Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: Notesfiles; site trsvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!mgnetp!ihnp4!inuxc!pur-ee!uiucdcs!trsvax!cozadde From: cozadde@trsvax.UUCP Newsgroups: net.space Subject: Re: High Frontier - (nf) Message-ID: <56000016@trsvax.UUCP> Date: Fri, 15-Jun-84 13:49:00 EDT Article-I.D.: trsvax.56000016 Posted: Fri Jun 15 13:49:00 1984 Date-Received: Fri, 22-Jun-84 04:05:15 EDT References: <328@ames-lm.UUCP> Lines: 153 Nf-ID: #R:ames-lm:-32800:trsvax:56000016:000:6887 Nf-From: trsvax!cozadde Jun 15 12:49:00 1984 #R:ames-lm:-32800:trsvax:56000016:000:6887 trsvax!cozadde Jun 15 12:49:00 1984 I would like to turn your numbers around. 1. How many hand grenades are there in the world, outside of the U.S.? 2. How many people can a hand grenade kill under optimum conditions? 3. Is the resultant numbers sufficient to kill every person in the U.S. if applied under optimum conditions? 4. How much would it cost for the U.S. to protect every person residing in the U.S. from being killed by a determined enemy (one who is willing to die while carrying out the attack) wielding hand grenades? 5. What is the difference between a person being killed by a hand grenade attack and a nuclear attack? The above questions are basicly illogical, if not silly. But they reflect the level of logic applied to the High Frontier debate. WARNING: THIS IS LONG AND POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS TO LIBERAL IDEAS OF HISTORY AND OF THE MILITARY. PROCEED AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION!!!! I would like to insert a little personnal information that I have picked up over the years. 1. The ABM system (Safeguard) of the early 70's failed to live up to its promises for a number of reasons. a. The system was initially designed to deal with incoming warheads sequencially. The system was also designed to have independent, but mutually supporting complexes consisting of radars, computers, and missiles (all ground based). b. The system was initially designed to attack incoming warheads at the midcourse point (half way to the target ) with small nuclear weapons carried by ground launched. missiles. c. After some testing, it was found that (then) current technology could not produce the following items to ful fill its missions. d. Radars: Did not have the range or precision to detect and track warheads prior to midcourse point to allow early launch of ABM missiles. e. Computers: Did not have the speed and power to han- dle the flow of data required to project the course of incoming warheads and compute the trajectory of the in- terceptor missiles to allow sufficient time to launch, intercept and destroy the incoming warheads without destroying or damaging the target with our own weapons. f. Missiles: Did not the acceleration necessary to reach the interception points that were plotted for them. Attempted fixes: a. Faster missiles,ie the Nike X, were tried. It got to the interception point, but there was a high (~20%) percentage point of failure to destroy the incoming warhead. b. Better radars and faster computers were looked for but none were satifactory. So more complexes were asked for and the price tag started to skyrocket. More testing revealed: a. That if incoming missiles were launched in waves, the system would be unable to destroy incoming warheads fast enough to protect the target. And if the target was the ABM system itself, poof goes the whole ball of wax. (Even more complexes were asked for after this one was brought to light.) b. That if decoys were deployed along with the warheads the system would have to shoot at more targets and de- plete the system's supply of missiles. This caused a complete rethinking of strategy. Since decoys had a smaller mass than warheads, they had a different tra- jectory when they hit the upper parts of the atmosphere and then the real warheads could be detected with pre- cision. But, this meant the warheads would be almost on top of the target before the warheads could be tracked and plotted for interception. This meant even faster missiles, ie the Sprint. At this point, the ABM system was a multi-layered system with detection, plotting, and interception to be attempted at mid- course point, upper atmosphere, and right above the target. Now two things happened, one the military brought the ABM sys- tem to Congress for funding and the Soviet Communist Party started to request negotiations for a ban on ABM systems. At first, the U.S. decided to build several complexes and not to negotiate a ban on our advantage. But two more things came to light, one: the civilian leaders started to understand what the ABM system would probably flatten their cities while protecting them from ICBM attack and the cost of the system. Two: the military, after some more test, found that two more factors affected the success of the ABM system. A. EMP (ElectroMagne- tic Pulse) from our Sprint missiles and certain preprogrammed incoming missiles would force our radars and possibly our com- puters to shut down during flash (when the EMP passes through the point of concern) or risk the almost certain chance of burned out electronics. This would mean our radars would be blind for a few seconds after each detonation if not destroyed. B. Because of the research done to develop the small but very efficient warheads for the Sprint and Nike X missiles, the military had the ability to have more warheads per ICBM (this is not MIRV, more like a shotgun) and this meant more targets that had to be shot at (decoys could be ignored once they hit the atmosphere). More targets meant more Sprint missiles and the Soviets had the ability of loading up their missiles the same way within a short period of time, once they got the idea. These two pieces of news caused two changes in plans. 1. No one wanted an ABM system protecting their city. And 2. the military no longer supported a total protection system. How- ever they did want something to protect certain military installations for nuclear war fighting capabilities. There- fore the U.S. quickly sat down with the Soviets and negotiated the ABM treaty. (And where did MIRV come from? It was a result of the "shotgun" system and the requirement of mutually supporting targeting system and why waste a big bomb on a little target when a little one will do fine.) What is the whole point of this? Any connection between the concept of the High Frontier and efforts for an ABM system back in the early 70's is comparable to the connection between a '1984 Corvette' and a 'horse and buggy'. A parting comment: What the military wants, what Reagon wants and what Reagon tells the media and the civilians what he wants are three different things. The military wants something that will allow them to fulfill their mission of protecting the nation. Reagon wants something to beat the Soviets back so they can not blackmail him or the rest of the world into submission. And there is the media hype of "We dream of wiping out the need of nuclear weapons by building a 'Star Wars' defense that will stop anything the Soviets can throw at us or our friends." lt. of marines ...microsoft!trsvax!cozadde ...laidbak!trsvax!cozadde ...ctvax!trsvax!cozadde