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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354180 is a reply to message #354168] |
Tue, 10 October 2017 21:34   |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
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hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com writes:
> LIFE magazine ran a feature article in 1945 on how the Japanese codes
> were broken during the war.
>
> https://books.google.com/books?id=xUsEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&a mp;dq=life%20nov%2026%201945&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q& ;f=false
>
> Other articles in that issue include an ad by Studebaker extolling
> its high quality and utilization in WW II, and the introduction
> of Jackie Robinson on the Dodgers.
one of the accounts was that both US and Japanese Navy were spread all
over the Pacific and had really hard time finding each other. Then the
breaking of Japanese codes had Japanese task force heading for Midway
and US managed to marshal forces for surprise attack, destroying four
carriers and turning the tide of the pacific war (and should be
attributed to the breaking of the Japanese code).
Japanese Navy was afraid to tell anybody that they lost 1/3rd of
their carriers at midway.
The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 loc3988-97:
Unknown to the Japanese, the United States had broken their diplomatic
and naval codes and so knew the itineraries of the ships converging on
Midway, where it sank four, or one-third, of Japan's twelve
difficult-to-replace aircraft carriers.102 In doing so, it overturned
vague German and Japanese plans to join up in India and precluded
further Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Midway was Japan's first
major defeat since the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese
War. Henceforth the Japanese would have to defend what they had. For
many months the Imperial Japanese Navy concealed its aircraft carrier
losses from both the army and the civilian leadership.103 It did
inform Emperor Hirohito, who kept the bad news to himself as if it
would go away.104 So, no one examined how the United States, with
inferior naval assets, had miraculously managed to converge them at
just the right spot in the expansive Pacific theater to sink one
Japanese carrier after another and the army maintained its war plans
on the assumption that Japan still had twelve carriers.
.... snip ...
However, recently read "Another Kind Of War" by Milton Miles .. a couple
recent refs
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017h.html#105 Iraq, Longest War
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#68 Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge
Miles was sent in by the Navy to work with the Nationalists with some
navy and marines ... a marine account
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2009/11/marines-china
where the navy and marines lived and worked closely with the
Nationalists. Then the OSS & some parts of the Army try and come in and
take over control of the nationalists. They are rebuffed by the Navy and
the nationalists. Miles then has those OSS/Army turning to support the
communists because they can take credit for it ... and effectively
giving China to the Communists. Then towards the end of the (Japanese)
war, the Chinese military fraction that had cooperated with the
Japanese, attempted to come over to the Nationalists and the US Army
vetoed it ... so they then went and joined the Communists. Miles has it
these Chinese military that also largely showup in Korea (against the
US) in that war.
Congressional hearings Dec1947, Wedemeyer appears to realize what has
been done wrong, but it is already too late (behind paywall, but lives
free at wayback machine).
http://web.archive.org/web/20110203103817/http://www.time.co m/time/magazine/article/0,9171,804381,00.html
1949 White Paper trying to absolve the state department of loosing
China to the communists
https://archive.org/details/VanSlykeLymanTheChinaWhitePaper1 949
Part of it was Marshall ran WW2 and Wedemeyer was his staff that he sent
to review China. Possibly can attribute Marshall's preoccupation with
Europe to not looking closely and siding with Wedemeyer. Then Marshall
is SEC of State, 47-49 (again preoccupied with Europe and the "Marshall
Plan").
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354186 is a reply to message #354179] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 01:37 |
Charles Richmond
Messages: 2754
Registered: December 2011
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On 10/10/2017 8:30 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Oct 2017 18:50:18 -0500, Charles Richmond
> <numerist@aquaporin4.com> wrote:
>
>> On 10/10/2017 4:49 PM, hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
>>> LIFE magazine ran a feature article in 1945 on how the Japanese codes
>>> were broken during the war.
>>>
>>> https://books.google.com/books?id=xUsEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PP1&a mp;dq=life%20nov%2026%201945&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q& ;f=false
>>>
>>> Other articles in that issue include an ad by Studebaker extolling
>>> its high quality and utilization in WW II, and the introduction
>>> of Jackie Robinson on the Dodgers.
>>>
>>
>> The title talks about the Japanese code broken *before* the war.
>
> No news there. The Japanese codes were broken before the war, some of
> them anyway. But knowing they're going to attack "A" doesn't help
> much until you can figure out what "A" is.
>
Yes, and the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
--
numerist at aquaporin4 dot com
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354205 is a reply to message #354186] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 10:16 |
bert
Messages: 56
Registered: August 2012
Karma: 0
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On Wednesday, 11 October 2017 06:37:07 UTC+1, Charles Richmond wrote:
> . . . the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
> Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
> the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
But that "bulk" of their fighting force was substantially
smaller than the Japanese force. I'm sure I remember reading
that when the armed services' training schools re-enact old
battles in simulators, the results in nearly all of them come
out as 60-40 either way. The exception is Midway, which the
Japanese win every time. They actually lost because of a
particular combination of events and command decisions,
and their timing, which never recurs in the simulations.
--
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354207 is a reply to message #354180] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 10:33 |
mausg
Messages: 2483
Registered: May 2013
Karma: 0
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On 2017-10-11, Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> wrote:
> hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com writes:
>
> The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 loc3988-97:
>
> Unknown to the Japanese, the United States had broken their diplomatic
> and naval codes and so knew the itineraries of the ships converging on
> Midway, where it sank four, or one-third, of Japan's twelve
> difficult-to-replace aircraft carriers.102 In doing so, it overturned
> vague German and Japanese plans to join up in India and precluded
> further Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Midway was Japan's first
> major defeat since the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese
> War. Henceforth the Japanese would have to defend what they had. For
> many months the Imperial Japanese Navy concealed its aircraft carrier
> losses from both the army and the civilian leadership.103 It did
> inform Emperor Hirohito, who kept the bad news to himself as if it
> would go away.104 So, no one examined how the United States, with
> inferior naval assets, had miraculously managed to converge them at
> just the right spot in the expansive Pacific theater to sink one
> Japanese carrier after another and the army maintained its war plans
> on the assumption that Japan still had twelve carriers.
>
> ... snip ...
>
According to some people, the Japanese still find it hard to report
failure to their ssuperiors.
--
greymaus.ireland.ie
Just_Another_Grumpy_Old_Man
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354212 is a reply to message #354207] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 12:50 |
Quadibloc
Messages: 4399
Registered: June 2012
Karma: 0
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On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:33:29 AM UTC-6, ma...@mail.com wrote:
> According to some people, the Japanese still find it hard to report
> failure to their ssuperiors.
I suppose that since it motivates underlings not to fail, those who could see no
reason to change that. So they will have to learn the hard way what the problem
is.
John Savard
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354213 is a reply to message #354212] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 13:29 |
Charlie Gibbs
Messages: 5313
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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On 2017-10-11, Quadibloc <jsavard@ecn.ab.ca> wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:33:29 AM UTC-6, ma...@mail.com wrote:
>
>> According to some people, the Japanese still find it hard to report
>> failure to their ssuperiors.
>
> I suppose that since it motivates underlings not to fail, those who could
> see no reason to change that. So they will have to learn the hard way what
> the problem is.
The problem has not only been identified, it's even been named. The Japanese
word is Karōshi (過労死), meaning "overwork death", and is becoming recognized
as a spreading problem.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karōshi
--
/~\ cgibbs@kltpzyxm.invalid (Charlie Gibbs)
\ / I'm really at ac.dekanfrus if you read it the right way.
X Top-posted messages will probably be ignored. See RFC1855.
/ \ HTML will DEFINITELY be ignored. Join the ASCII ribbon campaign!
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354218 is a reply to message #354205] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 14:48 |
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Originally posted by: JimP.
On Wed, 11 Oct 2017 07:16:39 -0700 (PDT), bert
<bert.hutchings@btinternet.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday, 11 October 2017 06:37:07 UTC+1, Charles Richmond wrote:
>> . . . the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
>> Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
>> the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
>
> But that "bulk" of their fighting force was substantially
> smaller than the Japanese force. I'm sure I remember reading
> that when the armed services' training schools re-enact old
> battles in simulators, the results in nearly all of them come
> out as 60-40 either way. The exception is Midway, which the
> Japanese win every time. They actually lost because of a
> particular combination of events and command decisions,
> and their timing, which never recurs in the simulations.
The Zero fighter cover were all down at wave height shooting down the
unescorted torpedo bombers. Then the dive bombers arrived over head
and blew up three air craft carriers.
--
Jim
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354219 is a reply to message #354218] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 15:06 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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JimP. <solosam90@gmail.com> writes:
> The Zero fighter cover were all down at wave height shooting down the
> unescorted torpedo bombers. Then the dive bombers arrived over head
> and blew up three air craft carriers.
re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
recent talk by A-6 pilot from VA-35 about his time in Vietnam ... and
VA-35 was the squadron that got two of the Japanese carriers at Midway.
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354220 is a reply to message #354218] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 16:00 |
scott
Messages: 4237
Registered: February 2012
Karma: 0
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JimP. <solosam90@gmail.com> writes:
> On Wed, 11 Oct 2017 07:16:39 -0700 (PDT), bert
> <bert.hutchings@btinternet.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, 11 October 2017 06:37:07 UTC+1, Charles Richmond wrote:
>>> . . . the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
>>> Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
>>> the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
>>
>> But that "bulk" of their fighting force was substantially
>> smaller than the Japanese force. I'm sure I remember reading
>> that when the armed services' training schools re-enact old
>> battles in simulators, the results in nearly all of them come
>> out as 60-40 either way. The exception is Midway, which the
>> Japanese win every time. They actually lost because of a
>> particular combination of events and command decisions,
>> and their timing, which never recurs in the simulations.
>
> The Zero fighter cover were all down at wave height shooting down the
> unescorted torpedo bombers. Then the dive bombers arrived over head
> and blew up three air craft carriers.
Favorite Kirk Douglas line:
"Splash the Zeros, I say again, Splash the Zeros"
(and the filmed dogfight between F-14's and Mitsubishi A6M (converted T-6) was
impressive :-)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3XNEWtJF0o
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Final_Countdown_%28film%29
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354227 is a reply to message #354186] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 18:05 |
Andreas Kohlbach
Messages: 1456
Registered: December 2011
Karma: 0
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On Wed, 11 Oct 2017 00:37:09 -0500, Charles Richmond wrote:
>
> On 10/10/2017 8:30 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
>> On Tue, 10 Oct 2017 18:50:18 -0500, Charles Richmond
>> <numerist@aquaporin4.com> wrote:
>>
>>> The title talks about the Japanese code broken *before* the war.
And the Japanese still used them into the war?
>> No news there. The Japanese codes were broken before the war, some of
>> them anyway. But knowing they're going to attack "A" doesn't help
>> much until you can figure out what "A" is.
>>
>
> Yes, and the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
> Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
> the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
Ah, the Midway classic. IIRC did the Americans not figure out what
letters the Japanese used for their bases. So one came up with the idea
to send in clear text they have a problem with the water supply on
Midway. And the Japanese relayed this right away and used the letters for
Midway. Now the Americans knew. And then from other messages that Midway
will be the target for an attack.
--
Andreas
You know you are a redneck if
you consider dating second cousins as "playing the field."
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354229 is a reply to message #354227] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 19:02 |
Charles Richmond
Messages: 2754
Registered: December 2011
Karma: 0
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On 10/11/2017 5:05 PM, Andreas Kohlbach wrote:
> On Wed, 11 Oct 2017 00:37:09 -0500, Charles Richmond wrote:
>>
>> On 10/10/2017 8:30 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
>>> On Tue, 10 Oct 2017 18:50:18 -0500, Charles Richmond
>>> <numerist@aquaporin4.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> The title talks about the Japanese code broken *before* the war.
>
> And the Japanese still used them into the war?
>
The breaking of the high level Japanese diplomatic code (code named
"purple") was a closely guarded secret. I'm *not* sure how long *after*
the ware it was... that the Japanese learned of the breaking of purple.
Through the purple code, the US learned of a trip that Admiral Yamamoto
was making. The US send several P-38's to kill the admiral and were
successful at that. Operation Vengeance was the American military
operation to kill Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of the Imperial Japanese Navy
on April 18, 1943, during the Solomon Islands campaign in the Pacific
Theater of World War II.
>>> No news there. The Japanese codes were broken before the war, some of
>>> them anyway. But knowing they're going to attack "A" doesn't help
>>> much until you can figure out what "A" is.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, and the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
>> Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
>> the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
>
> Ah, the Midway classic. IIRC did the Americans not figure out what
> letters the Japanese used for their bases. So one came up with the idea
> to send in clear text they have a problem with the water supply on
> Midway. And the Japanese relayed this right away and used the letters for
> Midway. Now the Americans knew. And then from other messages that Midway
> will be the target for an attack.
>
In wikipedia it is called an "unencrypted message". I have always read
(and think this is more likely the case) that the message was sent in a
low level US code that the Navy *knew* the Japanese had already broken.
According to Wikipedia:
Admiral Nimitz had one priceless advantage: US cryptanalysts had
partially broken the Japanese Navy's JN-25b code. Since early 1942, the
US had been decoding messages stating that there would soon be an
operation at objective "AF". It was initially not known where "AF" was,
but Commander Joseph Rochefort and his team at Station HYPO were able to
confirm that it was Midway; Captain Wilfred Holmes devised a ruse of
telling the base at Midway (by secure undersea cable) to broadcast an
uncoded radio message stating that Midway's water purification system
had broken down.[47] Within 24 hours, the code breakers picked up a
Japanese message that "AF was short on water."[48] No Japanese radio
operators who intercepted the message seemed concerned that the
Americans were broadcasting uncoded that a major naval installation
close to the Japanese threat ring was having a water shortage, which
could have tipped off Japanese intelligence officers that it was a
deliberate attempt at deception.[49] HYPO was also able to determine the
date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a
complete IJN order of battle.[50] Japan had a new codebook, but its
introduction had been delayed, enabling HYPO to read messages for
several crucial days; the new code, which would take several days to be
cracked, came into use on 24 May, but the important breaks had already
been made.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
--
numerist at aquaporin4 dot com
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354230 is a reply to message #354213] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 19:58 |
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Originally posted by: J. Clarke
On 11 Oct 2017 17:29:41 GMT, Charlie Gibbs <cgibbs@kltpzyxm.invalid>
wrote:
> On 2017-10-11, Quadibloc <jsavard@ecn.ab.ca> wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:33:29 AM UTC-6, ma...@mail.com wrote:
>>
>>> According to some people, the Japanese still find it hard to report
>>> failure to their ssuperiors.
>>
>> I suppose that since it motivates underlings not to fail, those who could
>> see no reason to change that. So they will have to learn the hard way what
>> the problem is.
>
> The problem has not only been identified, it's even been named. The Japanese
> word is Kar?shi (???), meaning "overwork death", and is becoming recognized
> as a spreading problem.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kar?shi
That's rampant workaholism, not unwillingness to report failure.
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354243 is a reply to message #354229] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 23:34 |
Quadibloc
Messages: 4399
Registered: June 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 5:03:13 PM UTC-6, Charles Richmond wrote:
> On 10/11/2017 5:05 PM, Andreas Kohlbach wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 10 Oct 2017 18:50:18 -0500, Charles Richmond
>>>> <numerist@aquaporin4.com> wrote:
>>>> > The title talks about the Japanese code broken *before* the war.
>> And the Japanese still used them into the war?
> The breaking of the high level Japanese diplomatic code (code named
> "purple") was a closely guarded secret. I'm *not* sure how long *after*
> the ware it was... that the Japanese learned of the breaking of purple.
PURPLE was indeed broken before the war started, and that's how the Americans
read coded messages, before Pearl Harbor, that indicated Japan was about to
issue an ultimatum.
It was broken, in part, because many messages were sent in both PURPLE and
another much simpler cipher code-named RED.
The LIFE magazine article, published in 1945, mentions that there were rumors
flying that had to do with Pearl Harbor and codes.
These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
John Savard
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354244 is a reply to message #354243] |
Wed, 11 October 2017 23:49 |
Quadibloc
Messages: 4399
Registered: June 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:34:36 PM UTC-6, Quadibloc wrote:
> These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
> published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
> declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
> rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
> saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
The disclosure took place due to Congressional hearings during 1946 about
the Pearl Harbor attack.
John Savard
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354245 is a reply to message #354244] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 00:00 |
Quadibloc
Messages: 4399
Registered: June 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:49:57 PM UTC-6, Quadibloc wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:34:36 PM UTC-6, Quadibloc wrote:
>
>> These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
>> published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
>> declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
>> rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
>> saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
>
> The disclosure took place due to Congressional hearings during 1946 about
> the Pearl Harbor attack.
....the hearings began on Nov. 15, 1945, thus *very* shortly after this
article was published - even though it didn't have the information those
hearings revealed, presumably it was published in response to the fact that
such hearings were about to start.
John Savard
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354246 is a reply to message #354245] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 00:10 |
Quadibloc
Messages: 4399
Registered: June 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 10:00:53 PM UTC-6, Quadibloc wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:49:57 PM UTC-6, Quadibloc wrote:
>> On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:34:36 PM UTC-6, Quadibloc wrote:
>>
>>> These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
>>> published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
>>> declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
>>> rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
>>> saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
>>
>> The disclosure took place due to Congressional hearings during 1946 about
>> the Pearl Harbor attack.
>
> ...the hearings began on Nov. 15, 1945, thus *very* shortly after this
> article was published - even though it didn't have the information those
> hearings revealed, presumably it was published in response to the fact that
> such hearings were about to start.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=PAW9hqzHy5gC&pg=PR15
may be of interest.
John Savard
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354247 is a reply to message #354243] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 00:24 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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Quadibloc <jsavard@ecn.ab.ca> writes:
> These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
> published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
> declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
> rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
> saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
The Battle of Bretton Woods:
http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Bretton-Woods-Relations-Univers ity-ebook/dp/B00B5ZQ72Y/
pg55/loc1059-63:
But it is notable that the Soviets, American allies in the European war,
were anxious to ensure that such an attack did take place. “The war in
the Pacific could have been avoided,” wrote retired GRU military
intelligence colonel and World War II “Hero of the Soviet Union”
Vladimir Karpov in 2000, nearly sixty years after Pearl Harbor. “Stalin
was the real initiator of the ultimatum to Japan,” he insisted.
pg56/loc1065-66:
The Soviets had, according to Karpov, used White to provoke Japan to
attack the United States. The scheme even had a name: “Operation Snow,”
snow referring to White.
pg56/loc1066-68
“[T]he essence of ‘Operation Snow’ was to provoke the war between the
Empire of the Rising Sun and the USA and to insure the interests of the
Soviet Union in the Far East…. If Japan was engaged in war against the
USA it would have no resources to strike against the USSR.”
pg56/loc1075-77
Pavlov called White in late May of 1941, saying he had a message to pass
on to him from “Bill” in China. Bill was the name by which White knew
Akhmerov, who had presented himself to White as a sinologist on his way
to China when the two had been introduced in 1939 by Lithuanian émigré
and Soviet intelligence liaison agent Joseph Katz.
.... snip ...
aka ... another part of Bretton Woods is the primary US person, asst
SECTREAS White ... was also working on behalf of Stalin. Stalin was
dealing with nearly all of German military on one front and was afraid
Japan would come in on his other front. Stalin sent White a draft of
demands for US to present to Japan, that Stalin felt would prompt Japan
to attack US (which would preclude Japan attacking Soviets) ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Dexter_White#Venona_proj ect
NSA cryptographers identified Harry Dexter White as the source denoted
in the Venona decrypts at various times under the code names
"Lawyer",[59] "Richard",[60] and "Jurist".[61] Two years after his
death, in a memorandum dated 15 October 1950, White was positively
identified by the FBI, through evidence gathered by the Venona project,
as a Soviet source, code named "Jurist".[62]
.... snip ...
and the Hull Note, US Demands transmitted to Japan just prior to attack on Pearl
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_note#Interpretations
According to Benn Steil, director of international economics at the
Council on Foreign Relations, while "no single individual can be said to
have triggered" the Pearl Harbor attack, Harry Dexter White "was the
author of the key ultimatum demands". Steil also maintains "the Japanese
government made the decision to move forward with the Pearl Harbor
strike after receiving the ultimatum."[11]
.... snip ...
Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941
https://www.amazon.com/Fateful-Choices-Decisions-Changed-194 0-1941-ebook/dp/B000UMAEKO/
pg370/loc7472-74:
Predictably, the ‘Ten Points’ were seen, when the cable arrived in Tokyo
on 27 November, as an ultimatum–practically an insult.124 There was
anger as well as consternation among Japan’s leaders. More than all
else, the demand to withdraw from the whole of China infuriated them.
pg370/loc7477-79:
Those who had pressed for continued negotiations in the hope of avoiding
war now felt the rug pulled from beneath them. For those, mainly in the
army and navy General Staffs, who had urged war, the ‘Hull Note’ (as it
later came to be called) was a heaven-sent opportunity.
.... snip ...
Venona project
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venona_project
Bretton Woods Conference
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_Conference
past posts mentioning during WW2, Stalin/Soviets dealing with 3/4s of
German military (rest of allies only had to deal with quarter of German
military)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2013g.html#77 What Makes collecting sales taxes Bizarre?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2016h.html#36 "I used a real computer at home...and so will you" (Popular Science May 1967)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2016h.html#85 US vs German Armies
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2016h.html#89 "I used a real computer at home...and so will you" (Popular Science May 1967)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017f.html#17 5 Naval Battles That Changed History Forever
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017h.html#43 Disregard post (another screwup; absolutely nothing to do with computers whatsoever!)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#28 WW2 Internment
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354262 is a reply to message #354247] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 05:58 |
mausg
Messages: 2483
Registered: May 2013
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On 2017-10-12, Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> wrote:
> Quadibloc <jsavard@ecn.ab.ca> writes:
>> These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
>> published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
>> declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
>> rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
>> saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
>
> re:
AFAIread, the vital intellegence (that the Japanese were going to try
to expand to the South aand East, rather than attack the Soviet Far
East), was delivered by a Soviet agent in Japan, called, I think,
Sorge. The Japanese had, as I read many years ago, where I forget,
that at the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, the Japanese had
decided that The indonesian islands, and surroundng areas, were an
easier, and richer target, than Siberia. Whoever thought of sending
those demands to the Japanese at that time, before Pearl Harbour,
must have known that they were likely to provoke war
--
greymaus.ireland.ie
Just_Another_Grumpy_Old_Man
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354263 is a reply to message #354205] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 07:26 |
Peter Flass
Messages: 8375
Registered: December 2011
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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bert <bert.hutchings@btinternet.com> wrote:
> On Wednesday, 11 October 2017 06:37:07 UTC+1, Charles Richmond wrote:
>> . . . the real importance of knowing the Japanese were attacking
>> Midway was *not* so much to surprise them... but for the U.S. to send
>> the bulk of their fighting force to the right place!!!
>
> But that "bulk" of their fighting force was substantially
> smaller than the Japanese force. I'm sure I remember reading
> that when the armed services' training schools re-enact old
> battles in simulators, the results in nearly all of them come
> out as 60-40 either way. The exception is Midway, which the
> Japanese win every time. They actually lost because of a
> particular combination of events and command decisions,
> and their timing, which never recurs in the simulations.
Knowledge of the Japanese attack was vital, but Midway was still a big part
luck finding them and catching them flatfooted with their planes all on the
carriers being refueled and rearmed. A bit earlier or later and it could
have been a bad thing.
--
Pete
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354273 is a reply to message #354212] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 09:47 |
jmfbahciv
Messages: 6173
Registered: March 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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Quadibloc wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:33:29 AM UTC-6, ma...@mail.com wrote:
>
>> According to some people, the Japanese still find it hard to report
>> failure to their ssuperiors.
>
> I suppose that since it motivates underlings not to fail, those who could
see no
> reason to change that. So they will have to learn the hard way what the
problem
> is.
It could be a problem with their language. Some companies have started
to have their meetings using only English; it reduces a 6-hour meeting
to 1 hour. IIRC, this has to do with the built-in class system of
the Japanese language.
/BAH
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354275 is a reply to message #354262] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 10:13 |
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Originally posted by: JimP.
On 12 Oct 2017 09:58:04 GMT, mausg@mail.com wrote:
> On 2017-10-12, Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> wrote:
>> Quadibloc <jsavard@ecn.ab.ca> writes:
>>> These rumors were the reason why, some time _after_ that article was
>>> published, the U. S. government, before the usual "50-year-rule" was up,
>>> declassified information relating to the breaking of PURPLE, in order to quell
>>> rumors claiming that FDR *deliberately* withheld information that could have
>>> saved lives at Pearl Harbor in order to force the U.S. into the war.
>>
>> re:
>
> AFAIread, the vital intellegence (that the Japanese were going to try
> to expand to the South aand East, rather than attack the Soviet Far
> East), was delivered by a Soviet agent in Japan, called, I think,
> Sorge. The Japanese had, as I read many years ago, where I forget,
> that at the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, the Japanese had
> decided that The indonesian islands, and surroundng areas, were an
> easier, and richer target, than Siberia. Whoever thought of sending
> those demands to the Japanese at that time, before Pearl Harbour,
> must have known that they were likely to provoke war
Zhukov also knocked the Japanese Army for a loop to. They decided they
did not want to tangle with him again. Afterwards, the Soviet spy let
Stalin know, one of the few times Stalin apparently listened to one of
his spies, that Japan was going to avoid attacking the Soviets due to
the Generalship of Zhukov.
--
Jim
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354280 is a reply to message #354273] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 13:32 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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jmfbahciv <See.above@aol.com> writes:
> It could be a problem with their language. Some companies have started
> to have their meetings using only English; it reduces a 6-hour meeting
> to 1 hour. IIRC, this has to do with the built-in class system of
> the Japanese language.
re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#79 WW II cryptography
mid-70s, after future sys (which had been shutting down
370 efforts) failure, there was mad rush to restart 370
effort. POK/high-end kicked off 303x and 370-xa (3081)
in parallel ... ref
http://www.jfsowa.com/computer/memo125.htm
and past posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#futuresys
Endicott (mid-range) kicked off 138/148 and e-systems (4331/4341). part
of 138/148 was significantly faster math than 135/145 as well as
"microcode assists". I get con'ed into helping with ECPS microcode
.... told that there was 6kbytes of microcode memory available. Was to
select the high-used VM370 pathlengths for moving to microcode. The
vertical microcode for low/mid range 370 avg. 10 microcode instructions
for every 370 instructions ... moving to microcode would be 10 times
speedup. Old post showing ECPS study measuring VM370 pathlength use
.... 6kbytes represented just under 80% of kernel time
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.htmL#21 370 ECPS VM microcode assist
I then get con'ed into going around the world with Endicott to the IBM
business people getting justification and sales forecasts for the
138/148 models. US regional forecasting groups basically said that
whatever had "IBM" logo would sell some additional percentage than
previous models ... regardless of features.
It was significantly different outside US, they were starting to
experience significant competition from clone 370 processors ... and
starting to say that base 138/148 models had very little (against clone
competition) unless it had additional features.
One differences was non-US forecasts were used to order machines from
manufacturing plants and shipped to the ordering countries ... which met
those countries then had responsibility for actually selling those
machines to customers (a mis-forecast actually cost that country money
and could mean the jobs of business people). In the US, forecasts didn't
actually mean anything ... manufacturing plants had to eat any bad
forecasts ... so US forecasters career was more based on following
strategic proclamations from hdqtrs location ... rather than their
actual business judgement.
In any case, the guy I went with to Japan was from Canada and spoke
Japanese. He told a story that in a meeting on early trip to Japan
conducted in Japanese ... he told the audience that he had learned his
Japanese from his roommate in college. At a break, somebody took him
aside and informed him that he was speaking "women's language". There
was vocabulary used with superior and vocabulary used with inferior and
then there was the "women's language" (using "women's language" was
extreme embarrassment). Note also that IBM Japan mid-range 370 sales was
also being particularly hard hit by clone 370 sales ... even going so
far that unless 138/148 had additional competitive features, they
weren't sure that they would be able to sell any. Other trivia: at the
time exchange rate was 330 yen to dollar ... a little over a decade
later, it was up to 80 yen to dollar.
This was also during the period that the HONE online sales&marketing
system was starting to be cloned around the world ... and since I was
providing HONE with their systems ... frequently on some of these visits
.... I would also be asked to do some work with the local HONE people.
Some past HONE posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hone
At the time, one of the issues with the HONE online sales&marketing
support system in Japan, use of keyboard was viewed as "women's work".
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354297 is a reply to message #354280] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 19:13 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#79 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#80 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#81 WW II cryptography
"Shattered Sword" based on released Japanese archives not previously
available ... past afc post
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2016e.html#113 E.R. Burroughs
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway
https://www.amazon.com/Shattered-Sword-Untold-Battle-Midway- ebook/dp/B005NIQ8SM/
pg397/loc9855-57:
This quest will necessarily set aside the more prominent reasons on the
American side for their having won the battle. Code breaking, of course,
stands at the top of the list, and Admiral Chester Nimitz’s bold
leadership, as well as strong performances by Admirals Frank Jack
Fletcher and Raymond Spruance played important roles.
.... snip ...
The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King--The Five-Star Admirals
Who Won the War at Sea
https://www.amazon.com/Admirals-Nimitz-Halsey-King-Five-Star -ebook/dp/B007ME5GYC/
pg249/loc3837-40:
In appraising the overall Pacific situation, King and Nimitz were both
heavily relying on intelligence garnered from the sleuth work of three
groups of code breakers in Australia, Washington, and Hawaii, the latter
led by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, a number-crunching nerd who
combined a computer-like mind with unabashed intuitive insight. How the
two admirals now chose to apply that intelligence, however, differed
greatly.
.... snip ...
The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 (S. C. M. Paine)
https://www.amazon.com/Wars-Asia-1911-1949-S-Paine-ebook/dp/ B0096R1NZ4/
loc4056-64:
Code breaking allowed the United States to predict the location of
Japanese supply ships and troop transports, which submarines destroyed
with great regularity once they received working ordnance. The original
Rhode Island–designed torpedoes were defective, and only after a
U.S. captain defied orders to open one up and figure out the problem did
the manufacturer finally acknowledge and correct its error in October
1943. During the Pacific Ocean war, U.S. submarines sank 201 warships of
686, including 1 battleship, 8 carriers, 12 cruisers, 23 submarines, 43
destroyers, and 60 escort ships.115 Of the 2,117 Japanese merchant ships
sunk in the war, U.S. submarines accounted for 1,314, or 56 percent.116
By war’s end Japan’s merchant marine had been reduced to one-ninth its
pre–Pearl Harbor capacity, and only half the men and supplies sent from
Japan and Manchuria reached the Pacific theater. These statistics are
particularly notable, given the tiny numbers of submariners compared to
the other services and specialties.
.... snip ...
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354298 is a reply to message #354297] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 19:39 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#79 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#80 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#81 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#85 WW II cryptography
misc. other from around the web:
The 'Codebreaker' Who Made Midway Victory Possible
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143287370/the-codebreaker-who- made-midway-victory-possible
King [denied the award] on the recommendation of his staff. His staff
was made up of people who knew Rochefort and actually despised him for
all kinds of different reasons. ... He did not suffer fools lightly. And
the chief of staff for King was a guy named Russell Wilson, who
Rochefort encountered on the battleship Pennsylvania many years
earlier. And Rochefort thought he was a stuffed shirt, and he conveyed
this to him in various ways. Now, Rochefort's friends warned him that
you can't talk to people that way. These people are going to be pretty
important someday, and they turned out to be pretty important someday.
.... snip ...
Joe Rochefort's War: Deciphering a Code Breaker
http://www.historynet.com/joe-rocheforts-war-deciphering-a-c ode-breaker.htm
Rochefort was by no means even remotely as brilliant a code breaker as,
say, Thomas Dyer, one of his staff officers. Rochefort was a highly
capable linguist and able intelligence officer, but so were many
others. The edge that Rochefort's background gave him, Carlson argues,
was his unique and irreplaceable ability to take fragmentary recoveries
of the contents from a small portion of Japanese operational-message
traffic and somehow connect these scattered shards into a remarkably
accurate Big Picture of Japanese intentions and plans. This is just what
he did for Midway. The complex story of how he ran the collegial and
free-wheeling operation that produced the info-shards, and how he
managed, against the odds, to link them, is as enthralling as any
mystery.
.... snip ...
WWII: The Naval Officer Who Saved Midway
https://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/WWII-The-Naval-Of ficer-Who-Saved-Midway-101459498
After Midway, the embarrassed officers in Washington exacted a measure
of revenge.
Rochefort was eventually pulled from his codebreaking efforts for the
rest of the war, leaving the Navy as a captain in 1953.
.... snip ...
reminds me of my executive interview when leaving IBM being told: "They
could have forgiven you for being wrong, but they were never going to
forgive you for being right".
Joseph Rochefort
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Rochefort
How the U.S. Cracked Japan's 'Purple Encryption Machine' at the Dawn of
World War II
https://io9.gizmodo.com/how-the-u-s-cracked-japans-purple-en cryption-machine-458385664
Magic (cryptography)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_(cryptography)
World War II cryptography
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_cryptography
Code breaking in the Pacific War
http://www.yeapeople.com/Age3/ussubs/Codebreaking.html
How Did the U.S. Break Japanese Military Codes Before the Battle of
Midway?
http://www.slate.com/blogs/quora/2013/11/20/u_s_in_world_war _ii_how_the_navy_broke_japanese_codes_before_midway.html
OFFICER WHO BROKE JAPANESE WAR CODES GETS BELATED HONOR
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/17/us/officer-who-broke-japan ese-war-codes-gets-belated-honor.html?pagewanted=all
Pivotal victory from "the dungeon" turned the tide of World War II
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/1/battle-of-mid way-helped-turn-tide-pacific-war/
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354315 is a reply to message #354291] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 21:42 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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The Communist Agent Who Caused Pearl Harbor -- and Global Economic Havoc
https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/17147-th e-communist-agent-who-caused-pearl-harbor-and-global-economi c-havoc
Documents released from the decoded Venona Files, from the Soviet KGB
archives, from our own National Archives, and memoirs of Soviet
officials now confirm what noted anti-communist writers, Congressional
investigations, Communist Party defectors, and FBI documents had stated
for decades: Harry Dexter White (shown), assistant secretary of the
treasury in the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was a top
Soviet spy and agent of influence who not only caused incalculable harm
to the United States, but also materially assisted Soviet dictator
Joseph Stalin's spreading of terror and tyranny throughout the
entire world.
and
White's plan was calculated to inflame public opinion in Japan and
undermine Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye,
both of whom favored peace with the U.S. It was also aimed at
guaranteeing the rise to power of Japan's political forces that were
beating the drums for war. This is precisely -- and predictably -- what
happened. However, White did not undertake this move on his own
initiative, it is important to note, but as a directive of the NKVD (an
earlier name for the Soviet KGB). His Kremlin bosses were most anxious
for assurance that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union; they thus
expended great efforts through their spy and propaganda networks in
Japan, Europe, and the United States to ensure that Japan would strike
America, rather than the U.S.S.R.
.... snip ...
.... article also weighs in on Mile's characterizing OSS & some factions
of the Army actions gave China to the communists ... recent posts:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017h.html#105 Iraq, Longest War
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#68 Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
with White's own contribution:
-- When Stalin requested a $6-billion loan in January of 1945 White
upped it to $10 billion, and at better terms. Russia's request had been
that it be for 30 years at an annual interest rate of 2.25
percent. White proposed the larger sum with a more generous 35-year
payment period at only two percent. Plus, he proposed that the
U.S. grant an additional $1 billion at no interest.
-- While providing the Communists with every possible assistance, White
was doing everything possible to cut off aid that had been appropriated
by Congress to assist our ally Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist
government in China. White was a key operative in treachery that pushed
China into Communist hands.
.... snip ...
Miles doesn't say OSS & Army were treacherous ... they just wanted
to be in charge .... when Navy and Nationalists rebuffed them during
WW2, they turned to working with the communists and could claim
they were in charge of something.
Did Soviet Agents Help Plan Pearl Harbor?
http://discerninghistory.com/2015/12/did-soviet-agents-help- plan-pearl-harbor/
In June of 1941, Adolf Hitler broke the Hitler-Stalin Pact (also known
as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), by his German army's invasion of the
Soviet Union. Japan at this time was allied to Germany due to the 1940
Tripartite pact. The German Army's invasion would have inevitably led to
Japan's involvement in the war against the Soviet Union. For Joseph
Stalin this meant a two front war with Germany attacking the Soviet
Union from the west and Japan attacking from the East
.... snip ...
Pearl Harvor 2.0
http://nation.time.com/2012/12/07/pearl-harbor-2-0/
The Russians, meanwhile, knew that they could not simultaneously repel
an expected German invasion from the west and respond to the Japanese
threat from the east. A series of skirmishes with the Japanese at
Nomonhan in 1939 had revealed serious weaknesses in the Soviet military.
.... snip ...
Understanding Pearl Harbor
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/de c/07/us-japan-pearl-harbor-anniversary
Over the course of the summer of 1941, events slowly tilted Japan toward
the possibility of war with the west. But Pearl Harbor was in no way
inevitable. Germany's attack on the Soviet Union compelled Japan in July
1941 to prepare a plan of attack
.... snip ...
another quote from the web:
Vitali Prokhorov, a Soviet agent, was told to go to Washington and start
a war between the United States and Japan. The Soviet Union did not want
to fight Germany and Japan at the same time. The Japanese and the
Russians had a battle in Mongolia early in 1939, and while the Russians
won, because they had better tanks, the Japanese were much tougher than
they had expected. The Soviets said if these people were to fight
against us with full force, it'd tie up a quarter of the army in Asia,
and they wouldn't be able to fight the Germans effectively. They had to
have a war between the United States and Japan, to keep the Japanese out
of Siberia, and out of Russia.
.... snip ...
National Archives on FDR involvement
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1996/fall/but ow.html
Archival research does not support these contentions. The problem in
1941 was not that Roosevelt was relentlessly pushing Japan's leaders
toward the brink; the problem was that he could not find a viable way to
stop them from taking the plunge of their own accord.
.... snip ...
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354319 is a reply to message #354168] |
Thu, 12 October 2017 23:32 |
Charles Richmond
Messages: 2754
Registered: December 2011
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On 10/12/2017 3:17 PM, Andreas Kohlbach wrote:
> On Wed, 11 Oct 2017 18:02:32 -0500, Charles Richmond wrote:
>>
>> On 10/11/2017 5:05 PM, Andreas Kohlbach wrote:
>>> On Wed, 11 Oct 2017 00:37:09 -0500, Charles Richmond wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 10/10/2017 8:30 PM, J. Clarke wrote:
>>>> > On Tue, 10 Oct 2017 18:50:18 -0500, Charles Richmond
>>>> > <numerist@aquaporin4.com> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> >> The title talks about the Japanese code broken *before* the war.
>>>
>>> And the Japanese still used them into the war?
>>>
>>
>> The breaking of the high level Japanese diplomatic code (code named
>> "purple") was a closely guarded secret. I'm *not* sure how long
>> *after* the ware it was... that the Japanese learned of the breaking
>> of purple.
>
> I understood it was published in the war. May be just after. The quote
>
> | LIFE magazine ran a feature article in 1945 on how the Japanese codes
> | were broken during the war.
>
> doesn't mention a month.
>
There were *some* Japanese codes broken during the war (like JN-25).
But the high level diplomatic code called PURPLE was broken *before* the
US entered the war.
--
numerist at aquaporin4 dot com
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354333 is a reply to message #354298] |
Fri, 13 October 2017 09:16 |
jmfbahciv
Messages: 6173
Registered: March 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
>
> re:
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#79 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#80 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#81 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#85 WW II cryptography
>
> misc. other from around the web:
>
> The 'Codebreaker' Who Made Midway Victory Possible
> http://www.npr.org/2011/12/07/143287370/the-codebreaker-who- made-midway-vict
ory-possible
>
> King [denied the award] on the recommendation of his staff. His staff
> was made up of people who knew Rochefort and actually despised him for
> all kinds of different reasons. ... He did not suffer fools lightly. And
> the chief of staff for King was a guy named Russell Wilson, who
> Rochefort encountered on the battleship Pennsylvania many years
> earlier. And Rochefort thought he was a stuffed shirt, and he conveyed
> this to him in various ways. Now, Rochefort's friends warned him that
> you can't talk to people that way. These people are going to be pretty
> important someday, and they turned out to be pretty important someday.
>
> ... snip ...
>
> Joe Rochefort's War: Deciphering a Code Breaker
> http://www.historynet.com/joe-rocheforts-war-deciphering-a-c ode-breaker.htm
>
> Rochefort was by no means even remotely as brilliant a code breaker as,
> say, Thomas Dyer, one of his staff officers. Rochefort was a highly
> capable linguist and able intelligence officer, but so were many
> others. The edge that Rochefort's background gave him, Carlson argues,
> was his unique and irreplaceable ability to take fragmentary recoveries
> of the contents from a small portion of Japanese operational-message
> traffic and somehow connect these scattered shards into a remarkably
> accurate Big Picture of Japanese intentions and plans. This is just what
> he did for Midway. The complex story of how he ran the collegial and
> free-wheeling operation that produced the info-shards, and how he
> managed, against the odds, to link them, is as enthralling as any
> mystery.
>
> ... snip ...
>
> WWII: The Naval Officer Who Saved Midway
> https://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/WWII-The-Naval-Of ficer-Who-Saved-
Midway-101459498
>
> After Midway, the embarrassed officers in Washington exacted a measure
> of revenge.
>
> Rochefort was eventually pulled from his codebreaking efforts for the
> rest of the war, leaving the Navy as a captain in 1953.
>
> ... snip ...
>
> reminds me of my executive interview when leaving IBM being told: "They
> could have forgiven you for being wrong, but they were never going to
> forgive you for being right".
<snip>
Yea. The trick is to let others claim the "right". That keeps one
out of the politics of being right and allows one to concentrate
on the work (which is the fun part).
/BAH
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354343 is a reply to message #354333] |
Fri, 13 October 2017 12:35 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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jmfbahciv <See.above@aol.com> writes:
> Yea. The trick is to let others claim the "right". That keeps one
> out of the politics of being right and allows one to concentrate
> on the work (which is the fun part).
at least Rochefort fared better than Turing
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Turing
One of Boyd's sayings ... note that by the time Boyd passed, the USAF
had pretty much disowned him ... it was the Marines at Arlington and his
papers went to library/research at Quantico ... so it somewhat suprising
that USAF did Boyd hall (although it was after he dies):
There are two career paths in front of you, and you have to choose which
path you will follow. One path leads to promotions, titles, and
positions of distinction.... The other path leads to doing things that
are truly significant for the Air Force, but the rewards will quite
often be a kick in the stomach because you may have to cross swords with
the party line on occasion. You can't go down both paths, you have to
choose. Do you want to be a man of distinction or do you want to do
things that really influence the shape of the Air Force? "To be or to
do", that is the question. Colonel John R. Boyd, USAF 1927-1997
From the dedication of Boyd Hall, United States Air Force Weapons
School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. 17 September 1999
....
trivia: when he was instructor at Nellis he was considered possibly the
best fighter pilot in the world ... and that was just the start
John Boyd's Art of War; Why our greatest military theorist only made colonel.
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/john-boyds-a rt-of-war/
past posts & URL mentioning Boyd
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html
posts in this thread
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#79 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#80 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#81 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#85 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#86 WW II cryptography
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#87 WW II cryptography
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354379 is a reply to message #354235] |
Fri, 13 October 2017 22:51 |
Andrew Swallow
Messages: 1705
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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On 12/10/2017 02:45, John Levine wrote:
> In article <orm7u6$odm$1@dont-email.me>,
> Charles Richmond <numerist@aquaporin4.com> wrote:
>>> Ah, the Midway classic. IIRC did the Americans not figure out what
>>> letters the Japanese used for their bases. So one came up with the idea
>>> to send in clear text they have a problem with the water supply on
>>> Midway. And the Japanese relayed this right away and used the letters for
>>> Midway. ...
>
>> In wikipedia it is called an "unencrypted message". I have always read
>> (and think this is more likely the case) that the message was sent in a
>> low level US code that the Navy *knew* the Japanese had already broken.
>
> That would make sense but even the NSA says it was sent in the clear:
>
> https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-fi gures-publications/publications/wwii/battle-midway.shtml
>
> R's,
> John
>
Crypto officers were officers and had to do it by hand. Minor messages
from a private to a supply corporal probably would not get encoded.
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354398 is a reply to message #354343] |
Sat, 14 October 2017 09:30 |
jmfbahciv
Messages: 6173
Registered: March 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
> jmfbahciv <See.above@aol.com> writes:
>> Yea. The trick is to let others claim the "right". That keeps one
>> out of the politics of being right and allows one to concentrate
>> on the work (which is the fun part).
>
> at least Rochefort fared better than Turing
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Turing
>
> One of Boyd's sayings ... note that by the time Boyd passed, the USAF
> had pretty much disowned him ... it was the Marines at Arlington and his
> papers went to library/research at Quantico ... so it somewhat suprising
> that USAF did Boyd hall (although it was after he dies):
>
> There are two career paths in front of you, and you have to choose which
> path you will follow. One path leads to promotions, titles, and
> positions of distinction.... The other path leads to doing things that
> are truly significant for the Air Force, but the rewards will quite
> often be a kick in the stomach because you may have to cross swords with
> the party line on occasion. You can't go down both paths, you have to
> choose. Do you want to be a man of distinction or do you want to do
> things that really influence the shape of the Air Force? "To be or to
> do", that is the question. Colonel John R. Boyd, USAF 1927-1997
At DEC, it was similar: the technical path or the management path.
If someone tried to do both, things became disasterous because one
person didn't have the time to finish both efforts.
>
> From the dedication of Boyd Hall, United States Air Force Weapons
> School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. 17 September 1999
At least someone in the USAF remembered and acknowledged him.
>
> ...
>
> trivia: when he was instructor at Nellis he was considered possibly the
> best fighter pilot in the world ... and that was just the start
I would have liked to have had a long dinner with him, assuming he
talked when he ate.
>
> John Boyd's Art of War; Why our greatest military theorist only made
colonel.
> http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/john-boyds-a rt-of-war/
>
> past posts & URL mentioning Boyd
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html
>
> posts in this thread
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#75 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#77 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#79 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#80 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#81 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#85 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#86 WW II cryptography
> http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#87 WW II cryptography
/BAH
>
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #354416 is a reply to message #354343] |
Sat, 14 October 2017 14:51 |
Anne & Lynn Wheel
Messages: 3156
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#88 WW II cryptography
Burton was graduate of 1st USAF academy class and on fast track to
general ... when he says that Boyd ruined his career by challenging to
do what was right. He was forced to retire from the USAF for his part in
significantly improving the Bradley fighting vehicle ... seriously
embarrasing the maker and others in the Pentagon.
The Pentagon Wars
https://www.amazon.com/Pentagon-Wars-Reformers-Challenge-Gua rd-ebook/dp/B00HXY969W/
The second half of the book deals with the author's attempts to get
frontline equipment tested under combat conditions. For the first time,
readers learn the nasty details of his battle with the army over
line-fire testing of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle'a battle that he
eventually won, leading to the personnel carrier's redesign and the
saving of many lives.
.... snip ...
HBO then dramatized as movie
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pentagon_Wars
there is little that the military-industrial complex won't do in pursuit
of profit. Gun Seller is novel by Hugh Laurie (TV's "House") ... is
about the subject, measures that the MIC will go to and also mentions
Boyd and OODA-loop
https://www.amazon.com/Gun-Seller-Hugh-Laurie-ebook/dp/B000S EGK0M/
loc4605-11:
The day Alexander Woolf decided to take on the military-industrial
complex was the day everything changed. For him, for his family, for his
business. Things changed quickly, and they changed for good. Roused from
its slumber, the military-industrial complex lifted a great, lazy paw,
and swatted him away, as if he were no more than a human being. They
cancelled his existing contracts and withdrew possible future ones. They
bankrupted his suppliers, disrupted his labour force, and investigated
him for tax evasion. They bought his company's stock in a few months and
sold it in a few hours, and when that didn't do the trick, they accused
him of trading in narcotics. They even had him thrown out of the St
Regis, for not replacing a fairway divot.
.... snip ...
MIC(C) past posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submisc.html#military.industrial .complex
Has military industrial complex wanting the Iraq2 Invasion so badly
corporate reps were telling former soviet block countries that if they
voted for the invasion in the UN, they would get NATO membership and
(directed appropriation) USAID (that could only be spent on modern US
arms). From law of unintended consequences ... in the invasion, they
were told to bypass ammo dumps looking for WMDs. When they got around to
going back, a million metric tons had evaporated. Later started seeing
large artillery shell IEDs ... even taking out Abrams
http://www.amazon.com/Prophets-War-Lockheed-Military-Industr ial-ebook/dp/B0047T86BA
The original Iraq2 invasion justification was that Iraq supported Al
Qaeda and it would only cost $50B. It then changed to WMDs. US rep to
UN (cousin of white house chief of staff Card) dealing with Iraqis was
given proof that the WMDs (dating back to US in the Iran/Iraq war) had
been decommissioned. The US UN rep provided the information to White
House and was then locked up in military hospital. An account was
published in 2010, including about the decommisioned WMDs, four years
before the information was declassified.
http://www.amazon.com/EXTREME-PREJUDICE-Terrifying-Story-Pat riot-ebook/dp/B004HYHBK2/
The decommissioned WMDs (tracing back to US & Iran/Iraq war) were found
early in the invasion, but the information was kept classified until
fall of 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/14/world/middleea st/us-casualties-of-iraq-chemical-weapons.html
WMD posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submisc.html#wmd
Consistent with Spinney's (another Boyd' acolyte) "perpetual war"
http://chuckspinney.blogspot.com/p/domestic-roots-of-perpetu al-war.html
and The Pentagon Labyrinth: 10 Short Essays to Help You Through It
(free Kindle at Amazon)
https://www.amazon.com/Pentagon-Labyrinth-Short-Essays-Throu gh-ebook/dp/B014JOVEOS/
as well as "War is a Racket"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Is_a_Racket
also references "perpetual war"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpetual_war
perpetual war posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submisc.html#perpetual.war
a couple books references the 16yrs and counting activities in Iran and
Afghanistan ... WMDs fabricated, surge and other activities
significantly misrepresented, and ongoing trillions being dumped into
the military-industrial complex
Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge
https://www.amazon.com/Ghost-Riders-Baghdad-Soldiers-Civilia ns-ebook/dp/B014PWVUAC/
Battle for Baqubah: Killing Our Way Out
https://www.amazon.com/Battle-Baqubah-1SG-Robert-Colella/dp/ 1469791064/
recent posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017i.html#68 Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2017j.html#0 Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge
--
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970
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| Re: WW II cryptography [message #355359 is a reply to message #355357] |
Thu, 26 October 2017 16:56 |
Dan Espen
Messages: 3867
Registered: January 2012
Karma: 0
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Senior Member |
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> writes:
> When Government Wanted To Prosecute Tribune Reporter For
> Leak -- But Feared Public Just Wouldn't Get It
> https://shadowproof.com/2017/10/25/government-wanted-prosecu te-tribune-reporter-leak-feared-public-just-wouldnt-get/
>
> Correspondent Stanley Johnston was accused of revealing the United
> States cracked a Japanese code, which alerted the military to Japanese
> war plans before the Battle of Midway. A Tribune editor attributed the
> source of information to "naval intelligence."
I'm skeptical.
My reading of the article says no such thing.
The accused revealed "information about Japanese warships".
He claims that it was his publisher that attributed the information
to "naval intelligence".
That's still a long way from indicating that any Japanese code had been
cracked.
Looks like no harm was done, so prosecution would be ... dumb.
--
Dan Espen
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