From: utzoo!decvax!harpo!npoiv!eisx!pd
Newsgroups: net.ai,net.physics
Title: Camus never believed in Robots.
Article-I.D.: eisx.497
Posted: Mon Jan 31 09:34:03 1983
Received: Wed Feb  2 02:20:30 1983


I would like to make a case/arguement against the feasiblity of
constructing a machine that exhibits conciousness/idenitity. The
frame work of the argument will be as follows:

1) Conciousness is a non-linguistic, non-mathematical experience.

2) Thus, one cannot convey the nature of one's experience of conciousness
   to another (by mathematical or linguistic means).

3) Thus one can never disprove or prove the existence one's own or
   any one else's conciousness thro mathematical or linguistic
   arguments.
   
4) Since one cannot mathematically model, or linguistically communicate
   one's experience of conciousness to another, it is impossible to
   build a machine that has conciousness. Furthermore, one can never
   prove or disprove that a machine has conciousness.

I will only defend statement 1) above as follows: 
Any statement one makes about oneself has an active and a passive: 
(eg) consider the statement "'I' am a good person"
'I' makes a descriptive statement about him/her/itself. This duality
will always be the case, what ever the statement the entity makes
about itherimself. Itheshe may make meta, philosphical, recursively
defining statements, but this will still prevail. (Go ahead,
try it). Trying to do otherwise will be like chasing one's own tail.
One's experience of one's own identity or conciousness is
essentially uncommunicable, since all mathematical and linguistic
descriptions/models are dualistic, whereas Conciousness is not. It
is a monadic experience of oneself.

Above is a justification of 1); hence 2), 3), and 4)

Any takers ?

Prem Devanbu