even if
you coat them with lots of rock, their sensors are still vulnerable.

Not true.  Pop-ups can be built if space starts getting vulnerable.
Besides, any attack on one of our sats is an act of war; hence, more
warning.

4) More missiles is probably cheaper than more defense satellites, if
that's the way the Russians choose to respond.  Richard DeLauer,
undersecretary of defense for research and engineering has stated that
arms control must be combined with space defenses if they are to work.

5) Bombers and cruise missiles will still exist, and most big US cities
are on the coast.  Tactical weapons will also still exist.

So?  Wouldn't you rather shoot down some missiles than none at all?
Bombers/cruise are recallable until no-return point.  The Russians use
turboprop aircraft which we can see coming from a looooong distance.  If
they switch, we've time to think about appropriate responses.  Only
missiles are game as soon as they are launched; only they have flight
times of minutes, too.
His is a non-argument--HF isn't going to make war impossible, merely less 
likely.  It will raise the level above which we MUST launch, for fear of an
incoming attack.

As far as tac nukes go, we can detect them if we know they're there.
There are more profitable ways for a terrorist organization to kill
millions.  Russia isn't going to blow up US cities one at a time.

(his summary:)
In summary, it is not at all clear that a space defense system will
work very well.  Even if it does work, it might not measurably increase
US security, and may just wind up being a big money sink.  The goal of
a perfect defense seems very far away.  It more likely would just add
an element of uncertainty for any attacker, and there are far cheaper
ways to do this, such as point defense of ICBM silos.  Treaties
reducing the ratio of warheads to launch vehicles would accomplish the
same goal at a much lower price.


(my reply:) 
I wish I had his hope for treaties.  Shame the Russians haven't kept one
they've signed, including SALT II.  
I never claimed for this straw man, "the perfect defense".  That's an
argument that McNamara advanced, and it's patently foolish.  Are tanks a
"perfect defense" against artillery?  Are Nylon vests "perfect" against
bullets?  No, but they're a damn sight better than the alternatives.  Same
for High Frontier.

I don't see how his arguments, even if true, lead inescapably to space
defense "/not working very well/".  My reasons:

HF need NOT, repeat *NOT* be perfect to offer a serious countermeasure.
It need only boggle up the Russian's targeting plans to the point that
they are NOT sure they will blow up all our silos.  The arithmetic is
simple: they may know that only 25% of their attack isn't going to make
it, but they will have no way of knowing _which_ 25%.  If they don't
know for certain whether they will destroy all our missiles & bombers,
their plans are cast with doubt.  _This_ _is_ _all_ _a_ _defense_ _need_ _do_
_to_ _have_ _an_ _effect_.  It must merely have a good chance of
succeeding.  Not even the Russians are crazy enough to test against such
a system by experiment. 

Let's not forget that HF's first step is neither space-based nor very
expensive.  Simple point-defense of our current missile silos would be a
defense bargain, pure and simple.  Does anyone seriously object to defending
our silos?

Alex

P.S.  Please, if you're going to offer anti-defense arguments, answer
the implicit questions above.  Ask yourself if this level of uncertainty
in targeting calculations are worth the money.  If not, why not?  I
weary of getting the same old arguments already answered by HF
literature.