From: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!C70:arms-d Newsgroups: fa.arms-d Title: Arms-Discussion Digest V0 #117 Article-I.D.: ucb.1234 Posted: Tue Jun 1 15:09:04 1982 Received: Wed Jun 2 02:59:22 1982 >From HGA@MIT-MC Tue Jun 1 14:41:38 1982 Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 0 : Issue 117 Today's Topics: Dropping A-bomb to get our boys home Reliability of spy satellites.... Selling subs to the Soviets... Soviet participation in ARMS-D... A possible blockade of Japan ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 29 May 1982 04:09-EDT From: Robert Elton MaasSubject: dropping A-bomb to get our boys home WW II was a long hard war, for a while we were losing, and only later did we make progress, taking Okinawa at last so we could reach Japan via air for bombing. The war in Europe was over and we wanted to get this damn Pacific war over so everybody could go home. This impatience to get the war over may have been partly responsible for using the BOMB (it sure did work! Wasn't surrender just a week or so after Nagasaki?) ------------------------------ Date: 29 May 1982 1337-PDT From: Herb Lin Subject: reliability of spy satellites.... [From: Gene Salamin ] Pacifist contributers [claim] that our spy satellite system is of such unimpeachable reliability (for example, we can read license plates in Moscow) that we may unilaterally disarm with risk < epsilon of sudden unanticipated Soviet nuclear blackmail. Surely then, that very same satellite system can, with equal or better reliability, provide warning of attack. Therefore, we can adopt a policy of launch on warning with risk < epsilon (same as above) of a false retaliatory attack. To my knowledge, NO ONE on this list has equated (tactical) warning of attack with ability to gather strategic information. The difference is that tactical warning requires very short response times, whereas strategic warning requires much longer response times. It really doesn't matter if our discovery of the existence of a new missile system is 30 minutes later, or that they are producing a larger number of warheads than they are entitled to, or whatever. By contrast, those 30 minutes are criticial to the actual military (i.e., tactical and low-level) response. I am amazed how anyone can... advise the abandonment of our nuclear retaliatory force. Just for my own information, has anyone on this list stated that he is in favor of our unilateral \\abandonment// of our nuclear retaliatory forces? Remember that reduction or freeze is \\NOT// the same thing as abandonment, and it is a disservice to those of us who support the freeze or reductions to accuse us of advocating the "abandonment" of nuclear forces. Forbidden to possess long range artillery like Big Bertha, [the Germans under the Versailles Treaty] managed to evade it by disguising the barrels as smokestacks. Do our pacificists care to comment on the extent to which we can entrust our lives and our freedom to this one particular technology, taking into consideration the potential for camouflage qtaylored specifically toward satellite reconnaissance? The primary difference between the deceptions of WWI/WWII and the present is that satellites allow for essentially continuous monitoring of large areas. It is of course true that if there were an area that was not previously monitored, and satellites then looked at it, they might not be able to notice anything different. But under present circumstances, the Soviets (or the US) would need the ability to keep massive construction undercover for long periods of time, and that they (or we) cannot do. [Enter Flame Mode] By the way, I have seen essentially \\NO// "pacifists" on this list. Being opposed to mindless and unnecessary and even militarily useless "defense" expenditures is not the same as being a pacifist. I believe that EVERYONE on this list believes in the use of military force under SOME circumstances; hence, there are none on this list. [Leave Flame Mode] ------------------------------ Date: 29 May 1982 1356-PDT From: Herb Lin Subject: selling subs to the Soviets... I find it interesting that the positions of some ARMS-D discussants seem to be reversed on the issue of technology transfer to the Soviets in the form of selling them nuclear subs. People who usually take "hawk" positions (Earl Weaver , Jim McGrath ) are arguing that the Soviets can't build/copy American subs, even if we give them the technology, and they cite this as an argument against our selling the Soviets submarines; since the Soviets wouldn't want to make themselves dependent on the US, they wouldn't do it. By contrast, I (one who leans usually to the "dove" position) am arguing that the Soviets are in fact pretty competent at producing military hardware at the current state of the (American) art. To everyone who suggests that "the Soviets wouldn't do it": Remember that the original proposal was to exchange Poseidon subs for the dismantling of most of their land-based ICBMs, thereby giving both sides a secure deterrent. Three arguments have been proposed against this suggestion: 1. They won't do it, because they won't want to be dependent on the US. Response: then sell them the technology to make their deterrent independent of the US. Certainly the Soviets are as smart as we are, and given appropriate instruction, they can learn. 2. They won't do it, because we might booby-trap the subs we sell the Soviets. Response: Then invite them to inspect the building of the subs in progress, and give them circuit diagrams and source code listings of the appropriate computer programs.... 3. It's politically impossible. Response: Sigh! This is true. But if people don't start *thinking* about the *merits* of ideas (rather than the emotional aspects), we've all had it. ------------------------------ Date: 29 May 1982 1401-PDT From: Herb Lin Subject: Soviet participation in ARMS-D... If it is indeed true that the Soviets read ARMS-D, I for one would like to hear from them. ------------------------------ Date: 29 May 1982 1844-PDT From: Jim McGrath Subject: Re: A possible blockade of Japan Jim, The technical possibility of a blockade is a more complex issue than it appears at first. While it is true that our navy was superior to that of Japans, we had no close forward bases to mount a blockade either in the regions west or north of the home islands. That is, unless we could secure a staging area on the Asian mainland. Remember that blockade actions have only worked in the era of steam and oil powered ships when such staging bases were available (such as northern blockades of the south in the later stages of the civil war; British and German blockades during WWI and WWII; etc...). Our staging areas were all hundreds of miles to the south and east of the home islands, leading me to believe that ONLY sub warfare could have had a chance in the vital western and northern areas. And even here it appears unlikely that subs could effectively opperate a thousand miles from support in hostile enemy waters. Although the Sea of Japan is rather wide, it is NOT the open Pacific! Jim ------------------------------ End of Arms-D Digest ********************