Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!seismo!hao!hplabs!sri-unix!phil.rice@rand-relay From: phil.rice%rand-relay@sri-unix.UUCP Newsgroups: net.unix-wizards Subject: Re: ioctl-ability, the TIOCCDTR problem Message-ID: <2848@sri-arpa.UUCP> Date: Tue, 5-Jul-83 21:14:44 EDT Article-I.D.: sri-arpa.2848 Posted: Tue Jul 5 21:14:44 1983 Date-Received: Mon, 11-Jul-83 00:25:58 EDT Lines: 25 From: Bill.LeFebvreOops! I wasn't thinking clearly when I composed that letter. It was an idea off the top of my head and I didn't stop to think about the consequences. I rescind my previous suggestion "allow only the owner of a terminal to change the terminal mode". But I just can't stop thinking that somehow the owner of the terminal can be worked into a solution for this security problem. Perhaps allow only the owner to change SOME of the terminal modes? No, I'm afraid that's a bit too hackish for my taste. I quite agree, however, that no matter how many restrictions you place on ioctl's that change a terminal's state, you still have the problem of anyone in the world writing any control sequence they wish to your terminal. For some reason, setting the terminal to mode 600 and having write and such set-uid rubs me the wrong way. It must just be the set-uid paranoia that is running rampant on UN*X systems these days. Thank you all for staying awake when I was quite obviously asleep at my terminal! Bill LeFebvre CSNet: phil@Rice ARPAnet: phil.Rice@Rand-Relay uucp: ...!lbl-csam!rice!phil