From: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!arms-d Newsgroups: fa.arms-d Title: ARMS-D Vol 1 #5 Article-I.D.: ucbvax.1052 Posted: Thu Mar 10 22:48:26 1983 Received: Fri Mar 11 21:30:47 1983 >From The-Moderator@MIT-MC Thu Mar 10 22:41:08 1983 Received: by UCBVAX.ARPA (3.322/3.14) id AA04393; 10 Mar 83 22:47:15 PST (Thu) Sender: FFM@MIT-MC To: ARMS-D-DIST@MIT-MC Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V1 #5 To: ARMS-D-DIST@MC Reply-To: ARMS-D at MIT-MC Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 1 : Issue 5 Today's Topics: Review of Bradley Fighting Vehicle article, Tal APC quote, Russian APC, March 83 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 5 March 1983 22:36-EST (Saturday) Sender: CARTER @ From: _BobTo: CAULKINS @ USC-ECL Cc: armsd @ MIT-MC Subject: Review of Bradley Fighting Vehicle article In-reply-to: Msg of 3 Mar 1983 23:00-EST from CAULKINS@USC-ECL Date: Thursday, 3 March 1983 23:00-EST From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL To: armsd at MIT-MC Re: Review of Bradley Fighting Vehicle article In the Feb 83 issue of "California" there is an article on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, an Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) intended to succeed the M-113 used in Viet Nam. The piece is titled "The $13 Billion Dud", and is by William Boly. When interviewed in the Swiss military journal "International Military Review", Israeli General Tal said that "The best APC in the world is the worst tank, just as the best tank in the world is the worst APC." How's that again? [reviewer's comment: If the military can so badly screw up something as relatively straightforward as an APC, my confidence in their ability to deal adequately with the greater complexities of nuclear weapons is close to zero.] [reader's comment: No comment.] ------------------------------ Date: 7 Mar 1513 9:42-PST From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL Subject: Tal APC quote To: armsd at MIT-MC What I think Tal meant was that a rough terrain vehicle designed to carry a high velocity >75 mm gun plus sufficient crew, ammunition, armor, and fuel to make the gun effective is no good for moving a bunch of infantrymen around; conversely a vehicle that is designed for transporting infantrymen is no good as a gun platform. ------------------------------ Date: 7 Mar 1983 9:42-PST From: dietz%usc-cse@USC-ECL Subject: Russian APC To: arms-d@mit-mc Origin: usc-cse Via: Usc-Cse; 07 Mar 83 10:31:59 I've read somewhere that some Soviet armored personel carriers have magnesium (!!) alloy armor and very poorly armored *external* fuel tanks (!!!) in back. I think this was the BMP. ------------------------------ Date: 10 Mar 83 9:26-PST From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL Subject: March 83 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists To: armsd at MIT-MC Here are some of the things I found interesting in this issue: No Evidence of Cheating [Jack] Anderson claimed [in a column of August 10, 1982] that "the Russians appear to have exceeded the 150-kiloton [Threshold Test Ban Treaty] limit at least 11 times since 1978." This interpretation of the information contained in secret documents is apparently in error. ..... UCID-19352, titled "An Analysis Based On Seismic Data of the Pattern of Soviet High-Yield Nuclear Tests from March 31, 1976 through December 31, 1981." The conclusions reached in these papers have, however, recently been made public. Michael M. May, associate director at large at Livermore, referring to an earlier question on the subject, said that the documents "did conclude that there was no evidence that the Soviets had cheated on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." No First Use: A View From Europe by Field Marshall Lord Michael Carver, Chief of the Defense Staff of the United Kingdom from 1973 to 1976 ..... a policy of nuclear deterrence - at what ever level it is considered - contains a fundemental paradox: if a nation wishes to deter war through the fear that nuclear weapons will be used, it has to appear to be prepared to use them in certain circumstances. But if this is done, and the enemy answers back in kind, then the nation that has struck first is very much worse off than if it had not done so. To pose an unacceptabe risk to the enemy automatically poses the same risk to oneself. But any attempt to reduce the risk by turning to some form of limited war, in order to make the threat more credible, begins to make the unacceptable risk appear more acceptable - and therefore less of a deterrent. ..... the best strategic brains have been trying to escape from this dilemma by inventing various concepts of limited nuclear war. Among these are counterforce strategies; selective and limited use against strategic targets, counterforce or countervalue; and use of theater or battlefield systems only, including very limited application of both - even down to the absurd demonstration shot. All these concepts of limiting nuclear war, in order to make the threat of it credible as a deterrent, fail for four reasons: o There can never be a guarantee that a nuclear exchange will remain limited to the extent that the initiator hopes. Indeed, it is inherent in deterrent strategy that, in the last of last resorts, it should not; that the ultimate threat of escalation to an attack on the opponent's principal cities should remain credible. ... o ... there is no guarantee that the side that intiated the exchange would emerge better off. Indeed, the probability is that, if it were NATO, it would be worse off. ... o My third reason for rejecting concepts of limited nuclear use of any kind is that they undermine the very basis of nuclear deterrence, which is to pose an unacceptable risk. These concepts are all designed to make the risk appear unacceptable to the opponent but acceptable to oneself. However in a situation where the opponent has the capability to retaliate and is likely to do so, that is neither rational nor credible. ... o My fourth reason for opposing concepts of limited nuclear use - and surely nobody is so mad as to suggest unlimited use - is that if it came to a crunch, such a policy would not be supported by the nations likely to be involved, when they realized what it would mean. ... ------------------------------ [End of Arms-D Digest]