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From: cozadde@trsvax.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.space
Subject: Re: High Frontier - (nf)
Message-ID: <56000016@trsvax.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 15-Jun-84 13:49:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: trsvax.56000016
Posted: Fri Jun 15 13:49:00 1984
Date-Received: Fri, 22-Jun-84 04:05:15 EDT
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Nf-From: trsvax!cozadde    Jun 15 12:49:00 1984

#R:ames-lm:-32800:trsvax:56000016:000:6887
trsvax!cozadde    Jun 15 12:49:00 1984



	I would like to turn your numbers around.

		1. How many hand grenades are there in the world, outside of
		the U.S.?

		2. How many people can a hand grenade kill under optimum
		conditions?

		3. Is the resultant numbers sufficient to kill every person in
		the U.S. if applied under optimum conditions?

		4. How much would it cost for the U.S. to protect every person
		residing in the U.S. from being killed by a determined enemy
		(one who is willing to die while carrying out the attack)
		wielding hand grenades?

		5. What is the difference between a person being killed by a
		hand grenade attack and a nuclear attack?

	The above questions are basicly illogical, if not silly.  But they
	reflect the level of logic applied to the High Frontier debate.

WARNING: THIS IS LONG AND POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS TO LIBERAL IDEAS OF HISTORY
	 AND OF THE MILITARY.  PROCEED AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION!!!!


	I would like to insert a little personnal information that I have
	picked up over the years.

		1. The ABM system (Safeguard) of the early 70's failed to live
		up to its promises for a number of reasons.
			a. The system was initially designed to deal with
			incoming warheads sequencially.  The system was also
			designed to have independent, but mutually supporting
			complexes consisting of radars, computers, and
			missiles (all ground based).
			b. The system was initially designed to attack incoming
			warheads at the midcourse point (half way to the target
			) with small nuclear weapons carried by ground launched.
			missiles.
			c. After some testing, it was found that (then) current
			technology could not produce the following items to ful
			fill its missions.
			d. Radars: Did not have the range or precision to
			detect and track warheads prior to midcourse point to
			allow early launch of ABM missiles.
			e. Computers: Did not have the speed and power to han-
			dle the flow of data required to project the course of
			incoming warheads and compute the trajectory of the in-
			terceptor missiles to allow sufficient time to launch,
			intercept and destroy the incoming warheads without
			destroying or damaging the target with our own weapons.
			f. Missiles: Did not the acceleration necessary to
			reach the interception points that were plotted for
			them.
		Attempted fixes:
			a. Faster missiles,ie the Nike X, were tried.  It got
			to the interception point, but there was a high (~20%)
			percentage point of failure to destroy the incoming
			warhead.
			b. Better radars and faster computers were looked for
			but none were satifactory.  So more complexes were
			asked for and the price tag started to skyrocket.
		More testing revealed:
			a. That if incoming missiles were launched in waves,
			the system would be unable to destroy incoming warheads
			fast enough to protect the target.  And if the target
			was the ABM system itself, poof goes the whole ball of
			wax.  (Even more complexes were asked for after this
			one was brought to light.)
			b. That if decoys were deployed along with the warheads
			the system would have to shoot at more targets and de-
			plete the system's supply of missiles.  This caused a
			complete rethinking of strategy.  Since decoys had a
			smaller mass than warheads, they had a different tra-
			jectory when they hit the upper parts of the atmosphere
			and then the real warheads could be detected with pre-
			cision.  But, this meant the warheads would be almost
			on top of the target before the warheads could be
			tracked and plotted for interception.  This meant even
			faster missiles, ie the Sprint.
		At this point, the ABM system was a multi-layered system with
		detection, plotting, and interception to be attempted at mid-
		course point, upper atmosphere, and right above the target.
		Now two things happened, one the military brought the ABM sys-
		tem to Congress for funding and the Soviet Communist Party
		started to request negotiations for a ban on ABM systems.  At
		first, the U.S. decided to build several complexes and not to
		negotiate a ban on our advantage.  But two more things came to
		light, one: the civilian leaders started to understand what the
		ABM system would probably flatten their cities while protecting
		them from ICBM attack and the cost of the system.  Two: the
		military, after some more test, found that two more factors
		affected the success of the ABM system.  A. EMP (ElectroMagne-
		tic Pulse) from our Sprint missiles and certain preprogrammed
		incoming missiles would force our radars and possibly our com-
		puters to shut down during flash (when the EMP passes through
		the point of concern) or risk the almost certain chance of
		burned out electronics.  This would mean our radars would be
		blind for a few seconds after each detonation if not destroyed.
		B. Because of the research done to develop the small but very
		efficient warheads for the Sprint and Nike X missiles, the
		military had the ability to have more warheads per ICBM (this
		is not MIRV, more like a shotgun) and this meant more targets
		that had to be shot at (decoys could be ignored once they hit
		the atmosphere).  More targets meant more Sprint missiles and
		the Soviets had the ability of loading up their missiles the
		same way within a short period of time, once they got the idea.

		These two pieces of news caused two changes in plans.  1. No
		one wanted an ABM system protecting their city.  And 2. the
		military no longer supported a total protection system.  How-
		ever they did want something to protect certain military
		installations for nuclear war fighting capabilities.  There-
		fore the U.S. quickly sat down with the Soviets and negotiated
		the ABM treaty.

	(And where did MIRV come from?  It was a result of the "shotgun" system
	and the requirement of mutually supporting targeting system and why
	waste a big bomb on a little target when a little one will do fine.)

	What is the whole point of this?  Any connection between the concept of
	the High Frontier and efforts for an ABM system back in the early 70's
	is comparable to the connection between a '1984 Corvette' and a 'horse
	and buggy'.

	A parting comment:

		What the military wants, what Reagon wants and what Reagon
		tells the media and the civilians what he wants are three
		different things.

		The military wants something that will allow them to fulfill
		their mission of protecting the nation.

		Reagon wants something to beat the Soviets back so they can
		not blackmail him or the rest of the world into submission.

		And there is the media hype of "We dream of wiping out the
		need of nuclear weapons by building a 'Star Wars' defense
		that will stop anything the Soviets can throw at us or our
		friends."


						lt. of marines
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