From: utzoo!decvax!harpo!npoiv!eisx!pd Newsgroups: net.ai,net.physics Title: Camus never believed in Robots. Article-I.D.: eisx.497 Posted: Mon Jan 31 09:34:03 1983 Received: Wed Feb 2 02:20:30 1983 I would like to make a case/arguement against the feasiblity of constructing a machine that exhibits conciousness/idenitity. The frame work of the argument will be as follows: 1) Conciousness is a non-linguistic, non-mathematical experience. 2) Thus, one cannot convey the nature of one's experience of conciousness to another (by mathematical or linguistic means). 3) Thus one can never disprove or prove the existence one's own or any one else's conciousness thro mathematical or linguistic arguments. 4) Since one cannot mathematically model, or linguistically communicate one's experience of conciousness to another, it is impossible to build a machine that has conciousness. Furthermore, one can never prove or disprove that a machine has conciousness. I will only defend statement 1) above as follows: Any statement one makes about oneself has an active and a passive: (eg) consider the statement "'I' am a good person" 'I' makes a descriptive statement about him/her/itself. This duality will always be the case, what ever the statement the entity makes about itherimself. Itheshe may make meta, philosphical, recursively defining statements, but this will still prevail. (Go ahead, try it). Trying to do otherwise will be like chasing one's own tail. One's experience of one's own identity or conciousness is essentially uncommunicable, since all mathematical and linguistic descriptions/models are dualistic, whereas Conciousness is not. It is a monadic experience of oneself. Above is a justification of 1); hence 2), 3), and 4) Any takers ? Prem Devanbu