From: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!arms-d Newsgroups: fa.arms-d Title: ARMS-D Vol 1 #3 Article-I.D.: ucbvax.947 Posted: Wed Feb 23 22:49:23 1983 Received: Thu Feb 24 20:23:57 1983 >From The.Moderator@MIT-MC Wed Feb 23 22:47:18 1983 Received: from UCBARPA.ARPA by UCBVAX.ARPA (3.314/3.5) id AA03166; 23 Feb 83 22:47:18 PST (Wed) Received: by UCBVAX.ARPA (3.314/3.5) id AA03202; 23 Feb 83 22:48:49 PST (Wed) Sender: FFM@MIT-MC To: ARMS-D-DIST@MIT-MC Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V1 #3 To: ARMS-D-DIST@MC Reply-To: ARMS-D at MIT-MC Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 1 : Issue 3 Today's Topics: Non-nuclear Deterrent to Nuclear War, review of "With Enough Shovels" by Robert Scheer ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 16 Feb 1983 1405-PST From: Bradley S. BrahmsSubject: Non-nuclear Deterrent to Nuclear War To: arms-d@MIT-MC Recently, I heard of a new proposal, proposed by some Major General(?), that has been going around Capital Hill during the past year. Unfortunately, I only have few details. The proposal, from what I know, is a three step process. What it would do is string a series of satellite that would watch for any enemy ICBM liftoffs. When that was determined, it would be able to send a missile, of it own, towards the ICBM. These missiles would have non-nuclear (nonexplosive?) war heads which would disable the incoming ICBM. The ICBMs that survived this would then be tracked by, I beleave, a second series of satellites that would send missiles at those ICBMs before they entered the earth's atmosphere. Those that survived this, would then have to contend with ground base missiles. The estimated cost for this would be $20 billion in todays dollars, not all that expensive considering what some weapon systems cost. The system would be able to cover the whole surface of the earth. Also, the first series of satellits could be ready in about three years with the whole system operational within about eight years. If anyone out there knows more about this or can correct me, I would appreciate hearing from you. -- Brad Brahms P.S. If possible, please add me to the ARMS-D mailing list. Thank You. ------------------------------ Date: 22 Feb 1983 2149-PST From: CAULKINS@USC-ECL Subject: review of "With Enough Shovels" by Robert Scheer To: armsd at MIT-MC A review of "With Enough Shovels" by Robert Scheer Random House, 1982 The title of Scheer's book is from the famous line by T.K. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: "... if there are enough shovels to go around, everyboby's going to make it [through a nuclear war]" The book is a frightening look at the nuclear war policies of the present administration. It is carefully researched - 155 of the 279 pages are references, footnotes, and verbatim interviews with Bethe, Bush, McNamara, Reagan, Rostow, Vance, Warnke, and York. Some quotes give the flavor: " ... Central to the arguments of [Colin] Gray and other nuclear war fighters is that they are not talking simply about deterring a Soviet first strike or responding to one after it has occurred. They want the capacity that the United States had during its decades of nuclear superiority to move up the so-called 'escalation ladder'. It is only by adding 'threat escalation' to one's deterrent paraphernalia that the nuclear-war-fighters believe they can stop conventional as well as strategic Soviet moves. ... If the Russians had appointed a man with Gray's views [Gray is a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] to a significant and visible government post, our own hawks would surely say 'we told you so' and demand vast new categoris of armaments. ..." Scheer devotes a chapter to the so-called 'window of vulnerability'. Like many experts who have considered the issue, Scheer concludes that no such 'window' exists. A simple inventory of superpower arsenals makes the point: the US has 9,200 strategic nuclear warheads; of these 23% are on vulnerable land-based ICBMs. The USSR has 8,000 strategic nuclear warheads; 69% are on vulnerable land-based ICBMs. There is another chapter on civil defense. Scheer quotes a New York Times editorial from April 3, 1982: "The sponsors of this [civil defense] project contend that the Soviet Union has an elaborate evacuation and shelter program that needs to be matched. In a crisis, they argue, the Kremlin could reinforce a nuclear ultimatum by suddenly evacuating its people and leaving Americans without a credible response. Most students of Soviet society hold this to be a vast exaggeration. They think the known Soviet instruction amnuals, shelter signs, and civil defense drills are modest exertions; there is no evidence that the Russians have ever practiced evacuating a city. That would require a miraculous transformation of the Soviet transport and supply networks. And it would be futile. With the twist of a few dials, as former Defense Secretary Brown once observed, America's nuclear weapons could be retargeted to blanket the evacuation sites. ....." The Times concluded that: "The mischief in this kind of planning goes far beyond the waste of money. The Stability of deterrence that has kept the peace between the Soviet Union and the United States assumes that neither side could ever launch a nuclear strike without suffering an unbearable retaliatory blow. The weapons - and defenses - on each side need to be designed to preserve that condition. Despite serious uncertainties caused by some of the Soviet Union's missiles, the balance of fear persists. Those who aim to upset it encourage the idea that it is feasible to fight a general nuclear war and 'survive'. That idea is not merely irresponsible, it is mad." ------------------------------